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The new section on 1944 planning completely misrepresents the prepartions and goals of the Chindits in 1944. This is an immensely complicated subject and the plans changed repeatedly right up to the launch of the operations. Putting a small selection of directives on the page and suggesting that they represent "the plan" for 1944 is extremely misleading. - anon (December 2 2005) —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 22:28, 2 December 2005 ( talk •  contribs) 63.133.154.10.

I put the details in because before I did so there was nothing to say what it was that the Chindits where tasked to do. It might be obvious to you who presumably know something about the operation but to someone who has never read anything else about the operation there was nothing in the article to say what the objectives were for Operation Thursday or why the Chindits were doing it.

The question of what the Chindits were tasked to do is another very complicated subject on which its difficult to find an easy answer even with access to a tremendous amount of material. To even suggest that there were fixed objectives when the operation started is an almost fatal assumption.

On the other two fronts the plans laid by SEAC went pair shaped when the Japanese attacked, but on the Northern Front the initiative remained with the Allies and the strategic objectives were met.

You are making a conclusion about plans based on the result which is a very dangerous sort of assumption to make. Further, by your own standards you are making conclusions which your sources are not sufficient to support.

The details of the tactical plans might of change up to the start of the operation. But the joint directive was issued one day before the start of the operation and is in my opinion a fair overview of what it was that the Chinits were expected to do during the campaign.

Who considers the operations to have started on that day? The day you are talking about is the day 16th Brigade marched off. Most people consider the start of operation thursday to be when the main force flew into burma in March (almost a month later). The plans were changing up to the point where the force flew in and even after. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 ( talk •  contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

Again, "in my opinion" falls short of the standards you are imposing on the page. Unless you have a complete understanding of the entire planning process leading up to the operation that you can cite sources for, your conclusions are opinion and by your own standards are not allowed. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 ( talk •  contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

If you wish to add a some paragraphs about the detailed alternative plans why they were abandoned and why the final plans were adopted I will be most interested to read them. -- Philip Baird Shearer 23:18, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

Sorry. I will be busy finding citations for my own work now based on your demands. I do not have time to correct your work. If you cannot correct your flawed narrative with proper sources, it should be removed. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 ( talk •  contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

For most of this article sources are not really needed as the "facts" are widely available. However there are a number of statements about individules which are a POV and ought to have a source to justify who said them, or are about operational details not widely available and so are not generally known, here is an inital list which if they can not be sourced ought to be removed:

Wingate refused to use Indian Army formations in this force, officially because their training in long-range penetration techniques would take longer and their maintenance by air would be difficult due to the varied dietary requirements of different Indian castes and religions. But in practice, Wingate disliked having non-european troops under his command in roles other than as guides and native pathfinders. He used Gurkha Battalions in both operations and even an african brigade in the second operation, but he used these units because they were what he was given rather than them being what he wanted.

Its no secret that Wingate did not want Indian Army soliders in the Chindits. The "official" excuse of diet, religion and training was proved false during operations in 1943. It is also no secret that in 1943 wingate campaigned for the use of the 70th British Division and against the use of other forces. His 1943 report (uncensored) repeated attacks indian army personnel and commanders without regards to facts or reason. The paragraph, as stands, is close to neutral in that it least makes a halfway attempt not to stand all with one side or the other. - anon —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 ( talk •  contribs) 22:24, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

Sources should be given if asked for and I am asking for them (please see Wikipedia:Verifiability). Philip Baird Shearer 00:23, 3 December 2005 (UTC)

If you apply that tight a standard to others, it will now be applied to you as well. I tried to go halfway and give you one source (the wingate 1943 report) but that does not seem to have been good enough correct? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 ( talk •  contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

Wingate also had plans for a general uprising of the Kachin population of Northern Burma. He fought over his plans with the leadership of Force 136, which was concerned that a premature uprising of the Kachins without a permanent British military presence would lead to their slaughter by the Japanese at the end of operations. Force 136 also had their own plans for a rising to be coordinated with the arrival of the regular army into Burma. Wingate was eventually convinced to scale back his original plans

The trouble is that sources which are not detailed tend to give what happend not what might have happend, so what is the detailed source for this?

That Wingate and Force 136 were both planning Kachin uprisings in 1944 is no secret. The relivant material here concerns the purposes, operation changes and other details of Dah Force in 1944 primarily. The cites would be from IWM (Wingate papers) and other archives. They can be produced but I'm not going to go to all that effort when the rest of the page is full of statements that would require similar citations but don't have them. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 ( talk •  contribs) 22:24, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

If it is from the Windgate papers directly there is a danger of this falling under WP:NOR issue. There should be a secondary source which could be quoted. I mention this because there is no harm in extracting a fact from a Primary source, eg "Windgate was flying from ABC to XYZ on the first Monday in the month". But "He fought over his plans with the leadership" involves drawing a conclusion from several primary sources and that would fall foul of the WP:NOR.

Oh come on! You can't seriously be suggesting that this page should be blind to the primary sources. You would then be ignoring actual facts in favor of the opinions of biographers and official historians. The war diaries, reports and official communications are definitive on the subject. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 ( talk •  contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

As you will be aware Windgate is still a controversial figure, and with controversial subjects it is better to ere on the side of too many footnotes than too few. Please see Bombing of Dresden in World War II for an example of a controversial WWII article with footnotes. Just because the subject has few footnotes to date does not mean that we can not add them. -- Philip Baird Shearer 00:23, 3 December 2005 (UTC)

I'm concerned that I'm put to a whole lot of effort to please someone who wants to rewrite the page but can't even spell the man's name right. (Its "Wingate"). —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 ( talk •  contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

The other Brigade commanders were unknown quantities, mostly without staff qualifications, and Wingate's staff officers lacked the necessary combat experience. The impulsive personalities of certain of the officers closest to Wingate raised questions about their suitability for such an enormous command responsibility.

This is not the resons Slim gives in Defeat into Vicory Page 265-6.

This is not an attempt to quote Silm directly, but to describe the circumstances of a very controversial decision in a way that is fair to all points of view. If necessary, more detail on the relative experience of the potential candidates and their personalties can be provided. - anon —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 ( talk •  contribs) 22:24, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

But it ought to be sourced otherwise we should remove it an replace it with a statement which can be sourced. It will not be as detailed but it will be an accurate Encyclopaedia entry. Philip Baird Shearer 00:23, 3 December 2005 (UTC)

Rather than being accurate, it will simply reflect the bias of the particular secondary source picked which tend to fall on one side or the other. The art of being accurate is about blending facts together into a better truth rather than blindly parrot secondary sources that in many cases don't even agree with each other. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 ( talk •  contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

19 Allied soldiers, who were so badly injured as to be beyond hope of recovery and could not be moved, were shot by the medical orderlies.

This last one is not a POV but is contriversial so it ought to be footnoted. -- Philip Baird Shearer 11:59, 1 December 2005 (UTC)

It is not controversial. It is unpleasent. But nobody has ever denied that it happened or given an account markedly different from the text above. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 ( talk •  contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

Some Sources

Wingate refused to use Indian Army formations in this force, officially because their training in long-range penetration techniques would take longer and their maintenance by air would be difficult due to the varied dietary requirements of different Indian castes and religions.

Burma 1942-1945, R. Callahan, Davis-Poynter 1978. The remainder of the para. is POV.

The other Brigade commanders were unknown quantities, mostly without staff qualifications, and Wingate's staff officers lacked the necessary combat experience.

Summarised in Allen, Burma: The longest War from D. Tulloch (Wingate's Chief of Staff) in Wingate in Peace and War. Again, the rest of the para. is POV.

HLGallon 22:06, 1 December 2005 (UTC)

Do you have page numbers for these as it would be better to footnote them properly? -- Philip Baird Shearer 22:17, 1 December 2005 (UTC)

Callahan, p. 101
Allen, pp. 348-351

HLGallon 23:09, 1 December 2005 (UTC)

Not sure if Wingate staff officers lacked the necessary comabt experiance. Because Slim complains in "Defeat into Victory" on page 216-217 that Windgate got the whole of the 70th division as it was not allocated to the 14th Army at the time W. aquired it and goes on to say that Windgate had an "elaborate staff". Surly although Slim does not say so, many of the staff must have come from the battle hardened and jungle warfare trained 70th. Philip Baird Shearer

In WW2, the Chief of Staff of a British division was the GSO 1, a Lieutenant-Colonel. The Chindits, being a "force" with no defined establishment or precedent, had Brigadier Derek Tulloch as its Chief of Staff (a full two ranks above a Lt. Colonel), and no doubt similarly inflated ranks to handle the various departments. The comparatively junior staff officers of 70th Division would be lost in the crowd at Special Force HQ.

Every formation led by Wingate tended to be hollowed out and not what it seemed. For example, a large percentage of men in the 1943 mission were recruited at random during the fall of 1942 rather than coming from the original two battalions given to Wingate. Wingate also considered every existing formation (battalions, brigades, divisions) to be obsolete and would remake them along lines that looked nothing like the rest of the army. "3rd Indian Division" in 1944 if you look at it in detail in the war diaries was nothing like a division. And Wingate wasn't a believer in command structure. - anon —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 ( talk •  contribs) 22:24, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

Masters, in The Road past Mandalay reports a cynical Joe Lentaigne claiming that Wingate had brought many of his contemporaries from the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich to fill the staff billets at Special Force. This suggests that Wingate went for familiarity when selecting his staff (although he favoured proven conduct in the field when selecting commanders).

HLGallon 06:24, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

Fair point. I am very happy to go with Masters or who ever, but the comments like these should be sourced. I'll add the two you (HLGallon) have provided please see that I have got them correct. -- Philip Baird Shearer 00:23, 3 December 2005 (UTC)

Because of the size of the article I think it is time to consider moving the Order of Battle to its own page. I would favour Order of Battle of the Chindits rather than Chindits' Order of Battle or Chindits' order of battle or order of battle of the Chindits. I don't like the apostrophe in the name and the name is similar to Order of Battle of the Waterloo Campaign. But I am open to suggestions on the name and if it should be done. -- Philip Baird Shearer 01:03, 3 December 2005 (UTC)

Yesterday I replaced the section on 1944 plans with a simplified version that explains the 1944 planning process in a very direct way. A short, to the point and non-controversial version is better in my opinion than a long misleading one. Depending on Slim's account and highlighting the version of "orders" he gives in his book is not the best approach. Slim's book also plays fast-and-loose with the chronology of his discussions with Wingate. I also strongly disagree with the over-emphesis of the SEAC conference. Some sources, rather than deal with the details of planning simply develop a narrative of conferences which is misleading.

This issue of planning is historically very important to get right because it plays heavily into arguments over events after the death of Wingate. What can be said to have been planned in 1944 was the entry of the Chindits into the strongholds in north burma and the advance of 16th brigade overland. Little in the way of firm plans beyond that existed or were followed.

Full explaination of the planning process would be very long. It would involve tracing events from August until March. It would require dealing with a large number of sources and seperating out decisions that matter from those that dont. Its not something to be done in a few hours. For those reasons, I advocate for a short direct version that explains the high level details of the operation but that does not depend on Slim's directive issued a month before the main operation was even launched. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 205.188.117.11 ( talk •  contribs) 18:42, 3 December 2005 (UTC)

You can sign you posts with 4 tildes ~~~~ and the system will automatically convert them to a name and time stamp. I think it would be better if you had an account but failing that the IP address with a time stamp is better than nothing.

Slim writes on pages 204,205, that by the end of November an overall strategic plan had been drawn and it was agreed at the SEAC level that the Chindits would be tasked "(V) To help Stilwell's advance, a long range penetration operation behind the Japanese opposing him, by Wingate's Special Force". Are you saying that Slim is mistaken and this is not what happened?

Slim writes on page 213 that the 7 point plan he highlights on 204 (Point V as above was the strategic use of the Chindits) was agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Cairo Conference at the end of Novemeber. Are you saying that Slim is mistaken and this is not what happened?

Slim says (P 213) only a week later to accomidate Stalin it was agreed that most amphbious forces were to be transfered to Europe and at the end of December the Chiefs of Staff informed Mountbattan that all amphbious craft were to be withdrawn to Europe and as Chiang Kai-shek had made his Yunnan offensive conditional on the amphbious landings they were gone as well. So he says on page 214 the plans were scaled back to:

1. an overland Arakan advance
2. an advance by Stillwell's Chinese on Myitkyina
3. "A long-range penetration operation by Wingate's force to help Stilwell
4. An advance on the "main front" (Central Front) in Assim by 4 Corps to the Chindwin.

Are you saying that Slim is mistaken and this is not what happened?

You can argue that the details of the tactical plans were not fixed until late in the process, and I don't think anyone would disagree, but what at the strategic level is wrong with what Slim writes, because it seems that Stilwell's operation with Wingate in support was the only stratigic constant from November on? -- Philip Baird Shearer 22:07, 3 December 2005 (UTC)

the french formed the C.L.I. ( FEFEO) commandos after the chindits [1]. it is worth mentioning in the article. Cliché Online ( talk) 10:27, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

I don't think that the two new section ("Medical services and sanitation" and "Discipline") introduced by This edit is supported by the source "Harrison , M., Medicine and victory: British military medicine in the Second World War" which is available in preview form with Google books seep pages 202-213 (not all of the pages are available but I think there are enough to give an reasonable overviews from the online cited source).

To give some examples. the first sentence "Wingate was later severely criticized for a disregardful attitude to medical services" well yes the source contain that but it says this is what others wrote. While not defending his behaviour the sources is not as condemning as some of the sources it quotes (see page 202). A much better approach to this issue is presented on page 212,213 where the author compares and contrasts Wingate and Slim's approach. It is generally recognised that Slim had a very progressive (and correct) approach to preventative medicine to reduce battle field casualties from disease. -- But as has been mentioned in other sources used in this article Slim had to order his offices to enforce the taking of quinine by their soldiers (see Slim: Relations with troops), so Windgate's attitude to the taking of preventative measures was not that unusual.

Another problem with this section is it fails to explain the difference between the first and second expedition eg "As there were no detailed stretcher bearers in the columns and often no means to evacuate sick or wounded men the alternative to marching was often being left behind." While this may have been true in the first expedition it was not true on the second one. Further because on the first expedition they had no means of air extraction, there was no means of evacuating sick or wounded men, so the alternative to marching or being left behind. The jungle terrain in Burma is some of the most difficult in the world, it would have been impossible for the fitter men to have carried their comrades for far.

So having read the source and looked at that section, I think that although the current wording is supported by the source, it does not present a fair description of the content of the source.

The second section is also not supported by the source and does not present a fair description of the content of the sources. The point is made in the source that some of the men who were sent to him were old (for soldiers), who had already been diagnosed as unfit for jungle warfare, so it suited Windgate and those men they they reported sick during training, as he had no use for them in the campaigns he was planning and they did not want to go. The paragraph does not read that way instead it reads that Windgate forced them to stay and flogged them if they did not perform.

The flogging sentence is very typical of the whole section what the source does is quote another source "Factors influencing Morale Unfavourably. ... Public Flogging of B.O.R.s. Greatly resented. Nothing but an exhibition of slavery. All agreed that the guilty men deserved their punishment, but the punishment should not have been implemented publicly in front of natives and coloured troops." But the source says in footnote "142 The only reference to corporal punishment anywhere in any sources available to the editor.".

So the source clearly does not support the statement "In violation of military law Wingate had men flogged during the first Chindit operation." Because

• (1) it does not say "Wingate had men flogged" or that it was contrary to military law
• (2) the quoted report "Psychiatric Report on 111 Ind Inf Bde, Special Force" that mentions flogging is talking about "Blackpool" which was a base in the second operation not the first.
• (3) the juxtaposition this sentence immediately after of the first two sentences implies the men were flogged for malingering, yet there is no evidence in the sentence that is true particularly as it is mixing up the fist and second operations.

I think both sections should be removed until such time that they are rewritten to present a fair and accurate summary of the content of the sources. -- PBS ( talk) 13:51, 13 August 2011 (UTC)

moved here as proposed above:

-- PBS ( talk) 12:30, 16 August 2011 (UTC)

I think that it is clear that the source is authoritative on the subject and it notes on page 202 that in view of the high rates of disease among his force some medical officers doubted his suitability for command (a very strong statement). Windgate's disregardful attitude to basic sanitation like latrines was, as the source says,arguably a black mark against him. The word "some ' and 'arguably' are not intended to, and do not IMO, justify IGNORING the very strong criticism of Wingate that the book notes was made by medical officers. Moreover, and as a senior medical officer is quoted as pointing out, senior officers (though it does not SAY ' Wingate' they mean him) set a very poor example with his own personal hygiene. Burma was an extremely unhealthy place but Windgate was not just a little old fashioned about medicine he was extremely eccentric and his force was decimated by diseases, some of which could have been prevented by standard procedures. He discounted medical advice, though he knew that on medical evacuation or even stretcher bearers would not be available and men died because of it. It is clear to the reader that the second expedition had medical evacuation a section is not required to stand alone in any case Overagainst ( talk) 19:46, 11 September 2011 (UTC)

Please read my comments in full. But to summarise to emphasise three points the sections I moved here were factually inaccurate particularly as they mixed up the first and second Chindit expeditions. The second is that the tone of the sections strongly imply that Windgate was way out on his eccentric own, yet it is clear from the comments in the section " Slim: Relations with troops" that this unfortunately was not true, that Wingate may have been at one end of a spectrum while Slim was at the other is true but there were a lot of officers nearer to Windgate on this issue than they were to Slim. I think that a much better and less POV presentation can be attained by using the information as it is presented on page 212 were the author compares and contrasts Wingate and Slim's approach.

For example did you know that when penicillin was first introduced in North Africa, its use to treat sexually transmitted diseases was resisted by the British high command, because they thought it should be used on the military wounded. Monty was only brought around when it was explained to him that it was the quickest way to extra get men back into the front line (21,000 in the first 2 months was the figure I think I read). In the same way (as explained on page 212) Wingate was willing to put more emphasis on evacuation in the second Chindit campaign because of the effects it had on morale within his force. Now that may be an amoral position to take, but is shows that Wingate was willing to heed medical advise if he though it had a direct effect on the military capability of his unit. So even if he was a mad as a march hare, Windgate was not very different from many other field commanders when it came to the medical care of his men. I just think that the two paragraphs as written are a hatchet job and biased against the man. -- PBS ( talk) 06:37, 12 September 2011 (UTC)

The point at issue is not an innovation like penicillin in relation to VD “As a result of bitter experience, the Army had evolved strict rules and regulations governing such matters as cleanliness of barracks, the preparation of food, and the purification of water supplies,” page 91. Montgomery gave a free hand to his medical officers who insisted on the importance of basic sanitary precautions but Wingate 'contracted a near-fatal bout of typhoid by drinking water from a flower vase' (which delayed the second Chindit operation by several weeks) (and) was accused of being 'contemptuous of hygiene and sanitation'" (p. 202). Wingate had a reputation for being wayward in those respects and the article should say so. Overagainst ( talk) 20:15, 12 September 2011 (UTC)

As I said I am not against the information being in the article, but it must be presented accurately and in a balanced way, which is why I suggest that it is done through comparing and contrasting Wingate against Slim of the medical care of the men under their command. -- PBS ( talk) 12:07, 13 September 2011 (UTC)

Today I removed a section on confusion to whom Windgate reported. Slim in "Defeat into Victory" on page 216 write "His force finished its training in India, and was now placed under my commad. I called Windgate to clear up several matters...". Slim goes on to say that Windgate announced that he felt at liberty to contact Slim's superiors directly if he did not agree with Slim to which Slim pushed a message pad over his desk to Windgate to call his bluff. -- Philip Baird Shearer 23:44, 1 December 2005 (UTC)

I wish you had not done that. This is another extremely complicated subject and taking Slim's "defeat into victory" as sole source isn't a good choice. The commanders themselves (including Slim) each had their own opinion as to who Wingate reported to. There are many issues with regard to Wingate where there is no "one" definitive source and careful wording is necessary to avoid taking sides. And Wingate did make contact with Slim's superior's directly. - anon (December 2, 2005). —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 ( talk •  contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

He was not the only one in that campaign who was a little caustic, Vinegar Joe was known to be difficult. But AFAICT Windgate reported to the 14th Army and that meant Slim. He may have chosen to talk to Slim's superiors, but that does not mean that the chain of command was not clear cut. Which in the case of Vinegar Joe was not true because he did have multiple commands. If you have a source which repudiates this and in fact Windgate did officially report to more than one commander during Operation Thursday, then please provide the source and integrate it into the text. -- Philip Baird Shearer 00:39, 3 December 2005 (UTC)

Please read what I wrote again. The question of who Wingate reported to is complicated. You have made a change based on one questionable source that is not by any means definitive. AFAICT means that you are the one that needs to produce more sources to back up the claim you are making. The original text reflected a great deal of ambiguity to do with the question. Your sources are not sufficient to resolve that ambiguity. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 ( talk •  contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

Why do you think that Slim is a questionable source and why is it not definitive? Can you produce another author to back up you assertion that Slim is a "questionable source that is not by any means definitive"? Do you have a source other than Wingate which confirms Wingate's view that his chain of command was not through Slim? Page 220 of D into V, Slim writes "[Windgate] made one last attempt to make me change by saying that he would not accept the order I had drafted. I gave him an unsigend copy of the draft, told hem to take it away, sleep on it that night and come back at ten the next morning, when I would give the same order signed. I told him I had never had a subordinate officer refuse an order, but if one did, I knew what to do. General Giffard happened to be visiting my headquaters and I asked him to be in my office the next day when Wingate came." Slim says that next morning Wingate accepted the order without comment. -- Philip Baird Shearer 15:57, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

Lundin, Walter B. (2002) Slim's Generalship in the 1944 India-Burma Campaign ( Abstract) confirms that Windgate reported to Slim. -- Philip Baird Shearer ( talk) 20:11, 14 March 2008 (UTC)

Historians and eye-witness accounts who show that Slim is a questionable source and not definitive include:

Air Marshal Sir John Baldwin (commander 3rd Tactical Air Force in Burma) General Tulloch (Chindit commander and close associate of Wingate) Brigadier Calvert (ditto) Brigadier Fergusson (ditto) Lord Mountbatten General Tanaka (Japanese general who opposed the Chindits whose testimony contradicts Slim's) General Mutagachi (ditto) Otto Heilbrunn (German military historian) Colonel Barker (military historian) Liddel Hart (ditto) Arthur Bailey (ditto) John Grover (GOC 2nd Division) Colonel Barton (military historian) Brigadier Peter Mead (ex-Chindit, co-author of Orde Wingate And The Historians which challenged the official history and the distortion, denials and misrepresentation Wingate's suffered in the history books) Sir Robert Thompson (RAF Liason officer with the Chindits & later counter-insurgency expert in Malaya and Vietnam; co-author of Orde Wingate And The Historians) Colonel Cane MC Brigadier Walter Scott (ex-Chindit) Louis Allen (historian & author of Burma, The Longest War) David Rooney (historian & author of Wingate And The Chindits: Redressing The Balance)

All of these commentators campaigned or wrote books against the image of Wingate presented by Slim and other figures such as Kirby. At the very least their testimony needs to be looked at. When Wingate died, Slim said of him:

"The number of men of our race in this war who are really irreplaceable can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Wingate is one of them. The force he built is his own; no-one else could have produced it. He designed it, he raised it, he trained it, he led it, inspired it and finally placed it where the meant to place it - in the enemy's vitals.

In all this he would have been irreplaceable, but he has accomplished his greatest work. He has forged the weapon, others may now wield it. From the force itself come his successors, imbued with his will and his vision.

We are proud to have WIngate's force as part of the Fourteenth Army. The men he led, his Chindits, know that the finest tribute they can pay to the great leader is to complete his work and to perpetuate in themselves his courage and his determination to strike to the utmost in their country's cause."

Why he changed his mind is dealt with in David Rooney's book. Pegasuswhiterose ( talk) 23:06, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

Is it worth merging the article Order of Battle of the Chindits with this one? It seems disjointed to have a section header with just a link to an article of lists. Or would a table here or drop down work better. Manytexts ( talk) 02:52, 30 August 2011 (UTC)

No I do not think it should not be merged. It is common for articles such as these to have "order of battle" articles. The section in this can be expanded slightly as per summary style. -- PBS ( talk) 09:02, 28 May 2013 (UTC)

This is a woefully inadequate article, which seems solely to peddle the revisionist line of Slim et al against Wingate. Detail of what LRP involved, detail of the campaigns themselves, accounts of the pro-Wingate campaign's historical assessment in response to the slur campaign since the war etc are all massively lacking. Moreover, some of it is just downright false and potentially slanderous. For instance, Wingate did not give orders on any Chindit campaign to leave the wounded behind. In the first campaign some wounded soldiers who could not be saved had to be abandoned, but when they could not be saved. Wingate never gave a blanket order that the wounded should be deserted (how could he? This was the British Army, for God's sake!. No proper army in the world would give such an order) and, as officer and historian Sir Roger Thompson made clear in his study of the campaigns, Make For The Hills (1989), Wingate specifically organised light aircraft to fly out his wounded.

Wingate was an austere but humane commander who inspired fierce loyalty in his troops. He also led from the front, which is more than can be said for many of detractors. At the very least this article should give both sides of the story about him, not just trade shallowly on the negative campaign against him.

Pegasuswhiterose ( talk) 08:22, 4 May 2013 (UTC)

True. One of the curious things about the critics of men such as Wingate and Montgomery is that the critics almost always display a complete lack of comprehension of the problems being faced. Often to those familiar with the circumstances the ignorance of their criticism is literally laughable.

... and Wingate wouldn't have needed to order men to be left behind, in the conditions and temperatures involved the men wouldn't have had the strength to carry the ill and wounded more than a mile or so. The men would soon have discovered this. So they all knew they could be left behind if they became ill or were wounded. There were few roads which is why motorised transport could not be used - only mules. And the mules were all busy carrying stores, food, water and ammunition. And the phrase 'a mile or so' is misleading, as in many of the hillier areas of Burma the terrain is made up of a number of consecutive ridges that all need to be first climbed, and then descended, that adds considerably to the distances 'as the crow flies' shown on a map. A journey that appears to be around five miles on the map may actually involve travelling eleven or twelve miles over the ground, often needing teams of two men with parangs or machetes hacking away a path through dense undergrowth all the way. Due to the exertion and heat involved, these men had to be rested frequently and replaced with another pair. Sometimes it might take a whole day to travel a mere mile or so. To someone back at GHQ unfamiliar with this sort of terrain this would seem outrageously poor slow performance. But you really did need to spend some time in the jungles of Burma to realise the difficulties.

... and during the monsoon season the men were constantly soaking wet, for weeks at a time, often when the column returned their uniforms were rotting on their backs due to the moisture. Webbing went mouldy and the brass fittings became green with verdigris. Illnesses suffered included dysentery, malaria, beri-beri, trench foot, prickly heat and various other skin rashes - sometimes these were contracted simultaneously, so a man might have both dysentery and beri-beri, and sometimes malaria as well. Dysentery gives you wet diarrhoea with loose stools, so toilet hygiene is difficult, if not impossible at times, as the men cannot help soiling themselves, it taking too long to unbuckle their kit and lower their trousers and underpants. And then where do you get the soiled things washed. You only have the water carried for drinking and Vickers gun cooling purposes. So unless the column happens upon a stream or watercourse in a quiet moment, no, toilet hygiene was not of the best by British Army standards. Then there were the leeches...

The point about Wingate's LRP columns was that they proved that it was possible to fight the Japanese and beat them in the jungle. Prior to this, the situation to many in the army seemed almost hopeless. Wingate proved additionally that you had to train the men specifically for jungle warfare. Sending men straight out from home was futile, as to the average British soldier the jungle conditions in places such as Burma, Singapore, etc., were completely alien to them and could be even frightening. However, as a famous soldier stated in the title of his book, The Jungle is Neutral, and could be overcome with proper training.

Criticism would be best left for those that left Burma and the rest of the Far East able to be invaded by the Japanese in the first place, and then failed to devise a suitable and effective strategy for evicting them afterwards.

BTW a good book on the experiences of one man in the Jungle campaign in Burma is; Safer Than a Known Way by Ian MacHorton. [2] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 ( talk) 21:23, 13 August 2013 (UTC)

He was second-in-command under Wingate, and was passed over in favour of Lentaigne. From what i have read, he played an important role in integrating the 70th Division into Wingate's force. Some mention should be made of him, and why he was not placed in full command on Wingate's death. EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 18:26, 5 March 2015 (UTC)