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Given the importance of the distinction between falsifiability, the logical criterion, and the non-logical criterion "ability to be proven wrong", it makes sense to have an article dedicated to Falsificationism, which considers and rejects the latter criterion, but is an important concept independently of falsifiability. Of course, this is not a WP:POV-fork, because it's not the same subject at all and both articles will duly refer to the other—no point of view will be hidden or made less important. This would also help a lot to reduce the false expectation that many readers have when visiting Falsifiability, because the article will have a disambiguation tag at the top such as:
The article Falsificationism could have a similar disambiguation tag at the top, but this is less important. The article itself will, of course, refer to falsifiability. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 17:34, 15 December 2021 (UTC)
--Doug Bashford — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2607:FB91:7905:9C86:D801:40FF:FE2B:D43B ( talk) 10:18, 16 December 2021 (UTC)
A point that came out of my search for sources is that "Falsificationism" is closely related to "Falsifiability". Essentially, Falsificationism is an analysis of the application of Falsifiability on the methodological side with a focus on making it rigorous. Because such methodology can hardly be formalized in terms of rules, Falsificationism is typically a criticism. It's not hard to understand the point of view that what is important is the application on the methodological side and if it cannot be made rigorous, then falsifiability has failed. However, this is only a point of view and it cannot be stated in Wikipedia's voice. The other point of view is that falsifiability is a logical criterion that is very useful despite the fact that the methodology is hardly rigorous, because this methodology is nevertheless rational, because science is rational even if we cannot formalize it in a fixed system. Here are the sources that I found:
These are the first that I saw in my shelves. Also, while looking for these sources, I realized that we have already a large section on falsificationism in the article. Are we questioning the verifiability of the section? Dominic Mayers ( talk) 20:56, 16 December 2021 (UTC)
After all that, you are the only one who knows what the hell you are talking about.Speak for yourself, Doug. Biogeographist ( talk) 03:02, 22 December 2021 (UTC)
I have been watching the talk page, but I don't have an opinion about whether to split off "Falsificationism" into a separate article. Here is another source: "Confirmationism vs. Falsificationism" (1977) by Nicholas Rescher. It presents confirmationism and falsificationism as ideal types exemplified by followers of Carnap and Popper respectively (not Carnap's and Popper's whole works, but just the parts relevant to this distinction). Rescher is not concerned with the "logic versus methodology" distinction. For Rescher, confirmationism and falsificationism are two ideal types or emphases in scientific epistemology, and he argues that a synthesis of the strengths of both emphases is needed, as phases in a dialectical process of knowledge generation. I don't mean to imply that Rescher is "right"; I am only adding his perspective to the conversation here. Rescher's perspective is a little like the view that "falsificationism" is a label for Popper's philosophy, except that Rescher is abstracting an ideal type from Popper, and not doing a detailed exegesis of Popper's philosophy. Biogeographist ( talk) 03:02, 22 December 2021 (UTC)
He also refers to Popper insistence on falsifications, but he does not mention that Popper does that only in the context of a rigorous logic.Rescher addresses the logical aspect but not in this section of the book: chapter 4 is on "dialectical logic", which I guess is a kind of paraconsistent logic for the dialectical process? (Correct me if I'm wrong; you are the logic expert.) Rescher is very aware of the logical issues, and he knows exactly how his system relates to strictly deductive logic, but the section of the book on "Confirmationism vs. Falsificationism" does not go into the details. Biogeographist ( talk) 19:14, 22 December 2021 (UTC)
as a way of systematizing the testing process for scientific theories (Karl Popper and his school). He must refer to Lakatos, who, despite his different with Popper, is often seen as a popperian. Except for Lakatos, most of his students were against systematic methods, certainly Feyerabend was. Lakatos proposed (sophisticated) falsificationism as an attempt to provide the missing rigour (but Musgrave, Feyerabend, etc. considered that he did not succeed and Lakatos partially agreed). To my knowledge, Popper only referred to classical logic. I am not aware that he flirted with paraconsistent logic. In my view, these are attempts to compensate for the limit of classical logic. I would say that Popper's main point is that we should not try that. For Popper, it's not within the scope of epistemology or the philosophy of science to try to put science within a systematic system, whether it is called paraconsistent logic, inductive logic or whatever. In other words, his solution to the problem of induction is simply that we should not try to solve it, because we don't use these other kinds of logic in practice. We use patterns, which we may call "inductive rules", but there are no real rules there. They are just tools, like statistical tools, etc. that we use whenever they apply given the background knowledge, but the whole process cannot be turned into a paraconsistent or an inductive logic. He was happy with the fact that we could locate where classical logic plays a role in the scientific process and used it as criterion of demarcation. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 20:30, 22 December 2021 (UTC)
He must refer to Lakatos, who, despite his different with Popper, is often seen as a popperian.No, Rescher never mentions Lakatos. He does say, in a footnote on page 55: "For a vivid picture of Popperian methodology in the light of a dialectical perspective of consideration see Hans Albert, Traktat über kritische Vernunft (Tübingen, 1968)."
My personal view on this is that Popper had the correct global approach, which is not to try to attack the big problem of putting all of science within a systematic logic of any kind, paraconsistent or whatever.I am not sure how this is relevant to the question at hand, but Rescher is not "putting all of science within a systematic logic". For Rescher, an important reason for dialectical metatheory in epistemology is that logical theory is insufficient. (In fact, as I think we have discussed elsewhere, logic is insufficient for any account of rationality because one has to account for the metacognitive generation and control of the logic, not just the logic itself.) For example, on page 118, the page just before the section on "Confirmationism vs. Falsificationism", Rescher wrote:
We can determine the probative status of the thesis only "in context"—only relative to the historical concreta of its probative background. Its status relative to a course of argument hinges on its antecedents within this argument in such a way that these cannot be put aside: it becomes important to consider not just the content of the evidence, but also the historical development of the evidential situation. The whole course of argumentation must be brought into the assessment of the probative status of the conclusion.
These general considerations regarding the probative structure of dialectical contexts have one particularly significant bearing in the specific setting of a disputational model of natural science. They mean that we can never really assess the probative standing of a scientific thesis outside its historical context—outside the background of the actual course of controversy and discussion from which it has emerged. The real-life sequence of argumentation and debate that has brought us to where we are becomes a crucial factor in the rational assessment of this position. The probative or evidential situation in this domain is context-dependent on the details of the historical background in a way that finds no parallel in the deductive sciences that have often (and mistakenly) been taken as the model of scientific rationality in general.
These considerations go very much against the grain of the positivist philosophy of science. ... Our present position goes against the grain of this view, arguing (on roughly evolutionary grounds) that some issues of historical development are bound to be probatively significant.
Perhaps a good example of a "follower of Popper" who comes very close to Rescher's depiction of falsificationism is David Miller, whose book Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence (Chicago: Open Court, 1994) is currently described by Miller's Wikipedia article as "an attempt to expound, defend, and extend an approach to scientific knowledge identified with Popper". Section 1.2 in that book, titled "Outline of Falsificationism", says (pp. 6–7):
For justificationists a hypothesis has to pass tests, or be confirmed, or in some other way be touched with grace, if it is to be admitted to the realm of scientific knowledge; if it fails these tests, or is disconfirmed, or even if it fails to be confirmed; it is excluded. Falsificationists, in contrast, think that a hypothesis need submit to tests only after it has been admitted to science. If it fails any of the tests to which it is put, then it is expelled, removed from science; if it passes them all, then nothing happens—that is to say, it is retained. The passing of tests therefore makes not a jot of difference to the status of any hypothesis, though the failing of just one test may make a great deal of difference. For justificationists, on the other hand, the passing of tests is quite as important as the failing of tests, for it is precisely this that determines whether a hypothesis is admitted to the body of science. Of course, justificationists need expulsion procedures as well as entrance examinations; for even the most rigorous entrance examination fails to guarantee the quality of a successful candidate. But the expulsion procedures are the sole means that Popper allows for the control of scientific knowledge. He adopts a policy of open admission, subject naturally to the condition that no hypothesis may be admitted unless there is some way in which, if necessary, it may be expelled.
Miller's phrase "a policy of open admission" is a good label for what Rescher finds insufficient in falsificationism: for Rescher, there is not a policy of open admission in scientific epistemology, because there is also a complementary confirmationist aspect to science, which seeks "reasonable" or "sensible" hypotheses that are "more or less consonant" with what is well known about the way things work.
Later in the same section, Miller says (pp. 11–12):
The whole business [of science] can be explained, quite satisfactorily, without any reference to certainty, probability, confirmation, support, reliability, confidence, justification, good reasons, or knowledge.
Again, this statement by Miller summarizing falsificationism (which Miller associates with Popper) is entirely consonant with Rescher's portrayal of falsificationism.
John W. N. Watkins's review of Miller's book accuses Miller of misrepresenting Popper in this regard (though Popper hardly had a closer follower than Miller, so I doubt that Miller's interpretation of critical rationalism can be considered illegitimate). Watkins says:
Since an unwary reader of this book may gain the impression from its many acknowledgements and salutations to Popper that it is essentially a restatement of Popper's philosophy, I may point out that it is very unPopperian in important ways. (1) Popper did not endorse a policy of waving in any old rivals to a currently prevailing theory, provided only that they are falsifiable. He rightly considered it an important feature of his methodology that it enables us to say what kind of theory would be better than the prevailing one, provided it passes tests ([1963], pp. 217, 240f.). (2) A main component of Popper's methodology was his theory of corroboration (see the concluding chapter and appendix *ix of his [1959]); corroborations are what ultimately govern the rational acceptance of theories. This disappears without trace in Miller's 'restatement'. In his index there are six entries against 'corroboration', five of which refer to places where an author is being quoted or reported. The sixth comes in the course of an examination of my [1984]. I had tried to give a fresh answer to the question, 'Why do corroborations matter?' Miller writes: 'The answer is that corroboration doesn't matter' (p. 120). (3) Popper had a horror of anything like rationality-scepticism. He insisted that a theory's being currently the best corroborated, while not justifying the theory, does justify a preference for it over its rivals. He may not have kept these two kinds of justification as separate as he should have done, but his philosophy allows there to be sufficient reasons for accepting one theory as better than its rivals at the present time. Of course, Miller is free to make what changes he likes; but in a book which purports to present 'a sounder and less blinkered appreciation of Popper's work than it has previously enjoyed' (p. x), I don't think he should silently ditch large chunks of it. ... A more accurate title for the book would have been: 'What Remains of Critical Rationalism when the Rationalism is Dropped'.
— Watkins, John W. N. (December 1995). "Book review: Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence, by David Miller". The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 46 (4): 610–616. doi: 10.1093/bjps/46.4.610. JSTOR 687902.
So there is indeed a prominent follower of Popper who portrays falsificationism as Rescher does, though Watkins disagrees that Miller's account of falsificationism is Popperian. Still, this perspective on falsificationism should not be dismissed as unimportant, given David Miller's stature among critical rationalists. Biogeographist ( talk) 15:36, 26 December 2021 (UTC)
it's good for a theory that it succeeds in severe tests and, therefore, corroborations are meaningful. Biogeographist ( talk) 21:12, 26 December 2021 (UTC)
I just want that we focus on a common objective for this article and possibly a split of falsificationism. The first goal should be to explain Popper's falsifiability and what it accomplishes. The entire article should be centred on that. Even opposite views should be centred on that, in negative manner perhaps, but presenting opposite views helps to clarify each view. Neutrality here does not mean presenting Bunge's, Rescher's, Miller's, etc. views. Popper is often mentioned, but this is not a lack of neutrality, because it's Popper's falsifiability. I don't think we should have sections or even paragraphs on other's views only for the sake of neutrality. Different views should be presented because they are different views about falsifiability and its applications, not because Bunge, Rescher, Miller, etc. are important philosophers with different perspectives. Otherwise I fear the article will lose its focus. This is why, when I read your comments, I am asking myself what part of the article is incorrect or needs an opposite view that would help us with the simple goal of explaining falsifiability and its applications? To achieve this goal is particularly important to not conflate different notions as being the same and not present in Wikipedia's voice what could possibly be confusion. Yes, there is a lot of confusion on the subject in the literature and I believe the article should not entirely hide it, but yet these possible confusions should not be presented in Wikipedia's voice and also we are not forced to present (with attributions) all possible confusions. We need to keep it simple. We do not want to hide important issues, but not all possible confusions are important. Also, what worries me is that looking at possible confusions is without end in this subject. We could keep playing this game for ever, with Bunge, Rescher, etc. and I will get exhausted. Miller's book is a tough one, because, as you know, it is a defence, and therefore he considers many subtle attacks on Popper's philosophy. Before, we can understand his response, we must look at the subtlety of the attack and often the response is simple, but the context was complicated. I don't think that the article should follow this style. Regarding your specific issue, Miller often follows Popper regarding the separation between the logical side and the methodological side, but he does not say it explicitly each time. In this case, it is easy to imagine that Miller has in mind the simple mathematical or logical situation where there is a universal law and a few instances that corroborate the law, without any assumptions whatsoever, just this abstract mathematical situation. Logically, the law still remains unjustified and the only thing that changed is that we know some instances that corroborate it. We can say that the law remains "totally" unjustified, because if we try to give a measure to this change, it is essentially nothing. That's all what he means when he says that corroborations are useless. He certainly does not mean that in the methodological side, in which we always make plenty of assumptions, the corroborations are never useful. I don't think covering this would help people to understand falsifiability. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 23:50, 26 December 2021 (UTC)
should be to explain Popper's falsifiability and what it accomplishesas you said, then it's my opinion that the section on "Lakatos's falsificationism" should be split off into a new Falsificationism article, since I don't think that section does much to achieve what you say should be the goal of this article. However, ideally the exposition of Lakatos's falsificationism would be only one part of the new Falsificationism article, since there are other important views such as that of Miller, who presents his own explanation of falsificationism and repeatedly calls it Popper's (e.g., "falsiticationism—Popper's theory", ibid., p. x) even though Popper said in 1978 that he "tends to avoid" the term; but at the same time Watkins' criticism that Miller's falsificationism is not Popper's view should be mentioned if Miller's falsificationism is mentioned.
Miller often follows Popper regarding the separation between the logical side and the methodological side, but he does not say it explicitly each time. In this case, it is easy to imagine that Miller has in mind the simple mathematical or logical situation where there is a universal law and a few instances that corroborate the lawetc. This interpretation is charitable toward Miller, but like Watkins I am not inclined to be so charitable; one reason is that the first sentence of Miller's first chapter says: "The task of empirical science, like that of other investigative disciplines, is to separate as thoroughly and efficiently as it can the true statements about the world from those that are false, and to retain the truths." Leaving aside possible criticisms of this definition, Miller's subject is all empirical science, not just universal hypotheses. In the next paragraph he says: "Unfortunately for such a project, conclusive verification by empirical means turns out, quite trivially, not to be practicable, anyway above the observational level. Universal hypotheses cannot be conclusively verified" etc. This would support your interpretation if the only statements in science were about "the observational level" and "universal hypotheses", but surely empirical science deals with more than these two extremes (here I am thinking of Mario Bunge, who argues for this point in several books), and as Watkins asked in his book review (repeating a question that Watkins had posed a decade before without response from Miller), what should we do "in the all too likely event that we have a plethora of unrefuted and mutually conflicting hypotheses" (p. 613)? The point of all this is to suggest that the criticisms of Watkins are not so easy to brush aside as far as I can see, and that both Miller's portrayal of falsificationism and the objections to it would be worth including in the Falsificationism article.
Wikipedia must make a choicein this case any more than it "must make a choice" in any other case where there is a term with multiple meanings and a disambiguation page is used or else the multiple meanings are discussed in the same article. My proposed solution in this case is a disambiguation page to accommodate your desire not to discuss the multiple meanings in a single article, but I am not opposed to the latter solution.
Some times I say instead that Lakatos popularized the term and the concept.If that were true, then Miller wouldn't use the term so proudly. The truth is that the term has multiple meanings. It's not owned by Lakatos. Biogeographist ( talk) 19:22, 27 December 2021 (UTC)
that the vast majority use this to refer to Lakatos's falsificationism. What do you think, for example, of the definition of falsificationism here in Oxford University Press's Dictionary of the Social Sciences? This is the more typical definition of "falsificationism" without Lakatosian qualifiers. It's explicitly associated with Popper. Biogeographist ( talk) 19:14, 27 December 2021 (UTC)
My idea would be to use Falsificationism for falsificationism as used by Lakatos, even though he does not own the term. You right that Wikipedia does not have to choose a terminology, but it can if it useful and avoid stating in Wikipedia's voice a confusion. The disambiguation tag at the top of the article would say something like
I changed my position. I consider now that it is simpler to consider that falsifiability is a very special solution among different approaches in falsificationism. It remains very wrong to identify Popper's philosophy with all these proposals that fail to avoid the falsification problems or to conflate it with a philosophy that needs to be complemented by some form of confirmationism. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 20:46, 27 December 2021 (UTC)
to use Falsificationism for falsificationism as used by Lakatosis a bad idea, because any article with that name should accommodate views such as Miller's. However, I could accept a new redirect if it were to a section of Imre Lakatos with a hatnote at the top of the section that says, e.g., "Falsificationism" redirects here. For the approach in Karl Popper's philosophy, see Falsifiability. This is still problematic but is no worse than the previous redirect to a section of Falsifiability, and would advance your stated goal of keeping this article focused on Popper. Biogeographist ( talk) 21:55, 27 December 2021 (UTC)
In any case, I believe my proposal meets all your requirements. As I explained, I am not formally against that falsificationism is a large category that includes Popper's philosophy. This is a big change in my position. Also, there is no reference to Lakatos in my description of the article Falsificationism and in the disambiguation tag (see above), which was an important requirement for you. Of course, simply by WP:proportion and the fact that the special case falsifiability is already well covered, the article will focus a lot on Lakatos's falsificationism. So, I feel like I had compromised a lot, but I hold strong on the fact that any confusion created by associating falsifiability and Popper's philosophy to the general case and ignoring essential aspects of Popper's philosophy, which is a unique special case, cannot be stated or implied in Wikipedia's voice. The "implied" is important here, because often choice of name, etc. can imply a point of view in a manner that is worst than something stated explicily in Wikipedia's voice. For example, given that Popper's philosophy is a very special case, referring to it as falsificationism is vague and can be used to create a confusion. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 22:45, 27 December 2021 (UTC)
We could keep playing this game for ever. Now I definitely think that you are the one who is playing a game. You proposed
to use Falsificationism for falsificationism as used by Lakatos, i.e., to create an article called "Falsificationism" about Lakatos. And now you say you made
no reference to Lakatos. You are playing your game and are completely ignoring my point. I hope you're having fun. There is no way I am going to agree with you when you play like this. Biogeographist ( talk) 22:56, 27 December 2021 (UTC)
idea would be to use Falsificationism for falsificationism as used by Lakatos. If you're saying that Lakatos is the general case, and everything else fits within that, I don't agree with that. It completely ignores the historical context in which these thinkers formulated their ideas. A single-article treatment of falsificationism would probably have to be an account of different thinkers presenting different interpretations of "falsificationism" in different contexts to address different problems/issues. For example, as you said further above, for Miller
Lakatos's problem was considered a false problem. Rescher was partly concerned with problems such as cognitive economy, which was (I guess) not so important for Popper, Lakatos, or Miller. I don't see how all this could be formalized into a logical schema. The intellectual contexts are different, so a historical approach would be appropriate to some degree.
idea would be to use Falsificationism for falsificationism as used by Lakatos, I meant that I can see Lakatos just like anyone else that saw the subject falsificationism. He might not own it, but his view contributes to define the subject. I thought it was obvious that, nevertheless, Lakatos's falsificationism cannot be the general case, because I accepted that the general case covers Popper's philosophy. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 23:56, 27 December 2021 (UTC)
For me, the secondary sources that we use should have placed their view within a perspective associated with the subject just as when we have a discussion.When we were discussing how to edit Scientific evidence earlier this year, I was trying to find secondary sources like what you described in that sentence, but for the subject of "scientific evidence". (By the way, I am still interested in editing that article, and I collected sources, but never came back to it.) At the same time, in our discussion about Scientific evidence, you argued (if I remember correctly) that some secondary sources may not include all important views, which of course is correct. So one has to use a variety of secondary sources that may frame the discussion among primary sources in very different ways. And how is one to adjudicate among secondary sources? There may be a tertiary source that covers it all, but probably not. At the "tertiary" level some degree of editor discretion will probably be necessary. Regarding your Kuhnian paradigm analogy, Michael Friedman said in response to Kuhn that although some scientific paradigms/frameworks are incommensurable in certain ways, nevertheless paradigm/framework change can be rationally guided at a philosophical meta-level. The analogous meta-level here would be the discretion and discussion of editors guided by Wikipedia's guidelines and policies. Biogeographist ( talk) 00:55, 28 December 2021 (UTC)
And how is one to adjudicate among secondary sources?The issue is often that the subject is large to start with and it can be addressed using so many different perspectives, agenda or theses. In that case, in principle, we have no other choice as to accept all perspectives that is proposed by editors and weight them using WP:proportion. In practice, it might not be what happens. Instead a few or even one editor come(s) in and pick a perspective and this perspective becomes part of the definition of the scope, i.e., of the subject. If editors try to include content using a different perspective they might meet resistance, because it appears as disturbing the flow and organization of the article. I don't think it is a bad thing. In fact, perhaps the solution was indeed to split the large subject so that every article focuses on a single perspective. It does not mean that the different articles cannot be connected. I don't remember the details, but I do remember that I was arguing in favour of a split and that it was not a POV-fork if the article were correctly connected. To answer your question, my answer is that a natural way is to pick one source not to fix the content, not as being the correct source, but as concrete material used as a reference to define the question, the subject, the perspective. In the case of Lakatos, his book is useful to define a question, a perspective, an agenda, but it did not prevent me to accept that it can be generalized so that it covers Popper's philosophy. In fact, the more I think about it, it's not surprising at all, because Lakatos got his agenda from Popper's agenda. He just did not appreciate how well Popper's solution was connected to the reality of science. I mean, for me, Popper found the correct way to locate rationality in science. Lakatos had the same agenda, but did not appreciate that and he kept looking for rationality where it could not be found. But the agenda, the perspective, etc. were not so different. In fact, some outsiders that look at this from a distance, classify them both as positivists. I don't see what these outsiders see, but I find interesting that some people can put Lakatos and Popper in the same category. So, you see that I have a different approach than you. You suggest a top down approach where we look at higher levels of abstraction. I know some of it is necessary, but I am saying that having a concrete material as a point of reference is also necessary. Yes, higher levels of abstraction are necessary, but they come naturally through discussions and in trying to understand the concrete material, simply trying to describe abstractly what is the question, etc. Regarding the non-commensurability of different paradigms, I also do not believe in this and Popper also did not believe in this. He wrote The myth of the framework to oppose this view. Nevertheless, it remains that some deep considerations of both paradigms are needed to make the connection. Therefore, I am not against different perspectives, but we need to have the willingness to go deep in each perspective to make this connection. It's not against any rule, because it will be our understanding of these sources and we will simply present them in the best way possible without doing any original research, because it will be the actual way the sources are connected. But that requires a deep understanding of the sources and a lot of reading to confirm with secondary sources, etc. a tremendous amount of work some times. Now, add to this that we can keep adding new perspectives and new sources with new agenda, new theses in this manner. It becomes frightening. The alternative approach is to present the different perspectives as being superficially connected, almost as if they were opposed some times, when in fact they are very close, if not almost the same thing. This is not an interesting article for me. This is what I would call an horizontal approach at the expense of a vertical approach with one perspective. It's way better to focus on a single perspective and go deep into it than to do that, only covering each perspective superficially. I admit that my attitude is motivated by a limited amount of energy. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 03:51, 28 December 2021 (UTC)
But that requires a deep understanding of the sources and a lot of reading to confirm with secondary sources, etc. a tremendous amount of work some times.That is why I have not returned to work on Scientific evidence; it requires a lot of such work. Biogeographist ( talk) 15:48, 28 December 2021 (UTC)
The article is peppered with footnotes, which gives an impression that it is thoroughly referenced. Well, it is not. I found this problem because I was curious about what is the "searchlight theory". It turned out that the footnotes are in fact further musings, often with no clear relation to the sentences footnoted.
There are two purposes of footnotes: (A) references (B) clarifications or minor pieces of info not critical to overall flow, e.g., etymologies of some terms, interesting but not essential biographical details, etc. This was not the case for the "searchlight" section. Therefore I removed all them and replaced with "citation needed" tags, and you should immediately see that citations are indeed needed.
I also removed pieces that show no relation to "searchlight" neither in text nor in refs cited, i.e., constituting pieces of WP:SYNTH/ WP:COATRACK.
I have no interest in further reading here, but whoever works here must review all the remaining "pseudoreferences". Loew Galitz ( talk) 21:01, 9 January 2022 (UTC)
The highlighted part contradicts both the source and wikipedia itself: the very previous sentence is an example of definite falsification. I fixed it ( On the other hand, Duhem and others said that a definitive experimental falsification of an isolated hypothesis is often impossible.), but was reverted. But this is the very essence of Durham's point: a validity oif a hypothsis is often contingent on "auxiliary hypotheses", i.e., often it is meanngless to discuss a hypothesis outside its context. .Please voice youor opinion. Loew Galitz ( talk) 00:05, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
You don't need to read this if you understand that falsifiability is a logical criterion
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Chalmers uses the following example of potential falsifier of Newton's law: "The brick felt upward when released". The point is that falsifiability is purely at the level of statements and their relations, i.e., at the level of the language. This was explained by Popper to answer the exact question that you raise: what about the auxiliary hypotheses? The answer is that they are not needed and not a concern at the logical level where falsifiability is defined. At the logical level, there is no auxiliary hypothesis, so it's pointless to say that the theory is isolated (i.e., separated from the auxiliary hypothesis). The whole point of Duhem's problem is that the theory in isolation, i.e., separated from the auxiliary hypotheses and other theories in the background knowledge, cannot be falsified, because it might be these other hypotheses and theories that are incorrect. It's not in my brain. It's exactly what the sources explain. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 05:01, 10 January 2022 (UTC)"Newton's theory... would equally be contradicted if the apples from one of my, or Newton's, apple trees were to rise from the ground (without there being a whirling about), and begin to dance round the branches of the apple tree from which they had fallen."
Go read a Wikipedia article about some mathematical resultmost wp articles in math and computer science are shitloads of dung (beyond the lede), precisely for the reason you mentioned, especially the ones which contain proofs of some seminal statemments. Loew Galitz ( talk) 05:22, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
I say that the clause "in isolation" is crucial for Duhem's logic, and you seem to have confirmed this right here.Yes, I said it's true that Duhem's problem does not apply to the entire system of statements that includes the theory on the logical side as well as the hypotheses, etc. in the methodological side. However, given that we know from the context that we are referring to falsifications of theories stated in the logical side, then we are in the case of isolated systems. There is no need to insist that it is an isolated system to be correct. On the contrary, it creates a confusion, because it suggests that the Duhem's problem does not apply to all the cases that we are considering. So, it's clearer not to mention uselessly that the systems that we consider must be isolated. The essential point is better conveyed in that manner. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 05:57, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
I can see that you might be frustrated that the text is not verifiable in a mechanical manner that does not require some thinking. Your objective is fine. It will be great that all articles can be verifiable in a mechanical manner that does not require any thinking, but the priority is to have a text that conveys the information in the simplest manner possible. Twisting a correct text so that it can be verified mechanically is not optimal for the readers. The ordinary reader that is learning about falsifiability will not see the problem that you see. Besides, in practice, we always consider systems in isolation. The concept of a totality is purely philosophical. I does not exist in practice: there is always some methodological aspects that are ignored in the description of a system: we never reach the bottom of the swamp in Popper's language. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 06:42, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
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Given the importance of the distinction between falsifiability, the logical criterion, and the non-logical criterion "ability to be proven wrong", it makes sense to have an article dedicated to Falsificationism, which considers and rejects the latter criterion, but is an important concept independently of falsifiability. Of course, this is not a WP:POV-fork, because it's not the same subject at all and both articles will duly refer to the other—no point of view will be hidden or made less important. This would also help a lot to reduce the false expectation that many readers have when visiting Falsifiability, because the article will have a disambiguation tag at the top such as:
The article Falsificationism could have a similar disambiguation tag at the top, but this is less important. The article itself will, of course, refer to falsifiability. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 17:34, 15 December 2021 (UTC)
--Doug Bashford — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2607:FB91:7905:9C86:D801:40FF:FE2B:D43B ( talk) 10:18, 16 December 2021 (UTC)
A point that came out of my search for sources is that "Falsificationism" is closely related to "Falsifiability". Essentially, Falsificationism is an analysis of the application of Falsifiability on the methodological side with a focus on making it rigorous. Because such methodology can hardly be formalized in terms of rules, Falsificationism is typically a criticism. It's not hard to understand the point of view that what is important is the application on the methodological side and if it cannot be made rigorous, then falsifiability has failed. However, this is only a point of view and it cannot be stated in Wikipedia's voice. The other point of view is that falsifiability is a logical criterion that is very useful despite the fact that the methodology is hardly rigorous, because this methodology is nevertheless rational, because science is rational even if we cannot formalize it in a fixed system. Here are the sources that I found:
These are the first that I saw in my shelves. Also, while looking for these sources, I realized that we have already a large section on falsificationism in the article. Are we questioning the verifiability of the section? Dominic Mayers ( talk) 20:56, 16 December 2021 (UTC)
After all that, you are the only one who knows what the hell you are talking about.Speak for yourself, Doug. Biogeographist ( talk) 03:02, 22 December 2021 (UTC)
I have been watching the talk page, but I don't have an opinion about whether to split off "Falsificationism" into a separate article. Here is another source: "Confirmationism vs. Falsificationism" (1977) by Nicholas Rescher. It presents confirmationism and falsificationism as ideal types exemplified by followers of Carnap and Popper respectively (not Carnap's and Popper's whole works, but just the parts relevant to this distinction). Rescher is not concerned with the "logic versus methodology" distinction. For Rescher, confirmationism and falsificationism are two ideal types or emphases in scientific epistemology, and he argues that a synthesis of the strengths of both emphases is needed, as phases in a dialectical process of knowledge generation. I don't mean to imply that Rescher is "right"; I am only adding his perspective to the conversation here. Rescher's perspective is a little like the view that "falsificationism" is a label for Popper's philosophy, except that Rescher is abstracting an ideal type from Popper, and not doing a detailed exegesis of Popper's philosophy. Biogeographist ( talk) 03:02, 22 December 2021 (UTC)
He also refers to Popper insistence on falsifications, but he does not mention that Popper does that only in the context of a rigorous logic.Rescher addresses the logical aspect but not in this section of the book: chapter 4 is on "dialectical logic", which I guess is a kind of paraconsistent logic for the dialectical process? (Correct me if I'm wrong; you are the logic expert.) Rescher is very aware of the logical issues, and he knows exactly how his system relates to strictly deductive logic, but the section of the book on "Confirmationism vs. Falsificationism" does not go into the details. Biogeographist ( talk) 19:14, 22 December 2021 (UTC)
as a way of systematizing the testing process for scientific theories (Karl Popper and his school). He must refer to Lakatos, who, despite his different with Popper, is often seen as a popperian. Except for Lakatos, most of his students were against systematic methods, certainly Feyerabend was. Lakatos proposed (sophisticated) falsificationism as an attempt to provide the missing rigour (but Musgrave, Feyerabend, etc. considered that he did not succeed and Lakatos partially agreed). To my knowledge, Popper only referred to classical logic. I am not aware that he flirted with paraconsistent logic. In my view, these are attempts to compensate for the limit of classical logic. I would say that Popper's main point is that we should not try that. For Popper, it's not within the scope of epistemology or the philosophy of science to try to put science within a systematic system, whether it is called paraconsistent logic, inductive logic or whatever. In other words, his solution to the problem of induction is simply that we should not try to solve it, because we don't use these other kinds of logic in practice. We use patterns, which we may call "inductive rules", but there are no real rules there. They are just tools, like statistical tools, etc. that we use whenever they apply given the background knowledge, but the whole process cannot be turned into a paraconsistent or an inductive logic. He was happy with the fact that we could locate where classical logic plays a role in the scientific process and used it as criterion of demarcation. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 20:30, 22 December 2021 (UTC)
He must refer to Lakatos, who, despite his different with Popper, is often seen as a popperian.No, Rescher never mentions Lakatos. He does say, in a footnote on page 55: "For a vivid picture of Popperian methodology in the light of a dialectical perspective of consideration see Hans Albert, Traktat über kritische Vernunft (Tübingen, 1968)."
My personal view on this is that Popper had the correct global approach, which is not to try to attack the big problem of putting all of science within a systematic logic of any kind, paraconsistent or whatever.I am not sure how this is relevant to the question at hand, but Rescher is not "putting all of science within a systematic logic". For Rescher, an important reason for dialectical metatheory in epistemology is that logical theory is insufficient. (In fact, as I think we have discussed elsewhere, logic is insufficient for any account of rationality because one has to account for the metacognitive generation and control of the logic, not just the logic itself.) For example, on page 118, the page just before the section on "Confirmationism vs. Falsificationism", Rescher wrote:
We can determine the probative status of the thesis only "in context"—only relative to the historical concreta of its probative background. Its status relative to a course of argument hinges on its antecedents within this argument in such a way that these cannot be put aside: it becomes important to consider not just the content of the evidence, but also the historical development of the evidential situation. The whole course of argumentation must be brought into the assessment of the probative status of the conclusion.
These general considerations regarding the probative structure of dialectical contexts have one particularly significant bearing in the specific setting of a disputational model of natural science. They mean that we can never really assess the probative standing of a scientific thesis outside its historical context—outside the background of the actual course of controversy and discussion from which it has emerged. The real-life sequence of argumentation and debate that has brought us to where we are becomes a crucial factor in the rational assessment of this position. The probative or evidential situation in this domain is context-dependent on the details of the historical background in a way that finds no parallel in the deductive sciences that have often (and mistakenly) been taken as the model of scientific rationality in general.
These considerations go very much against the grain of the positivist philosophy of science. ... Our present position goes against the grain of this view, arguing (on roughly evolutionary grounds) that some issues of historical development are bound to be probatively significant.
Perhaps a good example of a "follower of Popper" who comes very close to Rescher's depiction of falsificationism is David Miller, whose book Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence (Chicago: Open Court, 1994) is currently described by Miller's Wikipedia article as "an attempt to expound, defend, and extend an approach to scientific knowledge identified with Popper". Section 1.2 in that book, titled "Outline of Falsificationism", says (pp. 6–7):
For justificationists a hypothesis has to pass tests, or be confirmed, or in some other way be touched with grace, if it is to be admitted to the realm of scientific knowledge; if it fails these tests, or is disconfirmed, or even if it fails to be confirmed; it is excluded. Falsificationists, in contrast, think that a hypothesis need submit to tests only after it has been admitted to science. If it fails any of the tests to which it is put, then it is expelled, removed from science; if it passes them all, then nothing happens—that is to say, it is retained. The passing of tests therefore makes not a jot of difference to the status of any hypothesis, though the failing of just one test may make a great deal of difference. For justificationists, on the other hand, the passing of tests is quite as important as the failing of tests, for it is precisely this that determines whether a hypothesis is admitted to the body of science. Of course, justificationists need expulsion procedures as well as entrance examinations; for even the most rigorous entrance examination fails to guarantee the quality of a successful candidate. But the expulsion procedures are the sole means that Popper allows for the control of scientific knowledge. He adopts a policy of open admission, subject naturally to the condition that no hypothesis may be admitted unless there is some way in which, if necessary, it may be expelled.
Miller's phrase "a policy of open admission" is a good label for what Rescher finds insufficient in falsificationism: for Rescher, there is not a policy of open admission in scientific epistemology, because there is also a complementary confirmationist aspect to science, which seeks "reasonable" or "sensible" hypotheses that are "more or less consonant" with what is well known about the way things work.
Later in the same section, Miller says (pp. 11–12):
The whole business [of science] can be explained, quite satisfactorily, without any reference to certainty, probability, confirmation, support, reliability, confidence, justification, good reasons, or knowledge.
Again, this statement by Miller summarizing falsificationism (which Miller associates with Popper) is entirely consonant with Rescher's portrayal of falsificationism.
John W. N. Watkins's review of Miller's book accuses Miller of misrepresenting Popper in this regard (though Popper hardly had a closer follower than Miller, so I doubt that Miller's interpretation of critical rationalism can be considered illegitimate). Watkins says:
Since an unwary reader of this book may gain the impression from its many acknowledgements and salutations to Popper that it is essentially a restatement of Popper's philosophy, I may point out that it is very unPopperian in important ways. (1) Popper did not endorse a policy of waving in any old rivals to a currently prevailing theory, provided only that they are falsifiable. He rightly considered it an important feature of his methodology that it enables us to say what kind of theory would be better than the prevailing one, provided it passes tests ([1963], pp. 217, 240f.). (2) A main component of Popper's methodology was his theory of corroboration (see the concluding chapter and appendix *ix of his [1959]); corroborations are what ultimately govern the rational acceptance of theories. This disappears without trace in Miller's 'restatement'. In his index there are six entries against 'corroboration', five of which refer to places where an author is being quoted or reported. The sixth comes in the course of an examination of my [1984]. I had tried to give a fresh answer to the question, 'Why do corroborations matter?' Miller writes: 'The answer is that corroboration doesn't matter' (p. 120). (3) Popper had a horror of anything like rationality-scepticism. He insisted that a theory's being currently the best corroborated, while not justifying the theory, does justify a preference for it over its rivals. He may not have kept these two kinds of justification as separate as he should have done, but his philosophy allows there to be sufficient reasons for accepting one theory as better than its rivals at the present time. Of course, Miller is free to make what changes he likes; but in a book which purports to present 'a sounder and less blinkered appreciation of Popper's work than it has previously enjoyed' (p. x), I don't think he should silently ditch large chunks of it. ... A more accurate title for the book would have been: 'What Remains of Critical Rationalism when the Rationalism is Dropped'.
— Watkins, John W. N. (December 1995). "Book review: Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence, by David Miller". The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 46 (4): 610–616. doi: 10.1093/bjps/46.4.610. JSTOR 687902.
So there is indeed a prominent follower of Popper who portrays falsificationism as Rescher does, though Watkins disagrees that Miller's account of falsificationism is Popperian. Still, this perspective on falsificationism should not be dismissed as unimportant, given David Miller's stature among critical rationalists. Biogeographist ( talk) 15:36, 26 December 2021 (UTC)
it's good for a theory that it succeeds in severe tests and, therefore, corroborations are meaningful. Biogeographist ( talk) 21:12, 26 December 2021 (UTC)
I just want that we focus on a common objective for this article and possibly a split of falsificationism. The first goal should be to explain Popper's falsifiability and what it accomplishes. The entire article should be centred on that. Even opposite views should be centred on that, in negative manner perhaps, but presenting opposite views helps to clarify each view. Neutrality here does not mean presenting Bunge's, Rescher's, Miller's, etc. views. Popper is often mentioned, but this is not a lack of neutrality, because it's Popper's falsifiability. I don't think we should have sections or even paragraphs on other's views only for the sake of neutrality. Different views should be presented because they are different views about falsifiability and its applications, not because Bunge, Rescher, Miller, etc. are important philosophers with different perspectives. Otherwise I fear the article will lose its focus. This is why, when I read your comments, I am asking myself what part of the article is incorrect or needs an opposite view that would help us with the simple goal of explaining falsifiability and its applications? To achieve this goal is particularly important to not conflate different notions as being the same and not present in Wikipedia's voice what could possibly be confusion. Yes, there is a lot of confusion on the subject in the literature and I believe the article should not entirely hide it, but yet these possible confusions should not be presented in Wikipedia's voice and also we are not forced to present (with attributions) all possible confusions. We need to keep it simple. We do not want to hide important issues, but not all possible confusions are important. Also, what worries me is that looking at possible confusions is without end in this subject. We could keep playing this game for ever, with Bunge, Rescher, etc. and I will get exhausted. Miller's book is a tough one, because, as you know, it is a defence, and therefore he considers many subtle attacks on Popper's philosophy. Before, we can understand his response, we must look at the subtlety of the attack and often the response is simple, but the context was complicated. I don't think that the article should follow this style. Regarding your specific issue, Miller often follows Popper regarding the separation between the logical side and the methodological side, but he does not say it explicitly each time. In this case, it is easy to imagine that Miller has in mind the simple mathematical or logical situation where there is a universal law and a few instances that corroborate the law, without any assumptions whatsoever, just this abstract mathematical situation. Logically, the law still remains unjustified and the only thing that changed is that we know some instances that corroborate it. We can say that the law remains "totally" unjustified, because if we try to give a measure to this change, it is essentially nothing. That's all what he means when he says that corroborations are useless. He certainly does not mean that in the methodological side, in which we always make plenty of assumptions, the corroborations are never useful. I don't think covering this would help people to understand falsifiability. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 23:50, 26 December 2021 (UTC)
should be to explain Popper's falsifiability and what it accomplishesas you said, then it's my opinion that the section on "Lakatos's falsificationism" should be split off into a new Falsificationism article, since I don't think that section does much to achieve what you say should be the goal of this article. However, ideally the exposition of Lakatos's falsificationism would be only one part of the new Falsificationism article, since there are other important views such as that of Miller, who presents his own explanation of falsificationism and repeatedly calls it Popper's (e.g., "falsiticationism—Popper's theory", ibid., p. x) even though Popper said in 1978 that he "tends to avoid" the term; but at the same time Watkins' criticism that Miller's falsificationism is not Popper's view should be mentioned if Miller's falsificationism is mentioned.
Miller often follows Popper regarding the separation between the logical side and the methodological side, but he does not say it explicitly each time. In this case, it is easy to imagine that Miller has in mind the simple mathematical or logical situation where there is a universal law and a few instances that corroborate the lawetc. This interpretation is charitable toward Miller, but like Watkins I am not inclined to be so charitable; one reason is that the first sentence of Miller's first chapter says: "The task of empirical science, like that of other investigative disciplines, is to separate as thoroughly and efficiently as it can the true statements about the world from those that are false, and to retain the truths." Leaving aside possible criticisms of this definition, Miller's subject is all empirical science, not just universal hypotheses. In the next paragraph he says: "Unfortunately for such a project, conclusive verification by empirical means turns out, quite trivially, not to be practicable, anyway above the observational level. Universal hypotheses cannot be conclusively verified" etc. This would support your interpretation if the only statements in science were about "the observational level" and "universal hypotheses", but surely empirical science deals with more than these two extremes (here I am thinking of Mario Bunge, who argues for this point in several books), and as Watkins asked in his book review (repeating a question that Watkins had posed a decade before without response from Miller), what should we do "in the all too likely event that we have a plethora of unrefuted and mutually conflicting hypotheses" (p. 613)? The point of all this is to suggest that the criticisms of Watkins are not so easy to brush aside as far as I can see, and that both Miller's portrayal of falsificationism and the objections to it would be worth including in the Falsificationism article.
Wikipedia must make a choicein this case any more than it "must make a choice" in any other case where there is a term with multiple meanings and a disambiguation page is used or else the multiple meanings are discussed in the same article. My proposed solution in this case is a disambiguation page to accommodate your desire not to discuss the multiple meanings in a single article, but I am not opposed to the latter solution.
Some times I say instead that Lakatos popularized the term and the concept.If that were true, then Miller wouldn't use the term so proudly. The truth is that the term has multiple meanings. It's not owned by Lakatos. Biogeographist ( talk) 19:22, 27 December 2021 (UTC)
that the vast majority use this to refer to Lakatos's falsificationism. What do you think, for example, of the definition of falsificationism here in Oxford University Press's Dictionary of the Social Sciences? This is the more typical definition of "falsificationism" without Lakatosian qualifiers. It's explicitly associated with Popper. Biogeographist ( talk) 19:14, 27 December 2021 (UTC)
My idea would be to use Falsificationism for falsificationism as used by Lakatos, even though he does not own the term. You right that Wikipedia does not have to choose a terminology, but it can if it useful and avoid stating in Wikipedia's voice a confusion. The disambiguation tag at the top of the article would say something like
I changed my position. I consider now that it is simpler to consider that falsifiability is a very special solution among different approaches in falsificationism. It remains very wrong to identify Popper's philosophy with all these proposals that fail to avoid the falsification problems or to conflate it with a philosophy that needs to be complemented by some form of confirmationism. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 20:46, 27 December 2021 (UTC)
to use Falsificationism for falsificationism as used by Lakatosis a bad idea, because any article with that name should accommodate views such as Miller's. However, I could accept a new redirect if it were to a section of Imre Lakatos with a hatnote at the top of the section that says, e.g., "Falsificationism" redirects here. For the approach in Karl Popper's philosophy, see Falsifiability. This is still problematic but is no worse than the previous redirect to a section of Falsifiability, and would advance your stated goal of keeping this article focused on Popper. Biogeographist ( talk) 21:55, 27 December 2021 (UTC)
In any case, I believe my proposal meets all your requirements. As I explained, I am not formally against that falsificationism is a large category that includes Popper's philosophy. This is a big change in my position. Also, there is no reference to Lakatos in my description of the article Falsificationism and in the disambiguation tag (see above), which was an important requirement for you. Of course, simply by WP:proportion and the fact that the special case falsifiability is already well covered, the article will focus a lot on Lakatos's falsificationism. So, I feel like I had compromised a lot, but I hold strong on the fact that any confusion created by associating falsifiability and Popper's philosophy to the general case and ignoring essential aspects of Popper's philosophy, which is a unique special case, cannot be stated or implied in Wikipedia's voice. The "implied" is important here, because often choice of name, etc. can imply a point of view in a manner that is worst than something stated explicily in Wikipedia's voice. For example, given that Popper's philosophy is a very special case, referring to it as falsificationism is vague and can be used to create a confusion. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 22:45, 27 December 2021 (UTC)
We could keep playing this game for ever. Now I definitely think that you are the one who is playing a game. You proposed
to use Falsificationism for falsificationism as used by Lakatos, i.e., to create an article called "Falsificationism" about Lakatos. And now you say you made
no reference to Lakatos. You are playing your game and are completely ignoring my point. I hope you're having fun. There is no way I am going to agree with you when you play like this. Biogeographist ( talk) 22:56, 27 December 2021 (UTC)
idea would be to use Falsificationism for falsificationism as used by Lakatos. If you're saying that Lakatos is the general case, and everything else fits within that, I don't agree with that. It completely ignores the historical context in which these thinkers formulated their ideas. A single-article treatment of falsificationism would probably have to be an account of different thinkers presenting different interpretations of "falsificationism" in different contexts to address different problems/issues. For example, as you said further above, for Miller
Lakatos's problem was considered a false problem. Rescher was partly concerned with problems such as cognitive economy, which was (I guess) not so important for Popper, Lakatos, or Miller. I don't see how all this could be formalized into a logical schema. The intellectual contexts are different, so a historical approach would be appropriate to some degree.
idea would be to use Falsificationism for falsificationism as used by Lakatos, I meant that I can see Lakatos just like anyone else that saw the subject falsificationism. He might not own it, but his view contributes to define the subject. I thought it was obvious that, nevertheless, Lakatos's falsificationism cannot be the general case, because I accepted that the general case covers Popper's philosophy. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 23:56, 27 December 2021 (UTC)
For me, the secondary sources that we use should have placed their view within a perspective associated with the subject just as when we have a discussion.When we were discussing how to edit Scientific evidence earlier this year, I was trying to find secondary sources like what you described in that sentence, but for the subject of "scientific evidence". (By the way, I am still interested in editing that article, and I collected sources, but never came back to it.) At the same time, in our discussion about Scientific evidence, you argued (if I remember correctly) that some secondary sources may not include all important views, which of course is correct. So one has to use a variety of secondary sources that may frame the discussion among primary sources in very different ways. And how is one to adjudicate among secondary sources? There may be a tertiary source that covers it all, but probably not. At the "tertiary" level some degree of editor discretion will probably be necessary. Regarding your Kuhnian paradigm analogy, Michael Friedman said in response to Kuhn that although some scientific paradigms/frameworks are incommensurable in certain ways, nevertheless paradigm/framework change can be rationally guided at a philosophical meta-level. The analogous meta-level here would be the discretion and discussion of editors guided by Wikipedia's guidelines and policies. Biogeographist ( talk) 00:55, 28 December 2021 (UTC)
And how is one to adjudicate among secondary sources?The issue is often that the subject is large to start with and it can be addressed using so many different perspectives, agenda or theses. In that case, in principle, we have no other choice as to accept all perspectives that is proposed by editors and weight them using WP:proportion. In practice, it might not be what happens. Instead a few or even one editor come(s) in and pick a perspective and this perspective becomes part of the definition of the scope, i.e., of the subject. If editors try to include content using a different perspective they might meet resistance, because it appears as disturbing the flow and organization of the article. I don't think it is a bad thing. In fact, perhaps the solution was indeed to split the large subject so that every article focuses on a single perspective. It does not mean that the different articles cannot be connected. I don't remember the details, but I do remember that I was arguing in favour of a split and that it was not a POV-fork if the article were correctly connected. To answer your question, my answer is that a natural way is to pick one source not to fix the content, not as being the correct source, but as concrete material used as a reference to define the question, the subject, the perspective. In the case of Lakatos, his book is useful to define a question, a perspective, an agenda, but it did not prevent me to accept that it can be generalized so that it covers Popper's philosophy. In fact, the more I think about it, it's not surprising at all, because Lakatos got his agenda from Popper's agenda. He just did not appreciate how well Popper's solution was connected to the reality of science. I mean, for me, Popper found the correct way to locate rationality in science. Lakatos had the same agenda, but did not appreciate that and he kept looking for rationality where it could not be found. But the agenda, the perspective, etc. were not so different. In fact, some outsiders that look at this from a distance, classify them both as positivists. I don't see what these outsiders see, but I find interesting that some people can put Lakatos and Popper in the same category. So, you see that I have a different approach than you. You suggest a top down approach where we look at higher levels of abstraction. I know some of it is necessary, but I am saying that having a concrete material as a point of reference is also necessary. Yes, higher levels of abstraction are necessary, but they come naturally through discussions and in trying to understand the concrete material, simply trying to describe abstractly what is the question, etc. Regarding the non-commensurability of different paradigms, I also do not believe in this and Popper also did not believe in this. He wrote The myth of the framework to oppose this view. Nevertheless, it remains that some deep considerations of both paradigms are needed to make the connection. Therefore, I am not against different perspectives, but we need to have the willingness to go deep in each perspective to make this connection. It's not against any rule, because it will be our understanding of these sources and we will simply present them in the best way possible without doing any original research, because it will be the actual way the sources are connected. But that requires a deep understanding of the sources and a lot of reading to confirm with secondary sources, etc. a tremendous amount of work some times. Now, add to this that we can keep adding new perspectives and new sources with new agenda, new theses in this manner. It becomes frightening. The alternative approach is to present the different perspectives as being superficially connected, almost as if they were opposed some times, when in fact they are very close, if not almost the same thing. This is not an interesting article for me. This is what I would call an horizontal approach at the expense of a vertical approach with one perspective. It's way better to focus on a single perspective and go deep into it than to do that, only covering each perspective superficially. I admit that my attitude is motivated by a limited amount of energy. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 03:51, 28 December 2021 (UTC)
But that requires a deep understanding of the sources and a lot of reading to confirm with secondary sources, etc. a tremendous amount of work some times.That is why I have not returned to work on Scientific evidence; it requires a lot of such work. Biogeographist ( talk) 15:48, 28 December 2021 (UTC)
The article is peppered with footnotes, which gives an impression that it is thoroughly referenced. Well, it is not. I found this problem because I was curious about what is the "searchlight theory". It turned out that the footnotes are in fact further musings, often with no clear relation to the sentences footnoted.
There are two purposes of footnotes: (A) references (B) clarifications or minor pieces of info not critical to overall flow, e.g., etymologies of some terms, interesting but not essential biographical details, etc. This was not the case for the "searchlight" section. Therefore I removed all them and replaced with "citation needed" tags, and you should immediately see that citations are indeed needed.
I also removed pieces that show no relation to "searchlight" neither in text nor in refs cited, i.e., constituting pieces of WP:SYNTH/ WP:COATRACK.
I have no interest in further reading here, but whoever works here must review all the remaining "pseudoreferences". Loew Galitz ( talk) 21:01, 9 January 2022 (UTC)
The highlighted part contradicts both the source and wikipedia itself: the very previous sentence is an example of definite falsification. I fixed it ( On the other hand, Duhem and others said that a definitive experimental falsification of an isolated hypothesis is often impossible.), but was reverted. But this is the very essence of Durham's point: a validity oif a hypothsis is often contingent on "auxiliary hypotheses", i.e., often it is meanngless to discuss a hypothesis outside its context. .Please voice youor opinion. Loew Galitz ( talk) 00:05, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
You don't need to read this if you understand that falsifiability is a logical criterion
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Chalmers uses the following example of potential falsifier of Newton's law: "The brick felt upward when released". The point is that falsifiability is purely at the level of statements and their relations, i.e., at the level of the language. This was explained by Popper to answer the exact question that you raise: what about the auxiliary hypotheses? The answer is that they are not needed and not a concern at the logical level where falsifiability is defined. At the logical level, there is no auxiliary hypothesis, so it's pointless to say that the theory is isolated (i.e., separated from the auxiliary hypothesis). The whole point of Duhem's problem is that the theory in isolation, i.e., separated from the auxiliary hypotheses and other theories in the background knowledge, cannot be falsified, because it might be these other hypotheses and theories that are incorrect. It's not in my brain. It's exactly what the sources explain. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 05:01, 10 January 2022 (UTC)"Newton's theory... would equally be contradicted if the apples from one of my, or Newton's, apple trees were to rise from the ground (without there being a whirling about), and begin to dance round the branches of the apple tree from which they had fallen."
Go read a Wikipedia article about some mathematical resultmost wp articles in math and computer science are shitloads of dung (beyond the lede), precisely for the reason you mentioned, especially the ones which contain proofs of some seminal statemments. Loew Galitz ( talk) 05:22, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
I say that the clause "in isolation" is crucial for Duhem's logic, and you seem to have confirmed this right here.Yes, I said it's true that Duhem's problem does not apply to the entire system of statements that includes the theory on the logical side as well as the hypotheses, etc. in the methodological side. However, given that we know from the context that we are referring to falsifications of theories stated in the logical side, then we are in the case of isolated systems. There is no need to insist that it is an isolated system to be correct. On the contrary, it creates a confusion, because it suggests that the Duhem's problem does not apply to all the cases that we are considering. So, it's clearer not to mention uselessly that the systems that we consider must be isolated. The essential point is better conveyed in that manner. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 05:57, 10 January 2022 (UTC)
I can see that you might be frustrated that the text is not verifiable in a mechanical manner that does not require some thinking. Your objective is fine. It will be great that all articles can be verifiable in a mechanical manner that does not require any thinking, but the priority is to have a text that conveys the information in the simplest manner possible. Twisting a correct text so that it can be verified mechanically is not optimal for the readers. The ordinary reader that is learning about falsifiability will not see the problem that you see. Besides, in practice, we always consider systems in isolation. The concept of a totality is purely philosophical. I does not exist in practice: there is always some methodological aspects that are ignored in the description of a system: we never reach the bottom of the swamp in Popper's language. Dominic Mayers ( talk) 06:42, 10 January 2022 (UTC)