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What means the word "recieved" in the text ? Is it an alternate spelling of "received" ? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 201.90.132.168 ( talk • contribs) 20:30, September 30, 2006 (UTC)
This CNN article says that the wreckage was found only 20 miles (30km) from the city of Peixoto de Azevedo, while this article says 200 km (124 miles). Is there a source for the 200 km fact or should it be changed to what CNN is reporting? - albrozdude 20:42, 30 September 2006 (UTC)
Globo TV Internacional reported yesterday evening that the search-and-rescue base of operations was established at Jarinã cattle ranch, at a location some 40 km from the spotted wreckage. Helicopters used this spot to go back and forth to the crash site.
There is also another report about preparations at the cattle ranch: http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Politica/0,,AA1292257-5601,00.html
I guess there is a confusion because in some South American contries "Municipio" means city, but in Brazil it refers to an administrative division analog to a county: a much larger area, including rural areas. Some reports may refer to 30 km from the county border.
-- Aldo L 20:22, 1 October 2006 (UTC)
There is a complementary report about goverment operations at the cattle ranch:
(in portuguese) http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Brasil/0,,AA1294156-5598,00.html
Headline: Jarina ranch turns into support base for searches at the crash site.
End of second paragraph: "There are more than 200 people (from the Ministry of Aeronautics) here", affirms Ademir Ribeiro, who manages the ranch.
Aldo L 06:22, 2 October 2006 (UTC)
I added this section in the assumption that as events unfold and the accident is investigated, more information will be avalaible and added here about the Legacy. It is common in collision articles to have at least one section for each of the aircraft. Crum375 22:51, 30 September 2006 (UTC)
Especially concerning the external links and notes, please notice that this is the English-language Wikipedia. Even if you are linking to a document in Portuguese (and please, only do that if there's absolutely no other reliable source in English), it does the reader of this Encyclopedia little service to have the link read "Nota à Imprensa". The regular English-speaking user cannot understand that. Have it say "Press release" or something to that effect. We must keep in mind that this encyclopedia is written in English for the English-speaking audience. Use of the Portuguese language in the article must be kept to a minimal, only the essential. Thanks, Redux 23:09, 30 September 2006 (UTC)
If you do add a Portuguese link, please consider it to be temporary only, and when you find the same information in english, replace the link. The ideal is to have no foreign language links! 213.112.249.100 20:50, 2 October 2006 (UTC)
It seems unlikely that the embraer aircraft involved in the accident is unlikely to be owned by Excel Airways, which is a holiday charter company based in the UK, as the link suggests? It is more likely to have been being operated by Excel Air (www.excel-air.com), which operates Private Business Charter Aircraft.
Type Reservation Fee Paid Mode S Code 51744527 Reserved Date 06/15/2006 Renewal Date None Purge Date 07/15/2007 Pending Number Change None Date Change Authorized None Reserving Party Name EXCELAIRE LLC Street 200 HERING DR LI MACARTHUR AIRPORT City RONKONKOMA State NEW YORK Zip Code 11779 County SUFFOLK Country UNITED STATES
antiuser 17:57, 1 October 2006 (UTC)
Good job antiuser! I guess it is in a 'reserve' status hence not on the usual place, probably pending delivery and US arrival (which may take a while longer now). Crum375 18:17, 1 October 2006 (UTC)
Can someone who knows how to do this replace the current one with the image at wikimedia commons? I uploaded it to wikipedia by mistake and wikipedia doesn't have the proper licensing template for Agência Brasil. I've marked the image on wikipedia for speedy deletion but don't know how to include images from commons. Help, anyone? - antiuser 20:24, 1 October 2006 (UTC)
Brazilian news sites are using images of both left and right sides of the Legacy to put the damage in perspective, specially for people who are not familiar with this type. Wouldn't that be a good idea for Wikipedia too?
Aldo L 06:36, 2 October 2006 (UTC)
I just heard on TV:
Can someone find online sources for these? I can't be sure I didn't mishear something. (Forgot to add: the TV channel was TV Bandeirantes.) -- cesarb 00:09, 2 October 2006 (UTC)
Is it only me, or is the page actually not describing the actual details of the collision at all?!? I for one don't understand how this accident came to be. Writing "no details of how the collision occurred is currently known" would help visitors understand this, so they don't have to hunt the page - in vain, I might add. 213.112.249.100 20:53, 2 October 2006 (UTC)
The current altitudes (relative to the flight directions) don't sound right, although they could be temporary ones. More verifiation is needed. Crum375 21:35, 2 October 2006 (UTC)
Does anybody have a problem if we swap the "crash site" and the "Boeing wreckage" photos? IOW, use the wreckage photo in the crash box, and the "crash site" photo in the recovery section. If we get a better (clearer) wreckage photo it could replace the existing one. Any thoughts? Crum375 22:16, 2 October 2006 (UTC)
Sharkey's report that he posted on his blog has been taking a lot of flak lately and might be interpreted wrong. I see he's also published an article about the accident on the New York Times [7], which is much better-worded and more detailed. If there's no objection, I will change the part about his blog report with the NY Times one. ||| antiuser ( talk) ( contribs) 05:42, 3 October 2006 (UTC)
There have been a lot of conflicting reports lately in the press. This abcnews report does a reasonable summary, but leaves a lot of speculation open. There is also a lot of info in Portuguese on Globo and Folha, rife with speculations. I think we should stay away from trying to insert the conflicting speculations into the article until the dust settles.
A point I'd like to clarify, since it's not in the articles I've read, is that an aircraft under IFR, as both these flights were (above 18,000 feet all flights are by default), may only fly a cleared altitude and routing. The cleared routing is normally the latest one assigned via radio by ATC, but defaults to an older clearance or the original 'flight planned' one (submitted and approved prior to flight) in the case of a radio communications failure. Since in this case, at this point anyway, we don't know what the exact state of the ATC communications were at each moment for the 2 individual flights, we really don't know what the 'correct' altitudes were for each flight at each point. Speculating at this time, or listing a lot of controversial theories, would not be encyclopedic - all we need to do is wait for more solid evidence to come in (e.g. ATC communication transcripts, CVR transcripts, FDR data, etc.). I hope we are in agreement here. Comments? Crum375 15:02, 4 October 2006 (UTC)
Yeah, there are a lot of conflicting reports going on right now. The current hypothesis is the following: The Gol flight was flying at FL370. The Legacy, after taking off from São José dos Campos was flying at FL370 as well, which despite being against the Flight Level rules was permissible since it was a one-way airway from São Paulo to Brasília. After Brasilia the Gol flight should've changed altitude to either FL360 of FL380, since he was now on a two-way airway. We know he did not, and thus the collision occured. Questions: 1)Did Brasilia Center authorize him to continue to fly on FL370 or did he tell him to change altitude? If the latter is true, did he disobey an ATC instruction? 2)The crash near the boundary between Brasilia Center and Manaus Center. Was there a mix-up in the hand-off? 3)And the question on my mind: Why did the TCAS not light up like a christmas tree and tell the pilots they were about the collide?
BUT, we'll know more by Friday when they open the FDR and CVR of either plane. We can provide lots of speculation until then or wait until we have factual data. -- Dali-Llama 15:18, 4 October 2006 (UTC)
I agree with antiuser, and would add the following observation which I have not seen published: If in fact, ATC wanted the Legacy at FL360 when northwest-bound from Brasilia to Manaus on UZ6, regardless of the original flight plan filed, Brasilia ATC would have instructed the Legacy to descend to FL360. Presumably the Legacy, arriving at FL370 over Brasilia, would have been in good radio contact with Brasilia ATC for quiet a while, both before and after arriving overhead. There is no mention of any radio outage, nor is there any known 'black hole', over Brasilia. If the Legacy mode C was not reporting properly, then Brasilia ATC would have simply asked the Legacy to verify mode C was on, and in any case to 'verify level at FL360'. All this would have been done in the Brasilia area, as the Legacy started its northwest-bound leg on UZ6 toward Manaus. Assuming even worst case (that we are not directly told) that a radio outage with the Legacy started over Brasilia, and Brasilia ATC could not confirm, either by radio or mode C, the altitude change, then assuming normal ATC practices they would have 'blocked' at least both altitudes (FL360-FL370) and sent an urgent message to Manaus that those altitudes are blocked on the UZ6 airway. Bottom line: there is more here than we know at this point, and this is why I think we should refrain from reporting speculations in the article that (at least to me) don't make sense, until we get some hard evidence. Thanks, Crum375 12:12, 5 October 2006 (UTC)
The article says the airliner had been cleared by ATC to climb from FL350 to FL390 so discussion of the flight level of the bizjet above seems almost moot. ATC must have had a part to play in the collision if both aircraft were flying IFR in controlled airspace as that means that ATC were responsible for aircraft separation. If the pilots were following instructions - there's nothing to the contrary so far. Paul Beardsell 16:25, 5 October 2006 (UTC)
Gainsaying something said far above: If you are IFR outside controlled airspace (and this is routinely done) then no cleared altitude and routing will be followed. However, then the pre-allocated altitude levels depending upon direction must be! Paul Beardsell 16:37, 5 October 2006 (UTC)
There is one aspect that I consider is now appearing in the brazilian media and is not common for air crashes: there seems to be some kind of frenzy to quickly point a culprit, rather than a cause. And in this case, most reports from Brazil are blaming the Legacy pilots.
Risking to enter in conspiracy-theory land, let's not forget that the civil aeronautics in Brazil is run by the military, and we are reading reports that top officials have already ruled out any wrong-doing from the ATC, which ironically is there exactly to prevent this kind of national disasters.
There are many interests in this case: the brazilian military investigating their own participation in the mishap, the brazilian military investigating a plane from Brazil's main aerospace firm (actually, Embraer's facilities are located right next to the military-run Aerospace Technical Center), the brazilian military investigating a downed brazilian airliner, which from its crash site they themselves are right now retrieving thousands of body parts, and the brazilian military investigatig two foreing pilots.
This report is very interesting: (in portuguese)
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/cotidiano/ult95u126723.shtml
Headline:Pilots deny having turned off Legacy equipment.
Eighth paragraph: American company ExcelAire, which bought the Legacy, is fearing to turn into a "scapegoat" and decided to go out of a defensive position and started an offensive, hiring lawyer José Carlos Dias' bureau and the communications agency Burson-Marsteller, represented in Brazil by Francisco de Carvalho.
Some aviation forums are already talking about similarities with other multicultural air crash investigations, such as Egypt Air 990.
Aldo L 19:35, 5 October 2006 (UTC)
While the media is publishing a lot of speculative stories, it is important to note that neither the Air Force nor the DAC/ANAC have published any accusatory material on their own websites. Furthermore, Brazil and the US have very close diplomatic ties, the NTSB and Boeing have personnel assisting with the investigation — the last thing they want is a diplomatic incident. |||
antiuser (
talk) (
contribs)
19:26, 5 October 2006 (UTC)
LEGACY FICOU FORA DO RADAR POR 15 MINUTOS E RECEBEU 5 ALERTAS. I will merge that information to the article later (replacing part of the speculation) if nobody beats me to it. -- cesarb 04:45, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
As mentioned above, we have to be extremely careful in building and updating this article, sticking to well supported facts and staying clear of speculations and misinformations. There are 2 types of relevant facts in this case: those that pertain specifically to this accident, and those that relate to aviation in general. Unfortunately, many of the statements in the press include speculations by both journalists as well as some officials, that are conflicting. What I suggest again is that we apply very strict standards of quality, and try our very best to stick to raw data and hard facts. I read the Globo article cited above, as well as previous Globo, Folha and other articles. Many have factual technical errors as well as sheer speculations. Since this article obviously involves living persons, both named (the Legacy crew) and as yet unnamed (the Brasilia, Manaus and other ATC personnel involved), we must adhere to WP's living persons sourcing policies. I see no problem to discuss and report here in the Talk page about speculations and allegations, but I don't think anything but hard, well supported (e.g. by raw data from CVR/FDR or ATC transcripts, ANAC, CENIPA or NTSB official statements) facts should go into the article. I hope we are in agreement. Crum375 12:59, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
I (and others) have already specifically agreed with this. I'm not sure why the reminder is necessary. But, in the same spirit, and hopefully unnecessarily, let me add I hope we will apply what Wikipedia policy actually says, not what we think it says or ought to say. Paul Beardsell 13:56, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
I added the part I think can be considered reliable (it was both radio and secondary radar, it's not "unclear" anymore, or at least it's less unclear from a similarly reliable source). While the article says the informations come from the ATC records and CVR records, I think it's better to wait before adding the rest (such as how many times they were contacted, that the primary radar was showing 36000 feet because it's less accurate, that they were going to ask other airplanes to help with the communication, etc); there have been way too many conflicting reports lately. -- cesarb 15:17, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
I added this template to the top of the Talk page to remind us all that even though this is not a biography article per se, it does deal with a high profile case with living persons and their reputations, careers and legal liabilities involved. Hence we should continue to carefully adhere to the ultra strict sourcing and validation policies of WP:BLP. Crum375 18:49, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
These excerpts may or may not be related to this accident. Please be careful.
From: http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/0/1bddc176ac629452862571e70059100d!OpenDocument Airworthiness Directive Federal Register Information Header Information DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA-2006-24639; Directorate Identifier 2005-NM-171-AD; Amendment 39-14761; AD 2006-19-04] RIN 2120-AA64 Airworthiness Directives; Honeywell RCZ-833J/K, -851J/K, and - 854J Communication (COM) Units, Equipped with XS-852E/F Mode S Transponders; and Honeywell XS-856A/B and -857A Mode S Transponders; Installed on But Not Limited to Certain Transport Category Airplanes PDF Copy (If Available): 2006-19-04.pdf Preamble Information AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Honeywell COM units and transponders, installed on but not limited to certain transport category airplanes. This AD requires a revision to the Normal Procedures section of the airplane flight manual to advise the flightcrew to check the status of the transponder after changing the air traffic control (ATC) code. This AD also requires replacing certain identification plate(s) with new plate(s), testing certain COM units or transponders as applicable, and corrective action if necessary. For certain airplanes, this AD requires replacing the transponders of certain COM units with new or modified transponders. For certain other airplanes, this AD requires installing a modification into certain transponders. This AD results from the transponder erroneously going into standby mode if the flightcrew takes longer than five seconds when using the rotary knob of the radio management unit to change the ATC code. We are issuing this AD to prevent the transponder of the COM unit from going into standby mode, which could increase the workload on the flightcrew and result in improper functioning of the traffic alert and collision avoidance system. DATES: This AD becomes effective October 17, 2006. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of October 17, 2006. Another excerpt from further down in the web page: Request To Revise Compliance Time Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (EMBRAER) requests that we extend the compliance time for the AFM revision from 5 to 30 days. EMBRAER asserts that the loss of the transponder does not pose so great of a hazard to justify such an urgent compliance time. As justification for extending the compliance time, EMBRAER states that some of the affected airplanes might be on international trips, where it may not be possible to return an airplane to a convenient location and accomplish the AFM revision within 5 days after the effective date of this AD. We agree that the compliance times can be extended somewhat. We have determined that extending the compliance time to 14 days will not adversely affect safety. Therefore, we have revised paragraph (f) of this AD accordingly. And yet another excerpt from further down in the web page: Applicability (c) This AD applies to the Honeywell parts identified in paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) of this AD, approved under Technical Standard Order TSO-C112, installed on but not limited to Bombardier Model BD-700-1A10 and BD-700-1A11 airplanes; Cessna Model 550 and 560 airplanes; Cessna Model 650 airplanes; Dassault Model Falcon 900EX airplanes, serial number (S/N) 97 and S/Ns 120 and subsequent; Dassault Model Falcon 2000EX airplanes, S/N 6 and S/Ns 28 and subsequent; EMBRAER Model EMB-135BJ, -135ER, -135KE, -135KL, and - 135LR airplanes; EMBRAER Model EMB-145, -145ER, -145MR, -145LR, - 145XR, -145MP, and -145EP airplanes; Learjet Model 45 airplanes; Lockheed Model 282-44A-05 (C-130B) airplanes; Lockheed Model 382G series airplanes; Raytheon Model Hawker 800 (including variant U- 125A), 800XP, and 1000 airplanes; certificated in any category. (1) Communication (COM) unit RCZ-833J part numbers (P/Ns) 7510700-763 and -863; RCZ-833K P/Ns 7510700-765 and -875; RCZ-851J P/N 7510700-813; RCZ-851K P/N 7510700-815; and RCZ-854J P/Ns 7510700-725 and -825. (2) Mode S transponder XS-856A P/Ns 7517400-865 and -885; XS- 856B P/Ns 7517400-866 and -886; and XS-857A P/Ns 7517400-876 and - 896. Unsafe Condition (d) This AD results from the transponder erroneously going into standby mode if the flightcrew takes longer than five seconds when using the rotary knob of the radio management unit to change the air traffic control code. We are issuing this AD to prevent the transponder of the COM unit from going into standby mode, which could increase the workload on the flightcrew and result in improper functioning of the traffic alert and collision avoidance system. Compliance (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done. Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Revision (f) For all airplanes: Within 14 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the Normal Procedures section of the applicable AFM to include the following statement: "After completion of any 4096 ATC Code change (also referred to as Mode A Code), check the status of the transponder. If the transponder indicates that it is in standby mode, re-select the desired mode (i.e., the transponder should be in the active mode)." This may be done by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. Accomplishing the actions specified in paragraph (h) or (j), as applicable, of this AD terminates the requirement of this paragraph. For the complete report please refer to the aforementioned Internet address. Aldo L 19:02, 6 October 2006 (UTC) [Editing note: Moved down from other section, squeezed out spaces. Crum375 20:25, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
Flight International published this more than one year ago:
DATE:02/08/05
SOURCE:Flight International
Transponder drop-outs spark AD
Regulators urged to act quickly as fault on Honeywell device causes flight details to disappear from radar screens
With aircraft suddenly disappearing from radar screens, air traffic controllers are calling on European safety regulators to speed up approval of a solution for a recurring fault afflicting Honeywell’s Primus II transponder.
European controllers lose identification and flight details for an aircraft around five times a month, says the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers (IFATCA). The data loss also disables air traffic control safety-net systems – short-term conflict alert and the airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) of the aircraft concerned.
IFATCA has written to the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), Eurocontrol and the Joint Aviation Authorities to try to accelerate the process of approving a permanent modification to the transponder to supersede the current operational “fix” proposed by Honeywell. IFATCA says EASA is shortly to publish an airworthiness directive (AD), but under present rules it would give carriers a year to comply, which it says is too long. Meanwhile, Honeywell says it has had a software fix available “for a while”, and airlines can obtain it by returning the transponder. It also has a rotable pool of units for loan.
The Honeywell Primus II Mode S (elementary) transponder has been fitted in some aircraft since September 2004. The problem has usually involved Embraer ERJ-135/145 regional jets and occurs when pilots are asked to change their four-digit “squawk” code – the flight identification code allocated by the ATC unit; if they take more than 5s to input the new code the transponder automatically switches to “standby”, making it unresponsive to interrogation by ground radar or by the ACAS transponders of other aircraft. In areas where there is only secondary radar with no primary radar back-up, the contact disappears from the controller’s display. IFATCA cites a case this year over France where an ERJ-145 flew for more than 30min in busy airspace without radar contact.
Honeywell has told pilots to select the transponder to standby before inputting the new code, then back to active once the code has been set; or they can check the annunciators on the unit or on the ACAS display after a reset, and if they indicate standby they should select the transponder to active.
The latter advice was accepted in January as “a mitigation procedure” by Eurocontrol’s Mode S regulatory group. “In themselves [these measures] are not a permanent solution,” says Eurocontrol, adding that EASA’s proposed AD is “expected to be released shortly”.
DAVID LEARMOUNT / LONDON
Aldo L 02:21, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
New York Times reported:
"Device on Jet in Amazon Crash Had Not Been Recalled as Faulty (...) Some transponders built by Honeywell, an American company, have been ordered repaired by the Federal Aviation Administration because they have stopped broadcasting unexpectedly in some cases. But a review of the part numbers on the Legacy shows that the model on the jet was not recalled, Bill Reavis, a Honeywell spokesman, said Sunday."
Full text at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/world/americas/09crash.html
Aldo L 06:32, 10 October 2006 (UTC)
I reverted the "airbase was not secret" and speculation about Sharkey's emotions because it was not sourced. We do have Sharkey on record saying it was secret (probably because someone told him so at the time), we don't have a reliable source saying it isn't. I did see a forum somewhere that mentioned it was originally a secret nuclear airbase during the 1980's; interesting if we can get more data on it. The US NTSB just calls it "Cachimbo air base" in the preliminary accident report. I'm sure we'll find out more in the future. If anyone has a reliable source about the base, feel free to add. Crum375 01:02, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
Seção de Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos ________________________________________________________________________________________
DEFINIÇÃO
Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos, de Incidentes Aeronáuticos e Ocorrência de Solo é o conjunto de atividades destinadas a impedir essas ocorrências, evitando assim custos adicionais desnecessários à operação através da preservação dos recursos humanos e materiais.
Os elementos que constituem a base e o objeto de toda a atividade de Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos são definidos no trinômio “homem-meio-máquina”.
PRINCÍPIOS BÁSICOS DO SIPAER
a) “Todo acidente aeronáutico pode e deve ser evitado”;
b) “Todo acidente aeronáutico resulta de uma seqüência de eventos, e nunca de uma causa isolada”;
c) “Todo acidente aeronáutico tem um precedente”;
d) “Prevenção de acidentes aeronáuticos é uma tarefa que requer mobilização geral”;
e) “O propósito da Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos não é restringir a atividade aérea, mas estimular o seu desenvolvimento com segurança”;
f) “Os Comandantes, Diretores e Chefes são os principais responsáveis pelas medidas de segurança”;
g) “Em prevenção de acidentes aeronáuticos não há segredos nem bandeiras”;
h) “Acusações e punições agem contra os interesses da Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos”.
It seems so eerily apt. (feel free to add to and fix my loose translation) Crum375 01:52, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
I revised the lead to better express the current known status, as I felt the old version was out of date. My only concern was about using the word 'collided' instead of 'probably colliding', but that would sound awkward and I think by now there is very little doubt left, and we certainly have plenty of sources. If anyone feels otherwise, please comment. Crum375 14:50, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
I think that these easily obtained pieces of evidence, that should be available hours if not minutes after an incident or accident, hold the key to this specific accident. If you had all the time-stamped transcripts, of all relevant frequencies, plus the landline contacts between the relevant ATC sectors, I think this case would probably be largely solved. Despite this, I see no reference anywhere in the Brazilian (or other) press to these crucial tapes or transcripts. They do not require a major effort to obtain or even analyze (at least superficially). Obviously with the Brazilian ATC being quasi-military (I am assuming) it may take longer than other countries where ATC is totally civilian. Can anyone shed any light on this issue? Crum375 16:29, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
As I mentioned elsewhere on this page, we need excellent sourcing on anything that casts a doubt on the proper conduct of any living person. In this case, it is premature to speculate on whether FL370 was 'correct' or 'legal' for the Legacy crew or not. There are multiple issues and rules to consider, for example:
These rules may vary between ICAO, FAA and Brazilian ANAC; obviously the latter would be most relevant. If someone can get the online version of the ANAC lost comm IFR procedures, that would be most helpful. But in the meanwhile, we can't just insert editorial comments or even quote from newspapers where we know that these issues are complex, unclear and conflicting. Thanks, Crum375 18:42, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
Here are the Regras do Ar e Serviços de Tráfego Aéreo (Brazilian Air Rules). I believe it's current.
http://www.icea.gov.br/ead/ima100-12intraer/sumario.htm
Aldo L 06:16, 10 October 2006 (UTC)
Both these plans were brand spanking NEW. You know when you pick up a car at the rental, you have to figure where the lights/wipers/ect are?? Well, maybe, just maybe these people didn't read the NEW owners manuels. Maybe the "another plan is about to hit us" alarm wasn't properly set. These plans were HOURS old...thats my take, we'll have to see....-- 68.228.148.52 22:41, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
I removed this section because I think that it is mostly WP:OR. If the contributor wants something like this to go into the article, every statement and factoid need to be meticulously sourced, per WP:V, WP:RS and WP:BLP. Crum375 23:53, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
I reverted these edits as I believe them to be a combination of WP:OR and improperly sourced statements. Since this article must conform to WP:BLP rules, it must have excellent quality sources for each allegation related to living people. Please discuss each intended change here first if at all possible. As example in this case (but only one example), we have no sources showing that Joe Sharkey said "the accident was caused by the poor flight control". Again, at WP we don't accept any facts that are not extremely well sourced when it relates to living people. Please note that per WP:BLP, anyone can remove unsourced or poorly sourced material in such cases, with no need for discussion or WP:3RR limits. Thanks, Crum375 00:09, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
As a heads-up to everyone collaborating to the article, Brazilian media is already reporting that the Air Force's preliminary findings are that the Legacy pilot is basically at fault. I recommend we hold any edits in that direction (assigning guilt) until the actual report is released, early next week.-- Dali-Llama 00:54, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
I think some things need to be added and some need to be cut.
At this point, I think the metion of the farmer spotting the plane low can be snipped out. Also, the discussion on whether there was a collision or not at first should be shortened.
We also need to add more. Supposedly the FAA was considering a recall of the transponder in use on the Legacy. Also, Joe Sharkey seems to be changing his story a bit, it's gotten more dramatic over the last few days. I would reconsider using him as a reliable source, though it could just be the "glad to be alive" wearing off. Also, to add more to the GOL Flight and the search for it, some relatives that were criticising the long wait were flown over the site by the Brazilian AF to see how challenging it was, and they thanked them for the hard work afterwards. Might be worth a mention.
And for human interest when the whole thing blows over, there's a photo of the Air Force throwing 154 roses over where the plane fell that imght go well in closing.
Just floating some ideas...
One of my own guiding principles in writing an 'encyclopedic' article for this type of a dynamically unfolding event is to try to shoot for 'permanence', i.e. ideally we should be gradually building, the 'final version'. Of course there is never anything really final on WP, but there is a 'stable version' which is close. My own crash articles, many of which were very sensational as they occurred, rarely get touched nowadays. The point here is to try to keep to a minimum both wrong info that will have to be reverted as we uncover the truth over time (although in principle WP allows us to include 'well sourced falsehoods') as well as anything that is clearly transient and will not belong in the 'final' or 'stable' version. The way to achieve that, IMO, is to keep insisting on 'excellent' sourcing for anything that we include, which we are required to anyway by WP:BLP rules. BTW, even if everyone in a crash dies, unlike here, you still need to practice care because first there are always live people potentially liable: mechanics, dispatchers, controllers, etc. and second, even casting premature (i.e. pre-final-report) blame on any deceased party carries legal liabilities.
Specifically in your suggestion list, I think the 154 dropped flowers, can certainly be added. The farmer seeing the plane flying low - I would leave it as the only eyewitness for now - it can be dropped down the road if it doesn't make the final report. The transponder issue I would leave until we know (from ultra reliable sources) if the Legacy actually had the model and serial number affected by the AD, and whether Embraer claims it had been complied with (and how - workaround, software fix). As to Joe Sharkey - I would stay away for now from subsequent bloggish statements made by him but keep the early ones, made as a direct and 'fresh' witness. Regarding the collision speculations, I would wait for some evidence of paint transfer - that would be fairly definitive. BTW, I read that one theory that was unlikely but could not yet be excluded is that the Gol broke up in midair for another reason, and one of the debris pieces hit the Embraer. Of course the FDR's from both planes could exclude that one based on precise timing.
All of the above is of course just my own opinion and is open to challenge and debate. Thanks, Crum375 11:54, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
With the overall theme of keeping this article tightly within WP's policies and guidelines, please consider the WP:EL guideline before adding any external links to the article. The one I just reverted does not necessarily contain technically incorrect data, but that's not a criterion for EL. In this case it is a clear case of WP:OR in a non-notable web site. One cannot evade WP:NOR by just setting up a web site and linking to it. In any case I think we are in general agreement that we should only allow hard evidence (as defined elsewhere) into the article and no speculations. Thanks, Crum375 16:59, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
I reverted this new section due to improper sourcing which fails WP:V, WP:OR, WP:NPOV, WP:RS, etc. Right now we have the Brazilian ANAC and CENIPA officially investigating this accident. They have the actual flight plans that were filed by the two flights, the initial IFR clearances that were issued by ATC (which supersede any filed plan) as well as the enroute clearances (which supersede the initial clearance). Clearances include both routes and altitudes. The ANAC also have the transcripts of the readback for each clearance, which are crucial for any potential miscommunication. They also know the specific variations of the Brazilian flight rules from the ICAO rules, if any. The newspapers at this point are printing a lot of conflicting reports and speculations. It is important for us to keep our eyes on the ball and ensure that all our sources are of the best possible quality, as this article relates to living people and to potential liablities. I believe that high quality sources in this case are the ANAC, CENIPA, the U.S. NTSB, ATC tapes/transcripts, CVR/FDR transcripts, etc. I think the other editors on this page are in agreement, as noted above. Crum375 03:00, 9 October 2006 (UTC)
My main issue with using the flight plans is that as it stands even the pilots disagree with the ATC as to what the filed Flight Level was, with the pilots stating that the flight plan was filed for FL370 all the way to Manaus, and the ATC saying that it's technically impossible as the filing computer would declare a conflict with flight rules of the airway. And, as Crum mentioned, we don't know what clearances and changes were made afterwards. I would be okay with a "he-said, she-said" edit containing the flight plan data, with both the going ATC version and the pilots' versions, but we can't be stating it as fact until the preliminary report is out in the next couple of days.-- Dali-Llama 15:52, 9 October 2006 (UTC)
Well, I'm glad this part's over--phew!-- Dali-Llama 03:04, 10 October 2006 (UTC)
I removed a statement about ICAO altitude rules for two reasons: first, it is unsourced (and per WP:BLP must be removed from this article on sight, as it could be seen as casting blame); second, there is no indication that ICAO rules were applicable or relevant for this particular flight. Let me mention another point while we are at it. This point was also raised earlier by Antiuser, that if the Legacy flight was expected to use FL360 or FL380, this could only be accomplished via RVSM. Up to a few years ago, in most of the world, only the odd altitudes were available and legal from FL290 to FL410. The even altitudes of FL300 to FL400 were simply unheard of (to my knowledge) and never used by normal civilian flights, leaving a 2,000' separation at the higher cruising altitudes. One of the main reasons for the original larger separation (vs. 1,000' at the lower altitudes) was that altimeter error of +/-1% at 35,000' is +/-350', enough to bring two flights separated by only 1000' unacceptably close to each other vertically. The RVSM is an attempt to squeeze more flights vertically into the same airspace by insisting on higher accuracy standards, more equipment and training, etc. and is still somewhat controversial, quoting from WP:
Critics of the change are concerned that by reducing the space between aircraft, DRVSM may increase the number of mid-air collisions and near-collisions. In the US this program was known as the Domestic Reduced Separation Minimum (DRVSM).
Anyway, I suspect that this issue will also come up during the investigation, but I don't see how ICAO can mandate even altitudes for the higher flight levels where clearly using RVSM requires special approval from the aviation authorities. [12]
Of course, Brazilian flight rules could very well be different. If anyone can shed more light on this issue, please chime in. Crum375 12:20, 12 October 2006 (UTC)
Whereas I don't disagree with the removal of the default altitude material it is for a different reason than Crum's: Quoting details of this particular rule at this time gives it far too much weight. It just does not matter what that particular rule says: What is important is twofold: Firstly, the altitude for which each aircraft was actually cleared by ATC and, secondly, if either of the aircraft deviated from their clearance. The actual details of RVSM seem completely irrelevant at this time and I bet will remain so. Paul Beardsell 17:56, 12 October 2006 (UTC)
A different point: The idea that quoting an aviation rule can defame anyone seems a little far fetched to me. I agree with WP:BPL - I just think that policy is being cited in this case entirely inappropriately. Certainly, if a rule was relevant I would want to see it cited in the article and now. Indeed, already in the article there is info present which allows one to see how blame might be apportioned depending upon facts as they are revealed. But no one is removing that info. Good! But why the inconsistency? Paul Beardsell 17:56, 12 October 2006 (UTC)
(outdent) I believe the Embraer crew testified they did have a comm failure, but having read so many different and conflicting versions, I am not sure exactly when it started. OTOH, a brief 'comm failure' is very commonplace, certainly to be expected over undeveloped and uninhabited areas, and when such an outage occurs, you don't instantly start lost comm procedure - mostly you try to raise ATC on some other frequency, and this may take a while. You may punch in the lost comm code. If there are terrain obstacles coming up then you may have to climb, but in this case at FL370 this was not an issue. So yes, there was an outage, of unclear duration, which along with the exact procedure followed by the Embarer crew remains to be revealed. Crum375 23:31, 12 October 2006 (UTC)
I cannot find any reference to the Embraer pilots thinking anything was untoward before the collision. When it comes to comms failures I think the ATC version of events, that they tried to raise the Embraer seven times, without trying to talk to the 737, is just a little odd. Paul Beardsell 23:42, 12 October 2006 (UTC)
This page is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
What means the word "recieved" in the text ? Is it an alternate spelling of "received" ? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 201.90.132.168 ( talk • contribs) 20:30, September 30, 2006 (UTC)
This CNN article says that the wreckage was found only 20 miles (30km) from the city of Peixoto de Azevedo, while this article says 200 km (124 miles). Is there a source for the 200 km fact or should it be changed to what CNN is reporting? - albrozdude 20:42, 30 September 2006 (UTC)
Globo TV Internacional reported yesterday evening that the search-and-rescue base of operations was established at Jarinã cattle ranch, at a location some 40 km from the spotted wreckage. Helicopters used this spot to go back and forth to the crash site.
There is also another report about preparations at the cattle ranch: http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Politica/0,,AA1292257-5601,00.html
I guess there is a confusion because in some South American contries "Municipio" means city, but in Brazil it refers to an administrative division analog to a county: a much larger area, including rural areas. Some reports may refer to 30 km from the county border.
-- Aldo L 20:22, 1 October 2006 (UTC)
There is a complementary report about goverment operations at the cattle ranch:
(in portuguese) http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Brasil/0,,AA1294156-5598,00.html
Headline: Jarina ranch turns into support base for searches at the crash site.
End of second paragraph: "There are more than 200 people (from the Ministry of Aeronautics) here", affirms Ademir Ribeiro, who manages the ranch.
Aldo L 06:22, 2 October 2006 (UTC)
I added this section in the assumption that as events unfold and the accident is investigated, more information will be avalaible and added here about the Legacy. It is common in collision articles to have at least one section for each of the aircraft. Crum375 22:51, 30 September 2006 (UTC)
Especially concerning the external links and notes, please notice that this is the English-language Wikipedia. Even if you are linking to a document in Portuguese (and please, only do that if there's absolutely no other reliable source in English), it does the reader of this Encyclopedia little service to have the link read "Nota à Imprensa". The regular English-speaking user cannot understand that. Have it say "Press release" or something to that effect. We must keep in mind that this encyclopedia is written in English for the English-speaking audience. Use of the Portuguese language in the article must be kept to a minimal, only the essential. Thanks, Redux 23:09, 30 September 2006 (UTC)
If you do add a Portuguese link, please consider it to be temporary only, and when you find the same information in english, replace the link. The ideal is to have no foreign language links! 213.112.249.100 20:50, 2 October 2006 (UTC)
It seems unlikely that the embraer aircraft involved in the accident is unlikely to be owned by Excel Airways, which is a holiday charter company based in the UK, as the link suggests? It is more likely to have been being operated by Excel Air (www.excel-air.com), which operates Private Business Charter Aircraft.
Type Reservation Fee Paid Mode S Code 51744527 Reserved Date 06/15/2006 Renewal Date None Purge Date 07/15/2007 Pending Number Change None Date Change Authorized None Reserving Party Name EXCELAIRE LLC Street 200 HERING DR LI MACARTHUR AIRPORT City RONKONKOMA State NEW YORK Zip Code 11779 County SUFFOLK Country UNITED STATES
antiuser 17:57, 1 October 2006 (UTC)
Good job antiuser! I guess it is in a 'reserve' status hence not on the usual place, probably pending delivery and US arrival (which may take a while longer now). Crum375 18:17, 1 October 2006 (UTC)
Can someone who knows how to do this replace the current one with the image at wikimedia commons? I uploaded it to wikipedia by mistake and wikipedia doesn't have the proper licensing template for Agência Brasil. I've marked the image on wikipedia for speedy deletion but don't know how to include images from commons. Help, anyone? - antiuser 20:24, 1 October 2006 (UTC)
Brazilian news sites are using images of both left and right sides of the Legacy to put the damage in perspective, specially for people who are not familiar with this type. Wouldn't that be a good idea for Wikipedia too?
Aldo L 06:36, 2 October 2006 (UTC)
I just heard on TV:
Can someone find online sources for these? I can't be sure I didn't mishear something. (Forgot to add: the TV channel was TV Bandeirantes.) -- cesarb 00:09, 2 October 2006 (UTC)
Is it only me, or is the page actually not describing the actual details of the collision at all?!? I for one don't understand how this accident came to be. Writing "no details of how the collision occurred is currently known" would help visitors understand this, so they don't have to hunt the page - in vain, I might add. 213.112.249.100 20:53, 2 October 2006 (UTC)
The current altitudes (relative to the flight directions) don't sound right, although they could be temporary ones. More verifiation is needed. Crum375 21:35, 2 October 2006 (UTC)
Does anybody have a problem if we swap the "crash site" and the "Boeing wreckage" photos? IOW, use the wreckage photo in the crash box, and the "crash site" photo in the recovery section. If we get a better (clearer) wreckage photo it could replace the existing one. Any thoughts? Crum375 22:16, 2 October 2006 (UTC)
Sharkey's report that he posted on his blog has been taking a lot of flak lately and might be interpreted wrong. I see he's also published an article about the accident on the New York Times [7], which is much better-worded and more detailed. If there's no objection, I will change the part about his blog report with the NY Times one. ||| antiuser ( talk) ( contribs) 05:42, 3 October 2006 (UTC)
There have been a lot of conflicting reports lately in the press. This abcnews report does a reasonable summary, but leaves a lot of speculation open. There is also a lot of info in Portuguese on Globo and Folha, rife with speculations. I think we should stay away from trying to insert the conflicting speculations into the article until the dust settles.
A point I'd like to clarify, since it's not in the articles I've read, is that an aircraft under IFR, as both these flights were (above 18,000 feet all flights are by default), may only fly a cleared altitude and routing. The cleared routing is normally the latest one assigned via radio by ATC, but defaults to an older clearance or the original 'flight planned' one (submitted and approved prior to flight) in the case of a radio communications failure. Since in this case, at this point anyway, we don't know what the exact state of the ATC communications were at each moment for the 2 individual flights, we really don't know what the 'correct' altitudes were for each flight at each point. Speculating at this time, or listing a lot of controversial theories, would not be encyclopedic - all we need to do is wait for more solid evidence to come in (e.g. ATC communication transcripts, CVR transcripts, FDR data, etc.). I hope we are in agreement here. Comments? Crum375 15:02, 4 October 2006 (UTC)
Yeah, there are a lot of conflicting reports going on right now. The current hypothesis is the following: The Gol flight was flying at FL370. The Legacy, after taking off from São José dos Campos was flying at FL370 as well, which despite being against the Flight Level rules was permissible since it was a one-way airway from São Paulo to Brasília. After Brasilia the Gol flight should've changed altitude to either FL360 of FL380, since he was now on a two-way airway. We know he did not, and thus the collision occured. Questions: 1)Did Brasilia Center authorize him to continue to fly on FL370 or did he tell him to change altitude? If the latter is true, did he disobey an ATC instruction? 2)The crash near the boundary between Brasilia Center and Manaus Center. Was there a mix-up in the hand-off? 3)And the question on my mind: Why did the TCAS not light up like a christmas tree and tell the pilots they were about the collide?
BUT, we'll know more by Friday when they open the FDR and CVR of either plane. We can provide lots of speculation until then or wait until we have factual data. -- Dali-Llama 15:18, 4 October 2006 (UTC)
I agree with antiuser, and would add the following observation which I have not seen published: If in fact, ATC wanted the Legacy at FL360 when northwest-bound from Brasilia to Manaus on UZ6, regardless of the original flight plan filed, Brasilia ATC would have instructed the Legacy to descend to FL360. Presumably the Legacy, arriving at FL370 over Brasilia, would have been in good radio contact with Brasilia ATC for quiet a while, both before and after arriving overhead. There is no mention of any radio outage, nor is there any known 'black hole', over Brasilia. If the Legacy mode C was not reporting properly, then Brasilia ATC would have simply asked the Legacy to verify mode C was on, and in any case to 'verify level at FL360'. All this would have been done in the Brasilia area, as the Legacy started its northwest-bound leg on UZ6 toward Manaus. Assuming even worst case (that we are not directly told) that a radio outage with the Legacy started over Brasilia, and Brasilia ATC could not confirm, either by radio or mode C, the altitude change, then assuming normal ATC practices they would have 'blocked' at least both altitudes (FL360-FL370) and sent an urgent message to Manaus that those altitudes are blocked on the UZ6 airway. Bottom line: there is more here than we know at this point, and this is why I think we should refrain from reporting speculations in the article that (at least to me) don't make sense, until we get some hard evidence. Thanks, Crum375 12:12, 5 October 2006 (UTC)
The article says the airliner had been cleared by ATC to climb from FL350 to FL390 so discussion of the flight level of the bizjet above seems almost moot. ATC must have had a part to play in the collision if both aircraft were flying IFR in controlled airspace as that means that ATC were responsible for aircraft separation. If the pilots were following instructions - there's nothing to the contrary so far. Paul Beardsell 16:25, 5 October 2006 (UTC)
Gainsaying something said far above: If you are IFR outside controlled airspace (and this is routinely done) then no cleared altitude and routing will be followed. However, then the pre-allocated altitude levels depending upon direction must be! Paul Beardsell 16:37, 5 October 2006 (UTC)
There is one aspect that I consider is now appearing in the brazilian media and is not common for air crashes: there seems to be some kind of frenzy to quickly point a culprit, rather than a cause. And in this case, most reports from Brazil are blaming the Legacy pilots.
Risking to enter in conspiracy-theory land, let's not forget that the civil aeronautics in Brazil is run by the military, and we are reading reports that top officials have already ruled out any wrong-doing from the ATC, which ironically is there exactly to prevent this kind of national disasters.
There are many interests in this case: the brazilian military investigating their own participation in the mishap, the brazilian military investigating a plane from Brazil's main aerospace firm (actually, Embraer's facilities are located right next to the military-run Aerospace Technical Center), the brazilian military investigating a downed brazilian airliner, which from its crash site they themselves are right now retrieving thousands of body parts, and the brazilian military investigatig two foreing pilots.
This report is very interesting: (in portuguese)
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/cotidiano/ult95u126723.shtml
Headline:Pilots deny having turned off Legacy equipment.
Eighth paragraph: American company ExcelAire, which bought the Legacy, is fearing to turn into a "scapegoat" and decided to go out of a defensive position and started an offensive, hiring lawyer José Carlos Dias' bureau and the communications agency Burson-Marsteller, represented in Brazil by Francisco de Carvalho.
Some aviation forums are already talking about similarities with other multicultural air crash investigations, such as Egypt Air 990.
Aldo L 19:35, 5 October 2006 (UTC)
While the media is publishing a lot of speculative stories, it is important to note that neither the Air Force nor the DAC/ANAC have published any accusatory material on their own websites. Furthermore, Brazil and the US have very close diplomatic ties, the NTSB and Boeing have personnel assisting with the investigation — the last thing they want is a diplomatic incident. |||
antiuser (
talk) (
contribs)
19:26, 5 October 2006 (UTC)
LEGACY FICOU FORA DO RADAR POR 15 MINUTOS E RECEBEU 5 ALERTAS. I will merge that information to the article later (replacing part of the speculation) if nobody beats me to it. -- cesarb 04:45, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
As mentioned above, we have to be extremely careful in building and updating this article, sticking to well supported facts and staying clear of speculations and misinformations. There are 2 types of relevant facts in this case: those that pertain specifically to this accident, and those that relate to aviation in general. Unfortunately, many of the statements in the press include speculations by both journalists as well as some officials, that are conflicting. What I suggest again is that we apply very strict standards of quality, and try our very best to stick to raw data and hard facts. I read the Globo article cited above, as well as previous Globo, Folha and other articles. Many have factual technical errors as well as sheer speculations. Since this article obviously involves living persons, both named (the Legacy crew) and as yet unnamed (the Brasilia, Manaus and other ATC personnel involved), we must adhere to WP's living persons sourcing policies. I see no problem to discuss and report here in the Talk page about speculations and allegations, but I don't think anything but hard, well supported (e.g. by raw data from CVR/FDR or ATC transcripts, ANAC, CENIPA or NTSB official statements) facts should go into the article. I hope we are in agreement. Crum375 12:59, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
I (and others) have already specifically agreed with this. I'm not sure why the reminder is necessary. But, in the same spirit, and hopefully unnecessarily, let me add I hope we will apply what Wikipedia policy actually says, not what we think it says or ought to say. Paul Beardsell 13:56, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
I added the part I think can be considered reliable (it was both radio and secondary radar, it's not "unclear" anymore, or at least it's less unclear from a similarly reliable source). While the article says the informations come from the ATC records and CVR records, I think it's better to wait before adding the rest (such as how many times they were contacted, that the primary radar was showing 36000 feet because it's less accurate, that they were going to ask other airplanes to help with the communication, etc); there have been way too many conflicting reports lately. -- cesarb 15:17, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
I added this template to the top of the Talk page to remind us all that even though this is not a biography article per se, it does deal with a high profile case with living persons and their reputations, careers and legal liabilities involved. Hence we should continue to carefully adhere to the ultra strict sourcing and validation policies of WP:BLP. Crum375 18:49, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
These excerpts may or may not be related to this accident. Please be careful.
From: http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/0/1bddc176ac629452862571e70059100d!OpenDocument Airworthiness Directive Federal Register Information Header Information DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA-2006-24639; Directorate Identifier 2005-NM-171-AD; Amendment 39-14761; AD 2006-19-04] RIN 2120-AA64 Airworthiness Directives; Honeywell RCZ-833J/K, -851J/K, and - 854J Communication (COM) Units, Equipped with XS-852E/F Mode S Transponders; and Honeywell XS-856A/B and -857A Mode S Transponders; Installed on But Not Limited to Certain Transport Category Airplanes PDF Copy (If Available): 2006-19-04.pdf Preamble Information AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Honeywell COM units and transponders, installed on but not limited to certain transport category airplanes. This AD requires a revision to the Normal Procedures section of the airplane flight manual to advise the flightcrew to check the status of the transponder after changing the air traffic control (ATC) code. This AD also requires replacing certain identification plate(s) with new plate(s), testing certain COM units or transponders as applicable, and corrective action if necessary. For certain airplanes, this AD requires replacing the transponders of certain COM units with new or modified transponders. For certain other airplanes, this AD requires installing a modification into certain transponders. This AD results from the transponder erroneously going into standby mode if the flightcrew takes longer than five seconds when using the rotary knob of the radio management unit to change the ATC code. We are issuing this AD to prevent the transponder of the COM unit from going into standby mode, which could increase the workload on the flightcrew and result in improper functioning of the traffic alert and collision avoidance system. DATES: This AD becomes effective October 17, 2006. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of October 17, 2006. Another excerpt from further down in the web page: Request To Revise Compliance Time Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (EMBRAER) requests that we extend the compliance time for the AFM revision from 5 to 30 days. EMBRAER asserts that the loss of the transponder does not pose so great of a hazard to justify such an urgent compliance time. As justification for extending the compliance time, EMBRAER states that some of the affected airplanes might be on international trips, where it may not be possible to return an airplane to a convenient location and accomplish the AFM revision within 5 days after the effective date of this AD. We agree that the compliance times can be extended somewhat. We have determined that extending the compliance time to 14 days will not adversely affect safety. Therefore, we have revised paragraph (f) of this AD accordingly. And yet another excerpt from further down in the web page: Applicability (c) This AD applies to the Honeywell parts identified in paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) of this AD, approved under Technical Standard Order TSO-C112, installed on but not limited to Bombardier Model BD-700-1A10 and BD-700-1A11 airplanes; Cessna Model 550 and 560 airplanes; Cessna Model 650 airplanes; Dassault Model Falcon 900EX airplanes, serial number (S/N) 97 and S/Ns 120 and subsequent; Dassault Model Falcon 2000EX airplanes, S/N 6 and S/Ns 28 and subsequent; EMBRAER Model EMB-135BJ, -135ER, -135KE, -135KL, and - 135LR airplanes; EMBRAER Model EMB-145, -145ER, -145MR, -145LR, - 145XR, -145MP, and -145EP airplanes; Learjet Model 45 airplanes; Lockheed Model 282-44A-05 (C-130B) airplanes; Lockheed Model 382G series airplanes; Raytheon Model Hawker 800 (including variant U- 125A), 800XP, and 1000 airplanes; certificated in any category. (1) Communication (COM) unit RCZ-833J part numbers (P/Ns) 7510700-763 and -863; RCZ-833K P/Ns 7510700-765 and -875; RCZ-851J P/N 7510700-813; RCZ-851K P/N 7510700-815; and RCZ-854J P/Ns 7510700-725 and -825. (2) Mode S transponder XS-856A P/Ns 7517400-865 and -885; XS- 856B P/Ns 7517400-866 and -886; and XS-857A P/Ns 7517400-876 and - 896. Unsafe Condition (d) This AD results from the transponder erroneously going into standby mode if the flightcrew takes longer than five seconds when using the rotary knob of the radio management unit to change the air traffic control code. We are issuing this AD to prevent the transponder of the COM unit from going into standby mode, which could increase the workload on the flightcrew and result in improper functioning of the traffic alert and collision avoidance system. Compliance (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done. Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Revision (f) For all airplanes: Within 14 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the Normal Procedures section of the applicable AFM to include the following statement: "After completion of any 4096 ATC Code change (also referred to as Mode A Code), check the status of the transponder. If the transponder indicates that it is in standby mode, re-select the desired mode (i.e., the transponder should be in the active mode)." This may be done by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. Accomplishing the actions specified in paragraph (h) or (j), as applicable, of this AD terminates the requirement of this paragraph. For the complete report please refer to the aforementioned Internet address. Aldo L 19:02, 6 October 2006 (UTC) [Editing note: Moved down from other section, squeezed out spaces. Crum375 20:25, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
Flight International published this more than one year ago:
DATE:02/08/05
SOURCE:Flight International
Transponder drop-outs spark AD
Regulators urged to act quickly as fault on Honeywell device causes flight details to disappear from radar screens
With aircraft suddenly disappearing from radar screens, air traffic controllers are calling on European safety regulators to speed up approval of a solution for a recurring fault afflicting Honeywell’s Primus II transponder.
European controllers lose identification and flight details for an aircraft around five times a month, says the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers (IFATCA). The data loss also disables air traffic control safety-net systems – short-term conflict alert and the airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) of the aircraft concerned.
IFATCA has written to the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), Eurocontrol and the Joint Aviation Authorities to try to accelerate the process of approving a permanent modification to the transponder to supersede the current operational “fix” proposed by Honeywell. IFATCA says EASA is shortly to publish an airworthiness directive (AD), but under present rules it would give carriers a year to comply, which it says is too long. Meanwhile, Honeywell says it has had a software fix available “for a while”, and airlines can obtain it by returning the transponder. It also has a rotable pool of units for loan.
The Honeywell Primus II Mode S (elementary) transponder has been fitted in some aircraft since September 2004. The problem has usually involved Embraer ERJ-135/145 regional jets and occurs when pilots are asked to change their four-digit “squawk” code – the flight identification code allocated by the ATC unit; if they take more than 5s to input the new code the transponder automatically switches to “standby”, making it unresponsive to interrogation by ground radar or by the ACAS transponders of other aircraft. In areas where there is only secondary radar with no primary radar back-up, the contact disappears from the controller’s display. IFATCA cites a case this year over France where an ERJ-145 flew for more than 30min in busy airspace without radar contact.
Honeywell has told pilots to select the transponder to standby before inputting the new code, then back to active once the code has been set; or they can check the annunciators on the unit or on the ACAS display after a reset, and if they indicate standby they should select the transponder to active.
The latter advice was accepted in January as “a mitigation procedure” by Eurocontrol’s Mode S regulatory group. “In themselves [these measures] are not a permanent solution,” says Eurocontrol, adding that EASA’s proposed AD is “expected to be released shortly”.
DAVID LEARMOUNT / LONDON
Aldo L 02:21, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
New York Times reported:
"Device on Jet in Amazon Crash Had Not Been Recalled as Faulty (...) Some transponders built by Honeywell, an American company, have been ordered repaired by the Federal Aviation Administration because they have stopped broadcasting unexpectedly in some cases. But a review of the part numbers on the Legacy shows that the model on the jet was not recalled, Bill Reavis, a Honeywell spokesman, said Sunday."
Full text at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/world/americas/09crash.html
Aldo L 06:32, 10 October 2006 (UTC)
I reverted the "airbase was not secret" and speculation about Sharkey's emotions because it was not sourced. We do have Sharkey on record saying it was secret (probably because someone told him so at the time), we don't have a reliable source saying it isn't. I did see a forum somewhere that mentioned it was originally a secret nuclear airbase during the 1980's; interesting if we can get more data on it. The US NTSB just calls it "Cachimbo air base" in the preliminary accident report. I'm sure we'll find out more in the future. If anyone has a reliable source about the base, feel free to add. Crum375 01:02, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
Seção de Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos ________________________________________________________________________________________
DEFINIÇÃO
Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos, de Incidentes Aeronáuticos e Ocorrência de Solo é o conjunto de atividades destinadas a impedir essas ocorrências, evitando assim custos adicionais desnecessários à operação através da preservação dos recursos humanos e materiais.
Os elementos que constituem a base e o objeto de toda a atividade de Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos são definidos no trinômio “homem-meio-máquina”.
PRINCÍPIOS BÁSICOS DO SIPAER
a) “Todo acidente aeronáutico pode e deve ser evitado”;
b) “Todo acidente aeronáutico resulta de uma seqüência de eventos, e nunca de uma causa isolada”;
c) “Todo acidente aeronáutico tem um precedente”;
d) “Prevenção de acidentes aeronáuticos é uma tarefa que requer mobilização geral”;
e) “O propósito da Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos não é restringir a atividade aérea, mas estimular o seu desenvolvimento com segurança”;
f) “Os Comandantes, Diretores e Chefes são os principais responsáveis pelas medidas de segurança”;
g) “Em prevenção de acidentes aeronáuticos não há segredos nem bandeiras”;
h) “Acusações e punições agem contra os interesses da Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos”.
It seems so eerily apt. (feel free to add to and fix my loose translation) Crum375 01:52, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
I revised the lead to better express the current known status, as I felt the old version was out of date. My only concern was about using the word 'collided' instead of 'probably colliding', but that would sound awkward and I think by now there is very little doubt left, and we certainly have plenty of sources. If anyone feels otherwise, please comment. Crum375 14:50, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
I think that these easily obtained pieces of evidence, that should be available hours if not minutes after an incident or accident, hold the key to this specific accident. If you had all the time-stamped transcripts, of all relevant frequencies, plus the landline contacts between the relevant ATC sectors, I think this case would probably be largely solved. Despite this, I see no reference anywhere in the Brazilian (or other) press to these crucial tapes or transcripts. They do not require a major effort to obtain or even analyze (at least superficially). Obviously with the Brazilian ATC being quasi-military (I am assuming) it may take longer than other countries where ATC is totally civilian. Can anyone shed any light on this issue? Crum375 16:29, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
As I mentioned elsewhere on this page, we need excellent sourcing on anything that casts a doubt on the proper conduct of any living person. In this case, it is premature to speculate on whether FL370 was 'correct' or 'legal' for the Legacy crew or not. There are multiple issues and rules to consider, for example:
These rules may vary between ICAO, FAA and Brazilian ANAC; obviously the latter would be most relevant. If someone can get the online version of the ANAC lost comm IFR procedures, that would be most helpful. But in the meanwhile, we can't just insert editorial comments or even quote from newspapers where we know that these issues are complex, unclear and conflicting. Thanks, Crum375 18:42, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
Here are the Regras do Ar e Serviços de Tráfego Aéreo (Brazilian Air Rules). I believe it's current.
http://www.icea.gov.br/ead/ima100-12intraer/sumario.htm
Aldo L 06:16, 10 October 2006 (UTC)
Both these plans were brand spanking NEW. You know when you pick up a car at the rental, you have to figure where the lights/wipers/ect are?? Well, maybe, just maybe these people didn't read the NEW owners manuels. Maybe the "another plan is about to hit us" alarm wasn't properly set. These plans were HOURS old...thats my take, we'll have to see....-- 68.228.148.52 22:41, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
I removed this section because I think that it is mostly WP:OR. If the contributor wants something like this to go into the article, every statement and factoid need to be meticulously sourced, per WP:V, WP:RS and WP:BLP. Crum375 23:53, 7 October 2006 (UTC)
I reverted these edits as I believe them to be a combination of WP:OR and improperly sourced statements. Since this article must conform to WP:BLP rules, it must have excellent quality sources for each allegation related to living people. Please discuss each intended change here first if at all possible. As example in this case (but only one example), we have no sources showing that Joe Sharkey said "the accident was caused by the poor flight control". Again, at WP we don't accept any facts that are not extremely well sourced when it relates to living people. Please note that per WP:BLP, anyone can remove unsourced or poorly sourced material in such cases, with no need for discussion or WP:3RR limits. Thanks, Crum375 00:09, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
As a heads-up to everyone collaborating to the article, Brazilian media is already reporting that the Air Force's preliminary findings are that the Legacy pilot is basically at fault. I recommend we hold any edits in that direction (assigning guilt) until the actual report is released, early next week.-- Dali-Llama 00:54, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
I think some things need to be added and some need to be cut.
At this point, I think the metion of the farmer spotting the plane low can be snipped out. Also, the discussion on whether there was a collision or not at first should be shortened.
We also need to add more. Supposedly the FAA was considering a recall of the transponder in use on the Legacy. Also, Joe Sharkey seems to be changing his story a bit, it's gotten more dramatic over the last few days. I would reconsider using him as a reliable source, though it could just be the "glad to be alive" wearing off. Also, to add more to the GOL Flight and the search for it, some relatives that were criticising the long wait were flown over the site by the Brazilian AF to see how challenging it was, and they thanked them for the hard work afterwards. Might be worth a mention.
And for human interest when the whole thing blows over, there's a photo of the Air Force throwing 154 roses over where the plane fell that imght go well in closing.
Just floating some ideas...
One of my own guiding principles in writing an 'encyclopedic' article for this type of a dynamically unfolding event is to try to shoot for 'permanence', i.e. ideally we should be gradually building, the 'final version'. Of course there is never anything really final on WP, but there is a 'stable version' which is close. My own crash articles, many of which were very sensational as they occurred, rarely get touched nowadays. The point here is to try to keep to a minimum both wrong info that will have to be reverted as we uncover the truth over time (although in principle WP allows us to include 'well sourced falsehoods') as well as anything that is clearly transient and will not belong in the 'final' or 'stable' version. The way to achieve that, IMO, is to keep insisting on 'excellent' sourcing for anything that we include, which we are required to anyway by WP:BLP rules. BTW, even if everyone in a crash dies, unlike here, you still need to practice care because first there are always live people potentially liable: mechanics, dispatchers, controllers, etc. and second, even casting premature (i.e. pre-final-report) blame on any deceased party carries legal liabilities.
Specifically in your suggestion list, I think the 154 dropped flowers, can certainly be added. The farmer seeing the plane flying low - I would leave it as the only eyewitness for now - it can be dropped down the road if it doesn't make the final report. The transponder issue I would leave until we know (from ultra reliable sources) if the Legacy actually had the model and serial number affected by the AD, and whether Embraer claims it had been complied with (and how - workaround, software fix). As to Joe Sharkey - I would stay away for now from subsequent bloggish statements made by him but keep the early ones, made as a direct and 'fresh' witness. Regarding the collision speculations, I would wait for some evidence of paint transfer - that would be fairly definitive. BTW, I read that one theory that was unlikely but could not yet be excluded is that the Gol broke up in midair for another reason, and one of the debris pieces hit the Embraer. Of course the FDR's from both planes could exclude that one based on precise timing.
All of the above is of course just my own opinion and is open to challenge and debate. Thanks, Crum375 11:54, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
With the overall theme of keeping this article tightly within WP's policies and guidelines, please consider the WP:EL guideline before adding any external links to the article. The one I just reverted does not necessarily contain technically incorrect data, but that's not a criterion for EL. In this case it is a clear case of WP:OR in a non-notable web site. One cannot evade WP:NOR by just setting up a web site and linking to it. In any case I think we are in general agreement that we should only allow hard evidence (as defined elsewhere) into the article and no speculations. Thanks, Crum375 16:59, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
I reverted this new section due to improper sourcing which fails WP:V, WP:OR, WP:NPOV, WP:RS, etc. Right now we have the Brazilian ANAC and CENIPA officially investigating this accident. They have the actual flight plans that were filed by the two flights, the initial IFR clearances that were issued by ATC (which supersede any filed plan) as well as the enroute clearances (which supersede the initial clearance). Clearances include both routes and altitudes. The ANAC also have the transcripts of the readback for each clearance, which are crucial for any potential miscommunication. They also know the specific variations of the Brazilian flight rules from the ICAO rules, if any. The newspapers at this point are printing a lot of conflicting reports and speculations. It is important for us to keep our eyes on the ball and ensure that all our sources are of the best possible quality, as this article relates to living people and to potential liablities. I believe that high quality sources in this case are the ANAC, CENIPA, the U.S. NTSB, ATC tapes/transcripts, CVR/FDR transcripts, etc. I think the other editors on this page are in agreement, as noted above. Crum375 03:00, 9 October 2006 (UTC)
My main issue with using the flight plans is that as it stands even the pilots disagree with the ATC as to what the filed Flight Level was, with the pilots stating that the flight plan was filed for FL370 all the way to Manaus, and the ATC saying that it's technically impossible as the filing computer would declare a conflict with flight rules of the airway. And, as Crum mentioned, we don't know what clearances and changes were made afterwards. I would be okay with a "he-said, she-said" edit containing the flight plan data, with both the going ATC version and the pilots' versions, but we can't be stating it as fact until the preliminary report is out in the next couple of days.-- Dali-Llama 15:52, 9 October 2006 (UTC)
Well, I'm glad this part's over--phew!-- Dali-Llama 03:04, 10 October 2006 (UTC)
I removed a statement about ICAO altitude rules for two reasons: first, it is unsourced (and per WP:BLP must be removed from this article on sight, as it could be seen as casting blame); second, there is no indication that ICAO rules were applicable or relevant for this particular flight. Let me mention another point while we are at it. This point was also raised earlier by Antiuser, that if the Legacy flight was expected to use FL360 or FL380, this could only be accomplished via RVSM. Up to a few years ago, in most of the world, only the odd altitudes were available and legal from FL290 to FL410. The even altitudes of FL300 to FL400 were simply unheard of (to my knowledge) and never used by normal civilian flights, leaving a 2,000' separation at the higher cruising altitudes. One of the main reasons for the original larger separation (vs. 1,000' at the lower altitudes) was that altimeter error of +/-1% at 35,000' is +/-350', enough to bring two flights separated by only 1000' unacceptably close to each other vertically. The RVSM is an attempt to squeeze more flights vertically into the same airspace by insisting on higher accuracy standards, more equipment and training, etc. and is still somewhat controversial, quoting from WP:
Critics of the change are concerned that by reducing the space between aircraft, DRVSM may increase the number of mid-air collisions and near-collisions. In the US this program was known as the Domestic Reduced Separation Minimum (DRVSM).
Anyway, I suspect that this issue will also come up during the investigation, but I don't see how ICAO can mandate even altitudes for the higher flight levels where clearly using RVSM requires special approval from the aviation authorities. [12]
Of course, Brazilian flight rules could very well be different. If anyone can shed more light on this issue, please chime in. Crum375 12:20, 12 October 2006 (UTC)
Whereas I don't disagree with the removal of the default altitude material it is for a different reason than Crum's: Quoting details of this particular rule at this time gives it far too much weight. It just does not matter what that particular rule says: What is important is twofold: Firstly, the altitude for which each aircraft was actually cleared by ATC and, secondly, if either of the aircraft deviated from their clearance. The actual details of RVSM seem completely irrelevant at this time and I bet will remain so. Paul Beardsell 17:56, 12 October 2006 (UTC)
A different point: The idea that quoting an aviation rule can defame anyone seems a little far fetched to me. I agree with WP:BPL - I just think that policy is being cited in this case entirely inappropriately. Certainly, if a rule was relevant I would want to see it cited in the article and now. Indeed, already in the article there is info present which allows one to see how blame might be apportioned depending upon facts as they are revealed. But no one is removing that info. Good! But why the inconsistency? Paul Beardsell 17:56, 12 October 2006 (UTC)
(outdent) I believe the Embraer crew testified they did have a comm failure, but having read so many different and conflicting versions, I am not sure exactly when it started. OTOH, a brief 'comm failure' is very commonplace, certainly to be expected over undeveloped and uninhabited areas, and when such an outage occurs, you don't instantly start lost comm procedure - mostly you try to raise ATC on some other frequency, and this may take a while. You may punch in the lost comm code. If there are terrain obstacles coming up then you may have to climb, but in this case at FL370 this was not an issue. So yes, there was an outage, of unclear duration, which along with the exact procedure followed by the Embarer crew remains to be revealed. Crum375 23:31, 12 October 2006 (UTC)
I cannot find any reference to the Embraer pilots thinking anything was untoward before the collision. When it comes to comms failures I think the ATC version of events, that they tried to raise the Embraer seven times, without trying to talk to the 737, is just a little odd. Paul Beardsell 23:42, 12 October 2006 (UTC)