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Wow! I'm so glad to see this as the collaboration of the week! Sifting through the article, one thing gave me pause: Is it really fair to consider all of the epistemological theories mentioned in that section (empiricism, pragmatism, phenomenalism, etc.) as various flavors of foundationalism? Is that the consensus? I was of the understanding that there were viable, say, coherentist theories of knowledge that were also empiricist. Meanwhile, would anybody find it out of line if I added some short summary of, say, coherentism and reliabilism to this list? If there are no objections, I'll get on it. Thanks. Paul Hope 21:48, 9 August 2005 (UTC)
My apologies in advance to the authors of the article. The article is spoiled by having been edited and added to in an ad hoc fashion. It lacks structure, and so gives a confused account of the topic. Much of it looks like a list of links, rather than an attempt to explain the key issues.
The promotion of subjectivism and objectivism is unusual in an article on Epistemology. These two categories are more commonly used to differentiate two approaches to ethics rather than to knowledge. Also, running through the article is confusion between knowledge, the proper subject of epistemology, and truth, which is only indirectly relevant. There is a desperate need for a discussion of the relationship between knowledge and truth – and why not drop in justification and belief?
It is far more common to start with the rationalist/empiricist distinction, as this article once did. Since this follows more closely the historical development of epistemology, this also makes it far easier to introduce new material into the article.
The second paragraph is strange. It does not seem to have a content that is relevant to the article. Several other paragraphs have similarly lost their apparent relevance – no doubt as a result of editing since they were written. Several paragraphs are about truth, not knowledge – which would be fine, provided the distinction had been spelled out earlier. The taxonomy introduced in the middle of the article is also puzzling. For instance, few constructivists would consider themselves to be subjectivists, as is claimed. Again, the subject appears to be truth rather than knowledge.
A comment on style - much of the article is also written in the first person. Surly this is inappropriate?
The article needs editing and re-writing from top to bottom, with an eye towards consistence and completeness. Banno 13:23, 2 Jan 2004 (UTC)
I learnt a little about Epistemology while studying Ethology (which has little to do with ethics btw). Ethologists run into epistemological problems because they sometimes have different senses than the organisms they are observing. This causes 3 problems:
In these cases there is a disparity in knowlege between the observer and the observed. Epistemology warns us that such situations exist, and can sometimes help in solving problems arising from such a situation. I've written a bit about this problem at Animal_echolocation.
When editing the article, it might be interesting to mention some of the practical applications of Epistemology. It gets used by people diving to the deepest depths, and in the middle of steamy jungles ;-). What I'm saying is it's not "just some dusty philosophy", there's actual applications for it, and it might be nice to mention some :-) 80.126.238.189 17:11, 8 Feb 2004 (UTC)
And its not just because the subject matter is itself difficult, either. After all, other wiki articles dealing with similar subject matter (on "knowledge," for example, or "phenomenalism") do so in an orderly, transparent manner.
In this case, the person who conceived of the central section wanted to create a list of five approaches to epistemology and to explain why they are all inclusive. He came up with: nihilism, subjectivism, objectivism, mysticism, and skepticism. Or did he? It looks as if he intended to include "phenomenalism" but declined to cross-reference that so it wouldn't end up a list of six. But why NOT six then? Or twenty? What principled distinctions are behind this list? I can't tell.
I've tried to clean up this article, introducing a couple of subheads and my own definitions of some of the key terms, and adding a transition at the end of that second paragraph so it won't look so out of place.
But I won't go any further, fearing as some have mentioned that 'too many cooks' may be part of the problem here.
--Anonymous
Somehow rationalism and empiricism have gotten snowed under. There's so much *ELSE* going on that the 2 main schools in epistemology are snowed under. Eep. -- 80.126.238.189 22:06, 24 Feb 2004 (UTC)
The section “beliefs about how one acquires true beliefs” bothers me.
Primarily, this section is about belief, not about knowledge. So its relevance is questionable.
The section should be about justification, rather than belief. As it claims, the main question is when someone can know that their beliefs are true – that is, when is a true belief justified.
Nihilism, mysticism and scepticism have a place in this article, but subjectivism and objectivism are usually used to categorise ethical theories rather than epistemologies. Relegating rationalism and empiricism to the end of the article puts it at odds with most other accounts.
I intend to re-write much of this material, returning to a more historical structure. Comments welcome.
Banno 20:10, 29 Feb 2004 (UTC)
Thanks; I agree to some extent, but philosophy of science and scientific method are both fairly substantial articles, so I don’t think science is missing out. Banno 19:37, 5 Mar 2004 (UTC)
I changed this: "The [analytic-synthetic] distinction was first formulated By Kant, and later given a more formal shape by Frege."
Most historians of philosophy would tell you that the dichotomy was implicit in " Hume's fork," and my change was intended to acknowledge as much.
There appears to be a confusion creeping in to the article. Aren’t realism and naive realism ontological, rather than epistemological, theories? Although they inform empiricism (a theory of knowledge), aren’t they themselves theories about what exists?
For that reason, I think they should be removed, or at least re-worded. Banno 21:26, Apr 22, 2004 (UTC)
Alright, people are adding all kinds of detail to the article again, snowing under the core of the matter with words words words. I think this page should be replaced by something of an index or list pointing to epistemology topics, else it's going to become fat, bloated and utterly unreadable every couple of months. (and make for lots of annoying work cleaning it up, and every cleanup will loose data around the edges. :-/ ) Kim Bruning 09:14, 9 May 2004 (UTC)
It is really good to see folk taking an interest in the article. I’m very interested to see some more content on the Gettier problem. However, I’m concerned not to let the discussion of this particular issue detract from what I think is a useful structure for the overall article. Banno 11:27, May 10, 2004 (UTC)
The Theaetetus account is used in the article as a way to link the various epistemological theories in something like historical order. It is used as a rhetorical tool that provides, hopefully, a sequence for the reader to use to understand the issues. Theaetetus forms the core of the article, not because it is the prevailing opinion now, but because it was the prevailing opinion for the two-and- a-bit thousand years before now; and as such it provides a spine on which the article can stand and refer to the various epistemic theories. I agree that if one takes a look at the history and the talk pages, one will see that the article has in the past degenerated into near incomprehsibility. Without such a spine, it will do so again. Banno 11:27, May 10, 2004 (UTC)
None of which is intended to detract from the work of Amish. Placing the Gettier material at the start of the article breaks this historical sequence. So I’ve moved it to the end of the article, placing it with other recent material. Given its importance, I’ve left reference to it in the introduction. Banno 11:27, May 10, 2004 (UTC)
I just speed read this, but I didn't see any mention of information as defined by the bit. The bit is a building block of information. Our main fuzzy area of the nature of epistemology then is how exactly brains handle information; whether with some form of bits or something else.
The article misses a great chance when mentioning illness as an example. The human immune system does not operate independantly of the central nervous system at all. For instance, the CNS-generated hormone cortisol is a great example of an immunosupressant. This means that a persons' state of mind can influence the course of an illness to some degree. This would make a really nice example of observer effect. Kim Bruning 13:28, 18 Jul 2004 (UTC)
I’ve moved this stuff from the main page because it has a few problems. It claims to be offering a definition of knowledge, but instead just cites a few philosophers. In doing so it breaks the flow of the article. That is, there is no reason to give primacy to Descartes and Locke. Perhaps the author would like to place the material in the appropriate place in the article. Also, it misuses the phrase “begs the question”. Banno 03:32, Sep 26, 2004 (UTC)
Epistemology begs the question: from "where" or "what" does human knowledge derive? The "theory of knowledge" comes to us in the modern age by the arguable father of modern philosophy, Rene Descartes (1596-1650). It is Descartes, in his attempt to start upon a firm logical ground, who first employs the concept of methodical doubt: the concept that whatever is not provable must be discarded. It is from Descartes that the famous: "Cogito ergo sum" derives. What is irrefutable to Descartes, is this previous statement, which boldly asserts that the most basic knowledge is (in English this time), "I think, therefore I am."
John Locke (1632-1704) was considerably influenced by Descartes. It was Locke however, who stood forth against the idea that there are "innate" ideas or thoughts, but declared rather, that all are born with naught - a blank slate, (tabula rasa), and that all we truly know is that which we experience. Today John Locke is widely considered the father of empiricism, and is followed by Berkley, Hume, Russell, and others of the current era.
Juxtaposed directly opposite the empiricist, is the rationalist. Typified by philosophers including Plato, Aquinas, and Kant, the rationalist asserts that there exists knowledge without experience. This knowledge is said to be "a priori" - or knowledge existant that is known without experience. A rationalist might state: ". . .nowhere in nature can one find, let's say, a contradiction, an imaginary number, or mathematical concepts in the altogether."
Yet, their usage is commonplace.
Epistemology then, is about knowledge and its origins.
-- 172.191.126.235 17:22, 3 August 2005 (UTC) has this date moved from the article to this page the following because it has problems.
____ Before considering the definition of knowledge in detail, it is important to distinguish two slightly different meanings of belief. To believe something can mean to be convinced of its truth, despite their being insufficient evidence. In this sense, one might believe in ghosts, UFOs, love or some such phenomena, even though one knows the evidence to be inadequate to reach that conclusion. This sort of belief is a close cousin of faith.
The other meaning is less intense, but just as profound: to believe something can just mean to think that it is true. That is, to believe P is to do no more than to think, for whatever reason, that P is the case. It is this sort of belief that philosophers most often mean when they are discussing knowledge. The reason is that in order to know something, one must think that it is true - one must believe (in the second sense) it to be the case.
To see that this is so, consider someone saying "I know that P, but I don't think P is true". The person making this utterance has, in a profound sense, contradicted themselves. If one knows that P, then, amongst other things, one thinks that P is indeed true. If one thinks that P is true, then one believes (inthe second sense) P.
If someone claims to believe something, they are claiming that they think that it is the truth. But of course, it might turn out that they were mistaken, and that what they thought was true was actually false. This is not the case with knowledge. For example, suppose that Jeff thinks that a particular bridge is safe, and attempts to cross it; unfortunately the bridge collapses under his weight. We might say that Jeff believed that the bridge was safe, but that his belief was mistaken. We would not say that he knew that the bridge was safe, because plainly it was not. For something to count as knowledge, it must be true.
Similarly, two people can believe things that are mutually contradictory, but they cannot know things that are mutually contradictory. For example, Jeff can believe the bridge safe, while Jenny believes it unsafe. But Jeff cannot know the bridge is safe and Jenny know that the bridge is unsafe. Two people cannot know contradictory things.
The most influential writing on knowledge is the Theaetetus account written by Plato, in which he further develops the definition of knowledge. We know that, for something to count as knowledge, it must be true, and be believed to be true. Plato argues that this is insufficient, and that in addition one must have a reason or justification for that belief.
Plato defined knowledge as justified true belief.
One implication of this definition is that one cannot be said to "know" something just because one believes it and that belief subsequently turns out to be true. An ill person with no medical training but a generally optimistic attitude might believe that she will recover from her illness quickly, but even if this belief turned out to be true, on the Theaetetus account the patient did not know that she would get well, because her belief lacked justification.
Knowledge, therefore, is distinguished from true belief by its justification, and much of epistemology is concerned with how true beliefs might be properly justified. This is sometimes referred to as the theory of justification.
The Theaetetus definition agrees with the common sense notion that we can believe things without knowing them. Whilst knowing p entails that p is true, believing in p does not, since we can have false beliefs. It also implies that we believe everything that we know. That is, the things we know form a subset of the things we believe.
____
-- 172.191.126.235 17:22, 3 August 2005 (UTC) has this date moved from the article to this page the above because it has problems.
Problems: "The most influential writing on knowledge" is advocacy, and conflation of knowledge and belief, two different things, in "Knowledge is belief" is a form of equivocation, which is logical fallacy -- 172.191.126.235 17:22, 3 August 2005 (UTC)
Mr. Rhobite maintains that "Conflation of knowledge and belief" is "original research." It is not. Conflation is a form of equivocation, which is logical fallacy. -- 172.191.126.235 17:47, 3 August 2005 (UTC)
Ungtss, you are right that the first paragraph needs work, but there are several problems with your edits.
Firstly, it restricts truth to correspondence. This is too restrictive, as s look at truth will reveal.
Second, you have stated that justified belief is a subset of knowledge. This is the wrong way around. Things we know are a subset of our justified beliefs (pretty well that part of them that is true…)
Thirdly, you equate epistemology with theory of justification, which is incorrect.
Fourth, you have removed what I think is an important piece of the definition, which discusses two different senses of belief. This is included as a result of a discussion elsewhere in the Wiki (in truth, I think…), and should be maintained.
And finally, you place a great deal of emphasis on the types of belief that are not knowledge, which might be more appropriate for the article on belief, rather than the present article. Banno 00:32, Oct 30, 2004 (UTC)
Can I second the motion that "Justified True Belief" takes its own article? That's what brought me here on a redirect. I was investigating to see what, if anything, is recorded on Wikipedia concerning the critique of 'justificationism' (the -ism that holds JTB to be the correct definition of knowledge) eg, the school of 'anti-justificationism' associated with Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos. I was going to add something in but note the blizzard problem mentioned here. It would fit better under a new article on JTB, perhaps? Adhib 14:41, 11 Jan 2005 (UTC)
Most important: Diagram http://www.creightonbrown.co.nz/Creighton%20Brown%20-%20Theories%20-%20Philosophy%20-%20Epistemology%20-%20ForTheFinite_ToKnow_Is_ToAssume.png
Ideas: Philosophy meets maths:
Assumed knowing idea { Assumed Knowing To know with assumption is to think and achieve a computed truth when measured on the complete system, a complete test however is beyond the logic of smaller to know so it assumes it knows
Never Knowing To not know is for it to never be computed to never know, Direct to Assumed Knowing
Wrongly knowing To wrongly know is for the logic of the smaller to not meet that of the larger. Direct to assumed knowing
Always knowing To know without doubt is to have the logic of all, implausable to the logic of the smaller, and the larger is incapable of seeing beyond itself so will never know [Theory, see Assumed knowing]
NOTE THIS: Why do we not know? Because we cannot complete the equation [Of the complete system] ERGO: to know for sure is an equation we could not complete. }
PS if anyone wants to call me any sort of philosophist call it this: The philosophy of logic - Not fixed definable physicality merely the uncomplete measurement [Or uncomplete equation]
Anything else i was to define will be of assumption, the finite logic, and potentially incomplete. I So ask because it is to be finite that it not be seen as the philosophy i wish to bestow on others, but the practical assumptions i have to make
Idea: Philosophical Accountability
How do you make people accountable? by accounting [[cognition] n. a system that provides quantitative information about finances]
In response to the above, I -- Christofurio 15:02, Apr 14, 2005 (UTC), have just one question: Huh?
Shouldn't 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 (two forms of realism) be their own headings instead of subheadings under empiricism?
episteme is translated as knowledge rather than science by http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/episteme-techne/.
I think Paul Feyrabend should be present in this article. He wrote a lot of epistemology and is well known. May be many people do not like him, but he stated interesting questions.
In any case, he is in the Italian version (stub) of the article and will remain.
Truman Burbank from it.wiki -- 213.156.54.194 17:09, 15 Feb 2005 (UTC)
Understood: there are differences between English term Epistemology and Italian Epistemologia. In Italian the term is about the same as "philosophy of science". I think the same could be for other languages (e.g. French).
Truman Burbank -- 213.156.54.194 11:42, 17 Feb 2005 (UTC)
If there was to be a reason for reason, I hope it would be reasonable. Then if it were to be reasonable how would one reason it?
If there was to be reason, there a reasonable reason, an equation, not so much maths
I think of an equation as a reason :-)
Whatever it is, we will model it, whether its maths or otherwise is not so much the case, the system is modelled, whether words, diagrams, a book or so forth.
At some points you have to decide what is the best answer to the problem. When we have enough of the equations to model the mind and the other parts of the string theory it may be possible that we have an answer which shows enough of the workings to highlight that we do seem likely to have assumption.
Is there anyone here who can tell me: 1] They do not assume or 2] How they assume?
A JTB is an assumption of measuring equations too big to be computed.
I could also assume i have a date with alyssa milano this year, would that JTB / assumption be an advantage?
Why the redirect to Epistemology from Gnoseology (in the article 'Noetics') ?
Shouldn't there be an article on Gnoseology?
It could refer to the book entitled 'Gnoseology' by Alejandro Llano, translated by Fr. David Sands “Gnoseology should be considered — along with ontology and natural theology — as one of the principle part of metaphysics. It is the metaphysical theory of knowledge. Gnoseology is the metaphysics of truth. Its study has theoretical importance and vital relevance especially today because it warns us against fundamental errors which are very common at the present time.” ISBN 971 554 133
This page could be renamed Western Epistemology, and another page can be created for Eastern Epistemology, with an introduction page titled Epistemology. deeptrivia July 9, 2005 05:19 (UTC)
An anonymous user that has been removing content at Knowledge has come by here. I reverted the removal. I understand that you think that defining knowledge as justified true belief constitutes a conflation between knowledge and belief. However, this is a standard account which receives substantial discussion in the literature. If you have some references for why this is a bad view please feel free to add them to the entry, but please do not delete something that clearly deserves mention. For the sake of simplicity, lets keep all further discussion of this point at Talk: Knowledge. thanks, Kzollman 00:04, July 26, 2005 (UTC)
Nameless user, please calm down. You seem to be reacting with bitterness to what to us is, and please bear with us, a simple question. We have repeatedly asked you to clarify your position. Some of us are still confused as to what you are trying to say. More importantly, it is very rude to repeatedly change an article when it is very clear that a large number of people prefer the unchanged version. See Wikipedia:Wikiquette. In these cases it is best to discuss the matter and try to reach a consensus. Perhaps your changes can be applied in another part of the article, or worded differently.
Also, just as a matter of formality, please register and choose a user name for yourself. This will immediately improve other people's opinion of you. Officially, all are welcome, but the unspoken reality is that anonymous users are regarded with a dose of suspicion. Ravenswood 22:30, August 2, 2005 (UTC)
DotSix again removed a large piece of the article. This text was inserted: "Another current objection to the Theaetetus definition of knowledge is that the statement, "Knowledge is ... belief" suffers from the logical fallacy of conflation of two different things." Statements like these need to be cited, per the NPOV policy. Otherwise they are original research. It may be true that Plato's theory is no longer accepted by philosophers but it's still historically notable. Rhobite 17:30, August 3, 2005 (UTC)
Hey DotSix, you told me to come over here and post on the talk page but you haven't posted anything yourself recently. Please respond instead of revert-warring. Rhobite 17:32, August 3, 2005 (UTC)
See above, in the section "Moved from article" started by Mr. Banno. -- 172.191.126.235 17:47, 3 August 2005 (UTC)
Copied from above: -- 172.191.126.235 17:22, 3 August 2005 (UTC) has this date moved from the article to this page the above because it has problems.
Problems: "The most influential writing on knowledge" is advocacy,
"Knowledge is belief" is mentioned in the section, "Defining Knowledge" quote
Knowledge' is simply that which is known, to a high level of confidence, to be in accord with the actual state of affairs because it is supported by proof, where proof is the cogency of evidence that compels acceptance, or the process of establishing the validity of a statement by derivation from other statements in accordance with principles of reasoning.
For most of philosophical history, "knowledge" was taken to mean belief that was justified as true to an absolute certainty. Any less justified beliefs were called mere "probable opinion." This viewpoint still prevailed at least as late as Bertrand Russell's early 20th century book The Problems of Philosophy. In the decades that followed, however, the notion that the belief had to be justified to a certainty lost favour.
In the 1960s, Edmund Gettier criticised the Theaetetus definition of knowledge by pointing out situations in which a believer has a true belief justified to a reasonable degree, but not to a certainty, and yet in the situations in question, everyone would agree that the believer does not have knowledge.
Another current objection to the Theaetetus definition of knowledge is that the statement, "Knowledge is ... belief" suffers from the logical fallacy of conflation of two different things.
and conflation of knowledge and belief, two different things, in "Knowledge is belief" is a form of equivocation, which is logical fallacy-- 172.191.126.235 17:22, 3 August 2005 (UTC)
Isn't that just the fallacy of appeal to personal incredulity? "I don't understand the term, 'equivocation' here, therefore there is no fallacy of equivocation in saying, 'Knowledge is a type of belief'."
You insist, "It does not say 'Knowledge is belief'." You are mistaken, 'Knowledge is justified true belief' definitely says that knowledge is belief, which is equivocation. 'Knowledge is a subset of belief' says that knowledge is belief, which is the fallacy of equivocation.-- 67.182.157.6 22:33, 3 August 2005 (UTC)
Mr. Rhobite maintains that "Conflation of knowledge and belief" is "original research." It is not. Conflation is a form of equivocation, which is logical fallacy. -- 172.191.126.235 17:47, 3 August 2005 (UTC)
I also want to open the discussion on solipsism. In one edit, DotSix made the unqualified assertion that phenomenalism is the same thing as solipsism, and that both are fallacious. There are many counterarguments to Berkeley (and solipsism), but I'd prefer if we made our articles a little more nuanced than simply saying this:
It's not true that all people reject solipsism, just as it's not true that all people reject the existence of God, or UFOs, etc. You may believe that solipsism is a fallacy but many people hold irrational beliefs. Plus, it's inaccurate to say that the only argument for solipsism is argument ad ignorantiam. Berkeley did not argue that "solipsism is true because it cannot be disproved". As with many philosophers of his time, he assumed the existence of God as a premise. Rhobite 19:28, August 3, 2005 (UTC)
Phenomenalism is a development from George Berkeley's claim that to be is to be perceived. According to phenomenalism, when you see "a tree" you see a certain perception of a brown shape. On this view, one shouldn't think of objects as distinct substances, which interact with our senses so that we may perceive them; rather we should conclude that all that really exists is the perception itself.
Nowadays this point of view is rejected as solipsism, the fallacious argument that maybe all that really exists is perception, because there is no proof this hypothesis is false, which is the logical fallacy of argment _ad ignorantiam_).
in the same way that I think I see a tree outside my window. Now, to be logically consistent with Burkeley's point of view, (phenomenalism), when Berkeley thinks he sees (meaning he thinks he understands that there might be) an invisible God, he actually sees only a certain PERCEPTION of a God-like shape. On this view, Berkeley shouldn't think of objects as distinct substances, which interact with our senses so that we may perceive them; rather we should conclude that all that really exists is the perception itself, so there really is no God, all that really exists is the perception (as Phenomenalism says). So Burkeley cannot "presume the existence of God as a premise," as you put it, he has just said that just as there really is no tree, there is just the perception, there really is no God, there is just the perception, right?-- 67.182.157.6 21:35, 3 August 2005 (UTC)
I deleted the paragraph about Zacharyas Boufoy-Bastick because he is just a kid who's only philosophical paper was published a few weeks ago in a very minor journal. His views are not important enough to include in this article. (It also didn't make a lot of sense.)
Somebody wrote: Consider someone saying "I know P, but I don't think P is true."
That amounts to a straw man, since nobody in his right mind would EVER utter such an aninity. That would be like someone saying, "I know it is raining, but I don't think it is raining." Absurd!
The obscurantists are just trying to conflate knowledge and belief again, which is the logical fallacy of equivocation.
DotSix has been making a concentrated attack on this page (and others). Even when we try to work with him, he yanks out our edits and tries to force in his version. The opening paragraphs, as they stand now, are an effort to appease DotSix by woking in his issues without removing any existing text. These paragraphs are a bit clumsy, but they're being worked on. However, efforts to work on them are hampered by DotSix repeatedly reverting everything back to his version.
I, personally, believe that it is time to lock out all changes to this page, after first reverting it all the way back to whatever state it was in before DotSix began his agressive editing, even if that means a version from several months ago.
I realize this is drastic, but considering how tenacious DotSix is being, I feel there is no other way to save this article. Ravenswood 18:34, August 4, 2005 (UTC)
We need a new tag that says something like,
There is a well-organized obscurantist faction here in Wikipedia that is trying to control the content of this and related articles through ganging up on and bullying anyone who disagrees with them, and tyranny of the majority, which does not comport with policy.
user:Christofurio removed the following, describing it as "incoherent":
Before considering the definition of knowledge in detail, it is important to distinguish two slightly different meanings of belief. To believe something can mean to be convinced of its truth, despite their being insufficient evidence. In this sense, one might believe in ghosts, UFOs, love or some such phenomena, even though one knows the evidence to be inadequate to reach that conclusion. This sort of belief is a close cousin of faith.
The other meaning is less intense, but just as profound: to believe something can just mean to think that it is true. That is, to believe P is to do no more than to think, for whatever reason, that P is the case. It is this sort of belief that philosophers most often mean when they are discussing knowledge. The reason is that in order to know something, one must think that it is true - one must believe (in the second sense) it to be the case.
I'd like to re-instate it, although I guess that the prose could be improved. Here are my reasons:
1. the distinction is real. My Shorter Oxford, in its inimitable way, lists as its first sense of belief "The mental action of trusting to or confiding in a person or thing; trust, confidence"; and as its second: "acceptance of a proposition... as true". The Macquarie, in its much more direct style, lists "That which is believed; an accepted opinion" as its first sense, and "conviction of the truth or reality of a thing, based upon grounds insufficient to afford positive knowledge". So, on the one hand we have "belief used to express simple assent to a statement, and on the other we have "belief" used to indicate a strong commitment, trust or confidence.
2. It is relevant. I guess that .6 provides the best example of how misunderstanding this distinction leads to problems. The only way I can see to make sense of his position is to see him as taking "conviction of the truth or reality of a thing, based upon grounds insufficient to afford positive knowledge" as the entirety of belief; so when he claims that I am conflating knowledge and belief, he thinks I am asserting that knowledge is conviction of the truth or reality of a thing, based upon grounds insufficient to afford positive knowledge - which indeed would be wrong. See also the discussion at talk:Knowledge#mis-use.
So, Chris, please help me to write a better explanation rather than just removing the paragraphs. thanks. Banno 20:46, August 4, 2005 (UTC)
![]() | This page is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Wow! I'm so glad to see this as the collaboration of the week! Sifting through the article, one thing gave me pause: Is it really fair to consider all of the epistemological theories mentioned in that section (empiricism, pragmatism, phenomenalism, etc.) as various flavors of foundationalism? Is that the consensus? I was of the understanding that there were viable, say, coherentist theories of knowledge that were also empiricist. Meanwhile, would anybody find it out of line if I added some short summary of, say, coherentism and reliabilism to this list? If there are no objections, I'll get on it. Thanks. Paul Hope 21:48, 9 August 2005 (UTC)
My apologies in advance to the authors of the article. The article is spoiled by having been edited and added to in an ad hoc fashion. It lacks structure, and so gives a confused account of the topic. Much of it looks like a list of links, rather than an attempt to explain the key issues.
The promotion of subjectivism and objectivism is unusual in an article on Epistemology. These two categories are more commonly used to differentiate two approaches to ethics rather than to knowledge. Also, running through the article is confusion between knowledge, the proper subject of epistemology, and truth, which is only indirectly relevant. There is a desperate need for a discussion of the relationship between knowledge and truth – and why not drop in justification and belief?
It is far more common to start with the rationalist/empiricist distinction, as this article once did. Since this follows more closely the historical development of epistemology, this also makes it far easier to introduce new material into the article.
The second paragraph is strange. It does not seem to have a content that is relevant to the article. Several other paragraphs have similarly lost their apparent relevance – no doubt as a result of editing since they were written. Several paragraphs are about truth, not knowledge – which would be fine, provided the distinction had been spelled out earlier. The taxonomy introduced in the middle of the article is also puzzling. For instance, few constructivists would consider themselves to be subjectivists, as is claimed. Again, the subject appears to be truth rather than knowledge.
A comment on style - much of the article is also written in the first person. Surly this is inappropriate?
The article needs editing and re-writing from top to bottom, with an eye towards consistence and completeness. Banno 13:23, 2 Jan 2004 (UTC)
I learnt a little about Epistemology while studying Ethology (which has little to do with ethics btw). Ethologists run into epistemological problems because they sometimes have different senses than the organisms they are observing. This causes 3 problems:
In these cases there is a disparity in knowlege between the observer and the observed. Epistemology warns us that such situations exist, and can sometimes help in solving problems arising from such a situation. I've written a bit about this problem at Animal_echolocation.
When editing the article, it might be interesting to mention some of the practical applications of Epistemology. It gets used by people diving to the deepest depths, and in the middle of steamy jungles ;-). What I'm saying is it's not "just some dusty philosophy", there's actual applications for it, and it might be nice to mention some :-) 80.126.238.189 17:11, 8 Feb 2004 (UTC)
And its not just because the subject matter is itself difficult, either. After all, other wiki articles dealing with similar subject matter (on "knowledge," for example, or "phenomenalism") do so in an orderly, transparent manner.
In this case, the person who conceived of the central section wanted to create a list of five approaches to epistemology and to explain why they are all inclusive. He came up with: nihilism, subjectivism, objectivism, mysticism, and skepticism. Or did he? It looks as if he intended to include "phenomenalism" but declined to cross-reference that so it wouldn't end up a list of six. But why NOT six then? Or twenty? What principled distinctions are behind this list? I can't tell.
I've tried to clean up this article, introducing a couple of subheads and my own definitions of some of the key terms, and adding a transition at the end of that second paragraph so it won't look so out of place.
But I won't go any further, fearing as some have mentioned that 'too many cooks' may be part of the problem here.
--Anonymous
Somehow rationalism and empiricism have gotten snowed under. There's so much *ELSE* going on that the 2 main schools in epistemology are snowed under. Eep. -- 80.126.238.189 22:06, 24 Feb 2004 (UTC)
The section “beliefs about how one acquires true beliefs” bothers me.
Primarily, this section is about belief, not about knowledge. So its relevance is questionable.
The section should be about justification, rather than belief. As it claims, the main question is when someone can know that their beliefs are true – that is, when is a true belief justified.
Nihilism, mysticism and scepticism have a place in this article, but subjectivism and objectivism are usually used to categorise ethical theories rather than epistemologies. Relegating rationalism and empiricism to the end of the article puts it at odds with most other accounts.
I intend to re-write much of this material, returning to a more historical structure. Comments welcome.
Banno 20:10, 29 Feb 2004 (UTC)
Thanks; I agree to some extent, but philosophy of science and scientific method are both fairly substantial articles, so I don’t think science is missing out. Banno 19:37, 5 Mar 2004 (UTC)
I changed this: "The [analytic-synthetic] distinction was first formulated By Kant, and later given a more formal shape by Frege."
Most historians of philosophy would tell you that the dichotomy was implicit in " Hume's fork," and my change was intended to acknowledge as much.
There appears to be a confusion creeping in to the article. Aren’t realism and naive realism ontological, rather than epistemological, theories? Although they inform empiricism (a theory of knowledge), aren’t they themselves theories about what exists?
For that reason, I think they should be removed, or at least re-worded. Banno 21:26, Apr 22, 2004 (UTC)
Alright, people are adding all kinds of detail to the article again, snowing under the core of the matter with words words words. I think this page should be replaced by something of an index or list pointing to epistemology topics, else it's going to become fat, bloated and utterly unreadable every couple of months. (and make for lots of annoying work cleaning it up, and every cleanup will loose data around the edges. :-/ ) Kim Bruning 09:14, 9 May 2004 (UTC)
It is really good to see folk taking an interest in the article. I’m very interested to see some more content on the Gettier problem. However, I’m concerned not to let the discussion of this particular issue detract from what I think is a useful structure for the overall article. Banno 11:27, May 10, 2004 (UTC)
The Theaetetus account is used in the article as a way to link the various epistemological theories in something like historical order. It is used as a rhetorical tool that provides, hopefully, a sequence for the reader to use to understand the issues. Theaetetus forms the core of the article, not because it is the prevailing opinion now, but because it was the prevailing opinion for the two-and- a-bit thousand years before now; and as such it provides a spine on which the article can stand and refer to the various epistemic theories. I agree that if one takes a look at the history and the talk pages, one will see that the article has in the past degenerated into near incomprehsibility. Without such a spine, it will do so again. Banno 11:27, May 10, 2004 (UTC)
None of which is intended to detract from the work of Amish. Placing the Gettier material at the start of the article breaks this historical sequence. So I’ve moved it to the end of the article, placing it with other recent material. Given its importance, I’ve left reference to it in the introduction. Banno 11:27, May 10, 2004 (UTC)
I just speed read this, but I didn't see any mention of information as defined by the bit. The bit is a building block of information. Our main fuzzy area of the nature of epistemology then is how exactly brains handle information; whether with some form of bits or something else.
The article misses a great chance when mentioning illness as an example. The human immune system does not operate independantly of the central nervous system at all. For instance, the CNS-generated hormone cortisol is a great example of an immunosupressant. This means that a persons' state of mind can influence the course of an illness to some degree. This would make a really nice example of observer effect. Kim Bruning 13:28, 18 Jul 2004 (UTC)
I’ve moved this stuff from the main page because it has a few problems. It claims to be offering a definition of knowledge, but instead just cites a few philosophers. In doing so it breaks the flow of the article. That is, there is no reason to give primacy to Descartes and Locke. Perhaps the author would like to place the material in the appropriate place in the article. Also, it misuses the phrase “begs the question”. Banno 03:32, Sep 26, 2004 (UTC)
Epistemology begs the question: from "where" or "what" does human knowledge derive? The "theory of knowledge" comes to us in the modern age by the arguable father of modern philosophy, Rene Descartes (1596-1650). It is Descartes, in his attempt to start upon a firm logical ground, who first employs the concept of methodical doubt: the concept that whatever is not provable must be discarded. It is from Descartes that the famous: "Cogito ergo sum" derives. What is irrefutable to Descartes, is this previous statement, which boldly asserts that the most basic knowledge is (in English this time), "I think, therefore I am."
John Locke (1632-1704) was considerably influenced by Descartes. It was Locke however, who stood forth against the idea that there are "innate" ideas or thoughts, but declared rather, that all are born with naught - a blank slate, (tabula rasa), and that all we truly know is that which we experience. Today John Locke is widely considered the father of empiricism, and is followed by Berkley, Hume, Russell, and others of the current era.
Juxtaposed directly opposite the empiricist, is the rationalist. Typified by philosophers including Plato, Aquinas, and Kant, the rationalist asserts that there exists knowledge without experience. This knowledge is said to be "a priori" - or knowledge existant that is known without experience. A rationalist might state: ". . .nowhere in nature can one find, let's say, a contradiction, an imaginary number, or mathematical concepts in the altogether."
Yet, their usage is commonplace.
Epistemology then, is about knowledge and its origins.
-- 172.191.126.235 17:22, 3 August 2005 (UTC) has this date moved from the article to this page the following because it has problems.
____ Before considering the definition of knowledge in detail, it is important to distinguish two slightly different meanings of belief. To believe something can mean to be convinced of its truth, despite their being insufficient evidence. In this sense, one might believe in ghosts, UFOs, love or some such phenomena, even though one knows the evidence to be inadequate to reach that conclusion. This sort of belief is a close cousin of faith.
The other meaning is less intense, but just as profound: to believe something can just mean to think that it is true. That is, to believe P is to do no more than to think, for whatever reason, that P is the case. It is this sort of belief that philosophers most often mean when they are discussing knowledge. The reason is that in order to know something, one must think that it is true - one must believe (in the second sense) it to be the case.
To see that this is so, consider someone saying "I know that P, but I don't think P is true". The person making this utterance has, in a profound sense, contradicted themselves. If one knows that P, then, amongst other things, one thinks that P is indeed true. If one thinks that P is true, then one believes (inthe second sense) P.
If someone claims to believe something, they are claiming that they think that it is the truth. But of course, it might turn out that they were mistaken, and that what they thought was true was actually false. This is not the case with knowledge. For example, suppose that Jeff thinks that a particular bridge is safe, and attempts to cross it; unfortunately the bridge collapses under his weight. We might say that Jeff believed that the bridge was safe, but that his belief was mistaken. We would not say that he knew that the bridge was safe, because plainly it was not. For something to count as knowledge, it must be true.
Similarly, two people can believe things that are mutually contradictory, but they cannot know things that are mutually contradictory. For example, Jeff can believe the bridge safe, while Jenny believes it unsafe. But Jeff cannot know the bridge is safe and Jenny know that the bridge is unsafe. Two people cannot know contradictory things.
The most influential writing on knowledge is the Theaetetus account written by Plato, in which he further develops the definition of knowledge. We know that, for something to count as knowledge, it must be true, and be believed to be true. Plato argues that this is insufficient, and that in addition one must have a reason or justification for that belief.
Plato defined knowledge as justified true belief.
One implication of this definition is that one cannot be said to "know" something just because one believes it and that belief subsequently turns out to be true. An ill person with no medical training but a generally optimistic attitude might believe that she will recover from her illness quickly, but even if this belief turned out to be true, on the Theaetetus account the patient did not know that she would get well, because her belief lacked justification.
Knowledge, therefore, is distinguished from true belief by its justification, and much of epistemology is concerned with how true beliefs might be properly justified. This is sometimes referred to as the theory of justification.
The Theaetetus definition agrees with the common sense notion that we can believe things without knowing them. Whilst knowing p entails that p is true, believing in p does not, since we can have false beliefs. It also implies that we believe everything that we know. That is, the things we know form a subset of the things we believe.
____
-- 172.191.126.235 17:22, 3 August 2005 (UTC) has this date moved from the article to this page the above because it has problems.
Problems: "The most influential writing on knowledge" is advocacy, and conflation of knowledge and belief, two different things, in "Knowledge is belief" is a form of equivocation, which is logical fallacy -- 172.191.126.235 17:22, 3 August 2005 (UTC)
Mr. Rhobite maintains that "Conflation of knowledge and belief" is "original research." It is not. Conflation is a form of equivocation, which is logical fallacy. -- 172.191.126.235 17:47, 3 August 2005 (UTC)
Ungtss, you are right that the first paragraph needs work, but there are several problems with your edits.
Firstly, it restricts truth to correspondence. This is too restrictive, as s look at truth will reveal.
Second, you have stated that justified belief is a subset of knowledge. This is the wrong way around. Things we know are a subset of our justified beliefs (pretty well that part of them that is true…)
Thirdly, you equate epistemology with theory of justification, which is incorrect.
Fourth, you have removed what I think is an important piece of the definition, which discusses two different senses of belief. This is included as a result of a discussion elsewhere in the Wiki (in truth, I think…), and should be maintained.
And finally, you place a great deal of emphasis on the types of belief that are not knowledge, which might be more appropriate for the article on belief, rather than the present article. Banno 00:32, Oct 30, 2004 (UTC)
Can I second the motion that "Justified True Belief" takes its own article? That's what brought me here on a redirect. I was investigating to see what, if anything, is recorded on Wikipedia concerning the critique of 'justificationism' (the -ism that holds JTB to be the correct definition of knowledge) eg, the school of 'anti-justificationism' associated with Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos. I was going to add something in but note the blizzard problem mentioned here. It would fit better under a new article on JTB, perhaps? Adhib 14:41, 11 Jan 2005 (UTC)
Most important: Diagram http://www.creightonbrown.co.nz/Creighton%20Brown%20-%20Theories%20-%20Philosophy%20-%20Epistemology%20-%20ForTheFinite_ToKnow_Is_ToAssume.png
Ideas: Philosophy meets maths:
Assumed knowing idea { Assumed Knowing To know with assumption is to think and achieve a computed truth when measured on the complete system, a complete test however is beyond the logic of smaller to know so it assumes it knows
Never Knowing To not know is for it to never be computed to never know, Direct to Assumed Knowing
Wrongly knowing To wrongly know is for the logic of the smaller to not meet that of the larger. Direct to assumed knowing
Always knowing To know without doubt is to have the logic of all, implausable to the logic of the smaller, and the larger is incapable of seeing beyond itself so will never know [Theory, see Assumed knowing]
NOTE THIS: Why do we not know? Because we cannot complete the equation [Of the complete system] ERGO: to know for sure is an equation we could not complete. }
PS if anyone wants to call me any sort of philosophist call it this: The philosophy of logic - Not fixed definable physicality merely the uncomplete measurement [Or uncomplete equation]
Anything else i was to define will be of assumption, the finite logic, and potentially incomplete. I So ask because it is to be finite that it not be seen as the philosophy i wish to bestow on others, but the practical assumptions i have to make
Idea: Philosophical Accountability
How do you make people accountable? by accounting [[cognition] n. a system that provides quantitative information about finances]
In response to the above, I -- Christofurio 15:02, Apr 14, 2005 (UTC), have just one question: Huh?
Shouldn't 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 (two forms of realism) be their own headings instead of subheadings under empiricism?
episteme is translated as knowledge rather than science by http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/episteme-techne/.
I think Paul Feyrabend should be present in this article. He wrote a lot of epistemology and is well known. May be many people do not like him, but he stated interesting questions.
In any case, he is in the Italian version (stub) of the article and will remain.
Truman Burbank from it.wiki -- 213.156.54.194 17:09, 15 Feb 2005 (UTC)
Understood: there are differences between English term Epistemology and Italian Epistemologia. In Italian the term is about the same as "philosophy of science". I think the same could be for other languages (e.g. French).
Truman Burbank -- 213.156.54.194 11:42, 17 Feb 2005 (UTC)
If there was to be a reason for reason, I hope it would be reasonable. Then if it were to be reasonable how would one reason it?
If there was to be reason, there a reasonable reason, an equation, not so much maths
I think of an equation as a reason :-)
Whatever it is, we will model it, whether its maths or otherwise is not so much the case, the system is modelled, whether words, diagrams, a book or so forth.
At some points you have to decide what is the best answer to the problem. When we have enough of the equations to model the mind and the other parts of the string theory it may be possible that we have an answer which shows enough of the workings to highlight that we do seem likely to have assumption.
Is there anyone here who can tell me: 1] They do not assume or 2] How they assume?
A JTB is an assumption of measuring equations too big to be computed.
I could also assume i have a date with alyssa milano this year, would that JTB / assumption be an advantage?
Why the redirect to Epistemology from Gnoseology (in the article 'Noetics') ?
Shouldn't there be an article on Gnoseology?
It could refer to the book entitled 'Gnoseology' by Alejandro Llano, translated by Fr. David Sands “Gnoseology should be considered — along with ontology and natural theology — as one of the principle part of metaphysics. It is the metaphysical theory of knowledge. Gnoseology is the metaphysics of truth. Its study has theoretical importance and vital relevance especially today because it warns us against fundamental errors which are very common at the present time.” ISBN 971 554 133
This page could be renamed Western Epistemology, and another page can be created for Eastern Epistemology, with an introduction page titled Epistemology. deeptrivia July 9, 2005 05:19 (UTC)
An anonymous user that has been removing content at Knowledge has come by here. I reverted the removal. I understand that you think that defining knowledge as justified true belief constitutes a conflation between knowledge and belief. However, this is a standard account which receives substantial discussion in the literature. If you have some references for why this is a bad view please feel free to add them to the entry, but please do not delete something that clearly deserves mention. For the sake of simplicity, lets keep all further discussion of this point at Talk: Knowledge. thanks, Kzollman 00:04, July 26, 2005 (UTC)
Nameless user, please calm down. You seem to be reacting with bitterness to what to us is, and please bear with us, a simple question. We have repeatedly asked you to clarify your position. Some of us are still confused as to what you are trying to say. More importantly, it is very rude to repeatedly change an article when it is very clear that a large number of people prefer the unchanged version. See Wikipedia:Wikiquette. In these cases it is best to discuss the matter and try to reach a consensus. Perhaps your changes can be applied in another part of the article, or worded differently.
Also, just as a matter of formality, please register and choose a user name for yourself. This will immediately improve other people's opinion of you. Officially, all are welcome, but the unspoken reality is that anonymous users are regarded with a dose of suspicion. Ravenswood 22:30, August 2, 2005 (UTC)
DotSix again removed a large piece of the article. This text was inserted: "Another current objection to the Theaetetus definition of knowledge is that the statement, "Knowledge is ... belief" suffers from the logical fallacy of conflation of two different things." Statements like these need to be cited, per the NPOV policy. Otherwise they are original research. It may be true that Plato's theory is no longer accepted by philosophers but it's still historically notable. Rhobite 17:30, August 3, 2005 (UTC)
Hey DotSix, you told me to come over here and post on the talk page but you haven't posted anything yourself recently. Please respond instead of revert-warring. Rhobite 17:32, August 3, 2005 (UTC)
See above, in the section "Moved from article" started by Mr. Banno. -- 172.191.126.235 17:47, 3 August 2005 (UTC)
Copied from above: -- 172.191.126.235 17:22, 3 August 2005 (UTC) has this date moved from the article to this page the above because it has problems.
Problems: "The most influential writing on knowledge" is advocacy,
"Knowledge is belief" is mentioned in the section, "Defining Knowledge" quote
Knowledge' is simply that which is known, to a high level of confidence, to be in accord with the actual state of affairs because it is supported by proof, where proof is the cogency of evidence that compels acceptance, or the process of establishing the validity of a statement by derivation from other statements in accordance with principles of reasoning.
For most of philosophical history, "knowledge" was taken to mean belief that was justified as true to an absolute certainty. Any less justified beliefs were called mere "probable opinion." This viewpoint still prevailed at least as late as Bertrand Russell's early 20th century book The Problems of Philosophy. In the decades that followed, however, the notion that the belief had to be justified to a certainty lost favour.
In the 1960s, Edmund Gettier criticised the Theaetetus definition of knowledge by pointing out situations in which a believer has a true belief justified to a reasonable degree, but not to a certainty, and yet in the situations in question, everyone would agree that the believer does not have knowledge.
Another current objection to the Theaetetus definition of knowledge is that the statement, "Knowledge is ... belief" suffers from the logical fallacy of conflation of two different things.
and conflation of knowledge and belief, two different things, in "Knowledge is belief" is a form of equivocation, which is logical fallacy-- 172.191.126.235 17:22, 3 August 2005 (UTC)
Isn't that just the fallacy of appeal to personal incredulity? "I don't understand the term, 'equivocation' here, therefore there is no fallacy of equivocation in saying, 'Knowledge is a type of belief'."
You insist, "It does not say 'Knowledge is belief'." You are mistaken, 'Knowledge is justified true belief' definitely says that knowledge is belief, which is equivocation. 'Knowledge is a subset of belief' says that knowledge is belief, which is the fallacy of equivocation.-- 67.182.157.6 22:33, 3 August 2005 (UTC)
Mr. Rhobite maintains that "Conflation of knowledge and belief" is "original research." It is not. Conflation is a form of equivocation, which is logical fallacy. -- 172.191.126.235 17:47, 3 August 2005 (UTC)
I also want to open the discussion on solipsism. In one edit, DotSix made the unqualified assertion that phenomenalism is the same thing as solipsism, and that both are fallacious. There are many counterarguments to Berkeley (and solipsism), but I'd prefer if we made our articles a little more nuanced than simply saying this:
It's not true that all people reject solipsism, just as it's not true that all people reject the existence of God, or UFOs, etc. You may believe that solipsism is a fallacy but many people hold irrational beliefs. Plus, it's inaccurate to say that the only argument for solipsism is argument ad ignorantiam. Berkeley did not argue that "solipsism is true because it cannot be disproved". As with many philosophers of his time, he assumed the existence of God as a premise. Rhobite 19:28, August 3, 2005 (UTC)
Phenomenalism is a development from George Berkeley's claim that to be is to be perceived. According to phenomenalism, when you see "a tree" you see a certain perception of a brown shape. On this view, one shouldn't think of objects as distinct substances, which interact with our senses so that we may perceive them; rather we should conclude that all that really exists is the perception itself.
Nowadays this point of view is rejected as solipsism, the fallacious argument that maybe all that really exists is perception, because there is no proof this hypothesis is false, which is the logical fallacy of argment _ad ignorantiam_).
in the same way that I think I see a tree outside my window. Now, to be logically consistent with Burkeley's point of view, (phenomenalism), when Berkeley thinks he sees (meaning he thinks he understands that there might be) an invisible God, he actually sees only a certain PERCEPTION of a God-like shape. On this view, Berkeley shouldn't think of objects as distinct substances, which interact with our senses so that we may perceive them; rather we should conclude that all that really exists is the perception itself, so there really is no God, all that really exists is the perception (as Phenomenalism says). So Burkeley cannot "presume the existence of God as a premise," as you put it, he has just said that just as there really is no tree, there is just the perception, there really is no God, there is just the perception, right?-- 67.182.157.6 21:35, 3 August 2005 (UTC)
I deleted the paragraph about Zacharyas Boufoy-Bastick because he is just a kid who's only philosophical paper was published a few weeks ago in a very minor journal. His views are not important enough to include in this article. (It also didn't make a lot of sense.)
Somebody wrote: Consider someone saying "I know P, but I don't think P is true."
That amounts to a straw man, since nobody in his right mind would EVER utter such an aninity. That would be like someone saying, "I know it is raining, but I don't think it is raining." Absurd!
The obscurantists are just trying to conflate knowledge and belief again, which is the logical fallacy of equivocation.
DotSix has been making a concentrated attack on this page (and others). Even when we try to work with him, he yanks out our edits and tries to force in his version. The opening paragraphs, as they stand now, are an effort to appease DotSix by woking in his issues without removing any existing text. These paragraphs are a bit clumsy, but they're being worked on. However, efforts to work on them are hampered by DotSix repeatedly reverting everything back to his version.
I, personally, believe that it is time to lock out all changes to this page, after first reverting it all the way back to whatever state it was in before DotSix began his agressive editing, even if that means a version from several months ago.
I realize this is drastic, but considering how tenacious DotSix is being, I feel there is no other way to save this article. Ravenswood 18:34, August 4, 2005 (UTC)
We need a new tag that says something like,
There is a well-organized obscurantist faction here in Wikipedia that is trying to control the content of this and related articles through ganging up on and bullying anyone who disagrees with them, and tyranny of the majority, which does not comport with policy.
user:Christofurio removed the following, describing it as "incoherent":
Before considering the definition of knowledge in detail, it is important to distinguish two slightly different meanings of belief. To believe something can mean to be convinced of its truth, despite their being insufficient evidence. In this sense, one might believe in ghosts, UFOs, love or some such phenomena, even though one knows the evidence to be inadequate to reach that conclusion. This sort of belief is a close cousin of faith.
The other meaning is less intense, but just as profound: to believe something can just mean to think that it is true. That is, to believe P is to do no more than to think, for whatever reason, that P is the case. It is this sort of belief that philosophers most often mean when they are discussing knowledge. The reason is that in order to know something, one must think that it is true - one must believe (in the second sense) it to be the case.
I'd like to re-instate it, although I guess that the prose could be improved. Here are my reasons:
1. the distinction is real. My Shorter Oxford, in its inimitable way, lists as its first sense of belief "The mental action of trusting to or confiding in a person or thing; trust, confidence"; and as its second: "acceptance of a proposition... as true". The Macquarie, in its much more direct style, lists "That which is believed; an accepted opinion" as its first sense, and "conviction of the truth or reality of a thing, based upon grounds insufficient to afford positive knowledge". So, on the one hand we have "belief used to express simple assent to a statement, and on the other we have "belief" used to indicate a strong commitment, trust or confidence.
2. It is relevant. I guess that .6 provides the best example of how misunderstanding this distinction leads to problems. The only way I can see to make sense of his position is to see him as taking "conviction of the truth or reality of a thing, based upon grounds insufficient to afford positive knowledge" as the entirety of belief; so when he claims that I am conflating knowledge and belief, he thinks I am asserting that knowledge is conviction of the truth or reality of a thing, based upon grounds insufficient to afford positive knowledge - which indeed would be wrong. See also the discussion at talk:Knowledge#mis-use.
So, Chris, please help me to write a better explanation rather than just removing the paragraphs. thanks. Banno 20:46, August 4, 2005 (UTC)