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I have defended recent edits by a revert because they seemed to me a good attempt to improve the article. However I have some concern about them. 1) The paragraph "Purpose of falsifiability and common misconceptions" speaks about Popper's view, while the title sugget we are speaking about the "general" purpose. We should change the name of the paragraph to emphasize that we are talking of a particular POV. 2) Should we assume that the topic "falsifiability" is a subtopic of Popper Falsificationism? Or is it a more general topic? If it is more general (that0s what I think) then the paragraph "Purpose of falsifiability and common misconceptions" should be a subparagraph of "Falsificationism". -- Pokipsy76 ( talk) 13:33, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
"all men die before they reach the age of 150 years" Exactly how is this example falsifiable rather than simply empirical? —Preceding unsigned comment added by CSears ( talk • contribs) 17:07, 11 February 2008 (UTC)
can we have a reference or quote for this "The Popperian criterion excludes from the domain of science not unfalsifiable statements but only whole theories that contain no falsifiable statements". Why couldn't we just add some true falsifiable statement to a theory, thus making the theory "scientific". I will edit in a couple of days if no feedback 79.70.50.117 ( talk) 05:30, 1 March 2008 (UTC)
One of Popper's major reasons for criticising verificationism is that a universal law cannot be verified by finite evidence, given that it makes infinite predictions. At first sight, no such problem is there for falsificationism: a single anomaly proves a universal law wrong. However, contemporary physics does make certain predictions, such as the statement "Magnetic monopoles exist." This is a claim that can never be falsified, and as such, Popper must denounce it as unscientific. I can't recall reading this in the article, as it makes falsificationism a less probable conception of the scientific method. DDSaeger ( talk) 23:57, 5 April 2008 (UTC)
In the intro it is suggested that "people have souls" is a nonfalsifiable statement. But a limited and perhaps impractical falsification may exist, depending on what is meant by "soul". A soul is usually described as a nonmaterial entity that contains the identity of a person, and which animates (but is independent of) the person's material body. If a soul existed, reincarnation and resurrection would be possible. So one could (for example) test whether a possibly reincarnated person remembers things from their past life. If no one ever reported this, it would be a falsification of the theory. Granted it is impossible to check all bodies that ever existed to see whether they contain reincarnated souls, but the same difficulty confronts a person trying to check whether all swans are white.
So what is it about "people have souls" that makes it so much less falsifiable than "all swans are white"? 141.211.61.254 ( talk) 02:42, 6 May 2008 (UTC)
This article is densely written, or perhaps I'm just too dense to give it justice. This summary of Popper's position from a old version of the philosophy of science article seemed more straightforward to me:
68.167.254.2 ( talk) 08:04, 6 July 2008 (UTC).
Wikipedia:Reference_desk/Science#Quantum_Mechanics
Question moved to the appropriate location.-- OMCV ( talk) 23:34, 9 October 2008 (UTC)
I read this entire section, but am still unclear on what makes a falsification naïve; the term isn't clearly defined in its section.
Despite your uncertainty on interpreting this section. You have it completely right! Congratulations! Kmarinas86 (6sin8karma) 18:16, 19 June 2009 (UTC)
This sentance:
makes no sense.
1) Conspiracy theories (like other theories) can have very different logical structures.
2) What does "often" mean? Often according to whom?
--
Pokipsy76 09:44, 2 June 2006 (UTC)
PaineDisciple If the social and political "powers that be" have almost unlimited possibilities of collectively "conspiring," why is it so difficult to understand that ordinary people tend to be interested in them and even to create them? Could it be that, contrary to the "big lie" which is hard to refute because it is beyond the capability of ordinary people to refute it, "conspiracy theories" involving government or corporate and financial elites are so big that they are beyond the capability of the average person (even the "average intellectual") to confirm or deny? Are they simply to much trouble or too dangerous to deal with by elite people concerned for their social status? It does seem that there is a social class basis to the automatic rejection of political or elitist conspiracies. The comforting stereotype for elitists is that only "uneducated" people would believe in large-scale, collective conspiracies by the "powers-that-be." Maybe it would be useful to distinguish between "conspiracy theories" and "scapegoat theories." The latter are what really cause most of the trouble in society. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.99.3.7 ( talk) 18:20, 26 January 2009 (UTC)
"In science and the philosophy of science, falsifiability, contingency, and defeasibility are properties of empirical statements such that they must admit of logical counterexamples. This stands in contradistinction to formal and mathematical statements that may be tautologies, that is, universally true by dint of definitions, axioms, and proofs. No empirical hypothesis, proposition, or theory can be considered scientific if it does not admit the possibility of a contrary case."
The language here is too complex. It's full of philosophical buzz-words, which are supposed to make the writing sound precise and intelligent... but really we're just going to alienate anyone who hasn't already been schooled in this philosophical language. I'm going to try to dumb it down a bit. (e.g. "stands in contradistinction" = "contrasts")
PaineDisciple There is a very strong tendency in modern times, for ALL types of experts to develop the most complex jargon possible. In my view, this parellels the development of organized religion where "priesthoods" try to make the religious ideas as mysterious as possible so that the masses of believers cannot possibly figure it out on their own (or can never be completely sure if they've got it right). This guarantees the privileged status of the "priesthood." If modern science is going to follow this path, it is no wonder that the "masses" will get tired of it. It is also true that the attitude of elitism tends to make scientists think of themselves as a kind of "infallible" priesthood. Carl Sagan, in "Science as a Candle in the Dark," said that scientific truths do not have to be taught as if they were handed down from Moses (or something to that effect). The scientific method and sceptical attitude is what should be taught in schools and to the public. I believe this is happening less and less today and that those scientists who are sincerely concerned with public support of science as a necessity in a democratic republic are "shooting themselves in the foot" if they don't challenge the elitist, "religious" attitude of scientists. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.99.3.7 ( talk) 18:03, 26 January 2009 (UTC)
In the criticism section, an argument against Falsifiability is that "...falsifiability cannot distinguish between astrology and astronomy, as both make technical predictions which are sometimes incorrect." Would it make sense to respond to this saying that falsifiability might be a necessary condition rather than a sufficient one for something to be considered something?
I apologize for my lack of clarity. Feel free to go ahead and delete this if it doesn't make sense. Pete4512 07:21, 26 March 2007 (UTC)
Popper uses falsification as a criterion of demarcation
Verifiability came to be replaced by falsifiability as the criterion of demarcation
PaineDisciple Why not just stick to the scientific routine that first we have an hypothesis (an "educated guess"); then when some substantial PROOF (obviously "falsifiable") has been demonstrated, it is a "theory"; and finally, when it has been thoroughly tested and is capable of predictions, it is called a scientific "law?" —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.99.3.7 ( talk) 18:07, 26 January 2009 (UTC)
If any evidence surfaced suggesting that God existed, this would show that God is a natural phenomenon, and certainly not a "God" as most people would intend the word to mean - it would probably just be a member of some previously unknown species (such an organism existing by itself is unlikely), and we would not really call it a "God".
The statement is just as unfalsifiable as its negation. But I may be misinterpreting the claim. Is it really justified to claim that this statement is falsifiable?
Colin 00:25, 1 June 2007 (UTC)
The article states:
But, IIRC, a largish section of one of Popper's books (Logic of Scientific Discovery or Conjectures and Refutations) contains quite a bit of dense probability talk aimed at providing a measure of confirmation of a theory. Obviously, someone needs to take a gander at the original sources (I left mine in storage in California) to confirm what I recall. If that does indeed match up, then what we have is a relatively straightforward demonstration that the assertion by S&B above is overwrought and does not belong in this article. It's possible that I got confused and at the end Popper says that all the probability work shows that confirmation can't be considered even in principle, but that isn't my recall offhand. -- Wesley R. Elsberry 13:36, 13 August 2007 (UTC)
Rtc, I happen to really, really like you and much of what you've said in our previous exchanges, though I recognize that is irrelevant to this discussion. At the moment, the problem, IMO, is that Popper's criticisms of what he perceived to be misunderstandings of his earlier advocay of falsifiability are not appropriate for the lead section of this article. Therefore, I'm removing the newly inserted material in the lead and will put it below on this page so it can be discussed as to where it might possibly be appropriate. Sincerely yours, ... Kenosis 04:04, 22 August 2007 (UTC)
PaineDisciple Why not just stick to the scientific routine that first we have an hypothesis (an "educated guess"); then when some substantial PROOF (obviously "falsifiable") has been demonstrated, it is a "theory"; and finally, when it has been thoroughly tested and is capable of predictions, it is called a scientific "law?" —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.99.3.7 ( talk) 18:10, 26 January 2009 (UTC)
I disagree strongly with the edit [3]. You attempt to protect the mainstream misreading of Popper against the facts. You obviously moved it down to criticism to play down its significance. It is not a criticism, it is a clarification. -- rtc ( talk) 16:37, 21 December 2007 (UTC)
This section violates neutral point of view quite flagrantly with the sentence beginning "Yet for certain preconceived reasons, hardened creationists...". No citation, no evidence, just a declaration that those creationists are hardened and have preconceived reasons. The previous sentence's strenuous emphasis "not necessary" could also be a non-neutral attempt at an authoritative statement with no citation. —Preceding
unsigned comment added by
203.143.164.250 (
talk) 05:07, 15 July 2009 (UTC)
There's a reasonably good discussion of falsifiability on the Stanford University Department of Philosophy web site. [4]. Their definition is simple: "A theory is scientific only if it is refutable by a conceivable event. Every genuine test of a scientific theory, then, is logically an attempt to refute or to falsify it, and one genuine counter-instance falsifies the whole theory." That's clearer than what Wikipedia has now.
They then go on to a discussion of the hard part of the problem - evaluating whether one theory is "better" than another. It's easy to generate theories which are hard to falsify, but don't predict much. In their words, "for Popper any theory X is better than a ‘rival’ theory Y if X has greater empirical content, and hence greater predictive power, than Y." This is followed by a long discussion of the philosophical history of trying to get hold of the concept of "better" in some formal way. The article currently does not address this well.
There's a practical issue ignored in the article. Engineering is based on theories with predictive power. Engineering is about knowing whether a bridge will hold up or a circuit will work before building it. Only falsifiable theories have reliable predictive power. Hence, engineering is based on falsifiable theories. Philosophers tend to ignore this part, and engineers take it as a given, so it's not mentioned much. I'll look for a cite. -- John Nagle ( talk) 17:57, 23 December 2007 (UTC)
In the article as it currently stands (4-28-09) under the "Logic & mathematics section" contains the statement:
"In this way of looking at things, logic is a science that seeks after knowledge of how we ought to conduct our reasoning if we want to achieve the goals of reasoning. As such, the logical knowledge that we have at any given time can easily fall short of perfection. Thus rules of logical procedure, as normative claims about the fitness of this or that form of inference, are falsifiable according to whether their actual consequences are successful or not."
The most straightforward interpretation of this claim is incorrect. Truth value is defined by reference to the laws of logic. Therefore, any "falsification" of the laws of logic must first make reference to the laws of logic and is therefore self-contradictory. The intended meaning of "the rules of logical procedure" is vague; however, the statement itself must be changed to avoid being misleading at best and completely false at worst.
Dialegomai ( talk) 14:12, 28 April 2009 (UTC)
__________________________
This edit does not require an external source. This is a simply and directly provable deduction as a 2 premise syllogism:
Premise: The law of non-contradiction ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_noncontradiction) is false. Premise: The law of non-contradiction states that what is false (non-true) is not true (and vice versa). Conclusion: What is false is non-false (i.e. true).
Thus is it demonstrated that any falsification of the law of non-contradiction is self-contradictory; therefore the law of non-contradiction is non-falsifiable. The other two axioms (law of identity and of excluded middle) can be demonstrated by similar arguments.
My proposed change (which you undid) is as to replace the incorrect sentence with:
"However, the laws of logic themselves (the rules of inference and logical axioms) are not subject to falsifiability per se. That is, since truth values are defined in relation to the laws of logic any "falsification" of these laws would represent a self-contradictory situation though this conclusion has been argued against by philosophers such as W.V._Quine."
I will be the first to admit that the formatting needs some tweaking. I will give you a day or so to review this before correcting it again. Dialegomai ( talk) 01:41, 29 April 2009 (UTC)
I've heard two different interpretations of the article's opening sentence:
The first says the only criteria is the assertion itself, that what is not falsifiable today will never be falsifiable. The second adds consideration of our technological capabilities, that what is not falsifiable today may be tomorrow. I've always understood the first to be the correct interpretation, but I've heard it argued that Popper was referring only to things that are of current practical value to science. Even if he were not, they say, there is nothing useful in the first interpretation. I understood the issue to be about potential value, not actual value. Some ideas, by their very nature, are incapable of ever being meaningful. Other ideas may or may not be meaningful, but at least the possibility exists. The ability to distinguish between these two classes is what is useful.
I post this seeking the opinion of others. How is the aforementioned opening sentence to be interpreted? Siggimoo ( talk) 23:16, 9 December 2009 (UTC)
The section basically says that the existence of God is non falsifiable but accounts of the activities of God are. I don't see how the latter is falsifiable either. By it's very nature, such an action on the part of God would be defined as a "miracle" and we can't evaluate any particular instance of miracle in the historical record until we have come to a philosophical conclusion on whether or not miracles are possible or not. ( C. S. Lewis, " Miracles; A Preliminary Study") This to try to falsify a miracle on the grounds that such an event is contrary to the observed course of nature is circular reasoning.
I suggest we simply delete the section. I don't think the debate over the falsifiability of God is relevant to defining the process of falsification. -- BenMcLean ( talk) 18:35, 17 December 2009 (UTC)
It's source is self-published. Normally I'd say put in Lewis as a counter claim, but we don't have a third party claim to begin with. Ian.thomson ( talk) 18:39, 17 December 2009 (UTC)
I've read this page 3 times and I still can't fathom what falsifiability is... I think it needs a clear and simple definition at the beginning of the article. Kat, Queen of Typos 22:45, 9 November 2006 (UTC)
PRO The testability article does not present sufficient information in order for it to stand on its own. As it is mentioned in the lede of this article as a synonym for falsifiability (or at least part of falsifiability), it should be merged into this article. Neelix ( talk) 16:36, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
PRO I agree. It should be merged and a redirect added. lk ( talk) 14:19, 10 May 2008 (UTC)
CON I don't think Falsifiability should be merged with Testability. Falsifiability is an important strand of philosophical thought of one of the greatest thinkers of the twentieth century. Its application revolutionized science (e.g. the collapse of the Newtonian paradigm and its replacement with relativity) and is still the harsh "rock of reality" upon which all unsound scientific theories eventually founder. Testability is similar, however it is more of a grab-bag collection of practical problem-solving tools than it is a philosophical bedrock; it is the "applied mathematics" of testing as opposed to the "pure mathematics" of Falsifiability. For Wikipedia to have a page on Popper without a link to his central conceptual idea of Falsifiability would be like having a page on Henry VIII without directly mentioning his six wives, other than as a sub-section under mistresses, concubines, and other female companions. Jackmaturin ( talk) 07:52, 12 May 2008 (UTC)
CON I don't think Falsifiability should be merged with Testability either. There is an important strand in the testability article which is missing - I may add it when I get time - which is that testability is also a term used to describe how testable a physical system is (not just a hypothesis). In engineering it is a term used to discuss built in test methodologies and other self check schemes. It may also be a measure of how easy a product is to test by external methods. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.120.209.210 ( talk) 11:11, 22 May 2008 (UTC)
CON Added highlighting of the positions above. Ours is based on an anticipated build out of the Philosophy of Science here. Testability and Falsifiablity are distinct concepts, in Our English usage, with Testability the empirical projection of Falsifiability plus serendipitous discovery. A theoretical position could be falsified even though there was no known way to empirically test it. 74.78.162.229 ( talk) 15:54, 22 July 2008 (UTC)
CON should be kept if only for the fact that it was Popper's technical term. In addition testablitity is only good for experimental science (chemistry & physics) and does nothing for observational sciences (geology, astronomy, and much of ecology/biology).-- OMCV ( talk) 19:33, 13 August 2008 (UTC)
CON I know I am late, but let me throw my $0.02 in: Falsification is about whether an observation 'could' be made that would contradict a proposition. Testabiltiy is about collecting affirmative evidence for a proposition. The former is deductive while the latter is inductive. My thought is that these two things could easily be confused, but are quite different in nature (negative and deductive vs positive and inductive). 70.69.189.240 ( talk) 04:20, 23 September 2010 (UTC)
Original caption on "black swan" image:
I deleted most of this, because it was too long for a caption. The existence of black swans disproves the statement, "All swans are white." I think we should leave it at that, and hope that the reader pursues the matter further by reading the intro.
And if the intro is sufficiently interesting, maybe the reader will go on to the rest of the article.
The key point of falsifibility (and this should be in the intro) is that every general rule should be compared with real-world observations, and that we need to make corrections in the rule if too many observations contradict it.
"Things that you drop will fall to the ground." This is an excellent general rule, which can be grasped by children as young as 3 or 4. But then we can show exceptions such party balloons, which can be held up by air currents. So we must then modify the rule to, "Things that feel heavy will fall to the ground." We can then formulate a second rule for light things, like balloons, paper, and dust. "Lights things fall to the ground, unless the wind keeps them aloft." -- Uncle Ed ( talk) 17:03, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
I removed the above quote. Swedish philosopher Sven Ove Hansson has made an analysis regarding this quote, which concluded that this quote is misleading; see article [6]. Ulner ( talk) 11:42, 8 August 2010 (UTC)
The article currently contains this sentence, "As a result, it would be logically invalid to observe an act directly falsifying the existence of a common ancestor, just as it would be impossible to falsify the existence of an invisible God."
This sentence contains an obvious comparison between the "common ancestor" of Darwinian evolution and the "invisible God" of religion. However religions do not claim to be scientific, and since falsifiability is a principle Popper applied to scientific method, the insertion of religion here is quite unwarranted. Talking about negative evidence may include discussions of religion, but my opinion is that the article is about falsification, which relates solely to scientific theories, of which evolution claims to be (thereby suiting the context), whereas religion makes no claim to a scientific nature and thus does not suit the context. In other words, the arbitrating factor for me is the article title. Religion simply does not fit in this article anywhere, whereas any scientific theory would fit fine.
Please note that this comment is not intended to be prejudiced for or against religion, and I decline to (irrelevantly) share my personal beliefs here. Please forgive the run-on sentence above. 70.69.189.240 ( talk) 01:05, 17 September 2010 (UTC)
Some of the material appears to infringe copyright: i.e come from this source: http://books.google.ie/books?id=AiZe7fqM41AC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false . I will remove the copied paragraphs, if someone wants to re-insert the ideas fire ahead but I don't think we can leave up as is. IRWolfie- ( talk) 21:23, 3 January 2011 (UTC)
The green swan becomes falsifiable by testing the null hypothesis "no green swan exists". This is falsifiable by finding a single green swan. Symbolically, -(-A)=A, as opposed to +(A)=A which reduces to A=A. 108.65.0.169 ( talk) 22:33, 13 January 2011 (UTC)
This is an interesting point raised above in that long discussion "All men are mortal". I will edit in relevant links to
evidence of absence.-
Tesseract2
(talk) 03:12, 17 April 2011 (UTC)
Technically, I mean. If you say, "A green swan exists", that is falsifiable. Show one. Difficult, as nobody knows where the're supposed to live, but not impossible. If one says "Green swans do not exist", that cannot be proven. You would have to check every swan on the planet, which would only result in the person who made the claim say "Oh, I forgot to mention they live on the moon.". After searching the moon he would tell you to search Jupiter and the rest of the universe. You just can't. If you say " Russell's teapot exists", that is falsifiable. Well, technically. You would have to figure out a way to show it, but future technology may make that possible. However, if you say "Russell's teapot does not exist", Russell makes it clear how that claim is unfalsifiable.
But since the article on Russell's teapot makes it clear his claim is unfalsifiable, it seems to be the case, that falsifiability depends on available resources. Which would mean that saying "Ionizing radiation is lethal" was a non-falsifiable claim 500 years ago? Is this the case? W3ird N3rd ( talk) 00:43, 1 June 2011 (UTC)
At first glance "all men are mortal" may seem non-falsifiable, but if we look and think more closely we find something unexpected: the statement is completely falsifiable. Falsification of the statement "all men are mortal" is impractical, but is nevertheless possible. You simply need to wipe out every other human being in existence till you are the last one standing. To finally drive home the argument, you, as the last human on earth would have to commit suicide - and the human race would end with you. QED.
Again, I agree that the above falsification of the statement that "all men are mortal" is impractical (and a tad destitute of compassion for misery & suffering), but the simple fact is that the statement can hypothetically be falsified. Better and briefer (but more controversial) statements could be:
1 - "God exists" - Non-falsifiable
2 - "God does not exist" - Falsifiable
I hope this helps. Otherwise, the article is almost perfect. TranscendTranslation 01:56, 16 November 2007 (UTC)
The comment I have here is that observation that NOT "all men are moral" by seeing one man die leads to the obvious conclusion that SOME men are mortal, not that ALL men are mortal. this is an important point. § 74.13.89.115 ( talk) 06:50, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
Your comment above isn't perfectly clear to me. Nevertheless, my point is that the statement "all men are mortal" can be falsified by experimentation. Quite obviously, it is NOT falsified just by considering a single dead man, no-one is saying that. However, it IS falsified by killing all men (a theoretically possible but clearly callous/impractical task). Once all men have died, the human race ends with you, so you can be sure there will be new men to complicate the issue. Finally, this whole consideration is semantic, the overall point is that the 'God' examples are certainly true, whereas the mortal/immortal example are not. TranscendTranslation ( talk) 18:26, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
When you've reduced the set of "all men" to the empty set, assertions about its members are meaningless... and in fact, not falsifiable! 67.98.226.14 ( talk) 00:55, 5 December 2007 (UTC)
You're example "God does not exist" is also non-falsifiable because of the very nature of what people call god. God is so that "I don't understand" becomes "I understand", for that reason the proof which generates the faulsensee of the statment also generates a "we don't understand yet" response, and the choice taken is irrelevant because the 2 competing ideas "god"(proves the statement false) or "a lack of understanding" (doesn't prove it false) cannot be compared for the choice is based on personal beliefs and facts. For example any observation made to prove it false, "oh look, frogs from the sky", can be explained through a scientific method because the very existance of miracles are explained through probabilities and if one isn't happy with the probability explanation, argument of manipulation with human (or even non-human) technology can be use. If you witness god it could be drugs, if you and your friend witness god how can you argue that the 25foot tall guy in robes wasnt actually a giant robot. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 99.226.149.107 ( talk) 22:11, 22 April 2008 (UTC)
There is a lot of confusion here between logic and falsifiablelity. The statement “All people are mortal” is falsifiable. I need only find one person who is not mortal to show that the statement is false. The fact that there has never been an observation of a non-mortal person just goes to supporting the statement. Killing every one on the planet would not show the statement is falsifiable; it would just be another piece of evidence supporting the argument. 206.195.19.43 ( talk) 10:24, 24 April 2008 (UTC)
The concept of an immortal man, required to falsify the proposition 'all men are mortal', is entirely non-cognitive by virtue of immortality having no ostensive examples in reality; we can't after all point out an immortal man for the reason explained above, an observation made over a finite period is not logically coherent to claiming immortality. Thus an immortal man cannot be observed, and hence cannot provide the basis for an empirical falsification method. So in this respect at least the original statement can't be falsified. Apathy92 ( talk) 09:54, 2 December 2009 (UTC)
Thanks for the pointer :) Apathy92 ( talk) 11:28, 3 December 2009 (UTC)
Also, I'm grappling a little with this- Quote: "You simply need to wipe out every other human being in existence till you are the last one standing"- it occurs to me that if you reduce the human race to being non-existent any assertions about the set become meaningless and unfalsifiable as a result. Am I along the right lines here? Apathy92 ( talk) 11:56, 3 December 2009 (UTC)
Why not think on terms of "All men die before the age of 200"? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 200.27.146.116 ( talk) 01:09, 30 January 2010 (UTC)
'When you've reduced the set of "all men" to the empty set...' This logic is even more flawed. The set is all men, not all living men. Do men cease to exist when they die? Nope, they are just dead men. So the original commenter is absolutely correct: if all men died, that would be absolute proof and the statement would be falsified. 66.54.122.127 ( talk) 16:43, 25 March 2010 (UTC)
TranscendTranslation, you've just reversed those statements. "God exists" is a perfectly falsifiable claim. All you have to do is show him, and there's your proof. "God does not exist" however, is non-falsifiable. You can say he's not here. So somebody will suggest God is on the moon. You search the moon: no God. Somebody suggests he may be on Mars. You search Mars. Nothing. Somebody suggests another place. You search the entire universe (impossible, but let's go for it): nothing. Somebody will suggest he's in another dimension that we cannot see in any way. Not falsifiable. As for "all men are mortal", that is also a reasonably falsifiable claim. All you have to do is find somebody who is immortal, shoot him/her, throw this person off buildings, use poison, hanging, give him/her a lethal injection, etc. All this would be accepted as reasonable proof this person is immortal. Think of Jack Harkness from Torchwood. As always in science, if at some point something is proven wrong (Jack Harkness dies), that's ok. You've made a mistake. Similarly we could at some point figure out all the black swans were actually white swans painted black as a prank by the Australians. If that would happen you would also have to find another swan somewhere that's not white. Similarly you would have to find another immortal human if the one you thought to be immortal dies. On another note, killing all humans doesn't make the claim falsifiable. There may still be some humans on another planet (transported by spaceships a long time ago), underground, in the jungle etc. You could never verify everyone is dead. We don't have to watch somebody immortal for an infinite amount of time, if we can reasonably argue he is (shot, crushed, 500 years old etc and still standing, unaged) we can consider that proof. The same way we say comic books and atoms exist, even though we could still be proven wrong about that and figure out we're all living in The Matrix. We talk about history and consider it truth, despite having no absolute proof for everything we know (some bones or finding rusty tools in the ground is no absolute proof, it can be proven wrong). Good proof doesn't have to be impossible to be proven incorrect, in fact, virtually every proof of anything can be proven incorrect by the "Matrix" argument. W3ird N3rd ( talk) 00:18, 1 June 2011 (UTC)
This does not appear to drectly concern the wikipedia article- collapsed per
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Treating pure-mathematics as purely formal hypothetical knowledge; it is hard to see how 'falsifiable-statement' in a strict scientific sense is applicable. Never-the-less falsifiability in a mathematical as opposed to ' objectively observable' sense; does seem applicable.eg. Pythagoras's Theorem establishes that: for 'right angled triangles' in Euclidean space; H^2 = A^2 + B^2, for triangles with A and B in any ratio and hypotenuse H. The set of such triangles is necessarily infinite, but the set which will ever be calculated is necessarily finite.The theorem (a far from obvious tautology) establishes that the latter will always be a subset of the former. But surely this in no way contradicts the statement that "Pythagoras's Theorem is 'mathematically' falsifiable". If by mathematically falsifiable statement; we intend a statement which asserts explicitly or implicitly one or more mathematical 'facts' in some axiom system.Then we can catagorise such statements as: A/ Tautological falsifiable-statements (theorems); the asserted 'mathematical facts' of which; we are confident will always be a super-set of the set of calculated 'mathematical facts' and B/ Contingent falsifiable-statements the asserted 'mathematical facts' of which ;have thus far always been a super-set of the set of calculated 'mathematical facts'; but may not remain so. Now consider 'Godel-statements'; by which is meant the unprovable theorems of Kurt Godel’s famous Incompleteness Theorem, interpreted as:“ Every axiomatic system is either complete or consistent, but not both”.Which implies that every consistent axiomatic system is incomplete; which implies that Godel-statements must exist in every consistent axiomatic system.Where by 'complete axiomatic system' is intended ,one in which: 'all statements constructable within such a system, are provably true or false'; and whereby 'consistent axiomatic system ' is intended one, in which : 'no two provable statements, can be found to conflict' Now another theorem of Godel, his Consistency Theorem established that consistency of an axiomatic system is itself not provable; which implies the statements:“This axiom set is consistent” along with it's corollary ,“This axiom set is incomplete “ ; are necessarily Godel-statements in any axiom system, which is not formally inconsistent; ie. containing conflicting axioms. Now a difficulty arises when trying to decide what exactly a Godel-statement, 'IS'..! Statements which seem true, but can't be proved , superficially resemble the axioms themselves. In that axioms are statements, which are necessarily true, since they define the particular axiom system, but necessarily can't be proved using the other axioms; as they would then be unnecessary ; ie. they would be theorems. But if Godel-statements are considered to be additional axioms, and formally added to the set, one starts an escalating vicious cycle; because this new enhanced axiom set, will have it's own additional Godel-statements. etc. Returning to Godel's Incompleteness Theorem; we have in any axiomatic system: 1/ 'theorems' which are true and proved and 2/'theorems' which are true, but unprovable It occurred to me that: if 1/ can be identified with A/ above then perhaps 2/ can be identified with B/ above. The contention is that Godel-statements be identified as non-tautological 'mathematically' falsifiable-statements, Then we have a place for Godel-statements, without having to add them as axioms, thus avoiding the above vicious cycle. Queries (1) If Godel-statements can be considered to be 'mathematical falsifiable-statements' in this extended sense,of 'non-tautological statements, thus far found consistent with the facts of the axiom system, but possibly false by comparison with facts yet to be considered.'(1)Are Godel-statements , which are consistent with only a sub-set of the facts of the axiom system (a) possible ?; (b) necessary ? (2)Given the very general interpretations of Godel's Incompleteness Theorem which now exist, outside number theory; Can we conclude that in any consistent axiomatic system, non-tautological 'falsifiable-statements'; must exist ? Rhnmcl ( talk) 08:29, 8 October 2011 (UTC) |
Popper's argument was that theories are falsified/falsifiable in logic, not belief. For example, while Galileo's observations logically instantly falsified the Ptolomeic theory, the beliefs of other scientists did not change instantly, nor did such beliefs have to change at all in order for the logical falsification to exist. 108.65.0.169 ( talk) 02:24, 15 July 2011 (UTC)
The example used in the first paragraph in the abstract, "atoms do exist" seems confusing. The word atom is used in the metaphysical meaning, something indivisible, but I think that a lot of lay people might think it is referring to the scientific notion of the atom, meaning electons orbiting a nucleus. The former is not falsifiable, but the latter is. How hard would it be to use a different example here? Oktal ( talk) 13:17, 4 September 2011 (UTC)
I have restored the intro. Examples are important for understanding. And the example of atoms is the standard example, and one of the examples used by Popper himself. The example is not absurd. Oktal says "The word atom is used in the metaphysical meaning" -- This gets the point completely wrong. Words do not have "metaphysical meaning"; words can merely be used in the context of a statement, and it is the statement as such that may be metaphysical or falsifiable. It is completely irrelevant whether the statement "atoms do exist" refers to atoms in the old greek sense or in the modern scientific sense. The statement remains metaphysical in both cases. It is very easy: The "scientific [theory] of the atom, meaning electons orbiting a nucleus" says that atoms have certain structural properties and behave in certain ways. But If we have found an atom that does not have these structural properties predicted by modern theory, it does not contradict the claim that atoms (in this modern sense) exist. For there may always be a different atom that has these properties and that we have not looked at yet. What is falsifiable is the theory that *all* atoms obey the laws of the modern theory. But I have changed the statement slightly anyway to help understanding. -- rtc ( talk) 14:58, 6 November 2011 (UTC)
Does falsifiability mean a theory is not accepted as scientific---no matter how many experiments/observations support it---until we find out where it fails?
Was Newton's gravity falsifiable before physics at subatomic levels appeared?
--Roland 20:18, 14 September 2011 (UTC)
Assume that swans wouldn’t actually exist (for instance, because we replace swan by dragon)? We see that the sentence is actually not falsifiable, because if it is impossible to find a single swan, we sure cannot find a swan that is non white. So why do you claim, that "all swans are white" is falsifiable?
SteveBaker ( talk) 14:53, 21 November 2011 (UTC)
I am not sure all of Loew Galitz recent deletions are necessary. I have two worries. The first worry is that a quick glance at the deleted content does seem to contain some references. It was a quick glance though.
My second worry is a smaller comment. More of a hope. That is, I of course believe that Wikipedia should have sources for all of its information. I just hope that editors attempt literature searches to add sources, especially when this could be done with relative ease. Wikipedia has collected information that its public cares about, and I am not entirely sure that the easier route - of deleting entire passages - is always better than leaving it alone. I am much more convinced that it would be ideal to perform a more challenging "fix" like finding a reputable source (unless the information is altogether incorrect).- Tesseract2 (talk) 23:30, 21 November 2011 (UTC)
Are there any aspects of the anthropogenic global warming theory (AGW) which proponents and opponents both agree are falsifiable? That is, do scientists in general agree that AGW is a falsifiable theory?
That's a lot of verbiage to wade through. Could someone just tell me what sort of observations AGW theory proponents agree would disprove the theory?
A belated thanks for your courteous answer, but I think I still haven't made clear what I'm trying to do. I'm not fishing for a quote saying that AGW "is unfalsifiable". If it were unfalsifiable, then it wouldn't be a good example of falsifiability at all.
Rather, I'm trying to find something well known to the general public (or at least which is discussed a lot in the media), which we can use as an example for our readers to understand what it takes for a hypothesis or theory to be "falsifiable". Specifically, what predictions does AGW make which can be compared against (discovered) facts or observations which could conceivable disprove it?
Or is AGW not a good example, and should we find something else like the moon is made of green cheese? I read somewhere that an astronomer compared the refractive index of the moon's surface to that of green cheese to falsify this hypothesis.
Got me now? I'm looking for a really good popular example, not something controversial which will just make it harder for people to understand falsifiability. --
Rtc keeps reinserting statements he likes but which are either unreferenced or false, supplied with falase references. For example his claim that "White swans do exist" not falsifiable is false (They may become extinct). Likewise, the statement about indivisivility and atoms. What is worse these are supplied with footnotes supposedly to confirm these statements, which are not. For example Popper speaks about indivisibility for a completely different argument.
In summary, sorry, Rtc, your contributions have lost credibility. If you want to add something, please do this an small, well-referenced pieces which can be discussed. Loew Galitz ( talk) 16:45, 22 November 2011 (UTC)
On the subject of the atoms example in particular, and back to actually talking about the article: I affirm the technical validity of the example as used by Popper and quoted by Rfc, but I think it is a bad example to use in the article for the sake of clarity and the confusion that readers will make between the old metaphysical sense of "atoms" (fundamentally indivisible particles) vs the modern scientific sense of "atoms" (the things that join together into molecules and are composed of protons, neutrons, and electrons). --
Pfhorrest (
talk) 05:11, 23 November 2011 (UTC)
Rtc added:
In the Article we find this fragment:
"...US law says that only science may be taught in public school science classes (see Science education)."
Following the wiki link to Science education, we find an article in which the first reference to "public school" is in the following fragment:
"The first person credited with being employed as a Science teacher in a British public school was William Sharp...."
Following that wiki link to public school we find an article about schools that are not dependent on government financing. The reader may now conclude, simply by following two wiki links, that US law requires only science to be taught in schools that are not dependent on government financing.
This type of confusion arises because the term "public school" happens to have exactly opposite meanings in the US and UK respectively. In the US, a public school is a school run by the government. In the UK a public school is one that is run independently of the government.
I propose the solution that we always clarify by writing "government-run school" instead of "public school" when the US meaning is intended. And likewise, we should say "non-government school" instead of "public school" when the UK meaning is intended. This usage should ideally apply everywhere in the English Wikipedia.
In the current article, then, we could write:
"US law says that only science may be taught in science classes in government-run schools."
(Citation still needed for this assertion.)
(Edit: added signature below.)
Rahul ( talk) 23:27, 2 January 2012 (UTC)
The first two citations in the criticism section do not actually support what they're supposed to be citing. I'll give it a day, and then remove it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.19.102.88 ( talk) 00:25, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
I may need enlightening here.
Consider that we do have evidence of absence sometimes. The statement "Coins exist in my pocket" is falsifiable, but I can also tell you it is falsified - by checking quick.
My quandary starts when the article suggests that "White Swans exist" is a claim with no logical counter-example. Is that right? Is that the example that Popper gives in "The logic of scientific discovery" (because the reference does not mention a page number to help me find it, and yet it appears after the period - suggesting the whole paragraph IS the example that Popper gives)?
Presumably that claim translates to "White Swans exist anywhere in reality right now". We can logically imagine exploring everywhere and find there are no white swans. Like coins missing from a pocket. The statement does not seem unfalsifiable. It seems (with great practical difficulty) logically falsifiable.
If there are Swans somewhere (on earth) and coins in my pocket, those statements do not seem "unfalsifiable" in theory just because they were not falsified. Or is the idea: in that reality, practically, the claims are 'now unfalsifiable because nothing can counter the prior discovery of Swans on earth and coins in my pocket.
Thoughts? Maybe the article just needs to be more explicit about something. I may have similar issues with "All men are mortal" being called unfalsifiable. - Tesseract2 (talk) 17:21, 19 February 2012 (UTC)
This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Archive 1 | Archive 2 | Archive 3 | Archive 4 | Archive 5 | → | Archive 9 |
I have defended recent edits by a revert because they seemed to me a good attempt to improve the article. However I have some concern about them. 1) The paragraph "Purpose of falsifiability and common misconceptions" speaks about Popper's view, while the title sugget we are speaking about the "general" purpose. We should change the name of the paragraph to emphasize that we are talking of a particular POV. 2) Should we assume that the topic "falsifiability" is a subtopic of Popper Falsificationism? Or is it a more general topic? If it is more general (that0s what I think) then the paragraph "Purpose of falsifiability and common misconceptions" should be a subparagraph of "Falsificationism". -- Pokipsy76 ( talk) 13:33, 24 December 2007 (UTC)
"all men die before they reach the age of 150 years" Exactly how is this example falsifiable rather than simply empirical? —Preceding unsigned comment added by CSears ( talk • contribs) 17:07, 11 February 2008 (UTC)
can we have a reference or quote for this "The Popperian criterion excludes from the domain of science not unfalsifiable statements but only whole theories that contain no falsifiable statements". Why couldn't we just add some true falsifiable statement to a theory, thus making the theory "scientific". I will edit in a couple of days if no feedback 79.70.50.117 ( talk) 05:30, 1 March 2008 (UTC)
One of Popper's major reasons for criticising verificationism is that a universal law cannot be verified by finite evidence, given that it makes infinite predictions. At first sight, no such problem is there for falsificationism: a single anomaly proves a universal law wrong. However, contemporary physics does make certain predictions, such as the statement "Magnetic monopoles exist." This is a claim that can never be falsified, and as such, Popper must denounce it as unscientific. I can't recall reading this in the article, as it makes falsificationism a less probable conception of the scientific method. DDSaeger ( talk) 23:57, 5 April 2008 (UTC)
In the intro it is suggested that "people have souls" is a nonfalsifiable statement. But a limited and perhaps impractical falsification may exist, depending on what is meant by "soul". A soul is usually described as a nonmaterial entity that contains the identity of a person, and which animates (but is independent of) the person's material body. If a soul existed, reincarnation and resurrection would be possible. So one could (for example) test whether a possibly reincarnated person remembers things from their past life. If no one ever reported this, it would be a falsification of the theory. Granted it is impossible to check all bodies that ever existed to see whether they contain reincarnated souls, but the same difficulty confronts a person trying to check whether all swans are white.
So what is it about "people have souls" that makes it so much less falsifiable than "all swans are white"? 141.211.61.254 ( talk) 02:42, 6 May 2008 (UTC)
This article is densely written, or perhaps I'm just too dense to give it justice. This summary of Popper's position from a old version of the philosophy of science article seemed more straightforward to me:
68.167.254.2 ( talk) 08:04, 6 July 2008 (UTC).
Wikipedia:Reference_desk/Science#Quantum_Mechanics
Question moved to the appropriate location.-- OMCV ( talk) 23:34, 9 October 2008 (UTC)
I read this entire section, but am still unclear on what makes a falsification naïve; the term isn't clearly defined in its section.
Despite your uncertainty on interpreting this section. You have it completely right! Congratulations! Kmarinas86 (6sin8karma) 18:16, 19 June 2009 (UTC)
This sentance:
makes no sense.
1) Conspiracy theories (like other theories) can have very different logical structures.
2) What does "often" mean? Often according to whom?
--
Pokipsy76 09:44, 2 June 2006 (UTC)
PaineDisciple If the social and political "powers that be" have almost unlimited possibilities of collectively "conspiring," why is it so difficult to understand that ordinary people tend to be interested in them and even to create them? Could it be that, contrary to the "big lie" which is hard to refute because it is beyond the capability of ordinary people to refute it, "conspiracy theories" involving government or corporate and financial elites are so big that they are beyond the capability of the average person (even the "average intellectual") to confirm or deny? Are they simply to much trouble or too dangerous to deal with by elite people concerned for their social status? It does seem that there is a social class basis to the automatic rejection of political or elitist conspiracies. The comforting stereotype for elitists is that only "uneducated" people would believe in large-scale, collective conspiracies by the "powers-that-be." Maybe it would be useful to distinguish between "conspiracy theories" and "scapegoat theories." The latter are what really cause most of the trouble in society. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.99.3.7 ( talk) 18:20, 26 January 2009 (UTC)
"In science and the philosophy of science, falsifiability, contingency, and defeasibility are properties of empirical statements such that they must admit of logical counterexamples. This stands in contradistinction to formal and mathematical statements that may be tautologies, that is, universally true by dint of definitions, axioms, and proofs. No empirical hypothesis, proposition, or theory can be considered scientific if it does not admit the possibility of a contrary case."
The language here is too complex. It's full of philosophical buzz-words, which are supposed to make the writing sound precise and intelligent... but really we're just going to alienate anyone who hasn't already been schooled in this philosophical language. I'm going to try to dumb it down a bit. (e.g. "stands in contradistinction" = "contrasts")
PaineDisciple There is a very strong tendency in modern times, for ALL types of experts to develop the most complex jargon possible. In my view, this parellels the development of organized religion where "priesthoods" try to make the religious ideas as mysterious as possible so that the masses of believers cannot possibly figure it out on their own (or can never be completely sure if they've got it right). This guarantees the privileged status of the "priesthood." If modern science is going to follow this path, it is no wonder that the "masses" will get tired of it. It is also true that the attitude of elitism tends to make scientists think of themselves as a kind of "infallible" priesthood. Carl Sagan, in "Science as a Candle in the Dark," said that scientific truths do not have to be taught as if they were handed down from Moses (or something to that effect). The scientific method and sceptical attitude is what should be taught in schools and to the public. I believe this is happening less and less today and that those scientists who are sincerely concerned with public support of science as a necessity in a democratic republic are "shooting themselves in the foot" if they don't challenge the elitist, "religious" attitude of scientists. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.99.3.7 ( talk) 18:03, 26 January 2009 (UTC)
In the criticism section, an argument against Falsifiability is that "...falsifiability cannot distinguish between astrology and astronomy, as both make technical predictions which are sometimes incorrect." Would it make sense to respond to this saying that falsifiability might be a necessary condition rather than a sufficient one for something to be considered something?
I apologize for my lack of clarity. Feel free to go ahead and delete this if it doesn't make sense. Pete4512 07:21, 26 March 2007 (UTC)
Popper uses falsification as a criterion of demarcation
Verifiability came to be replaced by falsifiability as the criterion of demarcation
PaineDisciple Why not just stick to the scientific routine that first we have an hypothesis (an "educated guess"); then when some substantial PROOF (obviously "falsifiable") has been demonstrated, it is a "theory"; and finally, when it has been thoroughly tested and is capable of predictions, it is called a scientific "law?" —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.99.3.7 ( talk) 18:07, 26 January 2009 (UTC)
If any evidence surfaced suggesting that God existed, this would show that God is a natural phenomenon, and certainly not a "God" as most people would intend the word to mean - it would probably just be a member of some previously unknown species (such an organism existing by itself is unlikely), and we would not really call it a "God".
The statement is just as unfalsifiable as its negation. But I may be misinterpreting the claim. Is it really justified to claim that this statement is falsifiable?
Colin 00:25, 1 June 2007 (UTC)
The article states:
But, IIRC, a largish section of one of Popper's books (Logic of Scientific Discovery or Conjectures and Refutations) contains quite a bit of dense probability talk aimed at providing a measure of confirmation of a theory. Obviously, someone needs to take a gander at the original sources (I left mine in storage in California) to confirm what I recall. If that does indeed match up, then what we have is a relatively straightforward demonstration that the assertion by S&B above is overwrought and does not belong in this article. It's possible that I got confused and at the end Popper says that all the probability work shows that confirmation can't be considered even in principle, but that isn't my recall offhand. -- Wesley R. Elsberry 13:36, 13 August 2007 (UTC)
Rtc, I happen to really, really like you and much of what you've said in our previous exchanges, though I recognize that is irrelevant to this discussion. At the moment, the problem, IMO, is that Popper's criticisms of what he perceived to be misunderstandings of his earlier advocay of falsifiability are not appropriate for the lead section of this article. Therefore, I'm removing the newly inserted material in the lead and will put it below on this page so it can be discussed as to where it might possibly be appropriate. Sincerely yours, ... Kenosis 04:04, 22 August 2007 (UTC)
PaineDisciple Why not just stick to the scientific routine that first we have an hypothesis (an "educated guess"); then when some substantial PROOF (obviously "falsifiable") has been demonstrated, it is a "theory"; and finally, when it has been thoroughly tested and is capable of predictions, it is called a scientific "law?" —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.99.3.7 ( talk) 18:10, 26 January 2009 (UTC)
I disagree strongly with the edit [3]. You attempt to protect the mainstream misreading of Popper against the facts. You obviously moved it down to criticism to play down its significance. It is not a criticism, it is a clarification. -- rtc ( talk) 16:37, 21 December 2007 (UTC)
This section violates neutral point of view quite flagrantly with the sentence beginning "Yet for certain preconceived reasons, hardened creationists...". No citation, no evidence, just a declaration that those creationists are hardened and have preconceived reasons. The previous sentence's strenuous emphasis "not necessary" could also be a non-neutral attempt at an authoritative statement with no citation. —Preceding
unsigned comment added by
203.143.164.250 (
talk) 05:07, 15 July 2009 (UTC)
There's a reasonably good discussion of falsifiability on the Stanford University Department of Philosophy web site. [4]. Their definition is simple: "A theory is scientific only if it is refutable by a conceivable event. Every genuine test of a scientific theory, then, is logically an attempt to refute or to falsify it, and one genuine counter-instance falsifies the whole theory." That's clearer than what Wikipedia has now.
They then go on to a discussion of the hard part of the problem - evaluating whether one theory is "better" than another. It's easy to generate theories which are hard to falsify, but don't predict much. In their words, "for Popper any theory X is better than a ‘rival’ theory Y if X has greater empirical content, and hence greater predictive power, than Y." This is followed by a long discussion of the philosophical history of trying to get hold of the concept of "better" in some formal way. The article currently does not address this well.
There's a practical issue ignored in the article. Engineering is based on theories with predictive power. Engineering is about knowing whether a bridge will hold up or a circuit will work before building it. Only falsifiable theories have reliable predictive power. Hence, engineering is based on falsifiable theories. Philosophers tend to ignore this part, and engineers take it as a given, so it's not mentioned much. I'll look for a cite. -- John Nagle ( talk) 17:57, 23 December 2007 (UTC)
In the article as it currently stands (4-28-09) under the "Logic & mathematics section" contains the statement:
"In this way of looking at things, logic is a science that seeks after knowledge of how we ought to conduct our reasoning if we want to achieve the goals of reasoning. As such, the logical knowledge that we have at any given time can easily fall short of perfection. Thus rules of logical procedure, as normative claims about the fitness of this or that form of inference, are falsifiable according to whether their actual consequences are successful or not."
The most straightforward interpretation of this claim is incorrect. Truth value is defined by reference to the laws of logic. Therefore, any "falsification" of the laws of logic must first make reference to the laws of logic and is therefore self-contradictory. The intended meaning of "the rules of logical procedure" is vague; however, the statement itself must be changed to avoid being misleading at best and completely false at worst.
Dialegomai ( talk) 14:12, 28 April 2009 (UTC)
__________________________
This edit does not require an external source. This is a simply and directly provable deduction as a 2 premise syllogism:
Premise: The law of non-contradiction ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_noncontradiction) is false. Premise: The law of non-contradiction states that what is false (non-true) is not true (and vice versa). Conclusion: What is false is non-false (i.e. true).
Thus is it demonstrated that any falsification of the law of non-contradiction is self-contradictory; therefore the law of non-contradiction is non-falsifiable. The other two axioms (law of identity and of excluded middle) can be demonstrated by similar arguments.
My proposed change (which you undid) is as to replace the incorrect sentence with:
"However, the laws of logic themselves (the rules of inference and logical axioms) are not subject to falsifiability per se. That is, since truth values are defined in relation to the laws of logic any "falsification" of these laws would represent a self-contradictory situation though this conclusion has been argued against by philosophers such as W.V._Quine."
I will be the first to admit that the formatting needs some tweaking. I will give you a day or so to review this before correcting it again. Dialegomai ( talk) 01:41, 29 April 2009 (UTC)
I've heard two different interpretations of the article's opening sentence:
The first says the only criteria is the assertion itself, that what is not falsifiable today will never be falsifiable. The second adds consideration of our technological capabilities, that what is not falsifiable today may be tomorrow. I've always understood the first to be the correct interpretation, but I've heard it argued that Popper was referring only to things that are of current practical value to science. Even if he were not, they say, there is nothing useful in the first interpretation. I understood the issue to be about potential value, not actual value. Some ideas, by their very nature, are incapable of ever being meaningful. Other ideas may or may not be meaningful, but at least the possibility exists. The ability to distinguish between these two classes is what is useful.
I post this seeking the opinion of others. How is the aforementioned opening sentence to be interpreted? Siggimoo ( talk) 23:16, 9 December 2009 (UTC)
The section basically says that the existence of God is non falsifiable but accounts of the activities of God are. I don't see how the latter is falsifiable either. By it's very nature, such an action on the part of God would be defined as a "miracle" and we can't evaluate any particular instance of miracle in the historical record until we have come to a philosophical conclusion on whether or not miracles are possible or not. ( C. S. Lewis, " Miracles; A Preliminary Study") This to try to falsify a miracle on the grounds that such an event is contrary to the observed course of nature is circular reasoning.
I suggest we simply delete the section. I don't think the debate over the falsifiability of God is relevant to defining the process of falsification. -- BenMcLean ( talk) 18:35, 17 December 2009 (UTC)
It's source is self-published. Normally I'd say put in Lewis as a counter claim, but we don't have a third party claim to begin with. Ian.thomson ( talk) 18:39, 17 December 2009 (UTC)
I've read this page 3 times and I still can't fathom what falsifiability is... I think it needs a clear and simple definition at the beginning of the article. Kat, Queen of Typos 22:45, 9 November 2006 (UTC)
PRO The testability article does not present sufficient information in order for it to stand on its own. As it is mentioned in the lede of this article as a synonym for falsifiability (or at least part of falsifiability), it should be merged into this article. Neelix ( talk) 16:36, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
PRO I agree. It should be merged and a redirect added. lk ( talk) 14:19, 10 May 2008 (UTC)
CON I don't think Falsifiability should be merged with Testability. Falsifiability is an important strand of philosophical thought of one of the greatest thinkers of the twentieth century. Its application revolutionized science (e.g. the collapse of the Newtonian paradigm and its replacement with relativity) and is still the harsh "rock of reality" upon which all unsound scientific theories eventually founder. Testability is similar, however it is more of a grab-bag collection of practical problem-solving tools than it is a philosophical bedrock; it is the "applied mathematics" of testing as opposed to the "pure mathematics" of Falsifiability. For Wikipedia to have a page on Popper without a link to his central conceptual idea of Falsifiability would be like having a page on Henry VIII without directly mentioning his six wives, other than as a sub-section under mistresses, concubines, and other female companions. Jackmaturin ( talk) 07:52, 12 May 2008 (UTC)
CON I don't think Falsifiability should be merged with Testability either. There is an important strand in the testability article which is missing - I may add it when I get time - which is that testability is also a term used to describe how testable a physical system is (not just a hypothesis). In engineering it is a term used to discuss built in test methodologies and other self check schemes. It may also be a measure of how easy a product is to test by external methods. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.120.209.210 ( talk) 11:11, 22 May 2008 (UTC)
CON Added highlighting of the positions above. Ours is based on an anticipated build out of the Philosophy of Science here. Testability and Falsifiablity are distinct concepts, in Our English usage, with Testability the empirical projection of Falsifiability plus serendipitous discovery. A theoretical position could be falsified even though there was no known way to empirically test it. 74.78.162.229 ( talk) 15:54, 22 July 2008 (UTC)
CON should be kept if only for the fact that it was Popper's technical term. In addition testablitity is only good for experimental science (chemistry & physics) and does nothing for observational sciences (geology, astronomy, and much of ecology/biology).-- OMCV ( talk) 19:33, 13 August 2008 (UTC)
CON I know I am late, but let me throw my $0.02 in: Falsification is about whether an observation 'could' be made that would contradict a proposition. Testabiltiy is about collecting affirmative evidence for a proposition. The former is deductive while the latter is inductive. My thought is that these two things could easily be confused, but are quite different in nature (negative and deductive vs positive and inductive). 70.69.189.240 ( talk) 04:20, 23 September 2010 (UTC)
Original caption on "black swan" image:
I deleted most of this, because it was too long for a caption. The existence of black swans disproves the statement, "All swans are white." I think we should leave it at that, and hope that the reader pursues the matter further by reading the intro.
And if the intro is sufficiently interesting, maybe the reader will go on to the rest of the article.
The key point of falsifibility (and this should be in the intro) is that every general rule should be compared with real-world observations, and that we need to make corrections in the rule if too many observations contradict it.
"Things that you drop will fall to the ground." This is an excellent general rule, which can be grasped by children as young as 3 or 4. But then we can show exceptions such party balloons, which can be held up by air currents. So we must then modify the rule to, "Things that feel heavy will fall to the ground." We can then formulate a second rule for light things, like balloons, paper, and dust. "Lights things fall to the ground, unless the wind keeps them aloft." -- Uncle Ed ( talk) 17:03, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
I removed the above quote. Swedish philosopher Sven Ove Hansson has made an analysis regarding this quote, which concluded that this quote is misleading; see article [6]. Ulner ( talk) 11:42, 8 August 2010 (UTC)
The article currently contains this sentence, "As a result, it would be logically invalid to observe an act directly falsifying the existence of a common ancestor, just as it would be impossible to falsify the existence of an invisible God."
This sentence contains an obvious comparison between the "common ancestor" of Darwinian evolution and the "invisible God" of religion. However religions do not claim to be scientific, and since falsifiability is a principle Popper applied to scientific method, the insertion of religion here is quite unwarranted. Talking about negative evidence may include discussions of religion, but my opinion is that the article is about falsification, which relates solely to scientific theories, of which evolution claims to be (thereby suiting the context), whereas religion makes no claim to a scientific nature and thus does not suit the context. In other words, the arbitrating factor for me is the article title. Religion simply does not fit in this article anywhere, whereas any scientific theory would fit fine.
Please note that this comment is not intended to be prejudiced for or against religion, and I decline to (irrelevantly) share my personal beliefs here. Please forgive the run-on sentence above. 70.69.189.240 ( talk) 01:05, 17 September 2010 (UTC)
Some of the material appears to infringe copyright: i.e come from this source: http://books.google.ie/books?id=AiZe7fqM41AC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false . I will remove the copied paragraphs, if someone wants to re-insert the ideas fire ahead but I don't think we can leave up as is. IRWolfie- ( talk) 21:23, 3 January 2011 (UTC)
The green swan becomes falsifiable by testing the null hypothesis "no green swan exists". This is falsifiable by finding a single green swan. Symbolically, -(-A)=A, as opposed to +(A)=A which reduces to A=A. 108.65.0.169 ( talk) 22:33, 13 January 2011 (UTC)
This is an interesting point raised above in that long discussion "All men are mortal". I will edit in relevant links to
evidence of absence.-
Tesseract2
(talk) 03:12, 17 April 2011 (UTC)
Technically, I mean. If you say, "A green swan exists", that is falsifiable. Show one. Difficult, as nobody knows where the're supposed to live, but not impossible. If one says "Green swans do not exist", that cannot be proven. You would have to check every swan on the planet, which would only result in the person who made the claim say "Oh, I forgot to mention they live on the moon.". After searching the moon he would tell you to search Jupiter and the rest of the universe. You just can't. If you say " Russell's teapot exists", that is falsifiable. Well, technically. You would have to figure out a way to show it, but future technology may make that possible. However, if you say "Russell's teapot does not exist", Russell makes it clear how that claim is unfalsifiable.
But since the article on Russell's teapot makes it clear his claim is unfalsifiable, it seems to be the case, that falsifiability depends on available resources. Which would mean that saying "Ionizing radiation is lethal" was a non-falsifiable claim 500 years ago? Is this the case? W3ird N3rd ( talk) 00:43, 1 June 2011 (UTC)
At first glance "all men are mortal" may seem non-falsifiable, but if we look and think more closely we find something unexpected: the statement is completely falsifiable. Falsification of the statement "all men are mortal" is impractical, but is nevertheless possible. You simply need to wipe out every other human being in existence till you are the last one standing. To finally drive home the argument, you, as the last human on earth would have to commit suicide - and the human race would end with you. QED.
Again, I agree that the above falsification of the statement that "all men are mortal" is impractical (and a tad destitute of compassion for misery & suffering), but the simple fact is that the statement can hypothetically be falsified. Better and briefer (but more controversial) statements could be:
1 - "God exists" - Non-falsifiable
2 - "God does not exist" - Falsifiable
I hope this helps. Otherwise, the article is almost perfect. TranscendTranslation 01:56, 16 November 2007 (UTC)
The comment I have here is that observation that NOT "all men are moral" by seeing one man die leads to the obvious conclusion that SOME men are mortal, not that ALL men are mortal. this is an important point. § 74.13.89.115 ( talk) 06:50, 21 November 2007 (UTC)
Your comment above isn't perfectly clear to me. Nevertheless, my point is that the statement "all men are mortal" can be falsified by experimentation. Quite obviously, it is NOT falsified just by considering a single dead man, no-one is saying that. However, it IS falsified by killing all men (a theoretically possible but clearly callous/impractical task). Once all men have died, the human race ends with you, so you can be sure there will be new men to complicate the issue. Finally, this whole consideration is semantic, the overall point is that the 'God' examples are certainly true, whereas the mortal/immortal example are not. TranscendTranslation ( talk) 18:26, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
When you've reduced the set of "all men" to the empty set, assertions about its members are meaningless... and in fact, not falsifiable! 67.98.226.14 ( talk) 00:55, 5 December 2007 (UTC)
You're example "God does not exist" is also non-falsifiable because of the very nature of what people call god. God is so that "I don't understand" becomes "I understand", for that reason the proof which generates the faulsensee of the statment also generates a "we don't understand yet" response, and the choice taken is irrelevant because the 2 competing ideas "god"(proves the statement false) or "a lack of understanding" (doesn't prove it false) cannot be compared for the choice is based on personal beliefs and facts. For example any observation made to prove it false, "oh look, frogs from the sky", can be explained through a scientific method because the very existance of miracles are explained through probabilities and if one isn't happy with the probability explanation, argument of manipulation with human (or even non-human) technology can be use. If you witness god it could be drugs, if you and your friend witness god how can you argue that the 25foot tall guy in robes wasnt actually a giant robot. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 99.226.149.107 ( talk) 22:11, 22 April 2008 (UTC)
There is a lot of confusion here between logic and falsifiablelity. The statement “All people are mortal” is falsifiable. I need only find one person who is not mortal to show that the statement is false. The fact that there has never been an observation of a non-mortal person just goes to supporting the statement. Killing every one on the planet would not show the statement is falsifiable; it would just be another piece of evidence supporting the argument. 206.195.19.43 ( talk) 10:24, 24 April 2008 (UTC)
The concept of an immortal man, required to falsify the proposition 'all men are mortal', is entirely non-cognitive by virtue of immortality having no ostensive examples in reality; we can't after all point out an immortal man for the reason explained above, an observation made over a finite period is not logically coherent to claiming immortality. Thus an immortal man cannot be observed, and hence cannot provide the basis for an empirical falsification method. So in this respect at least the original statement can't be falsified. Apathy92 ( talk) 09:54, 2 December 2009 (UTC)
Thanks for the pointer :) Apathy92 ( talk) 11:28, 3 December 2009 (UTC)
Also, I'm grappling a little with this- Quote: "You simply need to wipe out every other human being in existence till you are the last one standing"- it occurs to me that if you reduce the human race to being non-existent any assertions about the set become meaningless and unfalsifiable as a result. Am I along the right lines here? Apathy92 ( talk) 11:56, 3 December 2009 (UTC)
Why not think on terms of "All men die before the age of 200"? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 200.27.146.116 ( talk) 01:09, 30 January 2010 (UTC)
'When you've reduced the set of "all men" to the empty set...' This logic is even more flawed. The set is all men, not all living men. Do men cease to exist when they die? Nope, they are just dead men. So the original commenter is absolutely correct: if all men died, that would be absolute proof and the statement would be falsified. 66.54.122.127 ( talk) 16:43, 25 March 2010 (UTC)
TranscendTranslation, you've just reversed those statements. "God exists" is a perfectly falsifiable claim. All you have to do is show him, and there's your proof. "God does not exist" however, is non-falsifiable. You can say he's not here. So somebody will suggest God is on the moon. You search the moon: no God. Somebody suggests he may be on Mars. You search Mars. Nothing. Somebody suggests another place. You search the entire universe (impossible, but let's go for it): nothing. Somebody will suggest he's in another dimension that we cannot see in any way. Not falsifiable. As for "all men are mortal", that is also a reasonably falsifiable claim. All you have to do is find somebody who is immortal, shoot him/her, throw this person off buildings, use poison, hanging, give him/her a lethal injection, etc. All this would be accepted as reasonable proof this person is immortal. Think of Jack Harkness from Torchwood. As always in science, if at some point something is proven wrong (Jack Harkness dies), that's ok. You've made a mistake. Similarly we could at some point figure out all the black swans were actually white swans painted black as a prank by the Australians. If that would happen you would also have to find another swan somewhere that's not white. Similarly you would have to find another immortal human if the one you thought to be immortal dies. On another note, killing all humans doesn't make the claim falsifiable. There may still be some humans on another planet (transported by spaceships a long time ago), underground, in the jungle etc. You could never verify everyone is dead. We don't have to watch somebody immortal for an infinite amount of time, if we can reasonably argue he is (shot, crushed, 500 years old etc and still standing, unaged) we can consider that proof. The same way we say comic books and atoms exist, even though we could still be proven wrong about that and figure out we're all living in The Matrix. We talk about history and consider it truth, despite having no absolute proof for everything we know (some bones or finding rusty tools in the ground is no absolute proof, it can be proven wrong). Good proof doesn't have to be impossible to be proven incorrect, in fact, virtually every proof of anything can be proven incorrect by the "Matrix" argument. W3ird N3rd ( talk) 00:18, 1 June 2011 (UTC)
This does not appear to drectly concern the wikipedia article- collapsed per
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Treating pure-mathematics as purely formal hypothetical knowledge; it is hard to see how 'falsifiable-statement' in a strict scientific sense is applicable. Never-the-less falsifiability in a mathematical as opposed to ' objectively observable' sense; does seem applicable.eg. Pythagoras's Theorem establishes that: for 'right angled triangles' in Euclidean space; H^2 = A^2 + B^2, for triangles with A and B in any ratio and hypotenuse H. The set of such triangles is necessarily infinite, but the set which will ever be calculated is necessarily finite.The theorem (a far from obvious tautology) establishes that the latter will always be a subset of the former. But surely this in no way contradicts the statement that "Pythagoras's Theorem is 'mathematically' falsifiable". If by mathematically falsifiable statement; we intend a statement which asserts explicitly or implicitly one or more mathematical 'facts' in some axiom system.Then we can catagorise such statements as: A/ Tautological falsifiable-statements (theorems); the asserted 'mathematical facts' of which; we are confident will always be a super-set of the set of calculated 'mathematical facts' and B/ Contingent falsifiable-statements the asserted 'mathematical facts' of which ;have thus far always been a super-set of the set of calculated 'mathematical facts'; but may not remain so. Now consider 'Godel-statements'; by which is meant the unprovable theorems of Kurt Godel’s famous Incompleteness Theorem, interpreted as:“ Every axiomatic system is either complete or consistent, but not both”.Which implies that every consistent axiomatic system is incomplete; which implies that Godel-statements must exist in every consistent axiomatic system.Where by 'complete axiomatic system' is intended ,one in which: 'all statements constructable within such a system, are provably true or false'; and whereby 'consistent axiomatic system ' is intended one, in which : 'no two provable statements, can be found to conflict' Now another theorem of Godel, his Consistency Theorem established that consistency of an axiomatic system is itself not provable; which implies the statements:“This axiom set is consistent” along with it's corollary ,“This axiom set is incomplete “ ; are necessarily Godel-statements in any axiom system, which is not formally inconsistent; ie. containing conflicting axioms. Now a difficulty arises when trying to decide what exactly a Godel-statement, 'IS'..! Statements which seem true, but can't be proved , superficially resemble the axioms themselves. In that axioms are statements, which are necessarily true, since they define the particular axiom system, but necessarily can't be proved using the other axioms; as they would then be unnecessary ; ie. they would be theorems. But if Godel-statements are considered to be additional axioms, and formally added to the set, one starts an escalating vicious cycle; because this new enhanced axiom set, will have it's own additional Godel-statements. etc. Returning to Godel's Incompleteness Theorem; we have in any axiomatic system: 1/ 'theorems' which are true and proved and 2/'theorems' which are true, but unprovable It occurred to me that: if 1/ can be identified with A/ above then perhaps 2/ can be identified with B/ above. The contention is that Godel-statements be identified as non-tautological 'mathematically' falsifiable-statements, Then we have a place for Godel-statements, without having to add them as axioms, thus avoiding the above vicious cycle. Queries (1) If Godel-statements can be considered to be 'mathematical falsifiable-statements' in this extended sense,of 'non-tautological statements, thus far found consistent with the facts of the axiom system, but possibly false by comparison with facts yet to be considered.'(1)Are Godel-statements , which are consistent with only a sub-set of the facts of the axiom system (a) possible ?; (b) necessary ? (2)Given the very general interpretations of Godel's Incompleteness Theorem which now exist, outside number theory; Can we conclude that in any consistent axiomatic system, non-tautological 'falsifiable-statements'; must exist ? Rhnmcl ( talk) 08:29, 8 October 2011 (UTC) |
Popper's argument was that theories are falsified/falsifiable in logic, not belief. For example, while Galileo's observations logically instantly falsified the Ptolomeic theory, the beliefs of other scientists did not change instantly, nor did such beliefs have to change at all in order for the logical falsification to exist. 108.65.0.169 ( talk) 02:24, 15 July 2011 (UTC)
The example used in the first paragraph in the abstract, "atoms do exist" seems confusing. The word atom is used in the metaphysical meaning, something indivisible, but I think that a lot of lay people might think it is referring to the scientific notion of the atom, meaning electons orbiting a nucleus. The former is not falsifiable, but the latter is. How hard would it be to use a different example here? Oktal ( talk) 13:17, 4 September 2011 (UTC)
I have restored the intro. Examples are important for understanding. And the example of atoms is the standard example, and one of the examples used by Popper himself. The example is not absurd. Oktal says "The word atom is used in the metaphysical meaning" -- This gets the point completely wrong. Words do not have "metaphysical meaning"; words can merely be used in the context of a statement, and it is the statement as such that may be metaphysical or falsifiable. It is completely irrelevant whether the statement "atoms do exist" refers to atoms in the old greek sense or in the modern scientific sense. The statement remains metaphysical in both cases. It is very easy: The "scientific [theory] of the atom, meaning electons orbiting a nucleus" says that atoms have certain structural properties and behave in certain ways. But If we have found an atom that does not have these structural properties predicted by modern theory, it does not contradict the claim that atoms (in this modern sense) exist. For there may always be a different atom that has these properties and that we have not looked at yet. What is falsifiable is the theory that *all* atoms obey the laws of the modern theory. But I have changed the statement slightly anyway to help understanding. -- rtc ( talk) 14:58, 6 November 2011 (UTC)
Does falsifiability mean a theory is not accepted as scientific---no matter how many experiments/observations support it---until we find out where it fails?
Was Newton's gravity falsifiable before physics at subatomic levels appeared?
--Roland 20:18, 14 September 2011 (UTC)
Assume that swans wouldn’t actually exist (for instance, because we replace swan by dragon)? We see that the sentence is actually not falsifiable, because if it is impossible to find a single swan, we sure cannot find a swan that is non white. So why do you claim, that "all swans are white" is falsifiable?
SteveBaker ( talk) 14:53, 21 November 2011 (UTC)
I am not sure all of Loew Galitz recent deletions are necessary. I have two worries. The first worry is that a quick glance at the deleted content does seem to contain some references. It was a quick glance though.
My second worry is a smaller comment. More of a hope. That is, I of course believe that Wikipedia should have sources for all of its information. I just hope that editors attempt literature searches to add sources, especially when this could be done with relative ease. Wikipedia has collected information that its public cares about, and I am not entirely sure that the easier route - of deleting entire passages - is always better than leaving it alone. I am much more convinced that it would be ideal to perform a more challenging "fix" like finding a reputable source (unless the information is altogether incorrect).- Tesseract2 (talk) 23:30, 21 November 2011 (UTC)
Are there any aspects of the anthropogenic global warming theory (AGW) which proponents and opponents both agree are falsifiable? That is, do scientists in general agree that AGW is a falsifiable theory?
That's a lot of verbiage to wade through. Could someone just tell me what sort of observations AGW theory proponents agree would disprove the theory?
A belated thanks for your courteous answer, but I think I still haven't made clear what I'm trying to do. I'm not fishing for a quote saying that AGW "is unfalsifiable". If it were unfalsifiable, then it wouldn't be a good example of falsifiability at all.
Rather, I'm trying to find something well known to the general public (or at least which is discussed a lot in the media), which we can use as an example for our readers to understand what it takes for a hypothesis or theory to be "falsifiable". Specifically, what predictions does AGW make which can be compared against (discovered) facts or observations which could conceivable disprove it?
Or is AGW not a good example, and should we find something else like the moon is made of green cheese? I read somewhere that an astronomer compared the refractive index of the moon's surface to that of green cheese to falsify this hypothesis.
Got me now? I'm looking for a really good popular example, not something controversial which will just make it harder for people to understand falsifiability. --
Rtc keeps reinserting statements he likes but which are either unreferenced or false, supplied with falase references. For example his claim that "White swans do exist" not falsifiable is false (They may become extinct). Likewise, the statement about indivisivility and atoms. What is worse these are supplied with footnotes supposedly to confirm these statements, which are not. For example Popper speaks about indivisibility for a completely different argument.
In summary, sorry, Rtc, your contributions have lost credibility. If you want to add something, please do this an small, well-referenced pieces which can be discussed. Loew Galitz ( talk) 16:45, 22 November 2011 (UTC)
On the subject of the atoms example in particular, and back to actually talking about the article: I affirm the technical validity of the example as used by Popper and quoted by Rfc, but I think it is a bad example to use in the article for the sake of clarity and the confusion that readers will make between the old metaphysical sense of "atoms" (fundamentally indivisible particles) vs the modern scientific sense of "atoms" (the things that join together into molecules and are composed of protons, neutrons, and electrons). --
Pfhorrest (
talk) 05:11, 23 November 2011 (UTC)
Rtc added:
In the Article we find this fragment:
"...US law says that only science may be taught in public school science classes (see Science education)."
Following the wiki link to Science education, we find an article in which the first reference to "public school" is in the following fragment:
"The first person credited with being employed as a Science teacher in a British public school was William Sharp...."
Following that wiki link to public school we find an article about schools that are not dependent on government financing. The reader may now conclude, simply by following two wiki links, that US law requires only science to be taught in schools that are not dependent on government financing.
This type of confusion arises because the term "public school" happens to have exactly opposite meanings in the US and UK respectively. In the US, a public school is a school run by the government. In the UK a public school is one that is run independently of the government.
I propose the solution that we always clarify by writing "government-run school" instead of "public school" when the US meaning is intended. And likewise, we should say "non-government school" instead of "public school" when the UK meaning is intended. This usage should ideally apply everywhere in the English Wikipedia.
In the current article, then, we could write:
"US law says that only science may be taught in science classes in government-run schools."
(Citation still needed for this assertion.)
(Edit: added signature below.)
Rahul ( talk) 23:27, 2 January 2012 (UTC)
The first two citations in the criticism section do not actually support what they're supposed to be citing. I'll give it a day, and then remove it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.19.102.88 ( talk) 00:25, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
I may need enlightening here.
Consider that we do have evidence of absence sometimes. The statement "Coins exist in my pocket" is falsifiable, but I can also tell you it is falsified - by checking quick.
My quandary starts when the article suggests that "White Swans exist" is a claim with no logical counter-example. Is that right? Is that the example that Popper gives in "The logic of scientific discovery" (because the reference does not mention a page number to help me find it, and yet it appears after the period - suggesting the whole paragraph IS the example that Popper gives)?
Presumably that claim translates to "White Swans exist anywhere in reality right now". We can logically imagine exploring everywhere and find there are no white swans. Like coins missing from a pocket. The statement does not seem unfalsifiable. It seems (with great practical difficulty) logically falsifiable.
If there are Swans somewhere (on earth) and coins in my pocket, those statements do not seem "unfalsifiable" in theory just because they were not falsified. Or is the idea: in that reality, practically, the claims are 'now unfalsifiable because nothing can counter the prior discovery of Swans on earth and coins in my pocket.
Thoughts? Maybe the article just needs to be more explicit about something. I may have similar issues with "All men are mortal" being called unfalsifiable. - Tesseract2 (talk) 17:21, 19 February 2012 (UTC)