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I haven't weighed in on the language of the intro section. Given the current ~3 paragraph intro I think the fuel tank part should be the last paragraph. I'm also OK with basically arranging the article with the fuel tank stuff at the end. Basically discuss the car and sibling models first. This would include press reviews, SCCA etc. Once finished then move to the controversy section. I would suggest the intro should follow in the same order. To be fair, I do think that at this point the most significant thing about the Pinto is the fuel tank/safety controversy. I'm suggesting making it basically the second half of the Pinto article (in truth it could be a separate article) about the issue because I think the topic is too significant to mix between a discussion of the Pinto and Bobcat. For that same reason I think the controversy section should be the last paragraph, not the middle, of the intro. I also think that we should use terms like alleged or other words that indicate that many of the claims made against the Pinto regarding safety etc were not proven. Honestly we should treat MJ as an unreliable yet significant source in this article. Springee ( talk) 20:48, 16 February 2016 (UTC)
CRICKETS??????? I've told you the main faults in MJ. here's a longer version deindent for convenience
MJ 1
By conservative estimates Pinto crashes have caused 500 burn deaths to people who would not have been seriously injured if the car had not burst into flames. The figure could be as high as 900.
refutation Schwartz 27
MJ 2
Ford waited eight years because its internal "cost-benefit analysis," which places a dollar value on human life, said it wasn't profitable to make the changes sooner.
No CBA was ever found for Pinto and rear end collisions (not saying it wasn't done)
MJ 3
The product objectives are clearly stated in the Pinto "green book." This is a thick, top-secret manual in green covers
Which MJ then contradicts by saying " The product objectives for the Pinto are repeated in an article by Ford executive F.G. Olsen published by the Society of Automotive Engineers." Highly unusual for a ford executive to print stuff from a TOP SECRET document, unless of course it isn't TOP SECRET at all. Maybe TOP SECRET is being used to make things more interesting.
MJ 4
To everyone's surprise, the 1977 Pinto recently passed a rear-end crash test in Phoenix, Arizona, for NHTSA. The agency was so convinced the Pinto would fail that it was the first car tested. Amazingly, it did not burst into flame.
Comment. I'm not amazed. it is not typical for a leaking gas tank to catch fire, whether in a crash test or anywhere else. It can certainly happen, but in the majority of cases I've seen gasoline pooling on the road, not burning.
MJ 5
Seventy or more people will burn to death in those cars every year for many years to come.
Schwartz 27 total
MJ 6
cost-valuing human life is not used by Ford alone. Ford was just the only company careless enough to let such an embarrassing calculation slip into public records.
Comment. Well, there'll be a whole damn lot more of these revealtions since it is standard practice mandated by NHTSA.
Greglocock ( talk) 04:51, 17 February 2016 (UTC)
Prior content in this article duplicated one or more previously published sources. The material was copied from: http://uniquecarsandparts.com/car_info_ford_pinto_v6_wagon.htm). Copied or closely paraphrased material has been rewritten or removed and must not be restored, unless it is duly released under a compatible license. (For more information, please see "using copyrighted works from others" if you are not the copyright holder of this material, or "donating copyrighted materials" if you are.)
For legal reasons, we cannot accept copyrighted text or images borrowed from other web sites or published material; such additions will be deleted. Contributors may use copyrighted publications as a source of information, and, if allowed under fair use, may copy sentences and phrases, provided they are included in quotation marks and referenced properly. The material may also be rewritten, providing it does not infringe on the copyright of the original or plagiarize from that source. Therefore, such paraphrased portions must provide their source. Please see our guideline on non-free text for how to properly implement limited quotations of copyrighted text. Wikipedia takes copyright violations very seriously, and persistent violators will be blocked from editing. While we appreciate contributions, we must require all contributors to understand and comply with these policies. Thank you. Hugh ( talk) 00:38, 5 March 2016 (UTC)
The article credits Lee Iacocca for the car. At the time of its design, he was in charge of the Ford Division -- clearly responsible for executive oversight, but too high up to be the real design, engineering, or product planning force. I am trying to research who else was involved. He clearly was the leading executive sponsor, however. Paulmeisel 02:48, 2 January 2006 (UTC)
My father worked on the Pinto as well as the Mustang. He always blamed Iacocca for the Pinto and thought he took too much credit for the Mustang. The Pinto was built based on his specification that it would cost $1000. Someone else says $2000, but that's probably what they sold it for originally. The Mustang was actually a lower profile project to redesign the Falcon. Of course, Iacocca did not want to take credit for the Pinto. My family had a Mustang and a Pinto. In the mid-70s they weren't that different, which Iacocca probably had something to do with also. Come to think of it those Chyrsler K-cars were junk heaps as well. The only people that bought them were true patriots. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.59.237.189 ( talk) 21:16, 26 May 2008 (UTC)
My father, Robert Emil Eidschun (born 1938) designed the Pinto -- largely at our home in Livonia, Michigan, and I remember his doing it. I was very young the time but I remember his doing it in a studio that he built in the basement of our house. In addition, I have some of his original sketches to prove it, as well as his own personal photos of the clay models that were made based on his sketches. The various claims made by Bob Thomas and others for the design of the Pinto are misleading, as those folks were involved in managing the design process or had designed elements of the Pinto that were ultimately rejected. But Robert Eidschun's design was eventually chosen in its entirety. Perhaps I should post scans of his sketches and the photos he took of the clay models? - Robert Walter Eidschun —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.67.31.237 ( talk) 12:26, 7 December 2010 (UTC)
According to the California appellate court in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., the Pinto was a "rush project," and while standard automotive industry practice was that "engineering studies precede the styling," in the case of the Pinto project "styling preceded engineering and dictated engineering design to a greater degree than usual."
The source highly reliable and extraordinarily neutral. The content is relevant to the design process as a whole. The design process is noteworthy for its record pace. We are asked to include all significant points of view WP:YESPOV. The claim is not in Wikipedia voice. The content is clearly attributed in-text for possible bias WP:ATTRIBUTEPOV. Hugh ( talk) 00:23, 6 March 2016 (UTC)
HughD, I'm sorry you are not familiar with some of the discussions regarding automobile pages. Not all recalls are considered worth noting on the article page. For example, the one you just added [ [2]] is not significant enough to make it to the page. Please show some sense of judgment when adding material. Springee ( talk) 05:12, 7 March 2016 (UTC) HughD, since you are not using good judgment regarding which recalls are worth mention and you refuse to engaged in talk page discussions, please review this Automobile Project page proposal [ [3]]. It makes it clear that the material you added is not encyclopedic. Springee ( talk) 05:32, 7 March 2016 (UTC)
Yesterday's recall, one of the largest in automotive history, was not the first involving the Pinto - a car introduced in 1970 as a crossbreed of American and European technology that was designed to battle small imported autos. More than 2.5 million have been sold. Soon after the Pinto was introduced, 26,000 were recalled because accelerators were sticking. Later, 220,000 Pintos were recalled for modifications to prevent possible engine compartment fires.
I condensed the list of "worst" lists that were mentioned in this section [ [4]]. My condensed version is here [ [5]]. The exact quotes from the sources are not particularly important given that none of the sources are automotive press. Forbes and Time are saying essentially the same thing. Business Week is offering an opinion on the styling of the car but I think it would be reasonable to say Business Week is not a notable opinion with regards to vehicle styling. What is significant is that the car made it to several "worst" lists, not the details of why. It is sloppy work to have each reference as a separate paragraph. There is certainly no reason for WP:PEACOCK material such as adding "Pulitzer-Prize winning" [ [6]]. HughD, please consider your edits more carefully before adding. Speaking of that, please work on your edits in a sandbox then roll them out all at once. It's crazy that that you have added 150 edits (!) to the article in just 4 days [ [7]]. Please take time to consider your edits, discuss them here then roll them out. I'm seeing the same disturbing pattern of ignoring the concerns of other editors here that resulted in sanctions against you on other topics. Springee ( talk) 23:18, 6 March 2016 (UTC)
HughD, please review WP:PEACOCK. You may disagree with me regarding the Businessweek as a RS (you have not attempted to justify that source) but you also restored obvious peacock language that you previously added. I've now had to remove it twice. If you don't start cooperating with other editors your editor behavior will have to be reviewed. Springee ( talk) 17:30, 7 March 2016 (UTC)
HughD, you are correct the lead is supposed to summarize the article. However, your recent edit to the lead contains errors. The NHTSA did not say the Pinto fuel "defect" resulted in fires. They don't use that sort of phrasing. They said "linked". Your edit claiming a causal relationship is simply wrong. Please show some care with such edits. Springee ( talk) 02:16, 7 March 2016 (UTC)
The part about nobody investigating Mustangs for explosions and fires is actually wrong. 60 Minutes did an investigation of Mustangs in the early 2000s.
(dummy thread contribution for archiving unsigned thread) Hugh ( talk) 16:26, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
The article states that Net Horsepower is horsepower measured at the wheels. This is incorrect. Net horsepower is still measured at the flwyheel. Th difference is that net horsepower is measured with the engined fully dressed with accessories.
(dummy thread contribution for archiving unsigned thread) Hugh ( talk) 16:26, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
This article has essentially two major topics. The first is the general discussion of the car which would be similar to other WP articles on cars. Material such as specifications, reviews, sales etc would go into that section. The safety controversy associated with the Pinto is the other major section. Discussions related to the car's engineering, safety etc which are related to the fuel tank fire controversy should be reserved for that section of the article. For example, a California appellate court's opinion on the engineering of the car based on only the testimony allowed into a lawsuit is NOT a reliable engineering opinion. Furthermore, such claims are contradicted by the historical record presented by Schwartz and others.
The controversy section, while increasing in length is actually dropping in quality due to a systematic removal of later sources which have pointed out significant errors in the early accounts and understanding of the Pinto's engineering and real world safety performance. We should not put those same questionable statements in other parts of the article. Springee ( talk) 00:03, 6 March 2016 (UTC)
HughD, user Greglocock expressed concerns about editorial bias in your edits to the related Grimshaw article [ [9]]. I think those same concerns apply here. Please consider your edits in context of talk page discussions that occurred before you joined this article. Those concerns, especially the ones related to the organizational structure of the fire controversy section and the removal of recent scholarly reviews of the case by Schwartz and others are still valid. Springee ( talk) 00:10, 6 March 2016 (UTC)
HughD, the material you moved is introductory. There is not talk page discussion, and certainly not one that you have participated in, that justified moving a high level general statement about the controversy to the retrospective section. Furthermore, if you followed the conversations that took place before you jointed this article, it was clear that we were not sure of the exact layout of the controversy section. A lead that states that there is a great deal of confusion and misinformation IS part of to the section lead. Springee ( talk) 19:53, 7 March 2016 (UTC)
There are really two stories here. 1) The controversy created by the Ford report. 2) The subsequent research suggesting the controversy may have been overblown. If we divide those two stories into two subsections I think it's going to be clearer for the reader. I also think this solution is going to let everyone insert the information they want in there.
The article could benefit from more sourcing from peer reviewed academic journals. They are ample. Good idea. I think your problem is you seem to have stopped after you found two that share a point of view in the direction of revisionism and exoneration. Some of the proposed edits above in this thread are best I can tell a minority telling of events, almost pseudo-historical. We have policies and guidelines that deal with this situation. Is the Pinto more or less safe overall than other cars, or other cars in its class, or its closest competitors? If you have sources that say so, feel free to start a section somewhere. It doesn't alter events. Some stuff definitely happened.
Hugh (
talk)
05:58, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
[Comments below were nested in reply above - any editor may remove this note] Springee ( talk) 12:50, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
In reply to Hugh's points (please number them in the future) 1. Yes, as specifically mentioned by numerous scholarly sources there is a great deal of misinformation that gets retold and thus people assume it to be true. Because of that issue we should rely most heavily on the sources that really investigated the issues rather than ones that repeat what is "known".
2. The cars that caught fire in crash tests were cars that were rigged to catch fire. Please cite your reliable source that says otherwise. I can cite sources to support my statements. It helps that, unlike you, I have been reading about this topic for several years.
3. Schwartz is perhaps the most significant, reliable source on the subject. Sure MJ is significant but not reliable. I know you are a bit of a Chicago fan, perhaps you will take this source as reliable [10] "Gary was one of the preeminent torts scholars of his generation. Many of his articles are staples of the literature. (See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013 (1991).) ". The article is also widely cited as reliable, even by Becker, a source you brought to the table.
4. Actually is does. Because we quote MJ without noting that the article has been criticized for poor accuracy and for being inflammatory you are creating a misleading story. You had a similar issue with the Grimshaw article. You wanted to use the appellate court's findings of fact as reliable fact [11] even though procedural rules made this a bad idea. Basically quoting/paraphrasing the source and then failing to note that it has been discredited is the same as treating it as reliable.
5. The NHTSA was under considerable political pressure to find a problem (See Rossow, section 2.7 "Recall" and Lee and Ermann page 41). MJ and the Grimshaw trial lawyers did in fact work together. Danley, footnote 12: "Based on information given to it by lawyers preparing cases against Ford, the Center for Auto Safety petitioned NHTSA in the mid-1970s to investigate the Pinto's rear-end design. According to material presented on the Center's website, Dowie's article is based on that information, made available to him by the Center. ... In an interview with Schwartz, Copp asserted that he was also a major source of the information for the Mother Jones story." It shouldn't be surprising that a litigation team would use the press to generate bad publicity before a trial. The same thing occurred to Audi and GM (saddle tanks).
6. Our lead says Ford was indited, why not say "found not guilty?" Both are true but you picked the more damning language. Why put so much emphasis on the pretrial gory details (Becker talks about this) vs talking about the issues with the case and explaining that because Ford was able to show the real world performance of the car was sound the claims didn't stand. You noted the difference in budgets for the legal teams but you didn't note that public opinion was heavily against Ford because of the bad press coverage. Basically, you seem to want to include only the negative news and ignore the rest.
7. The "popular understanding" section was being discussed prior to your arrival. Unlike you, I was working on a set of changes off line that could be rolled out with just a few article edits. I hope you understand that 200+ edits in 5 days means you are doing something wrong! Anyway, since that section appears unlikely now, it makes sense to include discussions of misinformation in each subsection. Please note that I don't necessarily support your updated subsection headings. Springee ( talk) 16:13, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
Sorry, I now understand how important the integrity of your walls of text are to you. I will not intersperse comments in the context of your bullet points, even 7 item lists. Thanks. Hugh ( talk) 20:14, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
1. ...we should rely most heavily on the sources that really investigated the issues rather than ones that repeat what is "known".
Let me guess, the real sources are Schwartz and Lee & Erdman? The truth is out there? Hugh ( talk) 20:14, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
2. The cars that caught fire in crash tests were cars that were rigged to catch fire.
Yikes. With that comment it is clear to me that this particular proposed editorial direction is more than I can deal with alone; kindly requesting de-lurking guys, you know how you are. Help! Of course all crash tests are "rigged" in the sense that they are all by definition simulations. If you believe the NHTSA was motivated by anything other than concern for public safety, that is an extraordinary claim that requires multiple extraordinarily strong noteworthy reliable sources, and even then may be undue weight here as a minority view. Thank you. Hugh ( talk) 20:14, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
3. Gary was one of the preeminent torts scholars of his generation
The Mother Jones article was later awarded a Pulitzer Prize.
Schwartz said the Mother Jones (magazine) article won a Pulitzer Prize for their Pinto article. Would you support adding that to our article, sourced to Schwartz? Thank you. Hugh ( talk) 17:27, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
4. ...we quote MJ without noting that the article has been criticized for poor accuracy and for being inflammatory
Please drop the stick and back away from Mother Jones (magazine). You seem obsessed with the Mother Jones (magazine) article. Our article does not quote from Mother Jones (magazine). Our article notes the key role of the article in events, and has a one sentence, neutral paraphrase summarization of the article, which seems to me due weight. You have largely succeeded in your crusade to exclude Mother Jones (magazine) as a source for content for this article. Uncontent with that, you are crusading to make sure our readers are aware that everything that everyone knows about the history of the Ford Pinto was polluted by Mother Jones (magazine) until a few courageous scholars like Schwartz set us right in the 1990s. Hugh ( talk) 17:56, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
5. The NHTSA was under considerable political pressure to find a problem
Our article says merely that the NHTSA initiated an investigation, and made a determination. Our article makes no claims about the NHTSA motivations. If by political pressure you mean letters from the public, that is well document and due weight. However, if your theory of events is that the NHTSA was manipulated by Mother Jones (magazine) or lawyers or motivated by anything other than concern for public safety, that is an extraordinary claim that requires multiple extraordinarily strong noteworthy reliable sources, and even then may be undue weight here as a minority view. Again, forgive me for repeating myself, our project has policy and guideline regarding due weight of minority views. Thank you. Hugh ( talk) 17:48, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
6. Body 1st, then lede. Thanks. Hugh ( talk)
HughD, when the article lock is lifted I would ask that you limit your edits per day. Currently you are average 40 per day. In just 5 days you have almost as many edits as the top page editor added over 8 years! This and your limited discussion and consensus building on the talk page may be [WP:DE]. Please use your sandbox for making a series of changes that can then be added to the article at one time. Please discussion what you see as good content and scope for the various sections on the talk page. Remember that others have a voice too. Springee ( talk) 16:44, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
I'm going to copy some sections from this article for people to read. Please ask if you have questions.
Long quote from Lee and Ermann article
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Technical Core Beliefs and Actions (1967-1973) To explain what employees in Ford's technical core subunits believed, when they believed it, and how corporate structures influenced them to communicate and act on their beliefs, we separate design from marketing stages. During the design stage ( 1967-1970), Ford technical core employees did not view their actions as taking calculated risks with consumers' lives. Even Harley Copp, the outspoken Ford safety whistle-blower, never asserted that informed Ford participants believed the car was unsafe. Furthermore, they were not thinking about potential lawsuits when making design decisions (Feaheny 1997; Gioia 1996). And they did not refuse to correct perceived problems because settling lawsuits would be cheaper (NHTSA C7-38; Strobel1980). Although technical core work groups were not informed by explicit cost-benefit analyses (we explain these analyses below), they did recognize that unavoidable cost and time constraints make safety trade-offs inevitable for all product designs (see Lowrance 1976). For the auto industry, with its long history of subordinating safety to styling (Eastman 1 984; Nader 1965), implicit safety compromises were particularly common. In the Pinto case, Lee Iacocca and others wanted to compete with foreign imports with a car that weighed less than 2,000 pounds and cost less than $2,000 (Camps 1997; Dowie 1977; Strobel1980). Other car manufacturers were building cars under similar or more stringent guidelines (Davidson 1983 ). Commentators on the Pinto case (writing in a later era with different beliefs) assume that fuel tank leakage in rear end-crash tests must have alarmed both engineers and managers. They didn't, because the tests were not sufficiently convincing at the time (or even today). Crash tests during that era were novel procedures. Both the auto industry and NHTSA were more concerned with the reliability and validity of the tests than with safety data generated by a particular car's tests. Harold MacDonald, the engineer in charge of the Pinto's design, and every other engineer charged with interpreting crash-test data at the time-all of whom whistleblower Harley Copp considered "safety-conscious individuals" (Strobel 1980:183)-doubted that the tests accurately represented real-world conditions (Feaheny 1997). After all, they reasoned, a car slamming backwards into a wall at twenty to thirty miles per hour in a crash test is only a rough approximation of a real-world car-to-car crash. Results that seemed "troubling" (Schwartz 1991:1028) to later writers seemed less problematical at the time and were neutralized by participants' background assumptions about small cars and crashworthiness. NHTSA validated the engineers' skepticism by asking the auto industry to help develop reliable and cost-effective ways to approximate real-world conditions (Strobel1980). Thus, engineers in the design stage were still trying "to find out how to conduct crash tests" (Feaheny 1997; see also Lacey 1986:613). For example, an internal Pinto test report dated November, 1970 listed as its objective "To develop a test procedure to be used to provide baseline data on vehicle fuel system integrity" (NHTSA C7-38-Al.5, Final Test Report #T- 0738). In this test, a Pinto sedan exhibited "excessive fuel tank leakage" when towed rearward into a fixed barrier at 21.5 miles per hour, considered roughly equivalent to a car-to-car impact at 35 miles per hour. Nothing in this, or any other, Ford test report indicates that participants felt cause for concern or organizational action. Although some Ford engineers were not especially pleased, they felt that the data were inconclusive or the risks acceptable (Feaheny 1997; Strobel 1980), or they kept their concerns to themselves (Camps 1997). Some felt that cars would rarely be subjected to the extreme forces generated in a fixed-barrier test in real-world collisions (Feaheny 1997; Devine 1996). NHTSA apparently agreed and ultimately replaced the proposed fixedbarrier test with a less-stringent moving-barrier test in its final standard (U.S. Department of Transportation 1988). Occupational caution encouraged engineers to view many design adjustments that improved test performance as "unproven" in real-world accidents (Devine 1996; Feaheny 1997; Schwartz 1991; Strickland 1996; Strobel 1980). Engineers, who typically value "uncertainty avoidance" (Allison 1971:72 ), chose to stick with an existing design rather than face uncertainties associated with novel ones (Devine 1996; Strobel 1980). One series of tests, for instance, showed that Pintos equipped with pliable foam-like gas tanks would not leak in 30 mile-per-hour crashes. But some engineers feared that such a tank might melt and disagreed with others who felt it was safer than the existing metal design (Devine 1996, see also Strobel 1980). Other engineers believed that rubber bladders improved performance in tests, but anticipated problems under real-world conditions (Strobel 1980). 3 Ford whistle-blower Harley Copp's argument-that the Pinto would have been safer had its gas tank been placed above the axle rather than behind it-is often cited in Pinto narratives as an example of safety being sacrificed to profits, or at least trunk space, in the design stage (Cullen, Maakestad and Cavender 1987; Dowie 1977; Strobel1994). Yet Copp did not reach this conclusion until1977 (Strobel1980). And other engineers were considerably less certain about it, even though the above-the-axle design did perform better in one set of crash tests. The engineer overseeing the Pinto's design, Harold MacDonald (whose father died in a fuel tank fire when his Model A Ford exploded after a frontal collision with a tree), felt that the above-theaxle placement was less safe under real-world conditions because the tank was closer to the passenger compartment and more likely to be punctured by items in the trunk (Strobel1980). Additionally, after making a judgment that the Pinto was acceptably safe, most participants readily devalued subsequent competing definitions (Feaheny 1997). Lou Tubben, an engineer Nwith a genuine concern for safety" (Dowie 1977:23), did not press his concerns until1971-after the car's release. Frank Camps (1981, 1997), another concerned engineer, did not formally object to the Pinto's windshield and frontal-impact fuel tank design problems until1973, and never objected to rear-end fuel tank integrity. Tom Feaheny (1997) was worried about the lack of safety glass on all Ford models, and viewed the Pinto gas tank as a "nonissue" by comparison. In sum, the design stage was not characterized by an engineering consensus that the Pinto was Nunsafe." The value of crash tests was unclear. The Pinto's specific "problem" (e.g., frontal fuel tank integrity, safety glass) varied among those few engineers troubled by the car's safety performance. A "safe" placement of the gas tank was not identified, and the safety value of potential design changes was subject to disagreement. Additionally, engineers believed that the crash test performance of other small cars, particularly imports, was "terrible" (Feaheny 1997). Given this background and the host of other safety issues confronting engineers as a result of the recently passed MVSA, it is not surprising that many Pinto engineers and their family members (e.g., the chief systems engineer's wife) drove Pintos (Strobel1980). In the design stage (1967-1970), no company or government standard on rear-end fuel tank integrity existed to guide the engineers, but their actions were consistent with the takenfor- granted, industry-wide tradition of building lower levels of crashworthiness into small cars. This situation changed in the marketing stage (post 1970). Shortly after the 1971 model year Pintos were released, Ford adopted an internal20 mile-per-hour moving barrier standard for the 1973 model year-the only manufacturer to do so (Gioia 1996; Strobel 1994). The extant legal/regulatory environment reinforced engineers' beliefs that this standard was Nquite reasonable" since it was the "same one recommended at that time by the federal General Services Administration; the Canadian equivalent of the GSA; the Society of Automotive Engineers; and a private consulting firm hired by NHTSA ... " and by NHTSA itself in 1969 (Strobel 1980:205). This standard would constrain future debates by certifying the Pinto as "safe" to Ford's subunit charged with evaluating potential recallable safety problems. Most Ford technical core personnel became less involved with Pinto safety during the marketing stage. One exception was Dennis Gioia, who began a new job in another part of Ford's technical core in the summer of 1972. A self-described Mchild of the '60s," Gioia ( 1992:379) hoped to change an industry he saw as insensitive to safety concerns. Within one year, this inexperienced recent MBA graduate was promoted to Field Recall Coordinator and charged with coordinating all active safety recall campaigns and identifying potential safety problems. Thus Ford had at least one individual in its technical core with the inclinations and authority, though little experience or organizational power, for taking a stand on the Pinto gas tank issue. When Gioia became Recall Coordinator, he inherited about 100 active recall campaigns, half of them safety-related. As with most jobs, the enormous workload required him to use Mstandard operating procedures" (SOPs) to organize and manage information for decision making (d. Kriesberg 1976:1102). SOPs increase organizational efficiency by operating as cognitive scripts that transform decision-making opportunities into largely predetermined action patterns. Existing SOPs required that, to be "recallable," problems needed either high frequency or a directly traceable causal link to a design defect. When reports began to trickle in to Gioia that Pintos were "lighting up" in relatively low speed accidents, and after viewing the burned wreckage of a Pinto, he initiated a meeting to determine if this represented a recallable problem. His work group voted unanimously not to recall the Pinto because the weak data did not meet SOP criteria (Gioia 1996). The work group was unaware of any cost-benefit analyses or Pinto crash test results. Reports of Pinto fires continued to trickle in, and eventually Gioia did become aware of, and concerned about, the crash test results. Again he wondered if the Pinto had a recallable problem, so he initiated a second meeting to convince his co-workers that crash tests showed a possible design flaw. But others again saw no design flaws-after all, the Pinto met internal company standards, and no contradictory external standard existed. The work group conceived the tank leak "problem" not as a defect, but as a fundamental and unalterable design feature: the car's small size, the use of light metals, and unibody construction produced a tendency for Pintos (and others in its class) to "crush up like an accordion" in rear-end collisions (Gioia 1996). In light of what they believed, work group members felt they would become the "laughing stock" of the company if they recommended a recall (Gioia 1996). But fear of ridicule did not motivate their vote. They doubted a recall's legitimacy, or its chances of approval. NHTSA's Role In The Landmark Narrative We now consider NHTSA's often contradictory contribution to the Pinto landmark narrative. Two issues are of primary importance: the selection of the Pinto for recall and NHTSA's use of cost-benefit analysis. NHTSA ultimately recalled the Pinto, but this outcome was far from predictable given the agency's record on the issue of fuel tank integrity. NHTSA's top administrator even testified on behalf of Ford in the Pinto's criminal trial (Strobel 1980). While NHTSA's actions appear Mrational" from a distance, like Ford's they were the product of compromise, conflicting organizational interests and routines, and environmental pressures and constraints. Before we examine NHTSA's actions concerning the Pinto, some background is necessary. Most accidents involve multiple factors contributing to the crash itself or the resulting death and injury. In detailed studies of specific accidents (see NHTSA C7-38), NHTSA employees made numerous recommendations for tougher standards regarding driver behavior (e.g., drunk driving laws), road safety (e.g., guardrails), and vehicle design (e.g., airbag standards). Outside parties (e.g., consumer groups, insurance companies, state government agencies) lobbied NHTSA to take action on particular problems. Therefore, deciding which problems to address was far from clear, given the blizzard of information and cross-pressures (Mashaw and Harfst 1990). Following two fuel tank burn deaths when a large truck rear-ended a Pinto in 1976, for instance, Pennsylvania's Bureau of Traffic Engineering pleaded with NHTSA for tougher truck braking standards, not auto fuel tank integrity standards. As early as 1968, the year of its creation, NHTSA had attempted to adopt a fuel tank integrity standard. The specifics of the standard were subject to much disagreement. In addition to dealing with industry claims that NHTSA's fuel tank integrity proposals would prove ineffective, NHTSA had to son through a fog of ambiguous data on vehicle fires. An Insurance Institute for Highway Safety study (NHTSA C7-38), for instance, reported that only 72 (out of a sample of 1,923) fires in 1973 resulted from collisions. Of these 72 fires, only 24 originated in the fuel tank-most began in the engine compartment and were caused by electrical shorts. Additionally, a number of factors affected the likelihood of vehicle fires, including make and age of the vehicle. The Pinto landmark narrative describes unique design features that purportedly made the Pinto less crashwonhy than other cars: for example, bolts on the differential housing and a fuel filler pipe that easily pulled out in collisions. Yet these same issues had been identified much earlier with other cars. For example, a 1970 NHTSA report (C7-38), along with a 1968 Society of Automotive Engineers report, found that pre-1967 Ford sedans exhibited "gross fuel spillage [in crash tests] arising out of the detachment of the filler spout" and tank punctures caused by a "poorly located track-bar bolt." NHTSA did not recall these cars to fix this acceptable risk. Forcing a "Voluntary" Recall In September, 1974, NHTSA crash-tested a number of vehicles, including the Pinto, Mto verify the [Department of Transportation's] rear-end moving barrier procedure ... " (NHTSA C7-38). Several cars, including the Pinto, exhibited significant fuel loss in 30 mile-per-hour tests. A 1969 Plymouth station wagon exhibited a Msteady flow of fuel." Like the Ford crash- test reports discussed above, NHTSA's report expressed neither shock nor concern, concluding only that "The tests indicated that the procedure would produce repeatable test results." None of the cars were subjected to follow-up studies or recall proceedings. 5 Also in 1974, Ralph Nader's Center for Auto Safety asked NHTSA to investigate Pinto fuel tank integrity. NHTSA beliefs and procedures were similar to Ford's: not enough evidence existed to warrant a full defect investigation (Graham I 991). The Pinto had no "recallable" problem, even though people were dying in Pinto fires. By 1977, the social context had changed. Dowie's (1977:18) article had labeled the Pinto a "firetrap" and accused the agency of buckling to auto-industry pressure. Public interest generated by the article forced a second Pinto investigation and guaranteed that NHTSA would be under a microscope for its duration. NHTSA engineer Lee Strickland was assigned to determine if Pinto (and Chevrolet Vega) tank problems warranted a mandatory recall. Strickland's work group held the Pinto and Vega to a higher standard than other cars (Strickland 1996). It dispensed with the usual moving barrier. Instead, it intentionally selected a large and particularly rigid "bullet car" to hit the Pinto's rear end. It weighed down the bullet car's nose to slide under the Pinto and maximize gas tank contact. It also turned on the bullet car's headlights to provide a ready source of ignition. And it completely filled gas tanks in both cars with gasoline rather than the non-flammable Stoddard fluid normally used. Strickland justified these actions as approximating real-world worst-case circumstances (Davidson 1983; NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). For NHTSA, the tests seemed an unqualified success: two 1972 Pintos burst into flame upon impact. In the summer of 1978 NHTSA announced that the Pinto gas tank represented a safety defect, leading to the largest recall campaign in automobile history at that time (NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). Ford agreed to "voluntarily" recall 1971-1976 Pintos. Other small cars sold during the 1 970s were not recalled, even though most were comparable, or in the case of the AMC Gremlin probably less safe (Schwartz 1991; NHTSA C7-38; Swigert and Farrell 1980- 81:180). Their manufacturers successfully defended them as acceptable risks (see Wallace 1978). When we asked why NHTSA forced a Pinto recall for failing the 35 mile-per-hour test, although most small cars could not withstand such a test, Strickland ( 1996) analogized that, "Just because your friends get away with shoplifting, doesn't mean you should get away with it too." Selection of the Pinto Beginning in the late 1970s, claims consistent with "Pinto Madness" readily gained public acceptance, but credible contradictory claims did not (e.g., Davidson 1983; Epstein 1980). For instance, Dowie's "conservative" estimate of 500 deaths (1977:18) was accepted, while NHTSA's report that it could document only 27 Pinto fire-related deaths (NHTSA C7-38; Frank 1985) was ignored. A transmission problem that also caused 27 Pinto deaths (and 180 on other Ford products [Clarke 1988]) never became a social problem. Similarly, publics accepted claims of safety errors leveled by Harley Copp, a Ford engineer who was apparently overseas when early crucial decisions were made (Camps 1997; Strobel 1980), but ignored other safety-conscious Pinto engineers who believed windshield retention was a more important safety problem (Camps 1997), and lack of safety glass caused more deaths (Feaheny 1997). Ford's cost-benefit analysis, a normal product of an interorganizational network, also facilitated the selection of the Pinto for inordinate attention. The year Ford sent the Grush/Saunby document to NHTSA (thus making it available to outside audiences), General Motors conducted a similar cost-benefit analysis (Nader and Smith 1996). Like Grush/Saunby, this analysis used the government's $200,000 figure as the value of a human life. Unlike Grush/Saunby, which addressed static rollover for all cars and light trucks, the GM analysis looked specifically at rearend collisions on its own cars. These facts suggest that GM would have made a better target for Dowie's analysis, but the GM document did not enter the public record until 1988. Contingencies led to the identification of Ford as deviant, while other auto makers escaped scrutiny. By the time of its Pinto investigation, NHTSA had essentially abandoned its original mission of forcing industry-wide safety improvements, in favor of investigating and recalling specific cars (Mashaw and Harfst 1990). NHTSA had two primary incentives in reinforcing the extant Nfocal organization" imagery of the Pinto narrative. First, NHTSA was pressured by specific organizations in its network (e.g., the Center for Auto Safety) and members of the public (see NHTSA C7-38) to take action on the Pinto's gas tank. Second, other network actors (e.g., courts, the Nixon administration, the auto industry) had increasingly limited NHTSA's ability to address systemic auto safety issues. |
The above both discusses why it was reasonable that Ford's design team wouldn't have found the crash tests unacceptable. It also discusses how public pressure resulted in teh NHTSA creating a questionable test to ensure the Pinto would fail. The rigged test is an important detail. Yes, the car caught fire in a non-standard test but that was because the test was setup for that purpose. When people say the Pinto failed a crash test or caught fire during a crash test it would only be one where that was the intended outcome. Note that the standard crash test doesn't use gasoline hence no fire in the standard test.
While from a less reliable source, this article is well cited and worth a read. It's a much quicker read that Schwartz. [12] I would also suggest reading the one Greglocock added as both have a large number of citations to support what they say and both are offered as part of courses. Springee ( talk) 04:20, 9 March 2016 (UTC)
![]() | This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Archive 1 | Archive 2 | Archive 3 | Archive 4 | Archive 5 |
I haven't weighed in on the language of the intro section. Given the current ~3 paragraph intro I think the fuel tank part should be the last paragraph. I'm also OK with basically arranging the article with the fuel tank stuff at the end. Basically discuss the car and sibling models first. This would include press reviews, SCCA etc. Once finished then move to the controversy section. I would suggest the intro should follow in the same order. To be fair, I do think that at this point the most significant thing about the Pinto is the fuel tank/safety controversy. I'm suggesting making it basically the second half of the Pinto article (in truth it could be a separate article) about the issue because I think the topic is too significant to mix between a discussion of the Pinto and Bobcat. For that same reason I think the controversy section should be the last paragraph, not the middle, of the intro. I also think that we should use terms like alleged or other words that indicate that many of the claims made against the Pinto regarding safety etc were not proven. Honestly we should treat MJ as an unreliable yet significant source in this article. Springee ( talk) 20:48, 16 February 2016 (UTC)
CRICKETS??????? I've told you the main faults in MJ. here's a longer version deindent for convenience
MJ 1
By conservative estimates Pinto crashes have caused 500 burn deaths to people who would not have been seriously injured if the car had not burst into flames. The figure could be as high as 900.
refutation Schwartz 27
MJ 2
Ford waited eight years because its internal "cost-benefit analysis," which places a dollar value on human life, said it wasn't profitable to make the changes sooner.
No CBA was ever found for Pinto and rear end collisions (not saying it wasn't done)
MJ 3
The product objectives are clearly stated in the Pinto "green book." This is a thick, top-secret manual in green covers
Which MJ then contradicts by saying " The product objectives for the Pinto are repeated in an article by Ford executive F.G. Olsen published by the Society of Automotive Engineers." Highly unusual for a ford executive to print stuff from a TOP SECRET document, unless of course it isn't TOP SECRET at all. Maybe TOP SECRET is being used to make things more interesting.
MJ 4
To everyone's surprise, the 1977 Pinto recently passed a rear-end crash test in Phoenix, Arizona, for NHTSA. The agency was so convinced the Pinto would fail that it was the first car tested. Amazingly, it did not burst into flame.
Comment. I'm not amazed. it is not typical for a leaking gas tank to catch fire, whether in a crash test or anywhere else. It can certainly happen, but in the majority of cases I've seen gasoline pooling on the road, not burning.
MJ 5
Seventy or more people will burn to death in those cars every year for many years to come.
Schwartz 27 total
MJ 6
cost-valuing human life is not used by Ford alone. Ford was just the only company careless enough to let such an embarrassing calculation slip into public records.
Comment. Well, there'll be a whole damn lot more of these revealtions since it is standard practice mandated by NHTSA.
Greglocock ( talk) 04:51, 17 February 2016 (UTC)
Prior content in this article duplicated one or more previously published sources. The material was copied from: http://uniquecarsandparts.com/car_info_ford_pinto_v6_wagon.htm). Copied or closely paraphrased material has been rewritten or removed and must not be restored, unless it is duly released under a compatible license. (For more information, please see "using copyrighted works from others" if you are not the copyright holder of this material, or "donating copyrighted materials" if you are.)
For legal reasons, we cannot accept copyrighted text or images borrowed from other web sites or published material; such additions will be deleted. Contributors may use copyrighted publications as a source of information, and, if allowed under fair use, may copy sentences and phrases, provided they are included in quotation marks and referenced properly. The material may also be rewritten, providing it does not infringe on the copyright of the original or plagiarize from that source. Therefore, such paraphrased portions must provide their source. Please see our guideline on non-free text for how to properly implement limited quotations of copyrighted text. Wikipedia takes copyright violations very seriously, and persistent violators will be blocked from editing. While we appreciate contributions, we must require all contributors to understand and comply with these policies. Thank you. Hugh ( talk) 00:38, 5 March 2016 (UTC)
The article credits Lee Iacocca for the car. At the time of its design, he was in charge of the Ford Division -- clearly responsible for executive oversight, but too high up to be the real design, engineering, or product planning force. I am trying to research who else was involved. He clearly was the leading executive sponsor, however. Paulmeisel 02:48, 2 January 2006 (UTC)
My father worked on the Pinto as well as the Mustang. He always blamed Iacocca for the Pinto and thought he took too much credit for the Mustang. The Pinto was built based on his specification that it would cost $1000. Someone else says $2000, but that's probably what they sold it for originally. The Mustang was actually a lower profile project to redesign the Falcon. Of course, Iacocca did not want to take credit for the Pinto. My family had a Mustang and a Pinto. In the mid-70s they weren't that different, which Iacocca probably had something to do with also. Come to think of it those Chyrsler K-cars were junk heaps as well. The only people that bought them were true patriots. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.59.237.189 ( talk) 21:16, 26 May 2008 (UTC)
My father, Robert Emil Eidschun (born 1938) designed the Pinto -- largely at our home in Livonia, Michigan, and I remember his doing it. I was very young the time but I remember his doing it in a studio that he built in the basement of our house. In addition, I have some of his original sketches to prove it, as well as his own personal photos of the clay models that were made based on his sketches. The various claims made by Bob Thomas and others for the design of the Pinto are misleading, as those folks were involved in managing the design process or had designed elements of the Pinto that were ultimately rejected. But Robert Eidschun's design was eventually chosen in its entirety. Perhaps I should post scans of his sketches and the photos he took of the clay models? - Robert Walter Eidschun —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.67.31.237 ( talk) 12:26, 7 December 2010 (UTC)
According to the California appellate court in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., the Pinto was a "rush project," and while standard automotive industry practice was that "engineering studies precede the styling," in the case of the Pinto project "styling preceded engineering and dictated engineering design to a greater degree than usual."
The source highly reliable and extraordinarily neutral. The content is relevant to the design process as a whole. The design process is noteworthy for its record pace. We are asked to include all significant points of view WP:YESPOV. The claim is not in Wikipedia voice. The content is clearly attributed in-text for possible bias WP:ATTRIBUTEPOV. Hugh ( talk) 00:23, 6 March 2016 (UTC)
HughD, I'm sorry you are not familiar with some of the discussions regarding automobile pages. Not all recalls are considered worth noting on the article page. For example, the one you just added [ [2]] is not significant enough to make it to the page. Please show some sense of judgment when adding material. Springee ( talk) 05:12, 7 March 2016 (UTC) HughD, since you are not using good judgment regarding which recalls are worth mention and you refuse to engaged in talk page discussions, please review this Automobile Project page proposal [ [3]]. It makes it clear that the material you added is not encyclopedic. Springee ( talk) 05:32, 7 March 2016 (UTC)
Yesterday's recall, one of the largest in automotive history, was not the first involving the Pinto - a car introduced in 1970 as a crossbreed of American and European technology that was designed to battle small imported autos. More than 2.5 million have been sold. Soon after the Pinto was introduced, 26,000 were recalled because accelerators were sticking. Later, 220,000 Pintos were recalled for modifications to prevent possible engine compartment fires.
I condensed the list of "worst" lists that were mentioned in this section [ [4]]. My condensed version is here [ [5]]. The exact quotes from the sources are not particularly important given that none of the sources are automotive press. Forbes and Time are saying essentially the same thing. Business Week is offering an opinion on the styling of the car but I think it would be reasonable to say Business Week is not a notable opinion with regards to vehicle styling. What is significant is that the car made it to several "worst" lists, not the details of why. It is sloppy work to have each reference as a separate paragraph. There is certainly no reason for WP:PEACOCK material such as adding "Pulitzer-Prize winning" [ [6]]. HughD, please consider your edits more carefully before adding. Speaking of that, please work on your edits in a sandbox then roll them out all at once. It's crazy that that you have added 150 edits (!) to the article in just 4 days [ [7]]. Please take time to consider your edits, discuss them here then roll them out. I'm seeing the same disturbing pattern of ignoring the concerns of other editors here that resulted in sanctions against you on other topics. Springee ( talk) 23:18, 6 March 2016 (UTC)
HughD, please review WP:PEACOCK. You may disagree with me regarding the Businessweek as a RS (you have not attempted to justify that source) but you also restored obvious peacock language that you previously added. I've now had to remove it twice. If you don't start cooperating with other editors your editor behavior will have to be reviewed. Springee ( talk) 17:30, 7 March 2016 (UTC)
HughD, you are correct the lead is supposed to summarize the article. However, your recent edit to the lead contains errors. The NHTSA did not say the Pinto fuel "defect" resulted in fires. They don't use that sort of phrasing. They said "linked". Your edit claiming a causal relationship is simply wrong. Please show some care with such edits. Springee ( talk) 02:16, 7 March 2016 (UTC)
The part about nobody investigating Mustangs for explosions and fires is actually wrong. 60 Minutes did an investigation of Mustangs in the early 2000s.
(dummy thread contribution for archiving unsigned thread) Hugh ( talk) 16:26, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
The article states that Net Horsepower is horsepower measured at the wheels. This is incorrect. Net horsepower is still measured at the flwyheel. Th difference is that net horsepower is measured with the engined fully dressed with accessories.
(dummy thread contribution for archiving unsigned thread) Hugh ( talk) 16:26, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
This article has essentially two major topics. The first is the general discussion of the car which would be similar to other WP articles on cars. Material such as specifications, reviews, sales etc would go into that section. The safety controversy associated with the Pinto is the other major section. Discussions related to the car's engineering, safety etc which are related to the fuel tank fire controversy should be reserved for that section of the article. For example, a California appellate court's opinion on the engineering of the car based on only the testimony allowed into a lawsuit is NOT a reliable engineering opinion. Furthermore, such claims are contradicted by the historical record presented by Schwartz and others.
The controversy section, while increasing in length is actually dropping in quality due to a systematic removal of later sources which have pointed out significant errors in the early accounts and understanding of the Pinto's engineering and real world safety performance. We should not put those same questionable statements in other parts of the article. Springee ( talk) 00:03, 6 March 2016 (UTC)
HughD, user Greglocock expressed concerns about editorial bias in your edits to the related Grimshaw article [ [9]]. I think those same concerns apply here. Please consider your edits in context of talk page discussions that occurred before you joined this article. Those concerns, especially the ones related to the organizational structure of the fire controversy section and the removal of recent scholarly reviews of the case by Schwartz and others are still valid. Springee ( talk) 00:10, 6 March 2016 (UTC)
HughD, the material you moved is introductory. There is not talk page discussion, and certainly not one that you have participated in, that justified moving a high level general statement about the controversy to the retrospective section. Furthermore, if you followed the conversations that took place before you jointed this article, it was clear that we were not sure of the exact layout of the controversy section. A lead that states that there is a great deal of confusion and misinformation IS part of to the section lead. Springee ( talk) 19:53, 7 March 2016 (UTC)
There are really two stories here. 1) The controversy created by the Ford report. 2) The subsequent research suggesting the controversy may have been overblown. If we divide those two stories into two subsections I think it's going to be clearer for the reader. I also think this solution is going to let everyone insert the information they want in there.
The article could benefit from more sourcing from peer reviewed academic journals. They are ample. Good idea. I think your problem is you seem to have stopped after you found two that share a point of view in the direction of revisionism and exoneration. Some of the proposed edits above in this thread are best I can tell a minority telling of events, almost pseudo-historical. We have policies and guidelines that deal with this situation. Is the Pinto more or less safe overall than other cars, or other cars in its class, or its closest competitors? If you have sources that say so, feel free to start a section somewhere. It doesn't alter events. Some stuff definitely happened.
Hugh (
talk)
05:58, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
[Comments below were nested in reply above - any editor may remove this note] Springee ( talk) 12:50, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
In reply to Hugh's points (please number them in the future) 1. Yes, as specifically mentioned by numerous scholarly sources there is a great deal of misinformation that gets retold and thus people assume it to be true. Because of that issue we should rely most heavily on the sources that really investigated the issues rather than ones that repeat what is "known".
2. The cars that caught fire in crash tests were cars that were rigged to catch fire. Please cite your reliable source that says otherwise. I can cite sources to support my statements. It helps that, unlike you, I have been reading about this topic for several years.
3. Schwartz is perhaps the most significant, reliable source on the subject. Sure MJ is significant but not reliable. I know you are a bit of a Chicago fan, perhaps you will take this source as reliable [10] "Gary was one of the preeminent torts scholars of his generation. Many of his articles are staples of the literature. (See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013 (1991).) ". The article is also widely cited as reliable, even by Becker, a source you brought to the table.
4. Actually is does. Because we quote MJ without noting that the article has been criticized for poor accuracy and for being inflammatory you are creating a misleading story. You had a similar issue with the Grimshaw article. You wanted to use the appellate court's findings of fact as reliable fact [11] even though procedural rules made this a bad idea. Basically quoting/paraphrasing the source and then failing to note that it has been discredited is the same as treating it as reliable.
5. The NHTSA was under considerable political pressure to find a problem (See Rossow, section 2.7 "Recall" and Lee and Ermann page 41). MJ and the Grimshaw trial lawyers did in fact work together. Danley, footnote 12: "Based on information given to it by lawyers preparing cases against Ford, the Center for Auto Safety petitioned NHTSA in the mid-1970s to investigate the Pinto's rear-end design. According to material presented on the Center's website, Dowie's article is based on that information, made available to him by the Center. ... In an interview with Schwartz, Copp asserted that he was also a major source of the information for the Mother Jones story." It shouldn't be surprising that a litigation team would use the press to generate bad publicity before a trial. The same thing occurred to Audi and GM (saddle tanks).
6. Our lead says Ford was indited, why not say "found not guilty?" Both are true but you picked the more damning language. Why put so much emphasis on the pretrial gory details (Becker talks about this) vs talking about the issues with the case and explaining that because Ford was able to show the real world performance of the car was sound the claims didn't stand. You noted the difference in budgets for the legal teams but you didn't note that public opinion was heavily against Ford because of the bad press coverage. Basically, you seem to want to include only the negative news and ignore the rest.
7. The "popular understanding" section was being discussed prior to your arrival. Unlike you, I was working on a set of changes off line that could be rolled out with just a few article edits. I hope you understand that 200+ edits in 5 days means you are doing something wrong! Anyway, since that section appears unlikely now, it makes sense to include discussions of misinformation in each subsection. Please note that I don't necessarily support your updated subsection headings. Springee ( talk) 16:13, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
Sorry, I now understand how important the integrity of your walls of text are to you. I will not intersperse comments in the context of your bullet points, even 7 item lists. Thanks. Hugh ( talk) 20:14, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
1. ...we should rely most heavily on the sources that really investigated the issues rather than ones that repeat what is "known".
Let me guess, the real sources are Schwartz and Lee & Erdman? The truth is out there? Hugh ( talk) 20:14, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
2. The cars that caught fire in crash tests were cars that were rigged to catch fire.
Yikes. With that comment it is clear to me that this particular proposed editorial direction is more than I can deal with alone; kindly requesting de-lurking guys, you know how you are. Help! Of course all crash tests are "rigged" in the sense that they are all by definition simulations. If you believe the NHTSA was motivated by anything other than concern for public safety, that is an extraordinary claim that requires multiple extraordinarily strong noteworthy reliable sources, and even then may be undue weight here as a minority view. Thank you. Hugh ( talk) 20:14, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
3. Gary was one of the preeminent torts scholars of his generation
The Mother Jones article was later awarded a Pulitzer Prize.
Schwartz said the Mother Jones (magazine) article won a Pulitzer Prize for their Pinto article. Would you support adding that to our article, sourced to Schwartz? Thank you. Hugh ( talk) 17:27, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
4. ...we quote MJ without noting that the article has been criticized for poor accuracy and for being inflammatory
Please drop the stick and back away from Mother Jones (magazine). You seem obsessed with the Mother Jones (magazine) article. Our article does not quote from Mother Jones (magazine). Our article notes the key role of the article in events, and has a one sentence, neutral paraphrase summarization of the article, which seems to me due weight. You have largely succeeded in your crusade to exclude Mother Jones (magazine) as a source for content for this article. Uncontent with that, you are crusading to make sure our readers are aware that everything that everyone knows about the history of the Ford Pinto was polluted by Mother Jones (magazine) until a few courageous scholars like Schwartz set us right in the 1990s. Hugh ( talk) 17:56, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
5. The NHTSA was under considerable political pressure to find a problem
Our article says merely that the NHTSA initiated an investigation, and made a determination. Our article makes no claims about the NHTSA motivations. If by political pressure you mean letters from the public, that is well document and due weight. However, if your theory of events is that the NHTSA was manipulated by Mother Jones (magazine) or lawyers or motivated by anything other than concern for public safety, that is an extraordinary claim that requires multiple extraordinarily strong noteworthy reliable sources, and even then may be undue weight here as a minority view. Again, forgive me for repeating myself, our project has policy and guideline regarding due weight of minority views. Thank you. Hugh ( talk) 17:48, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
6. Body 1st, then lede. Thanks. Hugh ( talk)
HughD, when the article lock is lifted I would ask that you limit your edits per day. Currently you are average 40 per day. In just 5 days you have almost as many edits as the top page editor added over 8 years! This and your limited discussion and consensus building on the talk page may be [WP:DE]. Please use your sandbox for making a series of changes that can then be added to the article at one time. Please discussion what you see as good content and scope for the various sections on the talk page. Remember that others have a voice too. Springee ( talk) 16:44, 8 March 2016 (UTC)
I'm going to copy some sections from this article for people to read. Please ask if you have questions.
Long quote from Lee and Ermann article
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Technical Core Beliefs and Actions (1967-1973) To explain what employees in Ford's technical core subunits believed, when they believed it, and how corporate structures influenced them to communicate and act on their beliefs, we separate design from marketing stages. During the design stage ( 1967-1970), Ford technical core employees did not view their actions as taking calculated risks with consumers' lives. Even Harley Copp, the outspoken Ford safety whistle-blower, never asserted that informed Ford participants believed the car was unsafe. Furthermore, they were not thinking about potential lawsuits when making design decisions (Feaheny 1997; Gioia 1996). And they did not refuse to correct perceived problems because settling lawsuits would be cheaper (NHTSA C7-38; Strobel1980). Although technical core work groups were not informed by explicit cost-benefit analyses (we explain these analyses below), they did recognize that unavoidable cost and time constraints make safety trade-offs inevitable for all product designs (see Lowrance 1976). For the auto industry, with its long history of subordinating safety to styling (Eastman 1 984; Nader 1965), implicit safety compromises were particularly common. In the Pinto case, Lee Iacocca and others wanted to compete with foreign imports with a car that weighed less than 2,000 pounds and cost less than $2,000 (Camps 1997; Dowie 1977; Strobel1980). Other car manufacturers were building cars under similar or more stringent guidelines (Davidson 1983 ). Commentators on the Pinto case (writing in a later era with different beliefs) assume that fuel tank leakage in rear end-crash tests must have alarmed both engineers and managers. They didn't, because the tests were not sufficiently convincing at the time (or even today). Crash tests during that era were novel procedures. Both the auto industry and NHTSA were more concerned with the reliability and validity of the tests than with safety data generated by a particular car's tests. Harold MacDonald, the engineer in charge of the Pinto's design, and every other engineer charged with interpreting crash-test data at the time-all of whom whistleblower Harley Copp considered "safety-conscious individuals" (Strobel 1980:183)-doubted that the tests accurately represented real-world conditions (Feaheny 1997). After all, they reasoned, a car slamming backwards into a wall at twenty to thirty miles per hour in a crash test is only a rough approximation of a real-world car-to-car crash. Results that seemed "troubling" (Schwartz 1991:1028) to later writers seemed less problematical at the time and were neutralized by participants' background assumptions about small cars and crashworthiness. NHTSA validated the engineers' skepticism by asking the auto industry to help develop reliable and cost-effective ways to approximate real-world conditions (Strobel1980). Thus, engineers in the design stage were still trying "to find out how to conduct crash tests" (Feaheny 1997; see also Lacey 1986:613). For example, an internal Pinto test report dated November, 1970 listed as its objective "To develop a test procedure to be used to provide baseline data on vehicle fuel system integrity" (NHTSA C7-38-Al.5, Final Test Report #T- 0738). In this test, a Pinto sedan exhibited "excessive fuel tank leakage" when towed rearward into a fixed barrier at 21.5 miles per hour, considered roughly equivalent to a car-to-car impact at 35 miles per hour. Nothing in this, or any other, Ford test report indicates that participants felt cause for concern or organizational action. Although some Ford engineers were not especially pleased, they felt that the data were inconclusive or the risks acceptable (Feaheny 1997; Strobel 1980), or they kept their concerns to themselves (Camps 1997). Some felt that cars would rarely be subjected to the extreme forces generated in a fixed-barrier test in real-world collisions (Feaheny 1997; Devine 1996). NHTSA apparently agreed and ultimately replaced the proposed fixedbarrier test with a less-stringent moving-barrier test in its final standard (U.S. Department of Transportation 1988). Occupational caution encouraged engineers to view many design adjustments that improved test performance as "unproven" in real-world accidents (Devine 1996; Feaheny 1997; Schwartz 1991; Strickland 1996; Strobel 1980). Engineers, who typically value "uncertainty avoidance" (Allison 1971:72 ), chose to stick with an existing design rather than face uncertainties associated with novel ones (Devine 1996; Strobel 1980). One series of tests, for instance, showed that Pintos equipped with pliable foam-like gas tanks would not leak in 30 mile-per-hour crashes. But some engineers feared that such a tank might melt and disagreed with others who felt it was safer than the existing metal design (Devine 1996, see also Strobel 1980). Other engineers believed that rubber bladders improved performance in tests, but anticipated problems under real-world conditions (Strobel 1980). 3 Ford whistle-blower Harley Copp's argument-that the Pinto would have been safer had its gas tank been placed above the axle rather than behind it-is often cited in Pinto narratives as an example of safety being sacrificed to profits, or at least trunk space, in the design stage (Cullen, Maakestad and Cavender 1987; Dowie 1977; Strobel1994). Yet Copp did not reach this conclusion until1977 (Strobel1980). And other engineers were considerably less certain about it, even though the above-the-axle design did perform better in one set of crash tests. The engineer overseeing the Pinto's design, Harold MacDonald (whose father died in a fuel tank fire when his Model A Ford exploded after a frontal collision with a tree), felt that the above-theaxle placement was less safe under real-world conditions because the tank was closer to the passenger compartment and more likely to be punctured by items in the trunk (Strobel1980). Additionally, after making a judgment that the Pinto was acceptably safe, most participants readily devalued subsequent competing definitions (Feaheny 1997). Lou Tubben, an engineer Nwith a genuine concern for safety" (Dowie 1977:23), did not press his concerns until1971-after the car's release. Frank Camps (1981, 1997), another concerned engineer, did not formally object to the Pinto's windshield and frontal-impact fuel tank design problems until1973, and never objected to rear-end fuel tank integrity. Tom Feaheny (1997) was worried about the lack of safety glass on all Ford models, and viewed the Pinto gas tank as a "nonissue" by comparison. In sum, the design stage was not characterized by an engineering consensus that the Pinto was Nunsafe." The value of crash tests was unclear. The Pinto's specific "problem" (e.g., frontal fuel tank integrity, safety glass) varied among those few engineers troubled by the car's safety performance. A "safe" placement of the gas tank was not identified, and the safety value of potential design changes was subject to disagreement. Additionally, engineers believed that the crash test performance of other small cars, particularly imports, was "terrible" (Feaheny 1997). Given this background and the host of other safety issues confronting engineers as a result of the recently passed MVSA, it is not surprising that many Pinto engineers and their family members (e.g., the chief systems engineer's wife) drove Pintos (Strobel1980). In the design stage (1967-1970), no company or government standard on rear-end fuel tank integrity existed to guide the engineers, but their actions were consistent with the takenfor- granted, industry-wide tradition of building lower levels of crashworthiness into small cars. This situation changed in the marketing stage (post 1970). Shortly after the 1971 model year Pintos were released, Ford adopted an internal20 mile-per-hour moving barrier standard for the 1973 model year-the only manufacturer to do so (Gioia 1996; Strobel 1994). The extant legal/regulatory environment reinforced engineers' beliefs that this standard was Nquite reasonable" since it was the "same one recommended at that time by the federal General Services Administration; the Canadian equivalent of the GSA; the Society of Automotive Engineers; and a private consulting firm hired by NHTSA ... " and by NHTSA itself in 1969 (Strobel 1980:205). This standard would constrain future debates by certifying the Pinto as "safe" to Ford's subunit charged with evaluating potential recallable safety problems. Most Ford technical core personnel became less involved with Pinto safety during the marketing stage. One exception was Dennis Gioia, who began a new job in another part of Ford's technical core in the summer of 1972. A self-described Mchild of the '60s," Gioia ( 1992:379) hoped to change an industry he saw as insensitive to safety concerns. Within one year, this inexperienced recent MBA graduate was promoted to Field Recall Coordinator and charged with coordinating all active safety recall campaigns and identifying potential safety problems. Thus Ford had at least one individual in its technical core with the inclinations and authority, though little experience or organizational power, for taking a stand on the Pinto gas tank issue. When Gioia became Recall Coordinator, he inherited about 100 active recall campaigns, half of them safety-related. As with most jobs, the enormous workload required him to use Mstandard operating procedures" (SOPs) to organize and manage information for decision making (d. Kriesberg 1976:1102). SOPs increase organizational efficiency by operating as cognitive scripts that transform decision-making opportunities into largely predetermined action patterns. Existing SOPs required that, to be "recallable," problems needed either high frequency or a directly traceable causal link to a design defect. When reports began to trickle in to Gioia that Pintos were "lighting up" in relatively low speed accidents, and after viewing the burned wreckage of a Pinto, he initiated a meeting to determine if this represented a recallable problem. His work group voted unanimously not to recall the Pinto because the weak data did not meet SOP criteria (Gioia 1996). The work group was unaware of any cost-benefit analyses or Pinto crash test results. Reports of Pinto fires continued to trickle in, and eventually Gioia did become aware of, and concerned about, the crash test results. Again he wondered if the Pinto had a recallable problem, so he initiated a second meeting to convince his co-workers that crash tests showed a possible design flaw. But others again saw no design flaws-after all, the Pinto met internal company standards, and no contradictory external standard existed. The work group conceived the tank leak "problem" not as a defect, but as a fundamental and unalterable design feature: the car's small size, the use of light metals, and unibody construction produced a tendency for Pintos (and others in its class) to "crush up like an accordion" in rear-end collisions (Gioia 1996). In light of what they believed, work group members felt they would become the "laughing stock" of the company if they recommended a recall (Gioia 1996). But fear of ridicule did not motivate their vote. They doubted a recall's legitimacy, or its chances of approval. NHTSA's Role In The Landmark Narrative We now consider NHTSA's often contradictory contribution to the Pinto landmark narrative. Two issues are of primary importance: the selection of the Pinto for recall and NHTSA's use of cost-benefit analysis. NHTSA ultimately recalled the Pinto, but this outcome was far from predictable given the agency's record on the issue of fuel tank integrity. NHTSA's top administrator even testified on behalf of Ford in the Pinto's criminal trial (Strobel 1980). While NHTSA's actions appear Mrational" from a distance, like Ford's they were the product of compromise, conflicting organizational interests and routines, and environmental pressures and constraints. Before we examine NHTSA's actions concerning the Pinto, some background is necessary. Most accidents involve multiple factors contributing to the crash itself or the resulting death and injury. In detailed studies of specific accidents (see NHTSA C7-38), NHTSA employees made numerous recommendations for tougher standards regarding driver behavior (e.g., drunk driving laws), road safety (e.g., guardrails), and vehicle design (e.g., airbag standards). Outside parties (e.g., consumer groups, insurance companies, state government agencies) lobbied NHTSA to take action on particular problems. Therefore, deciding which problems to address was far from clear, given the blizzard of information and cross-pressures (Mashaw and Harfst 1990). Following two fuel tank burn deaths when a large truck rear-ended a Pinto in 1976, for instance, Pennsylvania's Bureau of Traffic Engineering pleaded with NHTSA for tougher truck braking standards, not auto fuel tank integrity standards. As early as 1968, the year of its creation, NHTSA had attempted to adopt a fuel tank integrity standard. The specifics of the standard were subject to much disagreement. In addition to dealing with industry claims that NHTSA's fuel tank integrity proposals would prove ineffective, NHTSA had to son through a fog of ambiguous data on vehicle fires. An Insurance Institute for Highway Safety study (NHTSA C7-38), for instance, reported that only 72 (out of a sample of 1,923) fires in 1973 resulted from collisions. Of these 72 fires, only 24 originated in the fuel tank-most began in the engine compartment and were caused by electrical shorts. Additionally, a number of factors affected the likelihood of vehicle fires, including make and age of the vehicle. The Pinto landmark narrative describes unique design features that purportedly made the Pinto less crashwonhy than other cars: for example, bolts on the differential housing and a fuel filler pipe that easily pulled out in collisions. Yet these same issues had been identified much earlier with other cars. For example, a 1970 NHTSA report (C7-38), along with a 1968 Society of Automotive Engineers report, found that pre-1967 Ford sedans exhibited "gross fuel spillage [in crash tests] arising out of the detachment of the filler spout" and tank punctures caused by a "poorly located track-bar bolt." NHTSA did not recall these cars to fix this acceptable risk. Forcing a "Voluntary" Recall In September, 1974, NHTSA crash-tested a number of vehicles, including the Pinto, Mto verify the [Department of Transportation's] rear-end moving barrier procedure ... " (NHTSA C7-38). Several cars, including the Pinto, exhibited significant fuel loss in 30 mile-per-hour tests. A 1969 Plymouth station wagon exhibited a Msteady flow of fuel." Like the Ford crash- test reports discussed above, NHTSA's report expressed neither shock nor concern, concluding only that "The tests indicated that the procedure would produce repeatable test results." None of the cars were subjected to follow-up studies or recall proceedings. 5 Also in 1974, Ralph Nader's Center for Auto Safety asked NHTSA to investigate Pinto fuel tank integrity. NHTSA beliefs and procedures were similar to Ford's: not enough evidence existed to warrant a full defect investigation (Graham I 991). The Pinto had no "recallable" problem, even though people were dying in Pinto fires. By 1977, the social context had changed. Dowie's (1977:18) article had labeled the Pinto a "firetrap" and accused the agency of buckling to auto-industry pressure. Public interest generated by the article forced a second Pinto investigation and guaranteed that NHTSA would be under a microscope for its duration. NHTSA engineer Lee Strickland was assigned to determine if Pinto (and Chevrolet Vega) tank problems warranted a mandatory recall. Strickland's work group held the Pinto and Vega to a higher standard than other cars (Strickland 1996). It dispensed with the usual moving barrier. Instead, it intentionally selected a large and particularly rigid "bullet car" to hit the Pinto's rear end. It weighed down the bullet car's nose to slide under the Pinto and maximize gas tank contact. It also turned on the bullet car's headlights to provide a ready source of ignition. And it completely filled gas tanks in both cars with gasoline rather than the non-flammable Stoddard fluid normally used. Strickland justified these actions as approximating real-world worst-case circumstances (Davidson 1983; NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). For NHTSA, the tests seemed an unqualified success: two 1972 Pintos burst into flame upon impact. In the summer of 1978 NHTSA announced that the Pinto gas tank represented a safety defect, leading to the largest recall campaign in automobile history at that time (NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). Ford agreed to "voluntarily" recall 1971-1976 Pintos. Other small cars sold during the 1 970s were not recalled, even though most were comparable, or in the case of the AMC Gremlin probably less safe (Schwartz 1991; NHTSA C7-38; Swigert and Farrell 1980- 81:180). Their manufacturers successfully defended them as acceptable risks (see Wallace 1978). When we asked why NHTSA forced a Pinto recall for failing the 35 mile-per-hour test, although most small cars could not withstand such a test, Strickland ( 1996) analogized that, "Just because your friends get away with shoplifting, doesn't mean you should get away with it too." Selection of the Pinto Beginning in the late 1970s, claims consistent with "Pinto Madness" readily gained public acceptance, but credible contradictory claims did not (e.g., Davidson 1983; Epstein 1980). For instance, Dowie's "conservative" estimate of 500 deaths (1977:18) was accepted, while NHTSA's report that it could document only 27 Pinto fire-related deaths (NHTSA C7-38; Frank 1985) was ignored. A transmission problem that also caused 27 Pinto deaths (and 180 on other Ford products [Clarke 1988]) never became a social problem. Similarly, publics accepted claims of safety errors leveled by Harley Copp, a Ford engineer who was apparently overseas when early crucial decisions were made (Camps 1997; Strobel 1980), but ignored other safety-conscious Pinto engineers who believed windshield retention was a more important safety problem (Camps 1997), and lack of safety glass caused more deaths (Feaheny 1997). Ford's cost-benefit analysis, a normal product of an interorganizational network, also facilitated the selection of the Pinto for inordinate attention. The year Ford sent the Grush/Saunby document to NHTSA (thus making it available to outside audiences), General Motors conducted a similar cost-benefit analysis (Nader and Smith 1996). Like Grush/Saunby, this analysis used the government's $200,000 figure as the value of a human life. Unlike Grush/Saunby, which addressed static rollover for all cars and light trucks, the GM analysis looked specifically at rearend collisions on its own cars. These facts suggest that GM would have made a better target for Dowie's analysis, but the GM document did not enter the public record until 1988. Contingencies led to the identification of Ford as deviant, while other auto makers escaped scrutiny. By the time of its Pinto investigation, NHTSA had essentially abandoned its original mission of forcing industry-wide safety improvements, in favor of investigating and recalling specific cars (Mashaw and Harfst 1990). NHTSA had two primary incentives in reinforcing the extant Nfocal organization" imagery of the Pinto narrative. First, NHTSA was pressured by specific organizations in its network (e.g., the Center for Auto Safety) and members of the public (see NHTSA C7-38) to take action on the Pinto's gas tank. Second, other network actors (e.g., courts, the Nixon administration, the auto industry) had increasingly limited NHTSA's ability to address systemic auto safety issues. |
The above both discusses why it was reasonable that Ford's design team wouldn't have found the crash tests unacceptable. It also discusses how public pressure resulted in teh NHTSA creating a questionable test to ensure the Pinto would fail. The rigged test is an important detail. Yes, the car caught fire in a non-standard test but that was because the test was setup for that purpose. When people say the Pinto failed a crash test or caught fire during a crash test it would only be one where that was the intended outcome. Note that the standard crash test doesn't use gasoline hence no fire in the standard test.
While from a less reliable source, this article is well cited and worth a read. It's a much quicker read that Schwartz. [12] I would also suggest reading the one Greglocock added as both have a large number of citations to support what they say and both are offered as part of courses. Springee ( talk) 04:20, 9 March 2016 (UTC)