![]() | This article is rated C-class on Wikipedia's
content assessment scale. It is of interest to the following WikiProjects: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
||
This page has archives. Sections older than 365 days may be automatically archived by Lowercase sigmabot III when more than 5 sections are present. |
What is really missing on this page is a real summary of what this theory is at the beginning (instead it starts with explaining what is risk aversion) and the central formula E[u(X)]=p1 u(x1)+p2 u(x2)+... Maybe somebody has time to work this into the article?
(I myself published some research in decision theory, so I probably could improve the article by myself, but I am quite busy now and before I postpone forever, I'd rather ask for help...)
Rieger ( talk) 14:02, 3 April 2018 (UTC)
editeur24 ( talk) 21:01, 23 November 2020 (UTC)
The section "Savage's Representation Theorem" should be fixed or dropped. It does not say what assumptions P1-P7 are nor explain the notation, so it is too incomplete to be useful. Shall I delete the section? -- editeur24 ( talk) 21:07, 23 November 2020 (UTC)
This edit is puzzling. It uses some very odd notation, thus:
My best guess is that this was intended:
However, the cited work by Li, Loomes, and Pogrebna has nothing about this. Michael Hardy ( talk) 05:48, 15 September 2021 (UTC)
I'm not a trained economist, but you'd be hard pressed to find an armchair more often steeped in the public discourse. The existing lead contained allusive, undefined language, so I revised it as follows:
The expected utility hypothesis is a foundational assumption in mathematical economics concerning human preference when decision making under uncertainty. It postulates that a rational agent maximizes utility, as formulated in the mathematics of game theory, based on their risk aversion. Rational choice theory, a cornerstone of microeconomics, builds upon the expected utility of individuals to model aggregate social behaviour.
To my eye, to a 90% standard, this is clear, cogent, and suitably framed within the discipline. But I can't be certain it's entirely in pedagogical alignment with how professionals view the matter. Please review and revise accordingly. — MaxEnt 14:11, 27 September 2023 (UTC)
I think this section is mis-titled. The Tversky and Kahneman research that is summarised accepts the assumption that rational agents maximise subjective expected utility. Instead they say that people's behaviour doesn't follow SEU theory and so people choose irrationally (or that SEU isn't an appropriate normative standard). So it's confusing to label this a "criticism" of expected utility. Technically it's a criticism of the descriptive application of the expected utility hypothesis, rather than its normative application. There are different consistent positions one could take, including:
For now I'm just raising this issue for discussion. I don't know what the solution is; it has to not just involve a change of heading but further explanation. MartinPoulter ( talk) 15:07, 26 November 2023 (UTC)
![]() | This article is rated C-class on Wikipedia's
content assessment scale. It is of interest to the following WikiProjects: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
||
This page has archives. Sections older than 365 days may be automatically archived by Lowercase sigmabot III when more than 5 sections are present. |
What is really missing on this page is a real summary of what this theory is at the beginning (instead it starts with explaining what is risk aversion) and the central formula E[u(X)]=p1 u(x1)+p2 u(x2)+... Maybe somebody has time to work this into the article?
(I myself published some research in decision theory, so I probably could improve the article by myself, but I am quite busy now and before I postpone forever, I'd rather ask for help...)
Rieger ( talk) 14:02, 3 April 2018 (UTC)
editeur24 ( talk) 21:01, 23 November 2020 (UTC)
The section "Savage's Representation Theorem" should be fixed or dropped. It does not say what assumptions P1-P7 are nor explain the notation, so it is too incomplete to be useful. Shall I delete the section? -- editeur24 ( talk) 21:07, 23 November 2020 (UTC)
This edit is puzzling. It uses some very odd notation, thus:
My best guess is that this was intended:
However, the cited work by Li, Loomes, and Pogrebna has nothing about this. Michael Hardy ( talk) 05:48, 15 September 2021 (UTC)
I'm not a trained economist, but you'd be hard pressed to find an armchair more often steeped in the public discourse. The existing lead contained allusive, undefined language, so I revised it as follows:
The expected utility hypothesis is a foundational assumption in mathematical economics concerning human preference when decision making under uncertainty. It postulates that a rational agent maximizes utility, as formulated in the mathematics of game theory, based on their risk aversion. Rational choice theory, a cornerstone of microeconomics, builds upon the expected utility of individuals to model aggregate social behaviour.
To my eye, to a 90% standard, this is clear, cogent, and suitably framed within the discipline. But I can't be certain it's entirely in pedagogical alignment with how professionals view the matter. Please review and revise accordingly. — MaxEnt 14:11, 27 September 2023 (UTC)
I think this section is mis-titled. The Tversky and Kahneman research that is summarised accepts the assumption that rational agents maximise subjective expected utility. Instead they say that people's behaviour doesn't follow SEU theory and so people choose irrationally (or that SEU isn't an appropriate normative standard). So it's confusing to label this a "criticism" of expected utility. Technically it's a criticism of the descriptive application of the expected utility hypothesis, rather than its normative application. There are different consistent positions one could take, including:
For now I'm just raising this issue for discussion. I don't know what the solution is; it has to not just involve a change of heading but further explanation. MartinPoulter ( talk) 15:07, 26 November 2023 (UTC)