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This article is a stub, and needs considerable expansion. Brews ohare ( talk) 15:55, 30 March 2014 (UTC)
A useful article to create, but we need to make sure it does not digress into a coat rack for material that is in other articles - I have removed material that falls into that category. Also at the moment the sources used are a little restrictive and need expanding - I would have done something there this morning but I am away from home and my text books. We also need secondary sources to establish some of the claims in the lede.
Brews - can we please try and avoid a repetition of your normal strategy of immediately reverting changes, you know it will just be reverted in turn. Also there is an opportunity here to build a good article but that will not work if you are not prepared to compromise and insist on your material in its original form. ---- Snowded TALK 09:23, 2 April 2014 (UTC)
The following subsection was deleted by Snowded, and I'd like to discuss it:
Enaction applies to groups as well as individuals. Social constructivism is the study of an individual's learning that takes place because of their interactions in a group, and the group's experience with its environment. According to Gergen, the social constructionist orientation suggests: [1]
An example is the idea of a paradigm as described by Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. [2] [3] For the scientist a paradigm refers to the sense of the way reality is structured and the means by which the scientist uncovers this reality and is able to manipulate it and predict effects and events. The dissatisfaction of scientists with an existing theory leads to a paradigm shift, and this dissatisfaction is a matter of criteria demanded of an acceptable theory. These criteria are not themselves scientifically established, but describe an 'ideal' theory as seen by the scientific community, criteria such as 'elegance', 'completeness', 'seminality', 'simplicity'. [4] [5]
Thus, as the idea of enaction suggests within the context of social constructivism, the development of a paradigm involves the interaction of scientists with their environment and each other, the theoretical treatment of experimental results, and re-engagement in probing the environment on the basis of that theory, sometimes with very sophisticated apparatus. Examples of complex probing of the environment as part of the cognitive process, what enaction is about, are the Hadron collider or the Hubble telescope. These activities are accompanied by the evolution and application of theories subject to an aesthetic stemming from social interactions between scientists. [4]
One of the main defenders of epistemological constructivism who is also well known in IR [international relations], Thomas Kuhn.
Kuhn had already provided...the general basis for a conception of the social character of science.
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Snowded removed this section with the in-line editorial comment "essays on social constructivism are not appropriate to this article, especially OR".
Now, the reasons why Snowded thinks the topic of social constructivism is "not appropriate" and just what in this subsection constitutes a violation of WP:OR has not been identified. Perhaps some further guidance as to what exactly Snowded has in mind could be offered as a beginning point for discussion? Brews ohare ( talk) 15:11, 2 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded has removed the subsection below on non-reductive naturalism without any guidance as to his reasoning:
Reductionism in science is the argument that all events (ultimately) are connected to (possibly yet-to-be-established) primal events by the 'laws of nature' and, in particular, mental events are reducible to neuroscience and brain circuitry. [R 1] In contrast, non-reductive naturalism claims that "mental phenomena cannot be reduced to any particular material object or local process, as for instance neural processing." [R 2] One form of this thesis arises in cultural psychology where mind is viewed as a cultural phenomenon. [R 3]
The enactive approach is constructivist, not reductionist, that is, it is about "the active construction of knowledge through our interaction with the environment"..."Our brains do not indiscriminately and passively crunch up any structure that can be detected in a never ending stream of sensations...Cognition is a lot about discarding irrelevant information and going out to get relevant information...Open-loop approaches restricted to input-output mappings are unable to capture this circular causality and the emergent phenomena it can bring about." [R 2] [R 4]
...consciousness is a biological process that will eventually be explained in terms of molecular signaling pathways used by interacting populations of nerve cells...
Culture produces the mind; brain circuitry does not. The mind–body problem of how the physical body/brain produces mental, subjective qualia, is the wrong way to frame the origin of consciousness.
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I hope Snowded will provide some guidance as to his reasoning in removing this subsection. Brews ohare ( talk) 15:20, 2 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded has suggested by additon of {{citation needed}} that secondary sources are needed to establish two points. The leading paragraph identifies these points as follows:
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link)The first issue is whether there is any relation between 'enaction' and 'embodied cognition'.
My reaction is that the suggestion that the focus of embodied cognition does not necessarily stress the idea of interaction with the environment as a key aspect is obvious from the definition of that field.
The second issue is whether 'enaction' places an emphasis upon interaction.
My reaction is that the second point is the very meaning of the term 'enaction'.
In both cases the cited general introduction of the book by Varela, Thompson & Rosch is about as good a secondary source as one is likely to find, being the introduction by three authors to their essays on various topics from a decidedly non-partisan stance that discusses these aspects at length. Accordingly, these templates appear gratuitous here. Brews ohare ( talk) 16:40, 2 April 2014 (UTC)
Chapter 8 of this source is titled "Enaction: Embodied cognition". It defines enaction at great length on pp. 173-174. The organism itself chooses the stimuli in the physical world to which it will be sensitive. Perception is not simply embedded within and constrained by the surrounding world. The organism both initiates and is shaped by the environment.
Perhaps, Snowded, you have some other sources in mind that would present a more 'objective' view of the subject?? Brews ohare ( talk) 17:02, 2 April 2014 (UTC)
Providing the rationale "in text citations makes article creation a lot easier to handle" Snowded has changed some footnotes to an 'in-text' version <ref>{{cite book |title= |author= |isbn= |url= |publisher= |page= |year=}}</ref>, replacing the less distracting use of the 'in-text' designation <ref name =author/> formatting of the original. I'd say this is an imposition of his personal distaste for the cleaner approach, and as he has not originated this article, I do not think it his prerogative to force his aesthetic upon it. Brews ohare ( talk) 15:29, 2 April 2014 (UTC)
Accordingly, I have put the references into the original format. Brews ohare ( talk) 16:12, 2 April 2014 (UTC)
Finding no useful commentary here, and instead unsupported and peremptory reversion, I've decided to present this material on Citizendium where it can be found as Extended cognition. Brews ohare ( talk) 15:53, 4 April 2014 (UTC)
Brews, you asked me to be involved with this page. I am sorry to have to say that it is now looking like a rerun of many conflicts that have a arisen between you and Snowded, and conflicts without resolution or improvement resulting.
I agree with Snowded on removing the two sections. The last paragraphs in each section are not properly supported with clear citations, and your citations are put in as evidence for your views. But in fact they give only individual comments on the subject, and there are many other views and approaches which should merit a mention. I also agree that both were not strictly relevant to the subject, and I can't understand some of your responses, e.g. ' My reaction is that the suggestion that the focus of embodied cognition does not necessarily stress the idea of interaction with the environment as a key aspect is obvious from the definition of that field.' What does that mean? It does not address the point being made. Perhaps, taking up the -citation needed- suggestion constructively : ), you should look at some general introductory works on the 'four e's', some of which spell out relationships between embodied cognition, enactive cognitions, extended etc…
Well done for initiating this page, and I wish you well with it. It could be a very useful contribution to this subject. I am happy to contribute to it if there are sensible productive discussions going on, but not at the present.
TonyClarke ( talk) 01:55, 3 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded has removed the subsection below on internalism & externalism without any guidance as to his reasoning:
Proponents of enaction consider its emphasis upon interaction with the external environment to be in contrast with a view of mental processes as simply the internal operation of the brain as a computer manipulating symbols encoding representations of the world, the rules and representations approach to cognition. [S 1] The issue is not just that cognition involves structures outside the brain proper, but that cognition is a process of interaction, an activity. However, the role of the subject, the individuation, of this activity might be underestimated. [S 2] [S 3]
The interactivity between the organism and the environment emphasized by extended cognition impinges on the deeper philosophical questions of the subject-object problem, that is the partition of experience between subject and object. [S 2] At one extreme, our interior mental processes are dictated by interaction with the external world, and at the other extreme, they are creations of our conscious and subconscious brain activity. "Externalism with regard to mental content says that in order to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g. beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the right way. Internalism (or individualism) denies this, and it affirms that having those intentional mental states depends solely on our intrinsic properties." [S 3]
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Snowded removed this material with the in-line comment: restrict to material directly related to the top (holding action there may be more if we agree scope on talk ). On this Talk page he has added the remark: "You've been given clear reasons for the deletion by me (and in Tony's support). You just don't like them. Sorry Brews your average talk page words to content changes ration is about 5k:1 or more and I've done enough unless other editors engage"
What is omitted from Snowded's words is any clarification of his reasons for removal of this subsection, or the other two that he has removed in earlier efforts. My invitations to supply reasons and sources so far has resulted only in Snowded's personal peremptory opinions and his avoidance of all source-related commentary, suggesting that he "has already done enough". Enough what? Tony has also been invited without result to provide some substance to flesh out what he feels is an incomplete presentation.
However, Snowded takes things further than Tony by removing the presentation of these subtopics entirely, and without rationale. Brews ohare ( talk) 13:54, 4 April 2014 (UTC)
One of the things that needs to be sorted here is the name of the article an its scope. Enaction already covers much of the material as is one aspect of the wider issue. The general anti-cartesian position emerging in Philosophy of Mind could do with a simple summary, and that would include enaction in its wider context. It is also an area where we get inconsistent use of terms by different authors, characteristic of a new field and we could do some service there as well. Personally I think this is one of the most important emerging areas on Philosophy at the moment so it deserves some serious effort. ---- Snowded TALK 06:33, 3 April 2014 (UTC)
Brews: I agree with Snowded's removal of internalism/ externalism. People wanting to know about enactivism(philosophy) could maybe benefit form a link to internalism/externalism, to which this is related, but writing about it here would lose the focus on this important area. The article loses its strength and relevance by this divergent development.
I also think, Brews that you do use sources to back up what you say, which verges on OR. Instead we should be talking about the sources, as balanced pictures of the subject, and specify as closely as possible what they say.
You also said I haven't tried to improve the article. I think I made my point earlier about why I don't intend to get involved in editing this article. I would have to engage in drastic reversions and cuts, and Snowded is already doing this. I don't have any knowledge or allegiance to either of you, but I really think you need to listen to what is being said and try to focus your writing, after surveying the relevant literature.
I wish you well in your future writing.
TonyClarke ( talk) 23:13, 5 April 2014 (UTC)
Is there any reliable source that uses the term "enaction" for the topic of this article? -- Bob K31416 ( talk) 18:58, 6 April 2014 (UTC)
Scaffolding is a topic name-dropped without explanation on several occasions by Snowded. To accommodate him, this subsection was contributed. However, Snowded has removed this subsection with the in-line comment: You are just inserting material without context. Lets agree what this article is about first shall we. The subsection is below:
The term scaffolding in connection with mind refers to the dependence of more complicated functionality upon simpler functionality that serves as a 'scaffold' to build and develop the more complex activity. In developmental psychology one application of scaffolding is the idea that early life experiences significantly shape the adult’s understanding. [N 1] More broadly, the term has been introduced to describe a "broad class of physical, cognitive and social augmentations -- augmentations which allow us to achieve some goal which would otherwise be beyond us". [N 2]
In the context of enaction, scaffolding refers to cognition-enhancing tools that extend mental processes into the environment and modulate or even enable interaction with that environment in the processes of cognition. A simple example is the use of a cane by a blind man, "stick-augmented perception". [N 3] From this standpoint, "what individuals inherit from their ancestors is not a mind, but the ability to develop a mind," a "matrix of resources that serve as the actual physical causes of development." [N 4] The development of mind is seen as a dynamical process involving interaction with the environment.
According to Thelan (as quoted by Griffiths and Stotz): [N 5]
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Snowded suggests: "Let's agree what this article is about first, shall we?" Snowded indicated a while back that he was about to participate with this article, but so far no such discussion has taken place, and it remains to be seen whether Snowded has a real intention. Brews ohare ( talk) 14:32, 7 April 2014 (UTC)
This deleted subsection is one of four sourced subsections ( 1, 2, 3 & 4) that Snowded has deleted from the article without any concrete discussion of content or sourcing. Brews ohare ( talk) 14:35, 7 April 2014 (UTC)
I added a summary of a 2012 article which I think covers the areas and points to the importance of enaction. It is also easier to read than many Philosophy articles. I hope it sets the scene to retain and build upon this article, which we all think is important. We need some more entries now, e.g. on 'Criticisms' of the topic (and it certainly has had some opposition!), and some other viewpoints on it. Hopefully we can make it beyond the stub status. Peace!
TonyClarke ( talk) 12:58, 8 April 2014 (UTC)
Great, a way forward maybe. I agree that we can include contextual stuff, but perhaps when a secondary topic becomes important enough it needs its own page (or might have already), and we can branch off that way. But the article is called Enaction(Philosophy) and I think we should make that the main subject. (Not sure what you mean by the 'ISS of consciousness'?) TonyClarke ( talk) 14:35, 8 April 2014 (UTC)
OK lets try again. I will repeat my relier statement with some additions, hopefully we can get some engagement
Original comment
One of the things that needs to be sorted here is the name of the article an its scope. Enaction already covers much of the material as is one aspect of the wider issue. The general anti-cartesian position emerging in Philosophy of Mind could do with a simple summary, and that would include enaction in its wider context. It is also an area where we get inconsistent use of terms by different authors, characteristic of a new field and we could do some service there as well. Personally I think this is one of the most important emerging areas on Philosophy at the moment so it deserves some serious effort.
Additional points
I think the value of an article is to summarise the cartesian/non-cartesian split but in other language. Basically we have the view of the brain as directing activity (with lots of consequences for free will etc) and against that the ideas of extended consciousness (which might be a better title than extended cognition). That has multiple sources and we need to start with a secondary source that summarises the positions, the current one is a bit partial and over focused on the environment.
Leslie Paul Thiele is a good starting point. He characterises Cartesian approaches as seeing cognitive psychology as being responsible for working out the abstract programs that the brain (as a computational device) runs with cognitive neuroscience studying how they are implemented. He contrasts that with post-cartesian approaches which include:
He further expands on that (from memory there are some other "E"s and he also is good on the autonomic v novelty receptive receptive parts of the brain. Pattern recognition and partial scanning then also come in. My suggestion would be that Extended Consiousness is the better name and Thiele the starting point. He references the sources used by Brews. He is also a philosopher. ---- Snowded TALK 07:13, 8 April 2014 (UTC)
The value of the title is that it makes no claim for the field, but reports a view. Hence I have reverted to Tony's original title as that is OK, we cannot say that this article defines the field. I have also restored neutral language. The original of the sandwich looked like OR or a key word search, that needs to reflect what is said in the article (which I do not have to hand). If they reference Hurley OK put that change back, if they do not reference Hurley for that term it should not be used---- Snowded TALK 17:18, 9 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded has taken exception to this subsection added by TonyClarke following my addition of footnotes identifying references within this section and a change in wording to reflect Stapleton's and Ward's description of their own paper. These changes are duly noted on the Talk page in the above thread. Snowded's in-line editorial comment is A account not THE account so we can't use their title. You are also making the text definitive rather than reporting one view. TAKE IT TALK
Now this subsection clearly states that it is a presentation of the article of Stapleton and Ward, so there is no confusion about its being "definitive text". I also note that Snowded made no objection to this subsection before I made these changes, changes that are at most minor clarifications and links to sources. So I don't know what the fuss is about.
Maybe Snowded can explain??
In a recent article Stapleton and Ward discuss enaction as central to our cognition and perception. [F 1] They elaborate and partially defend the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended, named for convenience the E′s. The term 'affective' refers to unpurposed but motivating reactions to the environment, such as physiological responses (for example, nausea) and the emotions. [F 2] Enactive cognition is possible through skillful interaction with the environment. Therefore the article intends partially to defend each of these E′s but also to point out the centrality of enactive cognition: if this is seen as a valid interpretation of our cognition, then the other aspects (the E′s, and affect) follow also.
The authors propose an 'ecumenical' enactivism combining affordances ( James J. Gibson), sensorimotor expectations ( Alva Noë) and mutual enactive structuring (Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1992)) [F 3]. This enactivism avoids what Hurley calls the ′Classical Sandwich′, [F 4] whereby internal cognitive workings intervene between perceptual input and actions output. There is no separation between action and perception, since perception is a matter of being already attuned to the world and its features.
They agree (p9) with Varela Rosch and Thompson, that rules and regularities come about through our interaction with perceptible environment. The world and our cognition are co-constituted, the world informs us what we can see and do, and our perception demarcates that which is in our world.
The enactivist position they outline 'holds that cognition essentially depends upon the activity, both actual and potential, of the cogniser.' They trace the origins of this view to Kant's thinking, that our mind's structure and activity contribute fundamentally to the constitution of the world we inhabit. Their claim is that we embody interact with an environment we selectively create and in which we are embedded through the our bodily limitations and opportunities to enact that world. Further they emphasize the essential role of feelings, emotions and affect: since we selectively interact with the world, based on our interests, plans and goals, then evaluation of what we perceive is intrinsic to our cognitive processes. Overall their view is that our enactive cognition implies that we are embedded and embodied in an environment which we enact, and into which we are to a degree extended.
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Perception and action are not just separate from one another, but also separate from the higher processes of cognition. The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling.Hurley does not support the 'sandwich' view of cognition.
TonyClarke stated the selection of this article was based upon its clarity in stating its position, not that it was definitive. Perhaps Snowded could offer some reasons why including some footnotes has changed the character of this subsection?? Perhaps he can explain why the title: The E′s of enactive cognition, is tendentious, especially as the E′s occur in multiple references (Rowlands being one of them, and Snowded's bulleted list and reference to the E′s in talk page discussion being a recognition of the matter)?? The E′s were chosen by Stapleton and Ward simply because their audience would immediately understand what the E′s are. The subsection's wording makes its nature perfectly clear as a presentation of the views of Stapleton and Ward, IMO. Brews ohare ( talk) 17:52, 9 April 2014 (UTC)
This new section does not make clear what is philosophy and what is psychology. Is it the perspective here that we cannot tell? Brews ohare ( talk) 15:11, 14 April 2014 (UTC)
If this article is about enaction, then it is the third of the "E"s that the Rowlands quote identifies at the start. If that is to be the subject matter then we need to radically alter the lede to reflect the final paragraph of the first section Tony inserted. That would also imply articles for each of the other "E"s and also some summary on the post-Descartian approach. So Clark criticises eneaction, but exemplifies embedded and so on. The issue remains how much material exists to justify different approaches. At the moment a coatrack is a distinct possibility with identical material on different articles. My personal preference is to get the master article on post-Descartian approaches done and then sort out the individual ones, but I am more than open to other alternatives. The point is we need an agreed plan. ---- Snowded TALK 09:03, 15 April 2014 (UTC)
Well, it focuses on the work of a professor of philosophy; its written in an article that has philosophy in its title; how much more indication do you want that it is philosophical?? Please amend as you see fit to improve it. Not sure that I fully understand your comments Brews, or what you want to change. TonyClarke ( talk) 20:09, 14 April 2014 (UTC)
I don't find Snowded's drastic changes to this article have all been improvements. Much of the language is awkwardly constructed and unsourced, sometimes unintelligible. I have tried to make English out of the introduction, but find it unsatisfactory. Useful contributions (like Stapleton and Ward discussion) by Tony have been removed without Talk page discussion. Brews ohare ( talk) 14:54, 15 April 2014 (UTC)
![]() | This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
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This article is a stub, and needs considerable expansion. Brews ohare ( talk) 15:55, 30 March 2014 (UTC)
A useful article to create, but we need to make sure it does not digress into a coat rack for material that is in other articles - I have removed material that falls into that category. Also at the moment the sources used are a little restrictive and need expanding - I would have done something there this morning but I am away from home and my text books. We also need secondary sources to establish some of the claims in the lede.
Brews - can we please try and avoid a repetition of your normal strategy of immediately reverting changes, you know it will just be reverted in turn. Also there is an opportunity here to build a good article but that will not work if you are not prepared to compromise and insist on your material in its original form. ---- Snowded TALK 09:23, 2 April 2014 (UTC)
The following subsection was deleted by Snowded, and I'd like to discuss it:
Enaction applies to groups as well as individuals. Social constructivism is the study of an individual's learning that takes place because of their interactions in a group, and the group's experience with its environment. According to Gergen, the social constructionist orientation suggests: [1]
An example is the idea of a paradigm as described by Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. [2] [3] For the scientist a paradigm refers to the sense of the way reality is structured and the means by which the scientist uncovers this reality and is able to manipulate it and predict effects and events. The dissatisfaction of scientists with an existing theory leads to a paradigm shift, and this dissatisfaction is a matter of criteria demanded of an acceptable theory. These criteria are not themselves scientifically established, but describe an 'ideal' theory as seen by the scientific community, criteria such as 'elegance', 'completeness', 'seminality', 'simplicity'. [4] [5]
Thus, as the idea of enaction suggests within the context of social constructivism, the development of a paradigm involves the interaction of scientists with their environment and each other, the theoretical treatment of experimental results, and re-engagement in probing the environment on the basis of that theory, sometimes with very sophisticated apparatus. Examples of complex probing of the environment as part of the cognitive process, what enaction is about, are the Hadron collider or the Hubble telescope. These activities are accompanied by the evolution and application of theories subject to an aesthetic stemming from social interactions between scientists. [4]
One of the main defenders of epistemological constructivism who is also well known in IR [international relations], Thomas Kuhn.
Kuhn had already provided...the general basis for a conception of the social character of science.
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Snowded removed this section with the in-line editorial comment "essays on social constructivism are not appropriate to this article, especially OR".
Now, the reasons why Snowded thinks the topic of social constructivism is "not appropriate" and just what in this subsection constitutes a violation of WP:OR has not been identified. Perhaps some further guidance as to what exactly Snowded has in mind could be offered as a beginning point for discussion? Brews ohare ( talk) 15:11, 2 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded has removed the subsection below on non-reductive naturalism without any guidance as to his reasoning:
Reductionism in science is the argument that all events (ultimately) are connected to (possibly yet-to-be-established) primal events by the 'laws of nature' and, in particular, mental events are reducible to neuroscience and brain circuitry. [R 1] In contrast, non-reductive naturalism claims that "mental phenomena cannot be reduced to any particular material object or local process, as for instance neural processing." [R 2] One form of this thesis arises in cultural psychology where mind is viewed as a cultural phenomenon. [R 3]
The enactive approach is constructivist, not reductionist, that is, it is about "the active construction of knowledge through our interaction with the environment"..."Our brains do not indiscriminately and passively crunch up any structure that can be detected in a never ending stream of sensations...Cognition is a lot about discarding irrelevant information and going out to get relevant information...Open-loop approaches restricted to input-output mappings are unable to capture this circular causality and the emergent phenomena it can bring about." [R 2] [R 4]
...consciousness is a biological process that will eventually be explained in terms of molecular signaling pathways used by interacting populations of nerve cells...
Culture produces the mind; brain circuitry does not. The mind–body problem of how the physical body/brain produces mental, subjective qualia, is the wrong way to frame the origin of consciousness.
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I hope Snowded will provide some guidance as to his reasoning in removing this subsection. Brews ohare ( talk) 15:20, 2 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded has suggested by additon of {{citation needed}} that secondary sources are needed to establish two points. The leading paragraph identifies these points as follows:
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link)The first issue is whether there is any relation between 'enaction' and 'embodied cognition'.
My reaction is that the suggestion that the focus of embodied cognition does not necessarily stress the idea of interaction with the environment as a key aspect is obvious from the definition of that field.
The second issue is whether 'enaction' places an emphasis upon interaction.
My reaction is that the second point is the very meaning of the term 'enaction'.
In both cases the cited general introduction of the book by Varela, Thompson & Rosch is about as good a secondary source as one is likely to find, being the introduction by three authors to their essays on various topics from a decidedly non-partisan stance that discusses these aspects at length. Accordingly, these templates appear gratuitous here. Brews ohare ( talk) 16:40, 2 April 2014 (UTC)
Chapter 8 of this source is titled "Enaction: Embodied cognition". It defines enaction at great length on pp. 173-174. The organism itself chooses the stimuli in the physical world to which it will be sensitive. Perception is not simply embedded within and constrained by the surrounding world. The organism both initiates and is shaped by the environment.
Perhaps, Snowded, you have some other sources in mind that would present a more 'objective' view of the subject?? Brews ohare ( talk) 17:02, 2 April 2014 (UTC)
Providing the rationale "in text citations makes article creation a lot easier to handle" Snowded has changed some footnotes to an 'in-text' version <ref>{{cite book |title= |author= |isbn= |url= |publisher= |page= |year=}}</ref>, replacing the less distracting use of the 'in-text' designation <ref name =author/> formatting of the original. I'd say this is an imposition of his personal distaste for the cleaner approach, and as he has not originated this article, I do not think it his prerogative to force his aesthetic upon it. Brews ohare ( talk) 15:29, 2 April 2014 (UTC)
Accordingly, I have put the references into the original format. Brews ohare ( talk) 16:12, 2 April 2014 (UTC)
Finding no useful commentary here, and instead unsupported and peremptory reversion, I've decided to present this material on Citizendium where it can be found as Extended cognition. Brews ohare ( talk) 15:53, 4 April 2014 (UTC)
Brews, you asked me to be involved with this page. I am sorry to have to say that it is now looking like a rerun of many conflicts that have a arisen between you and Snowded, and conflicts without resolution or improvement resulting.
I agree with Snowded on removing the two sections. The last paragraphs in each section are not properly supported with clear citations, and your citations are put in as evidence for your views. But in fact they give only individual comments on the subject, and there are many other views and approaches which should merit a mention. I also agree that both were not strictly relevant to the subject, and I can't understand some of your responses, e.g. ' My reaction is that the suggestion that the focus of embodied cognition does not necessarily stress the idea of interaction with the environment as a key aspect is obvious from the definition of that field.' What does that mean? It does not address the point being made. Perhaps, taking up the -citation needed- suggestion constructively : ), you should look at some general introductory works on the 'four e's', some of which spell out relationships between embodied cognition, enactive cognitions, extended etc…
Well done for initiating this page, and I wish you well with it. It could be a very useful contribution to this subject. I am happy to contribute to it if there are sensible productive discussions going on, but not at the present.
TonyClarke ( talk) 01:55, 3 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded has removed the subsection below on internalism & externalism without any guidance as to his reasoning:
Proponents of enaction consider its emphasis upon interaction with the external environment to be in contrast with a view of mental processes as simply the internal operation of the brain as a computer manipulating symbols encoding representations of the world, the rules and representations approach to cognition. [S 1] The issue is not just that cognition involves structures outside the brain proper, but that cognition is a process of interaction, an activity. However, the role of the subject, the individuation, of this activity might be underestimated. [S 2] [S 3]
The interactivity between the organism and the environment emphasized by extended cognition impinges on the deeper philosophical questions of the subject-object problem, that is the partition of experience between subject and object. [S 2] At one extreme, our interior mental processes are dictated by interaction with the external world, and at the other extreme, they are creations of our conscious and subconscious brain activity. "Externalism with regard to mental content says that in order to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g. beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the right way. Internalism (or individualism) denies this, and it affirms that having those intentional mental states depends solely on our intrinsic properties." [S 3]
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Snowded removed this material with the in-line comment: restrict to material directly related to the top (holding action there may be more if we agree scope on talk ). On this Talk page he has added the remark: "You've been given clear reasons for the deletion by me (and in Tony's support). You just don't like them. Sorry Brews your average talk page words to content changes ration is about 5k:1 or more and I've done enough unless other editors engage"
What is omitted from Snowded's words is any clarification of his reasons for removal of this subsection, or the other two that he has removed in earlier efforts. My invitations to supply reasons and sources so far has resulted only in Snowded's personal peremptory opinions and his avoidance of all source-related commentary, suggesting that he "has already done enough". Enough what? Tony has also been invited without result to provide some substance to flesh out what he feels is an incomplete presentation.
However, Snowded takes things further than Tony by removing the presentation of these subtopics entirely, and without rationale. Brews ohare ( talk) 13:54, 4 April 2014 (UTC)
One of the things that needs to be sorted here is the name of the article an its scope. Enaction already covers much of the material as is one aspect of the wider issue. The general anti-cartesian position emerging in Philosophy of Mind could do with a simple summary, and that would include enaction in its wider context. It is also an area where we get inconsistent use of terms by different authors, characteristic of a new field and we could do some service there as well. Personally I think this is one of the most important emerging areas on Philosophy at the moment so it deserves some serious effort. ---- Snowded TALK 06:33, 3 April 2014 (UTC)
Brews: I agree with Snowded's removal of internalism/ externalism. People wanting to know about enactivism(philosophy) could maybe benefit form a link to internalism/externalism, to which this is related, but writing about it here would lose the focus on this important area. The article loses its strength and relevance by this divergent development.
I also think, Brews that you do use sources to back up what you say, which verges on OR. Instead we should be talking about the sources, as balanced pictures of the subject, and specify as closely as possible what they say.
You also said I haven't tried to improve the article. I think I made my point earlier about why I don't intend to get involved in editing this article. I would have to engage in drastic reversions and cuts, and Snowded is already doing this. I don't have any knowledge or allegiance to either of you, but I really think you need to listen to what is being said and try to focus your writing, after surveying the relevant literature.
I wish you well in your future writing.
TonyClarke ( talk) 23:13, 5 April 2014 (UTC)
Is there any reliable source that uses the term "enaction" for the topic of this article? -- Bob K31416 ( talk) 18:58, 6 April 2014 (UTC)
Scaffolding is a topic name-dropped without explanation on several occasions by Snowded. To accommodate him, this subsection was contributed. However, Snowded has removed this subsection with the in-line comment: You are just inserting material without context. Lets agree what this article is about first shall we. The subsection is below:
The term scaffolding in connection with mind refers to the dependence of more complicated functionality upon simpler functionality that serves as a 'scaffold' to build and develop the more complex activity. In developmental psychology one application of scaffolding is the idea that early life experiences significantly shape the adult’s understanding. [N 1] More broadly, the term has been introduced to describe a "broad class of physical, cognitive and social augmentations -- augmentations which allow us to achieve some goal which would otherwise be beyond us". [N 2]
In the context of enaction, scaffolding refers to cognition-enhancing tools that extend mental processes into the environment and modulate or even enable interaction with that environment in the processes of cognition. A simple example is the use of a cane by a blind man, "stick-augmented perception". [N 3] From this standpoint, "what individuals inherit from their ancestors is not a mind, but the ability to develop a mind," a "matrix of resources that serve as the actual physical causes of development." [N 4] The development of mind is seen as a dynamical process involving interaction with the environment.
According to Thelan (as quoted by Griffiths and Stotz): [N 5]
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Snowded suggests: "Let's agree what this article is about first, shall we?" Snowded indicated a while back that he was about to participate with this article, but so far no such discussion has taken place, and it remains to be seen whether Snowded has a real intention. Brews ohare ( talk) 14:32, 7 April 2014 (UTC)
This deleted subsection is one of four sourced subsections ( 1, 2, 3 & 4) that Snowded has deleted from the article without any concrete discussion of content or sourcing. Brews ohare ( talk) 14:35, 7 April 2014 (UTC)
I added a summary of a 2012 article which I think covers the areas and points to the importance of enaction. It is also easier to read than many Philosophy articles. I hope it sets the scene to retain and build upon this article, which we all think is important. We need some more entries now, e.g. on 'Criticisms' of the topic (and it certainly has had some opposition!), and some other viewpoints on it. Hopefully we can make it beyond the stub status. Peace!
TonyClarke ( talk) 12:58, 8 April 2014 (UTC)
Great, a way forward maybe. I agree that we can include contextual stuff, but perhaps when a secondary topic becomes important enough it needs its own page (or might have already), and we can branch off that way. But the article is called Enaction(Philosophy) and I think we should make that the main subject. (Not sure what you mean by the 'ISS of consciousness'?) TonyClarke ( talk) 14:35, 8 April 2014 (UTC)
OK lets try again. I will repeat my relier statement with some additions, hopefully we can get some engagement
Original comment
One of the things that needs to be sorted here is the name of the article an its scope. Enaction already covers much of the material as is one aspect of the wider issue. The general anti-cartesian position emerging in Philosophy of Mind could do with a simple summary, and that would include enaction in its wider context. It is also an area where we get inconsistent use of terms by different authors, characteristic of a new field and we could do some service there as well. Personally I think this is one of the most important emerging areas on Philosophy at the moment so it deserves some serious effort.
Additional points
I think the value of an article is to summarise the cartesian/non-cartesian split but in other language. Basically we have the view of the brain as directing activity (with lots of consequences for free will etc) and against that the ideas of extended consciousness (which might be a better title than extended cognition). That has multiple sources and we need to start with a secondary source that summarises the positions, the current one is a bit partial and over focused on the environment.
Leslie Paul Thiele is a good starting point. He characterises Cartesian approaches as seeing cognitive psychology as being responsible for working out the abstract programs that the brain (as a computational device) runs with cognitive neuroscience studying how they are implemented. He contrasts that with post-cartesian approaches which include:
He further expands on that (from memory there are some other "E"s and he also is good on the autonomic v novelty receptive receptive parts of the brain. Pattern recognition and partial scanning then also come in. My suggestion would be that Extended Consiousness is the better name and Thiele the starting point. He references the sources used by Brews. He is also a philosopher. ---- Snowded TALK 07:13, 8 April 2014 (UTC)
The value of the title is that it makes no claim for the field, but reports a view. Hence I have reverted to Tony's original title as that is OK, we cannot say that this article defines the field. I have also restored neutral language. The original of the sandwich looked like OR or a key word search, that needs to reflect what is said in the article (which I do not have to hand). If they reference Hurley OK put that change back, if they do not reference Hurley for that term it should not be used---- Snowded TALK 17:18, 9 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded has taken exception to this subsection added by TonyClarke following my addition of footnotes identifying references within this section and a change in wording to reflect Stapleton's and Ward's description of their own paper. These changes are duly noted on the Talk page in the above thread. Snowded's in-line editorial comment is A account not THE account so we can't use their title. You are also making the text definitive rather than reporting one view. TAKE IT TALK
Now this subsection clearly states that it is a presentation of the article of Stapleton and Ward, so there is no confusion about its being "definitive text". I also note that Snowded made no objection to this subsection before I made these changes, changes that are at most minor clarifications and links to sources. So I don't know what the fuss is about.
Maybe Snowded can explain??
In a recent article Stapleton and Ward discuss enaction as central to our cognition and perception. [F 1] They elaborate and partially defend the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended, named for convenience the E′s. The term 'affective' refers to unpurposed but motivating reactions to the environment, such as physiological responses (for example, nausea) and the emotions. [F 2] Enactive cognition is possible through skillful interaction with the environment. Therefore the article intends partially to defend each of these E′s but also to point out the centrality of enactive cognition: if this is seen as a valid interpretation of our cognition, then the other aspects (the E′s, and affect) follow also.
The authors propose an 'ecumenical' enactivism combining affordances ( James J. Gibson), sensorimotor expectations ( Alva Noë) and mutual enactive structuring (Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1992)) [F 3]. This enactivism avoids what Hurley calls the ′Classical Sandwich′, [F 4] whereby internal cognitive workings intervene between perceptual input and actions output. There is no separation between action and perception, since perception is a matter of being already attuned to the world and its features.
They agree (p9) with Varela Rosch and Thompson, that rules and regularities come about through our interaction with perceptible environment. The world and our cognition are co-constituted, the world informs us what we can see and do, and our perception demarcates that which is in our world.
The enactivist position they outline 'holds that cognition essentially depends upon the activity, both actual and potential, of the cogniser.' They trace the origins of this view to Kant's thinking, that our mind's structure and activity contribute fundamentally to the constitution of the world we inhabit. Their claim is that we embody interact with an environment we selectively create and in which we are embedded through the our bodily limitations and opportunities to enact that world. Further they emphasize the essential role of feelings, emotions and affect: since we selectively interact with the world, based on our interests, plans and goals, then evaluation of what we perceive is intrinsic to our cognitive processes. Overall their view is that our enactive cognition implies that we are embedded and embodied in an environment which we enact, and into which we are to a degree extended.
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On-line version here.
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Perception and action are not just separate from one another, but also separate from the higher processes of cognition. The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling.Hurley does not support the 'sandwich' view of cognition.
TonyClarke stated the selection of this article was based upon its clarity in stating its position, not that it was definitive. Perhaps Snowded could offer some reasons why including some footnotes has changed the character of this subsection?? Perhaps he can explain why the title: The E′s of enactive cognition, is tendentious, especially as the E′s occur in multiple references (Rowlands being one of them, and Snowded's bulleted list and reference to the E′s in talk page discussion being a recognition of the matter)?? The E′s were chosen by Stapleton and Ward simply because their audience would immediately understand what the E′s are. The subsection's wording makes its nature perfectly clear as a presentation of the views of Stapleton and Ward, IMO. Brews ohare ( talk) 17:52, 9 April 2014 (UTC)
This new section does not make clear what is philosophy and what is psychology. Is it the perspective here that we cannot tell? Brews ohare ( talk) 15:11, 14 April 2014 (UTC)
If this article is about enaction, then it is the third of the "E"s that the Rowlands quote identifies at the start. If that is to be the subject matter then we need to radically alter the lede to reflect the final paragraph of the first section Tony inserted. That would also imply articles for each of the other "E"s and also some summary on the post-Descartian approach. So Clark criticises eneaction, but exemplifies embedded and so on. The issue remains how much material exists to justify different approaches. At the moment a coatrack is a distinct possibility with identical material on different articles. My personal preference is to get the master article on post-Descartian approaches done and then sort out the individual ones, but I am more than open to other alternatives. The point is we need an agreed plan. ---- Snowded TALK 09:03, 15 April 2014 (UTC)
Well, it focuses on the work of a professor of philosophy; its written in an article that has philosophy in its title; how much more indication do you want that it is philosophical?? Please amend as you see fit to improve it. Not sure that I fully understand your comments Brews, or what you want to change. TonyClarke ( talk) 20:09, 14 April 2014 (UTC)
I don't find Snowded's drastic changes to this article have all been improvements. Much of the language is awkwardly constructed and unsourced, sometimes unintelligible. I have tried to make English out of the introduction, but find it unsatisfactory. Useful contributions (like Stapleton and Ward discussion) by Tony have been removed without Talk page discussion. Brews ohare ( talk) 14:54, 15 April 2014 (UTC)