This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Archive 5 | ← | Archive 7 | Archive 8 | Archive 9 |
Due to what I consider extreme request for mechanical verification in the lead, this sentence
On the other hand, Duhem and others said that definitive experimental falsifications are impossible.
was replaced by this sentence
On the other hand, the fact that Duhem and others said that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation means that definitive falsifications of falsifiable theories (because they are always taken in isolation, i.e., separated from any auxiliary hypotheses or background assumptions) are impossible.
Let me explain why the first sentence is what must be said to best inform the readers in the most simple manner. It's very clear all over the literature that falsifiability is very often criticized because in practice we can never rigorously falsify a theory. There is always an apparatus used to make an observation. Even in the case of swans, this issue arises. For example, we can think that it's a black swan, but it was actually a black raven. Or, someone painted the white swan in black. This illustrates the need for background assumptions and auxiliary hypotheses. I should not have to explain that and no one should doubt that this issue was raised very very often in the literature. But, I will give one example among many. In her book Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, Deborah Mayo wrote:
In a nutshell, hypothesis H is deductively falsified if H entails experimental outcome O, while in fact the outcome is ~O [i.e., not O]. What is learned is that H is false. Several familiar problems stand in the way of such learning. Outcome O, itself open to error, is “theory laden” and derived only with the help of auxiliary hypotheses. The anomaly cannot be taken as teaching us that H is false because it might actually be due to some error in the observations or one of the auxiliary hypotheses needed to derive O.
Mayo does not say "Often, the anomaly cannot be taken...". She does not say that it's only the case "when H is taken in isolation". No, she says "The anomaly cannot be taken ...", which means that it's always the case. This verifies the original sentence. Popper also explains this. He wrote:
It might be said that even if the asymmetry is admitted, it is still impossible, for various reasons, that any theoretical system should ever be conclusively falsified. For it is always possible to find some way of evading falsification...
It's all over the place in the literature and anyone with a minimal understanding of the subject would not have questioned the verifiability of the original sentence. It is also verified in the body of the article: "Popper was aware that one can always find another auxiliary hypothesis,..." So, the original sentence is verified in the literature and in the body of the article. However, there was a problem of mechanical verification of the statement of the Duhem's problem. More precisely, in a source, it is written that the Duhem's problem is that "it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation". So, Loew Galitz insisted that we add the "in isolation" for verifiability. This creates a confusion, because the non informed reader will think "Ah! It's only in these special cases in which the system is taken in isolation". The reader would be justified to think that, because we were careful to mention that it's only for systems taken "in isolation". So, to prevent this confusion, the sentence must further explain that it's always the case when we consider falsifiability that the system is taken in isolation. I tried to explain to Loew Galitz that an article must present a vast amount of information available in the literature in a short article and that some encyclopedic work is needed to achieve that, which means that we cannot verify this process in a mechanical manner by looking at one source. Instead, one must understand the subject. I also tried to explain to Loew Galitz that it's not useful to go into the concept of "in isolation" in the lead, but he would not understand, because in his view a text should be mechanically verifiable. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 14:43, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
his view a text should be mechanically verifiable, this is not "my view", this is our policy: WP:Verifiability. Loew Galitz ( talk) 18:30, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
I also tried to explain to Loew Galitz ..., but he would not understand-- And I tried to explain to the O.P. that I do not need their explanations, I need references so that I can compare wikipedia with sources without any interpreters. Loew Galitz ( talk) 18:35, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
It is also verified in the body- No it is not. Please provide the reference to the statement you insist on: "Duhem and others said that definitive experimental falsifications are impossible.". Loew Galitz ( talk) 18:30, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
For example, we can think that it's a black swan, but it was actually a black raven- that's bullshitting. Science has its scientific method to make sure that ravens are not taken for swans. Loew Galitz ( talk) 18:30, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
definitive experimental falsifications are impossible-- This statement is equivalent to the statement "definite experimental proofs are impossible", because proof of "A" is equivalent to falsification of "not A". Meaning in effect that one cannot trust in science, opening the whole can of anti-scientific worms. Loew Galitz ( talk) 18:30, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
"Warning. The text below includes a false quotation of mine. ..."This is a false accusation. This text did not quote you, certainly not misquoted you nor intended to do anything of the sort. Also, you should place your comment at the bottom, not at the top of the section.
Perhaps I reacted in a polemical manner to your polemical attitude. Let's try to stop that. I will assume that we are in opposition about what verifiability requires, but we both are great people with great intentions. I say that verifiability requires an understanding of the sources. You interpret it as if I say that you must use me as an interpret to understand the sources and you find this unacceptable. Please understand that I do not say that you must interpret the sources and certainly not that you must depend on me for that. The correct word in English for what I say is "understand", not "interpret" and though a discussion with others can be useful, it's you that must understand the sources: it's your direct understanding that is needed. Others can perhaps help, but you do not need to depend on them. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 22:51, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
Actually, there is a way more important issue here. This second issue worries me a lot more. You keep misinterpreting me and accusing me on the basis of these misinterpretations. This is not acceptable. In this edit I moved a text that you inadequately placed at the top of the section. You must make your comments at the bottom of the section. This comment was also inappropriate because you accused me of misquoting you, which is false. Not only that, despite my explanation, you wrote again your false accusation at the top of the section. Please remove your false accusation and in the future place your comments at the bottom and stop misinterpreting me to justify false accusations. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 23:27, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
You wrote Yes you are misquoting me and I provided the proof:
the diff of my last edit which you reverted.
You have a serious problem of seeing yourself at the centre of every thing written. There is nothing in what I wrote that says that the second sentence is what you wrote and that I reverted. In fact, I say clearly that this sentence came after you proposed "in isolation", so it cannot be your sentence which first proposed to add "in isolation". The idea that it's a misquote of your sentence exists only in your mind, not in the facts. In any case, you should not insert any comment at the top of a section. You must respect the convention of the talk page and the convention is to put comments at the bottom, definitively not at the top, of the section.
Dominic Mayers (
talk) 01:33, 11 January 2022 (UTC)
Note that they refer to it as the Duhem's problem, but they do not mention the "in isolation". This is why I am telling you that your view that verification is mechanical with a focus on a single source is not the usual approach in Wikipedia, not for science, mathematics and philosophy. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 03:03, 11 January 2022 (UTC)Accepting what is often referred to as the Duhem-Quine thesis, that “no experimental result can ever kill a theory: any theory can be saved from counter-instances either by some auxiliary hypothesis or by a suitable reinterpretation of its terms" (Lakatos 1978, 32).
— Mayo, Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge
To anyone looking at this discussion, it is a good illustration of the impossibility to verify usefully a content without an understanding of the subject. Loew Galitz saw "isolated hypothesis" in a source that describes Duhem's problem and insisted very strongly that it should be included: the entire discussion is about that. I tried the best I could to explain to him that the theory is isolated, because it does not include the required auxiliary hypotheses, etc. and thus it is confusing to add this requirement. He refused to even try to understand what I explained. Here is one version of the sentence used by Loew Galitz:
On the other hand, Duhem and others said that definitive experimental falsifications of an isolated hypothesis are often impossible.
Immediately, with an understanding of the subject, you can see that this sentence is confusing and shows a complete lack of understanding of the subject. The sentence in the source used by Loew Galitz says, while citing Duhem
“The physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses”. Thus there is no reason to single out any particular hypothesis as the guilty one for isolated hypotheses are immune from refutation: Duhem denies that unambiguous falsification procedures do exist in science.
Yes, the source uses "isolated hypothesis", but the context is that the source explains Duhem's thesis. It explains that there is always other hypotheses. So, it's true that we never falsify an isolated hypothesis, but again the idea is that every time that we try to falsify an hypothesis, we face the reality that the hypothesis is not isolated. In fact, the source concludes "Duhem denies that unambiguous falsification procedures do exist in science". This cannot be clearer. This conclusion is what we need in the Falsifiability article. In our context, mentioning "isolated hypothesis" as if it does not apply to all experimental falsifications, but only to the falsifications of isolated hypotheses is confusing. Also the sources does not say "often". Adding "often" shows a complete lack of understanding: Duhem denies that it is possible, which means that Duhem says it is simply impossible—adding "often" changes completely the meaning. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 18:37, 11 January 2022 (UTC)
"isolated hypothesis" as if it does not apply to all experimental falsifications- just find me a ref that says that "it" applies to all experimental falsifications, and we all are happy. Loew Galitz ( talk) 19:45, 11 January 2022 (UTC)
I suspect that all modern philosophers of science explain this in at the least one publication. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 19:55, 11 January 2022 (UTC)A theory cannot be conclusively falsified, because the possibility cannot be ruled out that some part of the complex test situation, other than the theory under test, is responsible for an erroneous prediction. This diffiulty often goes under the name of the Duhem/Quine thesis.
— Chalmers, What is this thing called science?
You wrote: If we say "all", then there is no way we can refute pseudoscience.
Yes, it indeed implies that we cannot refute pseudoscience experimentally, i.e., through an experimental falsification. Let me point out that you are starting to argue beyond the sources here. It's your own personal argument that you present here. It's ok, because we need to discuss our understanding of the sources. To help you understand, let us consider the
Omphalos_hypothesis. It cannot be refuted by an experiment. You can refute it by saying that it is not falsifiable.
Dominic Mayers (
talk) 20:14, 11 January 2022 (UTC)
(edit conflict) @
Loew Galitz: You wrote: I cannot believe a smart person as Lakatos surely is, can utter such a nonsense.
It's Mayo that quotes Lakatos here. If we want the point of view of Lakatos, we don't need Mayo. Here is a better quote of Lakatos:
According to the 'Duhem-Quine thesis', given sufficient imagination, any theory (whether consisting of one proposition or of a finite conjunction of many) can be permanently saved from 'refutation' by some suitable adjustment in the background knowledge in which it is embedded.
— Lakatos, The methodology of scientific research programmes
You wrote: Yes, but falsifiable pseudoscience exists.
The term "falsifiable" here can lead to confusion, because, as defined by Popper, it means logically (not experimentally) contradicted by an observation statement. I suppose that you simply meant to say that some pseudoscientific theories can be falsified, which is completely different. This indeed appears to contradict the Quine-Duhem thesis. Let's consider astrology. In the common language, we say that astrology has often been falsified. This seems to be a counter example of the Quine-Duhem thesis described by Lakatos (and many others). Actually, it is not a counter example. The explanation is that in the common language, when we speak of falsifications, we accept many required auxiliary hypotheses and background knowledge. The Quine-Duhem thesis still apply, as it does for Newton's theory. In the common language, we say that Newton's theory was shown to be false, for example, by the measurement of
the precession of Mercury. But, again, a lot of assumptions and background knowledge is accepted in the measurement of the precession. The Quine-Duhem thesis still applies: it says that maybe these assumptions were incorrect and, thus Newton's theory might be correct. For example, may be some special kind of invisible matter around Mercury interact in a special manner with it. Newton's theory would then be correct, only the description of the state of the system was incorrect. This is the kind of auxiliary hypotheses that Lakatos used to argue that Newton's theory cannot be falsified. In a similar manner, in the common language, we say that astrology has been falsified, just as we say that Newton's theory has been, but there are also assumptions when we falsify astrology. In both cases, these are not counter examples of the Quine-Duhem thesis (which says that the falsification of a theory is impossible, because perhaps other hypotheses were incorrect, not the theory).
Dominic Mayers (
talk) 21:57, 11 January 2022 (UTC)
Thenk you for an interesting discussion; it was useful for me. However I looked around and was appalled by a horrible state of the articles in the philosophy of science, in particular Ceteris paribus, Defeasible reasoning, Testability. I slipped a joke about mental health. I do have a certain degree of obsessive-compulsiveness, and since I have no full expertise nor time to right all "wrongs", I am reclusing myself again from all philosophical subjects, because it seems they all are effectively abandoned and the burden on my brain will be unbearable. I am removing this page from my watchlist as well, good-bye. Loew Galitz ( talk) 20:57, 11 January 2022 (UTC)
According to Godfrey-Smith, in the view of pragmatists, the main goal of language and thoughts is practical problem solving. [1] The theory must answer a question about the world of observations. If the theory answers the question well, then one is justified in believing in it. The question Hume was asking is how observation can be used to justify this belief. Peirce outlines three stages in the process: abduction, deduction, and induction. In the abduction phase, theories are presented for consideration. In the deductive phase, they are prepared for tests. In the inductive phase, test results are evaluated. [2]. To give a context to refutability, the most important thing is the existence of a deductive phase that exists purely at the theoretical level and serves to prepare tests. Refutability is simply the requirement that these tests be possible at this theoretical level. In this sense, the refutability criterion was implicit in Peirce. The most important difference between Peirce and Popper seems to be Popper's rejection that testing is an inductive process that leads to strong belief. For Popper, whether at the psychological level or at the objective level, there is no inductive, i.e., non-deductive, rigorous process that leads from observations to belief. According to him, the belief relates, on the contrary, to the conjectures that exist before the observations and any change in the belief due to corroborations can be justified deductively. He does not deny that we have the strong belief that if the tests are successful then the theory can be trusted, but he denies that this belief is a mental habit created by repetition. For him, it is innate, the result of an evolutionary process. On this respect, he somewhat joins Chomsky and other philosophers who believe that we have innate mechanisms at the level of language. He accepts that there is a form of induction in this evolutionary process and he calls it quasi-induction. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 16:06, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
seems to go in the wrong direction, but Miller is talking about a change of laws in a logical/formalistic sense whereas Peirce is talking about a change of mental states in a psychological/naturalistic sense. There is no formal logical level to Peirce's concept of belief; it's purely psychological. Falsifiability as a logical criterion is completely irrelevant to Peircean belief: "as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false". The 1877 article contains this little bit of incipient evolutionary epistemology (of biological mechanisms not of formal theories): "Logicality in regard to practical matters (if this be understood, not in the old sense, but as consisting in a wise union of security with fruitfulness of reasoning) is the most useful quality an animal can possess, and might, therefore, result from the action of natural selection; but outside of these it is probably of more advantage to the animal to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions, independently of their truth; and thus, upon unpractical subjects, natural selection might occasion a fallacious tendency of thought." Biogeographist ( talk) 03:15, 28 October 2022 (UTC)
It is often suggested that Popper defines refutability at the logical, i.e., theoretical level, but then changes the definition and that refutability, in practice, requires that the theory can be methodologically refuted. The argument given is that Popper says that, without methodological rules, refutability does not guarantee that the system is scientific. This argument ignores the importance of distinguishing between the logical and methodological levels in order to avoid false problems at the methodological level. The goal is not rigorous refutation, which is impossible, but only to allow critical discussion. Really, the whole idea is to separate the logical criterion which is easily and rigorously verifiable from the methodological rules which are also, it is true, important, but necessarily informal although sufficient for the intended objective. The logical criterion is very useful and works well in the context of these rules and the intended purpose. If we do not understand this, we have missed a central point. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 16:06, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
This edit and this one, both, have a useful purpose. The first one brings out that, being a logical criterion, we should not care that the actual devices exist. It should be sufficient that it can be built. The second one brings out that the way to build the devices must exist, which means that some technologies must exist and, therefore, it is not accurate to say the technologies need not exist. The material condition is at the junction point between existing technologies (the material aspect) and the logical world of statements. This is what the extract from Nola & Sankey quoted by Biogeographist says. Perhaps the text could still be improved to make clear that an « empirical test » is not something abstract, but something that can be physically executed given the intersubjective knowledge, even if the context is a « logical criterion ». Dominic Mayers ( talk) 22:41, 11 February 2023 (UTC)
This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Archive 5 | ← | Archive 7 | Archive 8 | Archive 9 |
Due to what I consider extreme request for mechanical verification in the lead, this sentence
On the other hand, Duhem and others said that definitive experimental falsifications are impossible.
was replaced by this sentence
On the other hand, the fact that Duhem and others said that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation means that definitive falsifications of falsifiable theories (because they are always taken in isolation, i.e., separated from any auxiliary hypotheses or background assumptions) are impossible.
Let me explain why the first sentence is what must be said to best inform the readers in the most simple manner. It's very clear all over the literature that falsifiability is very often criticized because in practice we can never rigorously falsify a theory. There is always an apparatus used to make an observation. Even in the case of swans, this issue arises. For example, we can think that it's a black swan, but it was actually a black raven. Or, someone painted the white swan in black. This illustrates the need for background assumptions and auxiliary hypotheses. I should not have to explain that and no one should doubt that this issue was raised very very often in the literature. But, I will give one example among many. In her book Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, Deborah Mayo wrote:
In a nutshell, hypothesis H is deductively falsified if H entails experimental outcome O, while in fact the outcome is ~O [i.e., not O]. What is learned is that H is false. Several familiar problems stand in the way of such learning. Outcome O, itself open to error, is “theory laden” and derived only with the help of auxiliary hypotheses. The anomaly cannot be taken as teaching us that H is false because it might actually be due to some error in the observations or one of the auxiliary hypotheses needed to derive O.
Mayo does not say "Often, the anomaly cannot be taken...". She does not say that it's only the case "when H is taken in isolation". No, she says "The anomaly cannot be taken ...", which means that it's always the case. This verifies the original sentence. Popper also explains this. He wrote:
It might be said that even if the asymmetry is admitted, it is still impossible, for various reasons, that any theoretical system should ever be conclusively falsified. For it is always possible to find some way of evading falsification...
It's all over the place in the literature and anyone with a minimal understanding of the subject would not have questioned the verifiability of the original sentence. It is also verified in the body of the article: "Popper was aware that one can always find another auxiliary hypothesis,..." So, the original sentence is verified in the literature and in the body of the article. However, there was a problem of mechanical verification of the statement of the Duhem's problem. More precisely, in a source, it is written that the Duhem's problem is that "it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation". So, Loew Galitz insisted that we add the "in isolation" for verifiability. This creates a confusion, because the non informed reader will think "Ah! It's only in these special cases in which the system is taken in isolation". The reader would be justified to think that, because we were careful to mention that it's only for systems taken "in isolation". So, to prevent this confusion, the sentence must further explain that it's always the case when we consider falsifiability that the system is taken in isolation. I tried to explain to Loew Galitz that an article must present a vast amount of information available in the literature in a short article and that some encyclopedic work is needed to achieve that, which means that we cannot verify this process in a mechanical manner by looking at one source. Instead, one must understand the subject. I also tried to explain to Loew Galitz that it's not useful to go into the concept of "in isolation" in the lead, but he would not understand, because in his view a text should be mechanically verifiable. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 14:43, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
his view a text should be mechanically verifiable, this is not "my view", this is our policy: WP:Verifiability. Loew Galitz ( talk) 18:30, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
I also tried to explain to Loew Galitz ..., but he would not understand-- And I tried to explain to the O.P. that I do not need their explanations, I need references so that I can compare wikipedia with sources without any interpreters. Loew Galitz ( talk) 18:35, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
It is also verified in the body- No it is not. Please provide the reference to the statement you insist on: "Duhem and others said that definitive experimental falsifications are impossible.". Loew Galitz ( talk) 18:30, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
For example, we can think that it's a black swan, but it was actually a black raven- that's bullshitting. Science has its scientific method to make sure that ravens are not taken for swans. Loew Galitz ( talk) 18:30, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
definitive experimental falsifications are impossible-- This statement is equivalent to the statement "definite experimental proofs are impossible", because proof of "A" is equivalent to falsification of "not A". Meaning in effect that one cannot trust in science, opening the whole can of anti-scientific worms. Loew Galitz ( talk) 18:30, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
"Warning. The text below includes a false quotation of mine. ..."This is a false accusation. This text did not quote you, certainly not misquoted you nor intended to do anything of the sort. Also, you should place your comment at the bottom, not at the top of the section.
Perhaps I reacted in a polemical manner to your polemical attitude. Let's try to stop that. I will assume that we are in opposition about what verifiability requires, but we both are great people with great intentions. I say that verifiability requires an understanding of the sources. You interpret it as if I say that you must use me as an interpret to understand the sources and you find this unacceptable. Please understand that I do not say that you must interpret the sources and certainly not that you must depend on me for that. The correct word in English for what I say is "understand", not "interpret" and though a discussion with others can be useful, it's you that must understand the sources: it's your direct understanding that is needed. Others can perhaps help, but you do not need to depend on them. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 22:51, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
Actually, there is a way more important issue here. This second issue worries me a lot more. You keep misinterpreting me and accusing me on the basis of these misinterpretations. This is not acceptable. In this edit I moved a text that you inadequately placed at the top of the section. You must make your comments at the bottom of the section. This comment was also inappropriate because you accused me of misquoting you, which is false. Not only that, despite my explanation, you wrote again your false accusation at the top of the section. Please remove your false accusation and in the future place your comments at the bottom and stop misinterpreting me to justify false accusations. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 23:27, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
You wrote Yes you are misquoting me and I provided the proof:
the diff of my last edit which you reverted.
You have a serious problem of seeing yourself at the centre of every thing written. There is nothing in what I wrote that says that the second sentence is what you wrote and that I reverted. In fact, I say clearly that this sentence came after you proposed "in isolation", so it cannot be your sentence which first proposed to add "in isolation". The idea that it's a misquote of your sentence exists only in your mind, not in the facts. In any case, you should not insert any comment at the top of a section. You must respect the convention of the talk page and the convention is to put comments at the bottom, definitively not at the top, of the section.
Dominic Mayers (
talk) 01:33, 11 January 2022 (UTC)
Note that they refer to it as the Duhem's problem, but they do not mention the "in isolation". This is why I am telling you that your view that verification is mechanical with a focus on a single source is not the usual approach in Wikipedia, not for science, mathematics and philosophy. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 03:03, 11 January 2022 (UTC)Accepting what is often referred to as the Duhem-Quine thesis, that “no experimental result can ever kill a theory: any theory can be saved from counter-instances either by some auxiliary hypothesis or by a suitable reinterpretation of its terms" (Lakatos 1978, 32).
— Mayo, Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge
To anyone looking at this discussion, it is a good illustration of the impossibility to verify usefully a content without an understanding of the subject. Loew Galitz saw "isolated hypothesis" in a source that describes Duhem's problem and insisted very strongly that it should be included: the entire discussion is about that. I tried the best I could to explain to him that the theory is isolated, because it does not include the required auxiliary hypotheses, etc. and thus it is confusing to add this requirement. He refused to even try to understand what I explained. Here is one version of the sentence used by Loew Galitz:
On the other hand, Duhem and others said that definitive experimental falsifications of an isolated hypothesis are often impossible.
Immediately, with an understanding of the subject, you can see that this sentence is confusing and shows a complete lack of understanding of the subject. The sentence in the source used by Loew Galitz says, while citing Duhem
“The physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses”. Thus there is no reason to single out any particular hypothesis as the guilty one for isolated hypotheses are immune from refutation: Duhem denies that unambiguous falsification procedures do exist in science.
Yes, the source uses "isolated hypothesis", but the context is that the source explains Duhem's thesis. It explains that there is always other hypotheses. So, it's true that we never falsify an isolated hypothesis, but again the idea is that every time that we try to falsify an hypothesis, we face the reality that the hypothesis is not isolated. In fact, the source concludes "Duhem denies that unambiguous falsification procedures do exist in science". This cannot be clearer. This conclusion is what we need in the Falsifiability article. In our context, mentioning "isolated hypothesis" as if it does not apply to all experimental falsifications, but only to the falsifications of isolated hypotheses is confusing. Also the sources does not say "often". Adding "often" shows a complete lack of understanding: Duhem denies that it is possible, which means that Duhem says it is simply impossible—adding "often" changes completely the meaning. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 18:37, 11 January 2022 (UTC)
"isolated hypothesis" as if it does not apply to all experimental falsifications- just find me a ref that says that "it" applies to all experimental falsifications, and we all are happy. Loew Galitz ( talk) 19:45, 11 January 2022 (UTC)
I suspect that all modern philosophers of science explain this in at the least one publication. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 19:55, 11 January 2022 (UTC)A theory cannot be conclusively falsified, because the possibility cannot be ruled out that some part of the complex test situation, other than the theory under test, is responsible for an erroneous prediction. This diffiulty often goes under the name of the Duhem/Quine thesis.
— Chalmers, What is this thing called science?
You wrote: If we say "all", then there is no way we can refute pseudoscience.
Yes, it indeed implies that we cannot refute pseudoscience experimentally, i.e., through an experimental falsification. Let me point out that you are starting to argue beyond the sources here. It's your own personal argument that you present here. It's ok, because we need to discuss our understanding of the sources. To help you understand, let us consider the
Omphalos_hypothesis. It cannot be refuted by an experiment. You can refute it by saying that it is not falsifiable.
Dominic Mayers (
talk) 20:14, 11 January 2022 (UTC)
(edit conflict) @
Loew Galitz: You wrote: I cannot believe a smart person as Lakatos surely is, can utter such a nonsense.
It's Mayo that quotes Lakatos here. If we want the point of view of Lakatos, we don't need Mayo. Here is a better quote of Lakatos:
According to the 'Duhem-Quine thesis', given sufficient imagination, any theory (whether consisting of one proposition or of a finite conjunction of many) can be permanently saved from 'refutation' by some suitable adjustment in the background knowledge in which it is embedded.
— Lakatos, The methodology of scientific research programmes
You wrote: Yes, but falsifiable pseudoscience exists.
The term "falsifiable" here can lead to confusion, because, as defined by Popper, it means logically (not experimentally) contradicted by an observation statement. I suppose that you simply meant to say that some pseudoscientific theories can be falsified, which is completely different. This indeed appears to contradict the Quine-Duhem thesis. Let's consider astrology. In the common language, we say that astrology has often been falsified. This seems to be a counter example of the Quine-Duhem thesis described by Lakatos (and many others). Actually, it is not a counter example. The explanation is that in the common language, when we speak of falsifications, we accept many required auxiliary hypotheses and background knowledge. The Quine-Duhem thesis still apply, as it does for Newton's theory. In the common language, we say that Newton's theory was shown to be false, for example, by the measurement of
the precession of Mercury. But, again, a lot of assumptions and background knowledge is accepted in the measurement of the precession. The Quine-Duhem thesis still applies: it says that maybe these assumptions were incorrect and, thus Newton's theory might be correct. For example, may be some special kind of invisible matter around Mercury interact in a special manner with it. Newton's theory would then be correct, only the description of the state of the system was incorrect. This is the kind of auxiliary hypotheses that Lakatos used to argue that Newton's theory cannot be falsified. In a similar manner, in the common language, we say that astrology has been falsified, just as we say that Newton's theory has been, but there are also assumptions when we falsify astrology. In both cases, these are not counter examples of the Quine-Duhem thesis (which says that the falsification of a theory is impossible, because perhaps other hypotheses were incorrect, not the theory).
Dominic Mayers (
talk) 21:57, 11 January 2022 (UTC)
Thenk you for an interesting discussion; it was useful for me. However I looked around and was appalled by a horrible state of the articles in the philosophy of science, in particular Ceteris paribus, Defeasible reasoning, Testability. I slipped a joke about mental health. I do have a certain degree of obsessive-compulsiveness, and since I have no full expertise nor time to right all "wrongs", I am reclusing myself again from all philosophical subjects, because it seems they all are effectively abandoned and the burden on my brain will be unbearable. I am removing this page from my watchlist as well, good-bye. Loew Galitz ( talk) 20:57, 11 January 2022 (UTC)
According to Godfrey-Smith, in the view of pragmatists, the main goal of language and thoughts is practical problem solving. [1] The theory must answer a question about the world of observations. If the theory answers the question well, then one is justified in believing in it. The question Hume was asking is how observation can be used to justify this belief. Peirce outlines three stages in the process: abduction, deduction, and induction. In the abduction phase, theories are presented for consideration. In the deductive phase, they are prepared for tests. In the inductive phase, test results are evaluated. [2]. To give a context to refutability, the most important thing is the existence of a deductive phase that exists purely at the theoretical level and serves to prepare tests. Refutability is simply the requirement that these tests be possible at this theoretical level. In this sense, the refutability criterion was implicit in Peirce. The most important difference between Peirce and Popper seems to be Popper's rejection that testing is an inductive process that leads to strong belief. For Popper, whether at the psychological level or at the objective level, there is no inductive, i.e., non-deductive, rigorous process that leads from observations to belief. According to him, the belief relates, on the contrary, to the conjectures that exist before the observations and any change in the belief due to corroborations can be justified deductively. He does not deny that we have the strong belief that if the tests are successful then the theory can be trusted, but he denies that this belief is a mental habit created by repetition. For him, it is innate, the result of an evolutionary process. On this respect, he somewhat joins Chomsky and other philosophers who believe that we have innate mechanisms at the level of language. He accepts that there is a form of induction in this evolutionary process and he calls it quasi-induction. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 16:06, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
seems to go in the wrong direction, but Miller is talking about a change of laws in a logical/formalistic sense whereas Peirce is talking about a change of mental states in a psychological/naturalistic sense. There is no formal logical level to Peirce's concept of belief; it's purely psychological. Falsifiability as a logical criterion is completely irrelevant to Peircean belief: "as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false". The 1877 article contains this little bit of incipient evolutionary epistemology (of biological mechanisms not of formal theories): "Logicality in regard to practical matters (if this be understood, not in the old sense, but as consisting in a wise union of security with fruitfulness of reasoning) is the most useful quality an animal can possess, and might, therefore, result from the action of natural selection; but outside of these it is probably of more advantage to the animal to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions, independently of their truth; and thus, upon unpractical subjects, natural selection might occasion a fallacious tendency of thought." Biogeographist ( talk) 03:15, 28 October 2022 (UTC)
It is often suggested that Popper defines refutability at the logical, i.e., theoretical level, but then changes the definition and that refutability, in practice, requires that the theory can be methodologically refuted. The argument given is that Popper says that, without methodological rules, refutability does not guarantee that the system is scientific. This argument ignores the importance of distinguishing between the logical and methodological levels in order to avoid false problems at the methodological level. The goal is not rigorous refutation, which is impossible, but only to allow critical discussion. Really, the whole idea is to separate the logical criterion which is easily and rigorously verifiable from the methodological rules which are also, it is true, important, but necessarily informal although sufficient for the intended objective. The logical criterion is very useful and works well in the context of these rules and the intended purpose. If we do not understand this, we have missed a central point. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 16:06, 26 March 2022 (UTC)
This edit and this one, both, have a useful purpose. The first one brings out that, being a logical criterion, we should not care that the actual devices exist. It should be sufficient that it can be built. The second one brings out that the way to build the devices must exist, which means that some technologies must exist and, therefore, it is not accurate to say the technologies need not exist. The material condition is at the junction point between existing technologies (the material aspect) and the logical world of statements. This is what the extract from Nola & Sankey quoted by Biogeographist says. Perhaps the text could still be improved to make clear that an « empirical test » is not something abstract, but something that can be physically executed given the intersubjective knowledge, even if the context is a « logical criterion ». Dominic Mayers ( talk) 22:41, 11 February 2023 (UTC)