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Two comments by wreck investigator Bill Jurens bear on this argument, I think:
Yes, I have had a chance to look at the rudders in detail on at least two occasions. On one expedition it was actually possible to enter some of the spaces below the rudder compartment. The starboard rudder is very badly mangled and pushed forward and up into the bottom. It's very difficult to describe the damage -- it quite literally defies description -- but it's very clear that there is no possibility whatsoever of getting the starboard rudder to operate again. Damage to the center screw suggest that the immediate effect of the torpedo hit was to push the starboard rudder into the center propeller, which actually took some pieces out. Afterwards, the hydrodynamic drag was sufficient to push the rudder, the foundations of which were now very heavily damaged and distorted, aft again some distance. Some additional damage -- it's difficult to tell how much -- was probably done during the slide down the bottom. The port rudder is gone. A close-up examination of the break in the shaft suggests to me that it broke off almost immediately after the fatal torpedo hit -- it would have likely been almost broadside on to the expanding gas bubble and the fluctuations in pressure from the explosion coupled with hydrodynamic effects due to ship motion and propeller loads were more than the rudder stock could take.
You have been misled... Unfortunately, a great deal of rather imaginative interpretation of the 2001 Expedition videotapes, etc. has gone on, including clear mis-identifications of the projectile hit on Bismarck forward, the bogus torpedo hit near the catapult, and the second explosion of Hood's forward magazines. The same thing occurred when the aft torpedo hit was, via some survivor accounts, said to have been taken on the port side. This so confused me that we didn't actually even examine the starboard side, where the real torpedo hit occurred, until later in the investigation, wasting a good deal of valuable time. It's sad but true that in many cases these sorts of mis-interpretations have actually obscured the true picture rather than expanding it. Assuming the wreck interpretations are reliable is very risky business indeed.
In other words, the hit was starboard. End of.
--
Solicitr (
talk) 06:15, 14 January 2020 (UTC)
No, I'm NOT any sort of Pattison at all, nor do I care about any of them. I am simply trying to see that Wiki gets updated to take account of new information. What had been believed for decades about the condition of the rudders has to yield in the face of firsthand examination of the wreck's stern- where the initial Ballard dive had not looked. If Jurens (surely a RS!) says that he personally has observed that the port rudder is gone and the starboard completely mangled, why all this insistence on trying to overcome his observations with the Old Consensus which was based on educated guesswork? It's rather like continuing to list Bormann's fate as "unknown," when in fact his remains have been identified by DNA testing.
Solicitr (
talk) 15:06, 18 May 2020 (UTC)
Lucky you. Here like all "nonessential businesses" they are shut down until at least June 10. Solicitr ( talk)
It would be a lovely addition if it still exists, but https://www.britishpathe.com/record.php?id=12723 ("Newsreel footage of Bismarck's last battle") is no more. It has ceased to be. It is an ex-link. 98.247.102.214 ( talk) 05:03, 31 March 2020 (UTC)
Block evasion by User:HarveyCarter. |
---|
The following discussion has been closed. Please do not modify it. |
What about the allegations that the sinking was a war crime? Bismarck was sailing back to port and its crew tried to surrender: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1391220/Should-sunk-Bismarck-Tormented-sailor-reveals-German-sailors-tried-surrender-ship-destroyed-costing-2-000-lives.html — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.151.111.224 ( talk) 15:38, 24 May 2020 (UTC)
|
It's not a war crime to refuse a surrender offer, protection is only given at the point surrender is accepted and the men become prisoners. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 88.105.18.6 ( talk) 09:03, 16 March 2021 (UTC)
What is an "apparent" U-boat sighting? Is there any documentation of it? Perhaps the British just claimed this in order to get payback for the Hood by leaving as many survivors as possible in the water. (Does anyone have information about similar situations, whether German submarines would refrain from attacking Allied ships clearly picking up German survivors out of the water?) Historian932 ( talk) 14:26, 2 March 2021 (UTC)
For articles on naval battles, our general practice is that, if an already-sinking ship is hastened along on its way down by scuttling, the infobox lists the ship as "sunk", not as "scuttled" (see, for instance, the battle infoboxes for Battle of Jutland, Battle of Midway, Battle of Savo Island, and Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, each of which involved the scuttling of at least one already-sinking ship [Lützow, the four Japanese fleet carriers, Canberra, and Hornet, respectively]). Given that Bismarck was already on her way to the bottom when she was scuttled, this article's infobox should list her under the German casualties/losses as "1 battleship sunk", not "1 battleship scuttled", both for consistency with our general practice for these sort of situations, and because "1 battleship scuttled" is highly misleading (it implies that the ship sank only because it was scuttled, when, in fact, it was already going down from British gun and torpedo fire and the scuttling merely hastened the end) whereas "1 battleship sunk" is a neutral and indisputable statement of fact (absolutely no one in their right mind would try to seriously claim that Bismarck didn't sink). Whoop whoop pull up Bitching Betty ⚧️ Averted crashes 23:02, 1 December 2022 (UTC)
I see that you are going to repeat pushing the same POV that you pushed so long and hard at the talk page of
German battleship Bismarck. You are even copying in cherry-picked text from that talk page discussion. Sad.
In the most recent work by Garzke, Dulin and Jurens (2019), there are various instances of outright contradiction – caused presumably by different views from different survivors. In these cases the authors do not usually take a side, but merely present both versions – sometimes in the same paragraph - leaving the readers to ponder the implications. Unfortunately this does leave the door wide open to selective cherry-picking.
There are three different aspects to this discussion – the known engineering data, the results of the Cameron undersea investigation, and the survivor testimonies.
The known engineering data includes the second chapter, "Bismarck Joins the Kriegsmarine", where the authors speak of the Bismarck's "superb capability to absorb damage", due in part to the extent of the protected volume, and the many subdivisions into separate watertight compartments – "probably as many as 1500" compartments.(page 63-64 eBook). They also describe the torpedo protection etc in detail. In the section "Analysis: Bismarck's state at the end": at (pages 679-680 eBook) G&D&J speak again of the stability, subdivisions and metacentric height, and state that: "As a result, it was necessary to cause massive off-center flooding to capsize and sink a Bismarck-class battleship". This flooding was caused by the scuttling process, as per Footnote 19 of Chapter 19 – see below.
In the detailed underwater inspection, the Cameron team found no evidence that the armour deck had been penetrated, nor that the torpedo bulkheads had been penetrated. They concluded that the ship had not been sunk by gunfire or by torpedoes. They concluded that the ship had been scuttled. There have been no subsequent inspections to bring new information to light, and you cannot "assume" that the areas not currently visible contain huge numbers of penetrations.
The various survivor testimonies show several contradictions between the recollections of Statz vs everyone else. Statz was a machinist's mate, and his battle-station was in the damage control centre supporting senior officers such as Oels – the Executive Officer. Just a couple of examples for illustration:
There is mention of "extensive flooding forward and aft", but this clearly consisted of leaking from the battle-damage from Prince of Wales (on the bow), and from the aerial torpedo hit (at the stern). The ship had been listing to port ever since, but Bismarck's crew had been managing this successfully for days, including while steaming at high speed in a serious storm.
The sources agree that Oels gave the order to scuttle sometime between 09h15 and 09h30, at which point damage control and counter-flooding activities were deliberately halted and water-tight doors were opened, to allow the ship to sink. Even Statz confirmed this. G&D&J specifically mention the water-tight doors connecting the machinery spaces with the shaft alleys – at least two of which were long since flooded due to leaking seals, caused by the torpedo hit days earlier. Once those doors were open, the engine rooms etc would effectively have started slowly "flooding" through those seals, as well as with water coming down from above through the now-open hatches. Statz remained in the damage control centre for at least ten minutes after Oels gave this order, so the "progressive uncontrolled flooding" he spoke of would have been as a result of the deliberate scuttling process post 09h30 - the flooding had been controlled until then.
Notwithstanding, when the machinery spaces were abandoned half an hour later after setting the fuses, the lights were still on, the engines and generators were still running, and the survivors saw little water down below. The "progressive uncontrolled flooding" was thus clearly not a major issue until after the scuttling charges detonated.
Conclusion - the authors mention that the ship was sinking before the charges detonated – however slowly – but this was due to the deliberate opening of the water-tight doors and hatches after 09h15. Before 09h15, things were much different. Please avoid cherry-picking.
I agree that HMS Dorsetshire had 4 remaining torpedoes. However those cruiser torpedoes had been ineffectual up to then, so the possible effect of the last four torpedoes is highly speculative. The British aerial torpedoes were smaller and even less powerful, so they would have had even less effect, assuming the pilots could even hit the ship in those weather conditions. The cruiser guns had already been shown by G&D&J to be ineffective. Speculating on what would have happened if the Bismarck had not been scuttled, does not change the fact that Bismarck actually was scuttled.
The consensus has long been that the Bismarck was scuttled by its crew. How alternative realities MAY have worked out, is irrelevant speculation. Please cease your relentless POV-pushing. Wdford ( talk) 14:50, 8 December 2022 (UTC)
And so your POV-pushing is now reduced to concocting a very selective and self-serving "definition" of scuttling. Scuttling is where a ship is sunk by its own side – however they manage to do it. Contrary to your personal view, in the aftermath of Midway the USN carriers did not exercise undisputed surface sea and air control (assuming that this is at all relevant here), and certainly this was not the case either after Lexington suffered "severe, progressive, uncontrollable damage" in the
Battle of the Coral Sea. The British cruisers I listed above ALL suffered "severe, progressive, uncontrollable damage" in their respective engagements, which is why they were scuttled in the first place – otherwise they would have merely sailed slowly home to be repaired.
The G&D&J source clearly states that Oels ordered the damage-control countermeasures to be halted and the watertight hatches to be opened so as to allow the ship to sink, which obviously resulted in subsequent "progressive uncontrolled flooding" - "this command ensured that significant sinkage would occur, and down-flooding would start below". But you already know this. And surely nobody was expecting any crew members to evacuate the ship via the shaft alleys, were they?
You are also wrong about the pressure in the flooded shaft alleys. G&D&J plainly state in several places, including "Analysis: Bismarck's State at the End" (page 683 eBook), and in the Gerhard Junack section of the Survivor's Reports (pages 843-844 eBook) that the watertight doors to the shaft alleys were deliberately opened on Oels' orders before the fuses were set – and yet Junack etc survived. This was because the water was entering through damaged prop-shaft seals – the bottom of the ship was still intact, and the shaft alleys were not wide open to the ocean. Once again, your blatant WP:OR has been disproved by a simple reading of the sources.
Please quit this tiresome POV-pushing. Wdford ( talk) 22:15, 9 December 2022 (UTC)
And still you repeat your tendentious POV.
First, the leaks in the shaft alleys were small enough that the flooding was controllable. This would be obvious if you read the sources objectively, and without desperately cherry-picking sentences to support your POV. Where the G&D&J source contradicts itself, the picture does become a bit uncertain, but the source is actually very clear on this point, which it repeats more than once.
Second, the famous " uncontrollable flooding" came from the German crew having opened the hatches to deliberately allow water to enter the citadel from above, and opening the shaft alley doors to allow water to enter from below. This was combined with deliberately ceasing efforts to control the flooding, and all of this began at around 09h15 to 09h30. This deliberate effort to help the ship to sink, is part of the scuttling process. The G&D&J source is clear on this.
Third, the G&D&J source made it clear that Oels decided to scuttle when he was informed that the last of Bismarck's guns had been destroyed, and that the ship was no longer able to fight. The source repeated this fact multiple times. Again, you are desperately cherry-picking, and ignoring all statements which contradict your POV.
Fourth, the G&D&J source made it clear that the British battleships had been ineffectual in sinking the Bismarck by gunfire, and were now withdrawing. The G&D&J source made it clear that the cruiser guns were unable to sink the ship, and that the torpedoes were unable to sink the ship.
The RN abandoned wounded men in the ocean based on the purported concern that U-boats were in the area and were able to sink the British cruisers, and you added sources which confirmed this, so clearly the RN was not actually in undisputed control of the area.
So as we determined from the long discussion recently at German battleship Bismarck, your entire POV rests solely on your personal WP:OR definition of scuttling. Since WP:OR is not permitted, you have no case, and your POV has no base. Please cease this tendentious POV-pushing. Wdford ( talk) 23:21, 10 December 2022 (UTC)
Merely repetitive tendentious POV-pushing.
The water taken on from the battle which destroyed the Hood was minimal in relation to the buoyancy of the Bismarck, and this flooding had been easily controlled for about three days already, including during a long high-speed chase in poor weather. The sources are clear that the eventual "uncontrolled flooding" was started by the deliberate decision of the German commander to cease controlling the flooding, and to open all hatches so as to exacerbate this flooding.
They didn't open a hatch in a compartment above that is flooded. They opened all the sealed hatches that could be opened, and allowed uncontrolled flooding to start as the storm drove huge waves onto the deck. The sources state that Oels finally made the scuttling decision when all the guns were gone and the Bismarck could no longer fight. The Bismarck's guns were gone by 10h31, give or take a minute, so the decision was made then. The order to cease counter-flooding and open the hatches was given then, but detonating the charges took a bit more time. This is all perfectly clear from the sources, as you already know.
The sources state (in Appendix D – The Scuttling Debate; page 809 eBook), that when Tovey left the battle area in KGV, he was convinced that the Bismarck was sinking and would never reach port. However this was at around 10h20, after the down-flooding from the open hatches had been in progress for about 50 minutes, and the scuttling charges had long since been detonated as well. The final torpedo attack from the Dorsetshire took place when the scuttling had virtually sunk the Bismarck already, and the torpedoes that didn't miss, quite possibly impacted on the armour belt and did nothing. The final torpedo is said to have hit the superstructure, which by then was already under water.
Some of the deployed U-boats had expended all their torpedoes, but others were fully armed. The sources state (in Analysis – Bismarck's State at the End; page 679 eBook), that Tovey was "still frustrated at the inability to sink the Bismarck wreck. With the fuel situation in his ships a problem and worried about potential threats of an air attack from the Luftwaffe and a possible submarine attack, he finally ordered Dorsetshire to sink the wreck with torpedoes". Tovey had no idea of the location of the U-boats or how many torpedoes they had left, but the source is clear that Tovey did not feel like he had "undisputed control of the area". Not that this affects the reality that Bismarck was scuttled by its own crew. Wdford ( talk) 14:22, 12 December 2022 (UTC)
The Background section has an unsourced statement tht the Brits' reason for making Bismark such a priority was "to avenge the sinking of the "Pride of the Navy" HMS Hood in the Battle of the Denmark Strait". My impression is different: tht Bismark was a strategic threat, to Atlantic shipping; this was a first-class problem for the Brits; the threat justified maximum response; and the RN command decision was on that basis not pride / revenge.
The propoganda benefit from the sinking would also be of obvious great value, on the Home Front and elsewhere; but my understanding is tht that was a secondary consideration (at every level - RN command and national political). Any sources etc on this? - on the basis for the tactical, strategic and political decision-making? 84.9.118.19 ( talk) — Preceding undated comment added 16:39, 11 January 2023 (UTC)
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Two comments by wreck investigator Bill Jurens bear on this argument, I think:
Yes, I have had a chance to look at the rudders in detail on at least two occasions. On one expedition it was actually possible to enter some of the spaces below the rudder compartment. The starboard rudder is very badly mangled and pushed forward and up into the bottom. It's very difficult to describe the damage -- it quite literally defies description -- but it's very clear that there is no possibility whatsoever of getting the starboard rudder to operate again. Damage to the center screw suggest that the immediate effect of the torpedo hit was to push the starboard rudder into the center propeller, which actually took some pieces out. Afterwards, the hydrodynamic drag was sufficient to push the rudder, the foundations of which were now very heavily damaged and distorted, aft again some distance. Some additional damage -- it's difficult to tell how much -- was probably done during the slide down the bottom. The port rudder is gone. A close-up examination of the break in the shaft suggests to me that it broke off almost immediately after the fatal torpedo hit -- it would have likely been almost broadside on to the expanding gas bubble and the fluctuations in pressure from the explosion coupled with hydrodynamic effects due to ship motion and propeller loads were more than the rudder stock could take.
You have been misled... Unfortunately, a great deal of rather imaginative interpretation of the 2001 Expedition videotapes, etc. has gone on, including clear mis-identifications of the projectile hit on Bismarck forward, the bogus torpedo hit near the catapult, and the second explosion of Hood's forward magazines. The same thing occurred when the aft torpedo hit was, via some survivor accounts, said to have been taken on the port side. This so confused me that we didn't actually even examine the starboard side, where the real torpedo hit occurred, until later in the investigation, wasting a good deal of valuable time. It's sad but true that in many cases these sorts of mis-interpretations have actually obscured the true picture rather than expanding it. Assuming the wreck interpretations are reliable is very risky business indeed.
In other words, the hit was starboard. End of.
--
Solicitr (
talk) 06:15, 14 January 2020 (UTC)
No, I'm NOT any sort of Pattison at all, nor do I care about any of them. I am simply trying to see that Wiki gets updated to take account of new information. What had been believed for decades about the condition of the rudders has to yield in the face of firsthand examination of the wreck's stern- where the initial Ballard dive had not looked. If Jurens (surely a RS!) says that he personally has observed that the port rudder is gone and the starboard completely mangled, why all this insistence on trying to overcome his observations with the Old Consensus which was based on educated guesswork? It's rather like continuing to list Bormann's fate as "unknown," when in fact his remains have been identified by DNA testing.
Solicitr (
talk) 15:06, 18 May 2020 (UTC)
Lucky you. Here like all "nonessential businesses" they are shut down until at least June 10. Solicitr ( talk)
It would be a lovely addition if it still exists, but https://www.britishpathe.com/record.php?id=12723 ("Newsreel footage of Bismarck's last battle") is no more. It has ceased to be. It is an ex-link. 98.247.102.214 ( talk) 05:03, 31 March 2020 (UTC)
Block evasion by User:HarveyCarter. |
---|
The following discussion has been closed. Please do not modify it. |
What about the allegations that the sinking was a war crime? Bismarck was sailing back to port and its crew tried to surrender: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1391220/Should-sunk-Bismarck-Tormented-sailor-reveals-German-sailors-tried-surrender-ship-destroyed-costing-2-000-lives.html — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.151.111.224 ( talk) 15:38, 24 May 2020 (UTC)
|
It's not a war crime to refuse a surrender offer, protection is only given at the point surrender is accepted and the men become prisoners. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 88.105.18.6 ( talk) 09:03, 16 March 2021 (UTC)
What is an "apparent" U-boat sighting? Is there any documentation of it? Perhaps the British just claimed this in order to get payback for the Hood by leaving as many survivors as possible in the water. (Does anyone have information about similar situations, whether German submarines would refrain from attacking Allied ships clearly picking up German survivors out of the water?) Historian932 ( talk) 14:26, 2 March 2021 (UTC)
For articles on naval battles, our general practice is that, if an already-sinking ship is hastened along on its way down by scuttling, the infobox lists the ship as "sunk", not as "scuttled" (see, for instance, the battle infoboxes for Battle of Jutland, Battle of Midway, Battle of Savo Island, and Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, each of which involved the scuttling of at least one already-sinking ship [Lützow, the four Japanese fleet carriers, Canberra, and Hornet, respectively]). Given that Bismarck was already on her way to the bottom when she was scuttled, this article's infobox should list her under the German casualties/losses as "1 battleship sunk", not "1 battleship scuttled", both for consistency with our general practice for these sort of situations, and because "1 battleship scuttled" is highly misleading (it implies that the ship sank only because it was scuttled, when, in fact, it was already going down from British gun and torpedo fire and the scuttling merely hastened the end) whereas "1 battleship sunk" is a neutral and indisputable statement of fact (absolutely no one in their right mind would try to seriously claim that Bismarck didn't sink). Whoop whoop pull up Bitching Betty ⚧️ Averted crashes 23:02, 1 December 2022 (UTC)
I see that you are going to repeat pushing the same POV that you pushed so long and hard at the talk page of
German battleship Bismarck. You are even copying in cherry-picked text from that talk page discussion. Sad.
In the most recent work by Garzke, Dulin and Jurens (2019), there are various instances of outright contradiction – caused presumably by different views from different survivors. In these cases the authors do not usually take a side, but merely present both versions – sometimes in the same paragraph - leaving the readers to ponder the implications. Unfortunately this does leave the door wide open to selective cherry-picking.
There are three different aspects to this discussion – the known engineering data, the results of the Cameron undersea investigation, and the survivor testimonies.
The known engineering data includes the second chapter, "Bismarck Joins the Kriegsmarine", where the authors speak of the Bismarck's "superb capability to absorb damage", due in part to the extent of the protected volume, and the many subdivisions into separate watertight compartments – "probably as many as 1500" compartments.(page 63-64 eBook). They also describe the torpedo protection etc in detail. In the section "Analysis: Bismarck's state at the end": at (pages 679-680 eBook) G&D&J speak again of the stability, subdivisions and metacentric height, and state that: "As a result, it was necessary to cause massive off-center flooding to capsize and sink a Bismarck-class battleship". This flooding was caused by the scuttling process, as per Footnote 19 of Chapter 19 – see below.
In the detailed underwater inspection, the Cameron team found no evidence that the armour deck had been penetrated, nor that the torpedo bulkheads had been penetrated. They concluded that the ship had not been sunk by gunfire or by torpedoes. They concluded that the ship had been scuttled. There have been no subsequent inspections to bring new information to light, and you cannot "assume" that the areas not currently visible contain huge numbers of penetrations.
The various survivor testimonies show several contradictions between the recollections of Statz vs everyone else. Statz was a machinist's mate, and his battle-station was in the damage control centre supporting senior officers such as Oels – the Executive Officer. Just a couple of examples for illustration:
There is mention of "extensive flooding forward and aft", but this clearly consisted of leaking from the battle-damage from Prince of Wales (on the bow), and from the aerial torpedo hit (at the stern). The ship had been listing to port ever since, but Bismarck's crew had been managing this successfully for days, including while steaming at high speed in a serious storm.
The sources agree that Oels gave the order to scuttle sometime between 09h15 and 09h30, at which point damage control and counter-flooding activities were deliberately halted and water-tight doors were opened, to allow the ship to sink. Even Statz confirmed this. G&D&J specifically mention the water-tight doors connecting the machinery spaces with the shaft alleys – at least two of which were long since flooded due to leaking seals, caused by the torpedo hit days earlier. Once those doors were open, the engine rooms etc would effectively have started slowly "flooding" through those seals, as well as with water coming down from above through the now-open hatches. Statz remained in the damage control centre for at least ten minutes after Oels gave this order, so the "progressive uncontrolled flooding" he spoke of would have been as a result of the deliberate scuttling process post 09h30 - the flooding had been controlled until then.
Notwithstanding, when the machinery spaces were abandoned half an hour later after setting the fuses, the lights were still on, the engines and generators were still running, and the survivors saw little water down below. The "progressive uncontrolled flooding" was thus clearly not a major issue until after the scuttling charges detonated.
Conclusion - the authors mention that the ship was sinking before the charges detonated – however slowly – but this was due to the deliberate opening of the water-tight doors and hatches after 09h15. Before 09h15, things were much different. Please avoid cherry-picking.
I agree that HMS Dorsetshire had 4 remaining torpedoes. However those cruiser torpedoes had been ineffectual up to then, so the possible effect of the last four torpedoes is highly speculative. The British aerial torpedoes were smaller and even less powerful, so they would have had even less effect, assuming the pilots could even hit the ship in those weather conditions. The cruiser guns had already been shown by G&D&J to be ineffective. Speculating on what would have happened if the Bismarck had not been scuttled, does not change the fact that Bismarck actually was scuttled.
The consensus has long been that the Bismarck was scuttled by its crew. How alternative realities MAY have worked out, is irrelevant speculation. Please cease your relentless POV-pushing. Wdford ( talk) 14:50, 8 December 2022 (UTC)
And so your POV-pushing is now reduced to concocting a very selective and self-serving "definition" of scuttling. Scuttling is where a ship is sunk by its own side – however they manage to do it. Contrary to your personal view, in the aftermath of Midway the USN carriers did not exercise undisputed surface sea and air control (assuming that this is at all relevant here), and certainly this was not the case either after Lexington suffered "severe, progressive, uncontrollable damage" in the
Battle of the Coral Sea. The British cruisers I listed above ALL suffered "severe, progressive, uncontrollable damage" in their respective engagements, which is why they were scuttled in the first place – otherwise they would have merely sailed slowly home to be repaired.
The G&D&J source clearly states that Oels ordered the damage-control countermeasures to be halted and the watertight hatches to be opened so as to allow the ship to sink, which obviously resulted in subsequent "progressive uncontrolled flooding" - "this command ensured that significant sinkage would occur, and down-flooding would start below". But you already know this. And surely nobody was expecting any crew members to evacuate the ship via the shaft alleys, were they?
You are also wrong about the pressure in the flooded shaft alleys. G&D&J plainly state in several places, including "Analysis: Bismarck's State at the End" (page 683 eBook), and in the Gerhard Junack section of the Survivor's Reports (pages 843-844 eBook) that the watertight doors to the shaft alleys were deliberately opened on Oels' orders before the fuses were set – and yet Junack etc survived. This was because the water was entering through damaged prop-shaft seals – the bottom of the ship was still intact, and the shaft alleys were not wide open to the ocean. Once again, your blatant WP:OR has been disproved by a simple reading of the sources.
Please quit this tiresome POV-pushing. Wdford ( talk) 22:15, 9 December 2022 (UTC)
And still you repeat your tendentious POV.
First, the leaks in the shaft alleys were small enough that the flooding was controllable. This would be obvious if you read the sources objectively, and without desperately cherry-picking sentences to support your POV. Where the G&D&J source contradicts itself, the picture does become a bit uncertain, but the source is actually very clear on this point, which it repeats more than once.
Second, the famous " uncontrollable flooding" came from the German crew having opened the hatches to deliberately allow water to enter the citadel from above, and opening the shaft alley doors to allow water to enter from below. This was combined with deliberately ceasing efforts to control the flooding, and all of this began at around 09h15 to 09h30. This deliberate effort to help the ship to sink, is part of the scuttling process. The G&D&J source is clear on this.
Third, the G&D&J source made it clear that Oels decided to scuttle when he was informed that the last of Bismarck's guns had been destroyed, and that the ship was no longer able to fight. The source repeated this fact multiple times. Again, you are desperately cherry-picking, and ignoring all statements which contradict your POV.
Fourth, the G&D&J source made it clear that the British battleships had been ineffectual in sinking the Bismarck by gunfire, and were now withdrawing. The G&D&J source made it clear that the cruiser guns were unable to sink the ship, and that the torpedoes were unable to sink the ship.
The RN abandoned wounded men in the ocean based on the purported concern that U-boats were in the area and were able to sink the British cruisers, and you added sources which confirmed this, so clearly the RN was not actually in undisputed control of the area.
So as we determined from the long discussion recently at German battleship Bismarck, your entire POV rests solely on your personal WP:OR definition of scuttling. Since WP:OR is not permitted, you have no case, and your POV has no base. Please cease this tendentious POV-pushing. Wdford ( talk) 23:21, 10 December 2022 (UTC)
Merely repetitive tendentious POV-pushing.
The water taken on from the battle which destroyed the Hood was minimal in relation to the buoyancy of the Bismarck, and this flooding had been easily controlled for about three days already, including during a long high-speed chase in poor weather. The sources are clear that the eventual "uncontrolled flooding" was started by the deliberate decision of the German commander to cease controlling the flooding, and to open all hatches so as to exacerbate this flooding.
They didn't open a hatch in a compartment above that is flooded. They opened all the sealed hatches that could be opened, and allowed uncontrolled flooding to start as the storm drove huge waves onto the deck. The sources state that Oels finally made the scuttling decision when all the guns were gone and the Bismarck could no longer fight. The Bismarck's guns were gone by 10h31, give or take a minute, so the decision was made then. The order to cease counter-flooding and open the hatches was given then, but detonating the charges took a bit more time. This is all perfectly clear from the sources, as you already know.
The sources state (in Appendix D – The Scuttling Debate; page 809 eBook), that when Tovey left the battle area in KGV, he was convinced that the Bismarck was sinking and would never reach port. However this was at around 10h20, after the down-flooding from the open hatches had been in progress for about 50 minutes, and the scuttling charges had long since been detonated as well. The final torpedo attack from the Dorsetshire took place when the scuttling had virtually sunk the Bismarck already, and the torpedoes that didn't miss, quite possibly impacted on the armour belt and did nothing. The final torpedo is said to have hit the superstructure, which by then was already under water.
Some of the deployed U-boats had expended all their torpedoes, but others were fully armed. The sources state (in Analysis – Bismarck's State at the End; page 679 eBook), that Tovey was "still frustrated at the inability to sink the Bismarck wreck. With the fuel situation in his ships a problem and worried about potential threats of an air attack from the Luftwaffe and a possible submarine attack, he finally ordered Dorsetshire to sink the wreck with torpedoes". Tovey had no idea of the location of the U-boats or how many torpedoes they had left, but the source is clear that Tovey did not feel like he had "undisputed control of the area". Not that this affects the reality that Bismarck was scuttled by its own crew. Wdford ( talk) 14:22, 12 December 2022 (UTC)
The Background section has an unsourced statement tht the Brits' reason for making Bismark such a priority was "to avenge the sinking of the "Pride of the Navy" HMS Hood in the Battle of the Denmark Strait". My impression is different: tht Bismark was a strategic threat, to Atlantic shipping; this was a first-class problem for the Brits; the threat justified maximum response; and the RN command decision was on that basis not pride / revenge.
The propoganda benefit from the sinking would also be of obvious great value, on the Home Front and elsewhere; but my understanding is tht that was a secondary consideration (at every level - RN command and national political). Any sources etc on this? - on the basis for the tactical, strategic and political decision-making? 84.9.118.19 ( talk) — Preceding undated comment added 16:39, 11 January 2023 (UTC)