This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Archive 1 | Archive 2 | Archive 3 |
In 2015, the community decided at this RfC that Pakistan won the Battle of Chawinda. Pro-Indian editors disputed the RfC outcome on the administrator's noticeboard, and the outcome of this RfC close review was to confirm the Pakistani victory. In 2018, a talk page consensus decided that the battle was "inconclusive". At issue in this RfC is the question of which of the previous consensuses takes precedence.
Note: The Battle of Chawinda was the final engagement of the Second Kashmir War. It is common ground that the Second Kashmir War was inconclusive. The decision needed here is not about the outcome of the campaign, but the outcome of this particular battle within it.
Procedurally speaking, there is dispute about whether RfC nominators should sign their nomination. I'm choosing to sign this one.— S Marshall T/ C 12:56, 15 April 2021 (UTC)
Indian Centurions defeated the 264 tanks of Pakistan's First Armored Division, mostly Pattons", as Black states on the same page in his book. While the Pakistanis did put up a comparatively better show at Chawinda, as Black notes, none of these many sources have interpreted that to be a victory for Pakistan. The Indians continued to camp therein and continued to have possession of more than 500 square kilometers of Pakistani territory in that area. Regards, Aman Kumar Goel ( Talk) 02:32, 16 April 2021 (UTC)
A victory is not achieved from defence ..., and yet there are literally thousands of times in the past when it was a good defense that led to victory for the defenders.
... failure to achieve the objectives of an attack "may" constitute a defeat for the attacker but does not necessarily constitute a victory for a defender.Sorry, but that also is a ??? in my book. And it is not WP:SYNTH to conclude that when sources say "Pakistan's military did not yield Chawinda to India's military," and "India's military did not attack, take and hold Chawinda" that India's military was defeated and Pakistan's military was victorious. Nobody's putting words in the mouths of the reliable sources, which are crystal clear on these two facts. P.I. Ellsworth ed. put'r there 04:49, 16 April 2021 (UTC)
...when sources say "Pakistan's military did not yield Chawinda to India's military," and "India's military did not attack, take and hold Chawinda" that India's military was defeated and Pakistan's military was victorious.By this, a WP editor is observing facts and applying criteria that they have chosen to reach a conclusion. This is the very definition of WP:SYNTH. Regards, Cinderella157 ( talk) 09:26, 17 April 2021 (UTC)
Pakistan agreed generally with the depth of penetration claimed by India.[3] So, this fact is also not disputed. All that is disputed is the meaning of the battle.
The US defense attaché in Karachi argued, “if the Indians press their attacks, the Pakistanis will be faced with the possibility of a complete and humiliating collapse of their army and air craft.”[4] The press conference of Pakistani president on 15 September
instead of showing a defiant and resolute stance, degenerated into Ayub appealing for Johnson and the US government to intervene in the dispute. This appeal showed clearly to the world that Pakistan was now desperate to end the war despite all its official statements to date.[5] In the end, Pakistan accepted an unconditional ceasefire, the only kind of ceasefire India would agree to.
During the Battle of Chawinda, the largest armoured engagement since Kursk, Pakistani forces halted an Indian invasion of their country. In September 1965, the Pakistanis blunted a thrust by the Indian 1st Armored Division as each side fielded more than 250 tanks. Pakistani armor included the M48 and improved Sherman tanks of World War II vintage, while the Indians committed both Centurions and Shermans to the fight. When it was over, the Pakistanis had lost an estimated 44 tanks, while the Indians suffered up to 120 destroyed, although they later asserted that they had lost only 29 armored vehicles. [6]
Indian sources such as Abhyankar and Proudfoot, whose research is also widely used by M.A. Zaki in a paper for IDSA ( article), acknowledge Chawinda as a "failure" and "unsuccessful" operation for India.
In the overall context, the Chawinda attack was a failure and in the confusion after an unsuccessful operation, the valour of those who fought and died went unheard and unsung. But in the Regiment, the battle of Chawinda will always be remembered and honoured as one more example of bravery in the unending saga of Maratha chivalry. [7]
Grauer characterises Chawinda as a defensive victory favouring Pakistan:
Among the notable defensive victories, however, were the Soviet defeat of the Japanese at Changkufeng Hill in 1938, Japan's repeated failures to retake Henderson Field on Guadalcanal between August and November 1942, the Indian failure to defeat the Pakistanis in the tank battle at Chawinda in the 1965 war fought between those countries, and Egypt and Syria's ultimately unsuccessful assaults on Israel through the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights during the Yom Kippur War. [8]
Bajwa, published by Hurst, notes the Indian command referred to Chawinda as a disaster:
...with their successful defence of Chawinda, and the Indians' inability to take the town must have been demoralising for the troops. The casualties inflicted on Indian troops in the last assault on 19 September effectively meant that 1 Armoured Division was also no longer able to carry out major offensive operations from that date. It appears that tensions amongst the senior commanders of this operation did not assist and it seems that there was also a failure to command from the front, from brigade commanders down. The Indian commander on the whole western front was highly critical of his own forces: 'an indifferent leadership made disaster inevitable' (H. Singh, 157). [9]
Spencer C. Tucker, in his A Global Chronology of Conflict, concludes that while the 1965 war ended days later in a ceasefire without decisive results, Pakistan was the major victor in Chawinda:
The Indians then reinforce and push the Pakistanis back to their base at Chawinda, where the Indians are again halted on September 10. After the Indians defeat a counterattack, the Pakistanis take up defensive positions. Both sides now reinforce. Although the Indians substantially outnumber the Pakistanis in manpower, many of the Pakistani tanks are superior to those of the Indians, and their artillery has greater range. The Pakistanis are ultimately able to push most of the Indian forces back across the international border. Pakistan is the victor in the battle. Its army has prevented the Indians from achieving their objective of capturing Sialkot and cutting the main Grand Trunk Road, which would have cut Pakistan in two. [10]
If we look at commentaries (for the sake of discussion), e.g. The Guardian's piece on Hamid Gul:
As a tank commander in the 1965 war with India over Kashmir, he was credited with contributing to a Pakistani victory at the battle of Chawinda, holding back the Indian offensive towards Sialkot.
Independent: [11]
He was credited with contributing to what has been regarded as a victory for Pakistan in the Battle of Chawinda, by holding back the Indian offensive towards Sialkot. The action has been described as the greatest tank battle since the Second World War, and Pakistan commentators called it “the graveyard of Indian tanks”. Hostilities were ended by a UN ceasefire.
The Indian and Pakistani armies fought each other another 15 days, during the course of which both armies won their share of tactical victories — India in Phillora and Khem Karan, Pakistan in Chawinda — but none decisive enough to alter the ultimate result of the war. A ceasefire was called by the UN on September 22 and the Tashkent Declaration was signed between Ayub and Shastri in January 1966, thus bringing an end to hostilities. [12]
etc. Mar4d ( talk) 19:10, 15 May 2021 (UTC)
The Indians knew it was essential for them to take Chawinda; the Pakistanis knew that if they did, the ground between Lahore and Sialkot would open up for their further advance as there were no forces available for defence further west. On 12 September the Pakistanis tried without success to retake Phillora, and next day the Indians attempted to outflank Chawinda from the east but, in an impressive display of flexibility, the Pakistanis moved 19 and 20 Lancers and 1 FF (of 1 Armd. Div.) to its defence, and the Indian advance was halted after fierce fighting... An attack against Chawinda was planned for the 14th, but in a classic employment of good intelligence and efficient artillery the Pakistanis located the forming-up place of the Garhwali battalion that was to lead the assault and brought fire down on it. The battalion was forced to withdraw and the attack did not take place... On the night of 15/16 September the Indians again tried to outflank the main Pakistani force, this time by pressing west to Jassoran... then south to cut off Chawinda from the rear. Once the village was isolated, the Indians considered it would fall... but their armour was engaged so heavily by Pakistani anti-tank weapons that it could not advance further. The battalion held out until 17 September, when it was forced to withdraw to Jassoran... [13]
Mar4d ( talk) 11:42, 16 May 2021 (UTC)
Would hopefully like to help out the closer on this issue and ask some questions. This is not to generate more opinions on the matter, it's just to clarify what the outcome will be when this RfC closes. This RfC began as the direct result of previous talks above it. We are asked to choose between the RfC consensus of 2015 (which upheld the Battle of Chawinda as a victory for Pakistan) or the more recent discussion of 2018 (which decided to call the battle result "inconclusive" in the same manner as the war's outcome itself was inconclusive). It does not look like this RfC has come to much of an agreement on this matter, and I'm curious to find out what that "no consensus" actually means. Does it mean that the stronger consensus of 2015 should outweigh that of 2018? or will "no consensus" mean that the 2018 discussion's result will continue to prevail? Again, these questions are rhetorical and just try to sum up what may happen when this RfC closes. P.I. Ellsworth ed. put'r there 16:25, 2 May 2021 (UTC)
I agree that the OP made some comments about the old RfC etc. But they are of no consequence [...]
At issue in this RfC is the question of which of the previous consensuses takes precedence.I'd say that puts the old 2015 RfC and the 2018 discussion right at the focus of this RfC, which makes my questions quite valid, thank you very much. P.I. Ellsworth ed. put'r there 21:37, 2 May 2021 (UTC)
What do RS say? Slatersteven ( talk) 14:43, 15 April 2021 (UTC)
Pakistan troops were reported confident today of scoring a major victory in the Sialkot sector, where bitter fighting between Indian and Pakistani tanks continues." So are you trying to deceive people by spouting such misleading falsehood? The sources clearly assert that the battle was ended by the ceasefire, so how on earth could a WP:PRIMARY source from a wartime even relevant today? As for John Fricker, he was commissioned by the Pakistani government to write thier history of the war [7], and his book is full of propagandistic statements. He is far from being an independent authority on the war, and anything he says or claims will be taken with a bucket full of salt and grouped under the Pakistani claims wherever deemed necessary, given his association with the Pakistani government. This has been said time and again, so your willingness to resort to prevarications and obfuscation is rather unfortunate. On one hand, you peddle conspiracy theories that "Indians" somehow schemed among themselves to flout the RFC, and established a consensus of their own to get rid of the Pakistani victory in the infobox, which they detested, and on the other you engage in this POV pushing that Pakistan won the battle by using propagandistic Pakistani government sources.The more you speak, the more you betray the hollowness of your argument. You really have no case for changing the consensus. The outcome of the battle has been explicitly deemed to be inconclusive not by one, but multiple reliable sources. About which you have nothing to say. Srijanx22 ( talk) 13:57, 16 April 2021 (UTC)
I have now acquired and read through Zaloga [15] and Higgins. [16] Neither of them provides any citations for their claims, which is not surprising since they are not scholarly sources. Moreover, both of them seem to be part of the American defence-industry ecosystem. Zaloga is mentioned as a defence consultant. I couldn't find Higgins' main occupation, but his writings and media work are obviously targeted at the same clientele as that of the defence industry.
Zaloga's book was written in 1980, before any authentic histories became available. And his treatment lacks fidely for the same reason. For instance, he says that Pakistan's 7th Division was defending the area, whereas it was the 15th Division. He himself admits:
Objective assessments of the 1965 war are as yet largely unavailable, and what Indian and Pakistani accounts do exist are as often as not poisoned by propaganda and highly suspect. Particularly contentious are the various claims for enemy tanks destroyed and so forth. [17]
But he doesn't say how he is accounting for the 'highly suspect' propaganda. His coverage is essentially in line with the Pakistani propaganda and, in some cases, goes beyond it. Pakistan's 11th Cavalry, which "ceased to function as a complete regiment" according to a Pakistani analyst, [18] does not even find a mention in Zaloga's coverage. Particularly vicious is his comment:
The Indians made the ludicrous claim of 67 Pakistani tanks destroyed, which was well in excess of the total number in the area at the time.
The Pakistani analyst [18] points out that two tank regiments were operating in the battle (10th and 11th Cavalries), which should have amounted to 88 tanks, not to mention the additional 'tank destroyers' attached to the 11th cavalry. So the supposed reason for the Indian claim being "ludicrous" falls flat.
His summary assessment of the Sialkot front is:
The Pakistanis admitted losing 44 tanks in the Sialkot sector, but claimed 120 Indian tanks, and the British journalists saw no reason to doubt them. [19]
There is no comparable mention of the Indian admissions and claims, let alone any effort to balance the two. In my view, this source is wholly worthless for reporting any judgmental information or even factual information.
Higgins' book is more thorough, being written 2016. Several authentic histories of the Indian account became available by this time, including some serious self-critiques. [20] Much of this self-critique finds its way into Higgins's coverage. However, there is no comparable self-critique of the Pakistani side. So, it leaves one with the impression that the Indians did poorly while the Pakistanis were close to perfect. His summary assessment is:
Outnumbered Pakistani Pattons performed very well with 25th Cavalry and the regiments of 6th Armoured Division, as demonstrated by the division knocking out 180 Indian tanks for the loss of 61 of its own between 10 and 23 September, the latter figure comprising 31 M48s, 17 M47s, nine M36B2s and four Shermans; many of the Indian tanks were Centurions Mk 7s of 17th Horse and 4th Horse. [21]
Notice that the Pakistani toll went up from Zaloga's 44 to 61. So, it appears that some serious accounting information became available in the interim. But, the Indian toll went up proportionately, without any rhyme or reason! This is just formulaic propaganda. [b]
Both the authors know enough to recognize that there is a difference between tanks getting "destroyed" or "damaged". But the benefit of this distinction is applied only to Pakistan. Indian claims of what were destroyed vs. damaged do not even find any mention. Also interesting is the claim that the Pakistani Pattons were "outnumbered", whereas by Higgins' own accounting, Pakistanis were employing four regiments of Pattons against three regiments of Indian Centurions. There is not even a semblance of effort to indicate where the information of "180 Indian tanks getting knocked out" comes from.
On the whole, Higgins too is a partisan source, which can't be used for any judgemental information. -- Kautilya3 ( talk) 16:09, 19 April 2021 (UTC)
Another source touted as supporting the proposition of Pakistani Victory is Shahid R. Amin, a Pakistani foreign policy expert. [23] But Amin is not really claiming Pakistani victory. Here is an extended passage:
The Pakistanis took satisfaction from the performance of their air force as also from many individual acts of gallantry, particularly by the heroic defenders at Chawinda who were able to stop a major Indian thrust. Indeed, judged by a realistic yardstick rather than by romantic expectations of a victory over India, the very fact that Pakistan had been able to hold back a much bigger foe was in itself creditable. Pakistan's relatively good performance was, no doubt, due also to the military aid received from the US in the previous decade, ostensibly to fight communist aggression.... [24]
The source is characterising "victory over India" as a romantic expectation, rather than a realistic yardstick. (I whole-heartedly agree that the Pakistani achievement in holding back a much bigger foe is creditable. But that does not amount to a victory.) He himself explains on the next page:
Despite individual gallantry and a good performance by its air force, Pakistan had little to show as its real gains in the 1965 War. 'Operation Gibraltar' was faulty both in conception as well as in implementation. Even worse, Pakistan found itself drawn into a full-scalel war with India that it had not anticipated and for which it was caught unprepared, in the actual fighting the Indians managed to cut deep into the strategic Sialkot sector whereas, at the end of the war, Pakistan was in possession of some desert land. Pakistan's counter-offensive led by its armour failed to make any headway. However, in spite of this, the hype was such that the Pakistani people, by and large, thought that the war was actually being won, when perfidious, or at least weak-hearted, elements in the leadership had halted it prematurely in obedience to US commands. [25]
In this short but brilliant passage, he clarifies that the war was initiated by Pakistan, that it was unprepared for Indian retaliation, that India made deep inroads, that Pakistan could not push it back, but there was hype that convinced the Pakistani people that it had actually won the war! What more do I need to say? -- Kautilya3 ( talk) 18:57, 19 April 2021 (UTC)
Notes
References
Stalemate ensued after 19 Sep ; the Pakistanis stayed back and did not attack and the Indian troops got busy with refitting and rest
This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Archive 1 | Archive 2 | Archive 3 |
In 2015, the community decided at this RfC that Pakistan won the Battle of Chawinda. Pro-Indian editors disputed the RfC outcome on the administrator's noticeboard, and the outcome of this RfC close review was to confirm the Pakistani victory. In 2018, a talk page consensus decided that the battle was "inconclusive". At issue in this RfC is the question of which of the previous consensuses takes precedence.
Note: The Battle of Chawinda was the final engagement of the Second Kashmir War. It is common ground that the Second Kashmir War was inconclusive. The decision needed here is not about the outcome of the campaign, but the outcome of this particular battle within it.
Procedurally speaking, there is dispute about whether RfC nominators should sign their nomination. I'm choosing to sign this one.— S Marshall T/ C 12:56, 15 April 2021 (UTC)
Indian Centurions defeated the 264 tanks of Pakistan's First Armored Division, mostly Pattons", as Black states on the same page in his book. While the Pakistanis did put up a comparatively better show at Chawinda, as Black notes, none of these many sources have interpreted that to be a victory for Pakistan. The Indians continued to camp therein and continued to have possession of more than 500 square kilometers of Pakistani territory in that area. Regards, Aman Kumar Goel ( Talk) 02:32, 16 April 2021 (UTC)
A victory is not achieved from defence ..., and yet there are literally thousands of times in the past when it was a good defense that led to victory for the defenders.
... failure to achieve the objectives of an attack "may" constitute a defeat for the attacker but does not necessarily constitute a victory for a defender.Sorry, but that also is a ??? in my book. And it is not WP:SYNTH to conclude that when sources say "Pakistan's military did not yield Chawinda to India's military," and "India's military did not attack, take and hold Chawinda" that India's military was defeated and Pakistan's military was victorious. Nobody's putting words in the mouths of the reliable sources, which are crystal clear on these two facts. P.I. Ellsworth ed. put'r there 04:49, 16 April 2021 (UTC)
...when sources say "Pakistan's military did not yield Chawinda to India's military," and "India's military did not attack, take and hold Chawinda" that India's military was defeated and Pakistan's military was victorious.By this, a WP editor is observing facts and applying criteria that they have chosen to reach a conclusion. This is the very definition of WP:SYNTH. Regards, Cinderella157 ( talk) 09:26, 17 April 2021 (UTC)
Pakistan agreed generally with the depth of penetration claimed by India.[3] So, this fact is also not disputed. All that is disputed is the meaning of the battle.
The US defense attaché in Karachi argued, “if the Indians press their attacks, the Pakistanis will be faced with the possibility of a complete and humiliating collapse of their army and air craft.”[4] The press conference of Pakistani president on 15 September
instead of showing a defiant and resolute stance, degenerated into Ayub appealing for Johnson and the US government to intervene in the dispute. This appeal showed clearly to the world that Pakistan was now desperate to end the war despite all its official statements to date.[5] In the end, Pakistan accepted an unconditional ceasefire, the only kind of ceasefire India would agree to.
During the Battle of Chawinda, the largest armoured engagement since Kursk, Pakistani forces halted an Indian invasion of their country. In September 1965, the Pakistanis blunted a thrust by the Indian 1st Armored Division as each side fielded more than 250 tanks. Pakistani armor included the M48 and improved Sherman tanks of World War II vintage, while the Indians committed both Centurions and Shermans to the fight. When it was over, the Pakistanis had lost an estimated 44 tanks, while the Indians suffered up to 120 destroyed, although they later asserted that they had lost only 29 armored vehicles. [6]
Indian sources such as Abhyankar and Proudfoot, whose research is also widely used by M.A. Zaki in a paper for IDSA ( article), acknowledge Chawinda as a "failure" and "unsuccessful" operation for India.
In the overall context, the Chawinda attack was a failure and in the confusion after an unsuccessful operation, the valour of those who fought and died went unheard and unsung. But in the Regiment, the battle of Chawinda will always be remembered and honoured as one more example of bravery in the unending saga of Maratha chivalry. [7]
Grauer characterises Chawinda as a defensive victory favouring Pakistan:
Among the notable defensive victories, however, were the Soviet defeat of the Japanese at Changkufeng Hill in 1938, Japan's repeated failures to retake Henderson Field on Guadalcanal between August and November 1942, the Indian failure to defeat the Pakistanis in the tank battle at Chawinda in the 1965 war fought between those countries, and Egypt and Syria's ultimately unsuccessful assaults on Israel through the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights during the Yom Kippur War. [8]
Bajwa, published by Hurst, notes the Indian command referred to Chawinda as a disaster:
...with their successful defence of Chawinda, and the Indians' inability to take the town must have been demoralising for the troops. The casualties inflicted on Indian troops in the last assault on 19 September effectively meant that 1 Armoured Division was also no longer able to carry out major offensive operations from that date. It appears that tensions amongst the senior commanders of this operation did not assist and it seems that there was also a failure to command from the front, from brigade commanders down. The Indian commander on the whole western front was highly critical of his own forces: 'an indifferent leadership made disaster inevitable' (H. Singh, 157). [9]
Spencer C. Tucker, in his A Global Chronology of Conflict, concludes that while the 1965 war ended days later in a ceasefire without decisive results, Pakistan was the major victor in Chawinda:
The Indians then reinforce and push the Pakistanis back to their base at Chawinda, where the Indians are again halted on September 10. After the Indians defeat a counterattack, the Pakistanis take up defensive positions. Both sides now reinforce. Although the Indians substantially outnumber the Pakistanis in manpower, many of the Pakistani tanks are superior to those of the Indians, and their artillery has greater range. The Pakistanis are ultimately able to push most of the Indian forces back across the international border. Pakistan is the victor in the battle. Its army has prevented the Indians from achieving their objective of capturing Sialkot and cutting the main Grand Trunk Road, which would have cut Pakistan in two. [10]
If we look at commentaries (for the sake of discussion), e.g. The Guardian's piece on Hamid Gul:
As a tank commander in the 1965 war with India over Kashmir, he was credited with contributing to a Pakistani victory at the battle of Chawinda, holding back the Indian offensive towards Sialkot.
Independent: [11]
He was credited with contributing to what has been regarded as a victory for Pakistan in the Battle of Chawinda, by holding back the Indian offensive towards Sialkot. The action has been described as the greatest tank battle since the Second World War, and Pakistan commentators called it “the graveyard of Indian tanks”. Hostilities were ended by a UN ceasefire.
The Indian and Pakistani armies fought each other another 15 days, during the course of which both armies won their share of tactical victories — India in Phillora and Khem Karan, Pakistan in Chawinda — but none decisive enough to alter the ultimate result of the war. A ceasefire was called by the UN on September 22 and the Tashkent Declaration was signed between Ayub and Shastri in January 1966, thus bringing an end to hostilities. [12]
etc. Mar4d ( talk) 19:10, 15 May 2021 (UTC)
The Indians knew it was essential for them to take Chawinda; the Pakistanis knew that if they did, the ground between Lahore and Sialkot would open up for their further advance as there were no forces available for defence further west. On 12 September the Pakistanis tried without success to retake Phillora, and next day the Indians attempted to outflank Chawinda from the east but, in an impressive display of flexibility, the Pakistanis moved 19 and 20 Lancers and 1 FF (of 1 Armd. Div.) to its defence, and the Indian advance was halted after fierce fighting... An attack against Chawinda was planned for the 14th, but in a classic employment of good intelligence and efficient artillery the Pakistanis located the forming-up place of the Garhwali battalion that was to lead the assault and brought fire down on it. The battalion was forced to withdraw and the attack did not take place... On the night of 15/16 September the Indians again tried to outflank the main Pakistani force, this time by pressing west to Jassoran... then south to cut off Chawinda from the rear. Once the village was isolated, the Indians considered it would fall... but their armour was engaged so heavily by Pakistani anti-tank weapons that it could not advance further. The battalion held out until 17 September, when it was forced to withdraw to Jassoran... [13]
Mar4d ( talk) 11:42, 16 May 2021 (UTC)
Would hopefully like to help out the closer on this issue and ask some questions. This is not to generate more opinions on the matter, it's just to clarify what the outcome will be when this RfC closes. This RfC began as the direct result of previous talks above it. We are asked to choose between the RfC consensus of 2015 (which upheld the Battle of Chawinda as a victory for Pakistan) or the more recent discussion of 2018 (which decided to call the battle result "inconclusive" in the same manner as the war's outcome itself was inconclusive). It does not look like this RfC has come to much of an agreement on this matter, and I'm curious to find out what that "no consensus" actually means. Does it mean that the stronger consensus of 2015 should outweigh that of 2018? or will "no consensus" mean that the 2018 discussion's result will continue to prevail? Again, these questions are rhetorical and just try to sum up what may happen when this RfC closes. P.I. Ellsworth ed. put'r there 16:25, 2 May 2021 (UTC)
I agree that the OP made some comments about the old RfC etc. But they are of no consequence [...]
At issue in this RfC is the question of which of the previous consensuses takes precedence.I'd say that puts the old 2015 RfC and the 2018 discussion right at the focus of this RfC, which makes my questions quite valid, thank you very much. P.I. Ellsworth ed. put'r there 21:37, 2 May 2021 (UTC)
What do RS say? Slatersteven ( talk) 14:43, 15 April 2021 (UTC)
Pakistan troops were reported confident today of scoring a major victory in the Sialkot sector, where bitter fighting between Indian and Pakistani tanks continues." So are you trying to deceive people by spouting such misleading falsehood? The sources clearly assert that the battle was ended by the ceasefire, so how on earth could a WP:PRIMARY source from a wartime even relevant today? As for John Fricker, he was commissioned by the Pakistani government to write thier history of the war [7], and his book is full of propagandistic statements. He is far from being an independent authority on the war, and anything he says or claims will be taken with a bucket full of salt and grouped under the Pakistani claims wherever deemed necessary, given his association with the Pakistani government. This has been said time and again, so your willingness to resort to prevarications and obfuscation is rather unfortunate. On one hand, you peddle conspiracy theories that "Indians" somehow schemed among themselves to flout the RFC, and established a consensus of their own to get rid of the Pakistani victory in the infobox, which they detested, and on the other you engage in this POV pushing that Pakistan won the battle by using propagandistic Pakistani government sources.The more you speak, the more you betray the hollowness of your argument. You really have no case for changing the consensus. The outcome of the battle has been explicitly deemed to be inconclusive not by one, but multiple reliable sources. About which you have nothing to say. Srijanx22 ( talk) 13:57, 16 April 2021 (UTC)
I have now acquired and read through Zaloga [15] and Higgins. [16] Neither of them provides any citations for their claims, which is not surprising since they are not scholarly sources. Moreover, both of them seem to be part of the American defence-industry ecosystem. Zaloga is mentioned as a defence consultant. I couldn't find Higgins' main occupation, but his writings and media work are obviously targeted at the same clientele as that of the defence industry.
Zaloga's book was written in 1980, before any authentic histories became available. And his treatment lacks fidely for the same reason. For instance, he says that Pakistan's 7th Division was defending the area, whereas it was the 15th Division. He himself admits:
Objective assessments of the 1965 war are as yet largely unavailable, and what Indian and Pakistani accounts do exist are as often as not poisoned by propaganda and highly suspect. Particularly contentious are the various claims for enemy tanks destroyed and so forth. [17]
But he doesn't say how he is accounting for the 'highly suspect' propaganda. His coverage is essentially in line with the Pakistani propaganda and, in some cases, goes beyond it. Pakistan's 11th Cavalry, which "ceased to function as a complete regiment" according to a Pakistani analyst, [18] does not even find a mention in Zaloga's coverage. Particularly vicious is his comment:
The Indians made the ludicrous claim of 67 Pakistani tanks destroyed, which was well in excess of the total number in the area at the time.
The Pakistani analyst [18] points out that two tank regiments were operating in the battle (10th and 11th Cavalries), which should have amounted to 88 tanks, not to mention the additional 'tank destroyers' attached to the 11th cavalry. So the supposed reason for the Indian claim being "ludicrous" falls flat.
His summary assessment of the Sialkot front is:
The Pakistanis admitted losing 44 tanks in the Sialkot sector, but claimed 120 Indian tanks, and the British journalists saw no reason to doubt them. [19]
There is no comparable mention of the Indian admissions and claims, let alone any effort to balance the two. In my view, this source is wholly worthless for reporting any judgmental information or even factual information.
Higgins' book is more thorough, being written 2016. Several authentic histories of the Indian account became available by this time, including some serious self-critiques. [20] Much of this self-critique finds its way into Higgins's coverage. However, there is no comparable self-critique of the Pakistani side. So, it leaves one with the impression that the Indians did poorly while the Pakistanis were close to perfect. His summary assessment is:
Outnumbered Pakistani Pattons performed very well with 25th Cavalry and the regiments of 6th Armoured Division, as demonstrated by the division knocking out 180 Indian tanks for the loss of 61 of its own between 10 and 23 September, the latter figure comprising 31 M48s, 17 M47s, nine M36B2s and four Shermans; many of the Indian tanks were Centurions Mk 7s of 17th Horse and 4th Horse. [21]
Notice that the Pakistani toll went up from Zaloga's 44 to 61. So, it appears that some serious accounting information became available in the interim. But, the Indian toll went up proportionately, without any rhyme or reason! This is just formulaic propaganda. [b]
Both the authors know enough to recognize that there is a difference between tanks getting "destroyed" or "damaged". But the benefit of this distinction is applied only to Pakistan. Indian claims of what were destroyed vs. damaged do not even find any mention. Also interesting is the claim that the Pakistani Pattons were "outnumbered", whereas by Higgins' own accounting, Pakistanis were employing four regiments of Pattons against three regiments of Indian Centurions. There is not even a semblance of effort to indicate where the information of "180 Indian tanks getting knocked out" comes from.
On the whole, Higgins too is a partisan source, which can't be used for any judgemental information. -- Kautilya3 ( talk) 16:09, 19 April 2021 (UTC)
Another source touted as supporting the proposition of Pakistani Victory is Shahid R. Amin, a Pakistani foreign policy expert. [23] But Amin is not really claiming Pakistani victory. Here is an extended passage:
The Pakistanis took satisfaction from the performance of their air force as also from many individual acts of gallantry, particularly by the heroic defenders at Chawinda who were able to stop a major Indian thrust. Indeed, judged by a realistic yardstick rather than by romantic expectations of a victory over India, the very fact that Pakistan had been able to hold back a much bigger foe was in itself creditable. Pakistan's relatively good performance was, no doubt, due also to the military aid received from the US in the previous decade, ostensibly to fight communist aggression.... [24]
The source is characterising "victory over India" as a romantic expectation, rather than a realistic yardstick. (I whole-heartedly agree that the Pakistani achievement in holding back a much bigger foe is creditable. But that does not amount to a victory.) He himself explains on the next page:
Despite individual gallantry and a good performance by its air force, Pakistan had little to show as its real gains in the 1965 War. 'Operation Gibraltar' was faulty both in conception as well as in implementation. Even worse, Pakistan found itself drawn into a full-scalel war with India that it had not anticipated and for which it was caught unprepared, in the actual fighting the Indians managed to cut deep into the strategic Sialkot sector whereas, at the end of the war, Pakistan was in possession of some desert land. Pakistan's counter-offensive led by its armour failed to make any headway. However, in spite of this, the hype was such that the Pakistani people, by and large, thought that the war was actually being won, when perfidious, or at least weak-hearted, elements in the leadership had halted it prematurely in obedience to US commands. [25]
In this short but brilliant passage, he clarifies that the war was initiated by Pakistan, that it was unprepared for Indian retaliation, that India made deep inroads, that Pakistan could not push it back, but there was hype that convinced the Pakistani people that it had actually won the war! What more do I need to say? -- Kautilya3 ( talk) 18:57, 19 April 2021 (UTC)
Notes
References
Stalemate ensued after 19 Sep ; the Pakistanis stayed back and did not attack and the Indian troops got busy with refitting and rest