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I don't understand why when I was looking for Formal Object http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_object, I arrive on this page. Is it because the process of Hypostatic abstraction creates (new) formal objects? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.4.255.4 ( talk) 13:44, 7 March 2009 (UTC)
In layman's terms, what's the difference in "honey is sweet" and "honey posseses sweetness"; does it really matter which way it is stated? Rlevse 12:43, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
JA: The information is practically the same, at least in the offing, but the transformed version assumes the existence of a new thing in the world, namely, sweetness, as something that exists on a par, more or less, with other things, like honey. That may be a mere grammatical difference, and it can be a risky business to be positing new entities in excess, but in the cases that are really of interest, like numbers and quarks and viruses and so on, it can be a practically indispensable trick of thought. Jon Awbrey 14:16, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
Rlevse Aha, my buddy User:Coffeeboy and I get it now; well, actually, I think he already understood it-;) Rlevse 18:13, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
Just thought you might like to know (or maybe add) that some analytic philosophy interpretations of 'honey is sweet' would be in terms of properties (in fact this may be the status quo); so that 'honey is sweet' should be understood as 'honey has the property of sweetness (or being sweet)'. There is some debate about how we should understand what a property is, but I believe it's generally taken to be something in itself, an extra if you like, over and above the honey. ---J
JA: Be sure to check out the link by Zeman:
JA: It's a really great read on the whole history of "dormitive virtue", and gives some clues about the different perspectives of pragmatic and analytic philosophies. Will fill in some links later on the "fictions" of Jeremy Bentham, connections to Moses Schönfinkel, Bertrand Russell, combinator calculus, theory of computation, etc. Jon Awbrey 21:12, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
The diagram does not help me understand Hypostatic abstraction. Rather than explain it further, I would suggest dropping the diagram.
-- Rajah9 17:07, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
I found the diagram to be quite helpful.
-- Irb 17:16, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
JA: I will add some exposition. The last couple of diagrams are related to the existential graphs that Charles Peirce developed for reasoning about complex relationships and subtle transformations like those involved in mathematics, of which HA is a very important example. Jon Awbrey 17:34, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
Jon, please edit the first para, which currently includes a sentence of 94 words, into something simple and elegant (or at least digestible in one sitting). The entry presently appearing on the main page would be a good start for a revised para. Obey 17:28, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
JA: Sorry, but that paragraph is a paraphrase of Peirce's original, historically important, and very well-considered statement, and it's already digested down quite a bit from the way Peirce wrote it. The version on the main page is okay for a taste, but it leaves out many essential details. Some things can only be made so simple before they verge on misinformation, so let's not go there. Jon Awbrey 17:45, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
JA: I promise to work on it a couple of days, and see how it looks then, but there seems to be something about accuracy of paraphrase that you fail to grasp, and so I'm afraid that it must go "with" saying. I gave a reasonable fascimile, much clarified and digested from the original source text, of a historically important statement by a major commentator, indeed, a veritable forefather of the subject in question. I then proceeded to give a more vernacular exposition of what it says, accompanied by a "keep it concrete and simple" (KICAS) example, plus several figures just for good measure. I'm perfectly happy to blockquote the original, but if you knew Peirce, you would know what a model of accessibility my paraphrase is, and it would still be necessaary to have a middle ground paraphrase to relate it to the contemporary scene. The exposition can always be expanded, but I do not see my job or yours as that of rewriting history. If you look through the mathematics articles, there is no pandering to accessibility that would be tolerated by that community if they think it would falsify the subject. But I'll work on it. Meanwhile, you might work on a rewrite of this:
JA: Then try to substitute your version for AL's version there. Let's talk again in a couple of days and compare our experiences.
JA: OK, after one bad case of revisionary hysteria, I did manage to ex(or)cise a few words and parsel out the first sentence in two pieces, the first of which now has a meagre 60 words, well under the bar bar ism of the 82 words — but who's counting!? — in the "em barr assingly long- winded" wind-up sentence of AL's otherwise embarassingly short- winded speech. Maybe it would help if I use more dashes? Jon Awbrey 16:54, 13 January 2006 (UTC)
JA: Oh, lighten up. It was mostly just something to do to keep the wrong hemisphere of my brain distracted while the proper half'o'my'wit worked on it. I think it's better now, but I could put a "what he's about to say" paragraph in front of it, and maybe break the figure into sections, verbalizing each piece. When I get some time to get back to it. Jon Awbrey 07:28, 15 January 2006 (UTC)
JA: Quoting is a very important operation in formal linguistics, and since the early days of computer-processed texts, the convention in the formal sciences on the use of quotation marks in coordination with other marks of punctuation has changed from what may still be common in some journalistic settings, namely, don't quote it if the lexeme in question doesn't say it. Nuff said. Jon Awbrey 18:20, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
I edited the entry rather extensively to be clearer and more precise. Also, I reduced extra words here and there. I hope I improved it.
1. In particular I didn't like the opening definition of the article, which read:
This isn't really accurate. An assertion is a proposition; in this case the assertion is "Honey is sweet". A relation is a two-place predicate; in this case the relation is "possesses" (or "has"). Calling the statement "Honey possesses sweetness" a relation is confusing for people that know a little logic.
It would be more accurate to say, for example, that hypostasis converts an attribution to a relationship.
However, this is just a feature of hypostasis and not a definition. It does not tell you what hypostasis is.
The real point is converting the predicate "sweet" into an abstract entity "sweetness". My definition says this precisely, although I admit the sentence is now a little long for a reader who is not familiar with the terminology of mathematical logic.
2. The sentence about Peirce now reads:
My intention was to improve the wording without changing the thesis of the sentence, which appears to be that the main point of Peirce's definition is the -arity increase. But is this really true? Should it receive this emphasis?
3. I edited the sentence starting with "grammatical trace" rather than deleting it because I liked the metaphor of precipitation. But I have to admit I didn't completely understand where this sentence was going, so maybe someone else can take a look at it.
4. The rest of the changes were cosmetic as far as I can tell.
-- 84.227.9.55 ( talk) 14:27, 24 December 2011 (UTC)
![]() | A fact from Hypostatic abstraction appeared on Wikipedia's
Main Page in the
Did you know column on 12 January 2006. The text of the entry was as follows:
| ![]() |
![]() | This article is rated Start-class on Wikipedia's
content assessment scale. It is of interest to the following WikiProjects: | ||||||||||||||||||||||
|
I don't understand why when I was looking for Formal Object http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_object, I arrive on this page. Is it because the process of Hypostatic abstraction creates (new) formal objects? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.4.255.4 ( talk) 13:44, 7 March 2009 (UTC)
In layman's terms, what's the difference in "honey is sweet" and "honey posseses sweetness"; does it really matter which way it is stated? Rlevse 12:43, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
JA: The information is practically the same, at least in the offing, but the transformed version assumes the existence of a new thing in the world, namely, sweetness, as something that exists on a par, more or less, with other things, like honey. That may be a mere grammatical difference, and it can be a risky business to be positing new entities in excess, but in the cases that are really of interest, like numbers and quarks and viruses and so on, it can be a practically indispensable trick of thought. Jon Awbrey 14:16, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
Rlevse Aha, my buddy User:Coffeeboy and I get it now; well, actually, I think he already understood it-;) Rlevse 18:13, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
Just thought you might like to know (or maybe add) that some analytic philosophy interpretations of 'honey is sweet' would be in terms of properties (in fact this may be the status quo); so that 'honey is sweet' should be understood as 'honey has the property of sweetness (or being sweet)'. There is some debate about how we should understand what a property is, but I believe it's generally taken to be something in itself, an extra if you like, over and above the honey. ---J
JA: Be sure to check out the link by Zeman:
JA: It's a really great read on the whole history of "dormitive virtue", and gives some clues about the different perspectives of pragmatic and analytic philosophies. Will fill in some links later on the "fictions" of Jeremy Bentham, connections to Moses Schönfinkel, Bertrand Russell, combinator calculus, theory of computation, etc. Jon Awbrey 21:12, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
The diagram does not help me understand Hypostatic abstraction. Rather than explain it further, I would suggest dropping the diagram.
-- Rajah9 17:07, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
I found the diagram to be quite helpful.
-- Irb 17:16, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
JA: I will add some exposition. The last couple of diagrams are related to the existential graphs that Charles Peirce developed for reasoning about complex relationships and subtle transformations like those involved in mathematics, of which HA is a very important example. Jon Awbrey 17:34, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
Jon, please edit the first para, which currently includes a sentence of 94 words, into something simple and elegant (or at least digestible in one sitting). The entry presently appearing on the main page would be a good start for a revised para. Obey 17:28, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
JA: Sorry, but that paragraph is a paraphrase of Peirce's original, historically important, and very well-considered statement, and it's already digested down quite a bit from the way Peirce wrote it. The version on the main page is okay for a taste, but it leaves out many essential details. Some things can only be made so simple before they verge on misinformation, so let's not go there. Jon Awbrey 17:45, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
JA: I promise to work on it a couple of days, and see how it looks then, but there seems to be something about accuracy of paraphrase that you fail to grasp, and so I'm afraid that it must go "with" saying. I gave a reasonable fascimile, much clarified and digested from the original source text, of a historically important statement by a major commentator, indeed, a veritable forefather of the subject in question. I then proceeded to give a more vernacular exposition of what it says, accompanied by a "keep it concrete and simple" (KICAS) example, plus several figures just for good measure. I'm perfectly happy to blockquote the original, but if you knew Peirce, you would know what a model of accessibility my paraphrase is, and it would still be necessaary to have a middle ground paraphrase to relate it to the contemporary scene. The exposition can always be expanded, but I do not see my job or yours as that of rewriting history. If you look through the mathematics articles, there is no pandering to accessibility that would be tolerated by that community if they think it would falsify the subject. But I'll work on it. Meanwhile, you might work on a rewrite of this:
JA: Then try to substitute your version for AL's version there. Let's talk again in a couple of days and compare our experiences.
JA: OK, after one bad case of revisionary hysteria, I did manage to ex(or)cise a few words and parsel out the first sentence in two pieces, the first of which now has a meagre 60 words, well under the bar bar ism of the 82 words — but who's counting!? — in the "em barr assingly long- winded" wind-up sentence of AL's otherwise embarassingly short- winded speech. Maybe it would help if I use more dashes? Jon Awbrey 16:54, 13 January 2006 (UTC)
JA: Oh, lighten up. It was mostly just something to do to keep the wrong hemisphere of my brain distracted while the proper half'o'my'wit worked on it. I think it's better now, but I could put a "what he's about to say" paragraph in front of it, and maybe break the figure into sections, verbalizing each piece. When I get some time to get back to it. Jon Awbrey 07:28, 15 January 2006 (UTC)
JA: Quoting is a very important operation in formal linguistics, and since the early days of computer-processed texts, the convention in the formal sciences on the use of quotation marks in coordination with other marks of punctuation has changed from what may still be common in some journalistic settings, namely, don't quote it if the lexeme in question doesn't say it. Nuff said. Jon Awbrey 18:20, 12 January 2006 (UTC)
I edited the entry rather extensively to be clearer and more precise. Also, I reduced extra words here and there. I hope I improved it.
1. In particular I didn't like the opening definition of the article, which read:
This isn't really accurate. An assertion is a proposition; in this case the assertion is "Honey is sweet". A relation is a two-place predicate; in this case the relation is "possesses" (or "has"). Calling the statement "Honey possesses sweetness" a relation is confusing for people that know a little logic.
It would be more accurate to say, for example, that hypostasis converts an attribution to a relationship.
However, this is just a feature of hypostasis and not a definition. It does not tell you what hypostasis is.
The real point is converting the predicate "sweet" into an abstract entity "sweetness". My definition says this precisely, although I admit the sentence is now a little long for a reader who is not familiar with the terminology of mathematical logic.
2. The sentence about Peirce now reads:
My intention was to improve the wording without changing the thesis of the sentence, which appears to be that the main point of Peirce's definition is the -arity increase. But is this really true? Should it receive this emphasis?
3. I edited the sentence starting with "grammatical trace" rather than deleting it because I liked the metaphor of precipitation. But I have to admit I didn't completely understand where this sentence was going, so maybe someone else can take a look at it.
4. The rest of the changes were cosmetic as far as I can tell.
-- 84.227.9.55 ( talk) 14:27, 24 December 2011 (UTC)