![]() | This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Archive 1 | ← | Archive 3 | Archive 4 | Archive 5 | Archive 6 | Archive 7 | Archive 8 |
Despite the arguments above, everyone does seem to have the same goal of improving the article. I acknowledge that the latter sections are the focus of the moment, but with that said I have started going through the article. Today, just the background section; I have a few comments:
Well, there is my food for thought for the day. EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 14:23, 1 July 2017 (UTC)
I think you are still trying to turn the article into a Monty bashing essay; all this is in his wiki article, it really doesn't need duplicating here, except for the fact that RS opinions differ and have changed since the 1940s. It's all there in the HofH section. As for collusion, I've been on the receiving end lately and wouldn't stoop so contemptibly low, I'm too vain. It seems to me that there are 3-5 editors and 2-4 broadly agree about content. I think that due weight has been given but the subject should get a short mention in the Analysis section too, since relations between Monty and Shaef had some influence on operations. Keith-264 ( talk) 15:39, 3 July 2017 (UTC)
The one thing that jumps out of the current version is "what about the Germans". They were not passive participants but were, at least the first part of the battle, trying to drive the Allies into the sea; eg there is really nothing on 21st Panzer's D-Day attack on the beachhead, or the German dispositions later in the battle, and the impact this had on the campaign. Aber~enwiki ( talk) 15:47, 6 July 2017 (UTC)
"...attacked Caen head on from the north under an overwhelming tonnage of 'air' which had torn the city apart; and three divisions had come grinding to a halt in the rubble along the line of the water barriers which divided the city in half. He was in Caen, but he had not taken Caen. The real prize, the dominating heights in rear, the plain behind them, and the road to Paris, which tactically were one, remained in German hands. Two minor failures, two major failures; redeemed so far by the success of the primary mission allotted to the British and Canadian Armies - to act as the honey to attract the German wasps. But by the second week in July, yet another failure imperilled everything they had so far done, and turned a serious situation into a critical one. The British and Canadian blood-letting went for nothing if the Americans failed in their part of the plan - to break-out of the bridgehead while the bulk of the German Army was elsewhere engaged, and to swing the whole Allied line through an angle of ninety degrees, with Caen as the pivot, and so push the German Army up against the Seine, where it might be destroyed in a great mobile tank battle. This was the over-riding idea, as originally conceived, but the Americans had failed again and again to break-out. Their last attempt had been timed to coincide with the British and Canadian head-on assault on Caen of July 7th, but by July 10th the Americans too had failed, and General Bradley reported that he would be unable to try again until July 20th at the very earliest; and in fact was not able to do so until five days after. The Allies were therefore pinned in a narrow bridgehead, ten to twenty miles deep, which was barely one-fifth of the area they had planned to occupy, and in fact needed to get, by mid-July. Every field was an arms dump; there was simply no room for many of the follow-up formations and specialized units. Hitler's strategy of not yielding one yard of ground, if it could possibly be avoided, had so far succeeded; and seemed to be on the verge of stabilizing the whole Normandy front altogether. If the bridgehead could be corralled off for another six weeks or so, the onset of autumn, and then winter weather, might well turn stalemate into disaster. Cherbourg was likely to be useless as a port for many months to come; the artificial harbours would probably not stand a winter storm, of twice the force which had smashed the American Mulberry and damaged the British one; and beach unloading would be a desperate and chancy business. In any event, tonnage unloaded would not anything like match tonnage required - for the Allied forces ashore had now grown almost to the strength of two Army Groups, one British and one American, controlling four Armies. But the German forces also had increased. At long last, Hitler and many of his senior commanders had realized that Normandy was the main Allied effort; that the VI bombardment of London had failed to produce a surrender or provoke an attack on the Pas de Calais. German infantry divisions, so far held in reserve, were being moved to the Normandy front; in the period of a few days just before and just after the attack on Caen of July 7th, no less than four German infantry divisions reached the front, three of them going into the line opposite the British and Canadians. Now, at last, much of the strategic armoured reserve - General Baron Geyr von Schweppenburg's Panzer Group West - could be pulled out of the line, to rest, re-fit, and prepare for its proper task; not limited local counter-attacks, but a massive counter-offensive to split the narrow bridgehead in two and destroy the British and Americans separately. The Americans being reckoned much the easier proposition, the German armour began to move away from the cemetery city of Caen and the bloodsoaked Odon stream, towards the American front, where Bradley's drive to take St Lo had collapsed, and where for at least ten days, and in fact fifteen, no major American offensive action was likely to succeed. If those panzer divisions were allowed to re-group in front of the delayed American breakout, there would be at very least no break-out; there might instead be a break-in. It was imperative to hold them, or at least the bulk of them, on the British-Canadian anvil of Caen; and to crack them there. A critical situation required emergency measures, improvised and unorthodox, and therefore open to criticism if it failed in any way. And this is the reason that Montgomery's last battle for Caen, Operation 'Goodwood', has provoked more criticism, much of it biased, and most of it ill-tempered, than all the rest of the Normandy battles put together." [McKee, pp.266-268]... The fiasco was naturally not publicized at the time, nor the terrible drain on the infantry which had reduced battalions to about half-strength. The British and Canadians had been prepared to take punishment for two or three weeks, while the Americans massed for the major break-out around July 1st; they had held the Germans for twice that time, and still the Americans could not get going. For his part, Bradley needed to be sure that his new break-out attempt, Operation 'Cobra', would really go; there was little time left for another failure. It was supposed to have been launched on the heels of 'Goodwood', to take full advantage of the flow of further German reinforcements to the Caen sector which would be the obvious result, win or lose; but the bad weather which set in after July 20 put back the date to July 24th, and then, finally July 25th. Weather was vital to 'Cobra', because the plan was similar to 'Goodwood' - attack on a very narrow front preceded by an enormous air bombardment. The Americans now had nineteen divisions in Normandy, facing a hotch-potch of German forces amounting to nine divisions (with 110 tanks, none of them Tigers). The British and Canadians had fourteen divisions facing fourteen German divisions (with 600 tanks, many of them Tigers). The only way to prevent some transfers to the American front was to make yet another threat to Falaise and the Paris road; this time, a hopeless one, head-on at the strongly-held heights. It was to be launched regardless of weather on July 25th and was called Operation 'Spring'. The infantry and armour of II Canadian Corps attacked at 0330, with the surviving British armoured divisions, 7th and Guards, ready to exploit a breakthrough...[McKee, p.314-315]
References
Keep your invective to yourself. Keith-264 ( talk) 17:10, 7 July 2017 (UTC)
"...Weigley managed to squeeze enormous detail about the 1944-45 campaign in the space of 730 pages. (Twenty-five percent of that space is devoted to the cross-Channel Attack and the Battle of Normandy.) He asserts that Montgomery, a commander he characterized as "altogether Britain's ablest general of the war," had originally intended for the breakout to occur on his 21 Army Group front, where the ground was decidedly more favorable to the deployment of armor. Although Mont- gomery carefully removed any obligation for a 21st Army Group breakout from the COSSAC plans, Weigley believes that he never ceased to contemplate the possibility. In support of this interpretation Weigley cites two sources-a memorandum written by Bedell Smith several months after the landings and the 21 Army Group plans for Operation Lucky Strike. Bedell Smith's memo indicates that Monty's claim merely to be drawing the Germans to his left flank was unknown to him until the end of June. At the same time, 21 Army Group planners were working on Operation Lucky Strike, which clearly involved a breakout to the east led by the Second British Army...
So we have no documentary evidence of a pre-invasion plan for a Commonwealth breakout via the Caen route, but instead we only have Weigley's "...interpretation...". As I and others have stated every Allied plan of operations had to prepare for all eventualities including a German collapse. So, of course, each thrust toward or around Caen had to plan for breaking through, yet the balance of forces, which were well known to Monty, via Ultra, made a breakthrough exceedingly unlikely. However, at the same time, those same balance of forces overwhelmingly favoured the US Army because the Germans had concentrated their armour and elite SS divisions to defend Caen, (and there is strong evidence that Monty had expected this). Monty for various reasons, would not interfere with the day to day planning and operations of the US Army in Normandy but it seems pretty clear that any Allied breakout would occur where the enemy was weakest, not where he was strongest; this simple idea seems to have gotten lost somehow but it is probably the oldest and surest maxim of military planning. Damwiki1 ( talk) 19:42, 7 July 2017 (UTC)
"...But to return to the campaign. My master plan for the land battle in Normandy I have described already. Briefly, it was so to stage and conduct operations that we drew the main enemy strength on to the front of the Second British Army on our eastern flank, in order that we might the more easily gain territory in the west and make the ultimate break-out on that flank—using the First American Army for the purpose. If events on the western flank were to proceed rapidly it meant that we must make quick territorial gains there. On the eastern flank, in the Caen sector, the acquisition of ground was not so pressing; the need there was by hard fighting to make the enemy commit his reserves, so that the American forces would meet less opposition in their advances to gain the territory which was vital on the west. In this master plan we were greatly assisted by the immense strategic importance of Caen. It was a vital road and rail centre through which passed the main routes leading to our lodgement area from the east and south-east. As the bulk of the German mobile reserves were located north of the Seine, they would have to approach our bridgehead from the east and would thus converge on Caen. To the south-east, between Caen and Falaise, was good ground for airfields. I was convinced that strong and persistent offensive action in the Caen sector would achieve our object of drawing the enemy reserves on to our eastern flank: this was my basic conception. From the beginning it formed the basis of all our planning. Once on shore and firmly established, I began to get this strategy working and after the heavy battles in the Caen area, and the overrunning of the Cherbourg peninsula, it began to take shape. I never once had cause or reason to alter my master plan. Of course we did not keep to the times and phase lines we had envisaged for the benefit of administrative planning, and of course, too, we didn't hesitate to adjust our plans and dispositions to the tactical situation as it developed—as in all battles. Of course we didn't. I never imagined we would. But the fundamental design remained unchanged; it was to that that I pinned my hopes and clung so resolutely, despite increasing opposition from the fainter-hearted. We did not capture Caen, for instance, till the l0th July and we did not finally clear the eastern suburbs till the 20th July. It had been my original intention to secure the high ground between Caen and Falaise as early as possible, as being a suitable area for the construction of airfields; but this was not vital, and when I found it could not be done in accordance with the original plan without suffering unjustified casualties, I did not proceed with that venture. This was not popular with the Air Command. It was indeed a fundamental object of my strategy on the eastern flank to establish a force strong in armour to the south-east of Caen in the area about Bourguebus; this was the key to ensuring that we kept the bulk of the German armour on the eastern flank, and thus helped the American expansion on the west. We did not get on to this high ground until Second Army launched Operation GOODWOOD on the 18th July, with armoured forces. As soon as the armoured advance came to a standstill because of determined enemy resistance, and also because heavy rain turned the whole area into a sea of mud, I decided to abandon that thrust. Many people thought that when Operation GOODWOOD was staged, it was the beginning of the plan to break out from the eastern flank towards Paris, and that, because I did not do so, the battle had been a failure. But let me make the point again at the risk of being wearisome. There was never at any time any intention of making the break-out from the bridgehead on the eastern flank. Misunderstandings about this simple and basic conception were responsible for much trouble between British and American personalities. Here, for example, is an extract from page 32 of Eisenhower's report on the campaign, dated the 13 th July 1945, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff: " Nevertheless, in the east we had been unable to break out towards the Seine, and the enemy's concentration of his main power in the Caen sector had prevented us from securing the ground in that area we so badly needed. Our plans were sufficiently flexible that we could take advantage of this enemy reaction by directing that the American forces smash out of the lodgement area in the west while the British and Canadians kept the Germans occupied in the east. Incessant pressure by the Second Army to contain the enemy was therefore continued by Field-Marshal Montgomery during July." The impression is left that the British and Canadians had failed in the east (in the Caen sector) and that, therefore, the Americans had to take on the job of breaking out in the west. This reflection on Dempsey and the Second Army is a clear indication that Eisenhower failed to comprehend the basic plan to which he had himself cheerfully agreed. All through the fierce fighting which took place in Normandy, there was never any intention of breaking out on the eastern flank towards the Seine; reference to all the orders and instructions which I issued makes that abundantly clear. This false conception existed only at Supreme Headquarters, and none of the senior officers responsible for the conduct of the actual fighting in Normandy, Bradley included, had any doubt about the true plan. The misconception led to much controversy and those at Supreme Headquarters who were not very fond of me took advantage of it to create trouble as the campaign developed. One of the reasons for this in my belief was that the original COSSAC plan had been, in fact, to break out from the Caen-Falaise area, on our eastern flank. I had refused to accept this plan and had changed it. General Morgan who had made the COSSAC plan was now at Supreme Headquarters as Deputy Chief of Staff He considered Eisenhower was a god; since I had discarded many of his plans, he placed me at the other end of the celestial ladder. So here were the seeds of discord. Morgan and those around him (the displaced strategists) lost no opportunity of trying to persuade Eisenhower that I was defensively minded and that we were unlikely to break out anywhere! In all the " curfufle " which developed on this issue Morgan was assisted by the airmen, because most understandably, they wanted the airfields on the eastern flank beyond Caen. And some airmen were only too glad to be able to suggest that something had gone wrong..." [my bolding for emphasis, and italics to show the quotes by Wdford]. On page 257 Monty explains how his GOODWOOD press conference in July gave the impression that GOODWOOD was an intended breakout, but that he and Bradley both agreed that the actual intentions of the operations had to be kept from the Germans.
"...In later years, some confusion would arise in the minds of military historians over the exact role Monty assigned his own forces in Overlord. There was never any confusion about his role at the time. Monty's self assigned mission was to seize Caen and the area south and east toward Falaise for the construction of Allied airfields and to give his ground forces a lodgement of sufficient size for resupply and maneuver. He did not ever envision a major "breakout" from his lodgement; the major breakout was to be conducted by my forces, wheeling as described; Monty would absorb the main shock of the enemy counterattack, pin down and kill as many of the enemy as possible (keeping them off my forces), providing the solid hub on which we would turn our wheel..." [ A General's life, p.234. My italics]. The exact timing of all of this was not entirely up to Bradley or Monty, since it depended on the German response: "...A key assumption in the Overlord plan was that after we had achieved overwhelming strength in Normandy the German armies facing us would make a gradual withdrawal to the Seine River, a natural defensive barrier. We also assumed that by that time the Germans would have awakened to the fact that Fortitude had been a deception, and the German Fifteenth Army would be shifted from Pas de Calais to the Seine for an all-out defense, the showdown battle for Germany. These were the prescribed textbook solutions to the German military battle in Normandy. But the Germans were not following the textbook. Hitler, still in pain and agony from the wounds he received in the assassination attempt, and distrustful of von Kluge's loyalty, had taken control of strategy on the Western Front. Against all military advice, he forbade withdrawal to the Seine. Not a foot of ground was to be yielded to the Allies. Not only that, he was hatching plans for a new and visionary counterattack that would shatter the Allies and drive us back into the sea. In preparation for this offensive, he released divisions from the Fifteenth Army at Pas de Calais to move to Normandy. Other units in southern France received similar orders. In all, Hitler committed some seven new divisions. Hitler had made the decision to fight the showdown battle for Germany not at the Seine, as we had anticipated, but in Normandy. It was the worst possible military strategy, one of the great mistakes of World War II..."[ A General's life, p.289 ]. This is not to suggest that Bradley and Monty didn't have some serious disagreements about the way the battle was fought and, for example, Bradley places the blame on Monty for not foreseeing the US Army's difficulties with the Bocage (as though Bradley was not an active participant in the planning, and as though there was any alternatives to placing the US Army where it was). And we can see that Bradley was also feeling the heat for the US Army's poor showing in July (First bolded segment below). Regarding GOODWOOD Bradley stated: "...Some historians have seized on these pronouncements, and others, to suggest that at this point there was a radical change in Allied strategy. That owing to lack of faith in the GI and the difficulty of the terrain facing my forces—the hedgerows and marshes—Monty had decided that he, not I, would mount the real breakout in good tank country and that Ike approved this change in strategy. This is not true. Monty's order to Dempsey's Second Army, dated July 15, clearly defines a limited offensive in which "a victory on the eastern flank will help us gain what we want on the Western Front." The aide he sent to the War Office also said, "All the activities on the eastern flank are designed to help the [American forces] in the west while ensuring that a firm bastion is kept in the east." What happened, I think, is that Monty promoted Goodwood to such a degree that Ike allowed himself to believe that it could develop into something larger than designed. At this point, Ike desperately wanted Monty to get moving. Goodwood was the first solid indication that Monty might really get moving. In his eagerness to buttress Monty's apparent resolve, Ike got a little carried away himself. Nor had Monty misled Ike into believing that he, Monty, had made a fundamental change in strategy—as some historians also suggest. Ike knew full well that the original Overlord strategy was still the guiding policy, that Goodwood was designed to support Cobra, the main breakout effort, and not the other way around. This is clearly shown, I believe, in an undated letter Ike wrote me on the eve of Cobra..."[ A General's life, p.274-275. My italics] and "...We viewed Goodwood as a limited thrust in support of Cobra and expected no more..."[A General's life, p.278. My italics]
![]() | This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Archive 1 | ← | Archive 3 | Archive 4 | Archive 5 | Archive 6 | Archive 7 | Archive 8 |
Despite the arguments above, everyone does seem to have the same goal of improving the article. I acknowledge that the latter sections are the focus of the moment, but with that said I have started going through the article. Today, just the background section; I have a few comments:
Well, there is my food for thought for the day. EnigmaMcmxc ( talk) 14:23, 1 July 2017 (UTC)
I think you are still trying to turn the article into a Monty bashing essay; all this is in his wiki article, it really doesn't need duplicating here, except for the fact that RS opinions differ and have changed since the 1940s. It's all there in the HofH section. As for collusion, I've been on the receiving end lately and wouldn't stoop so contemptibly low, I'm too vain. It seems to me that there are 3-5 editors and 2-4 broadly agree about content. I think that due weight has been given but the subject should get a short mention in the Analysis section too, since relations between Monty and Shaef had some influence on operations. Keith-264 ( talk) 15:39, 3 July 2017 (UTC)
The one thing that jumps out of the current version is "what about the Germans". They were not passive participants but were, at least the first part of the battle, trying to drive the Allies into the sea; eg there is really nothing on 21st Panzer's D-Day attack on the beachhead, or the German dispositions later in the battle, and the impact this had on the campaign. Aber~enwiki ( talk) 15:47, 6 July 2017 (UTC)
"...attacked Caen head on from the north under an overwhelming tonnage of 'air' which had torn the city apart; and three divisions had come grinding to a halt in the rubble along the line of the water barriers which divided the city in half. He was in Caen, but he had not taken Caen. The real prize, the dominating heights in rear, the plain behind them, and the road to Paris, which tactically were one, remained in German hands. Two minor failures, two major failures; redeemed so far by the success of the primary mission allotted to the British and Canadian Armies - to act as the honey to attract the German wasps. But by the second week in July, yet another failure imperilled everything they had so far done, and turned a serious situation into a critical one. The British and Canadian blood-letting went for nothing if the Americans failed in their part of the plan - to break-out of the bridgehead while the bulk of the German Army was elsewhere engaged, and to swing the whole Allied line through an angle of ninety degrees, with Caen as the pivot, and so push the German Army up against the Seine, where it might be destroyed in a great mobile tank battle. This was the over-riding idea, as originally conceived, but the Americans had failed again and again to break-out. Their last attempt had been timed to coincide with the British and Canadian head-on assault on Caen of July 7th, but by July 10th the Americans too had failed, and General Bradley reported that he would be unable to try again until July 20th at the very earliest; and in fact was not able to do so until five days after. The Allies were therefore pinned in a narrow bridgehead, ten to twenty miles deep, which was barely one-fifth of the area they had planned to occupy, and in fact needed to get, by mid-July. Every field was an arms dump; there was simply no room for many of the follow-up formations and specialized units. Hitler's strategy of not yielding one yard of ground, if it could possibly be avoided, had so far succeeded; and seemed to be on the verge of stabilizing the whole Normandy front altogether. If the bridgehead could be corralled off for another six weeks or so, the onset of autumn, and then winter weather, might well turn stalemate into disaster. Cherbourg was likely to be useless as a port for many months to come; the artificial harbours would probably not stand a winter storm, of twice the force which had smashed the American Mulberry and damaged the British one; and beach unloading would be a desperate and chancy business. In any event, tonnage unloaded would not anything like match tonnage required - for the Allied forces ashore had now grown almost to the strength of two Army Groups, one British and one American, controlling four Armies. But the German forces also had increased. At long last, Hitler and many of his senior commanders had realized that Normandy was the main Allied effort; that the VI bombardment of London had failed to produce a surrender or provoke an attack on the Pas de Calais. German infantry divisions, so far held in reserve, were being moved to the Normandy front; in the period of a few days just before and just after the attack on Caen of July 7th, no less than four German infantry divisions reached the front, three of them going into the line opposite the British and Canadians. Now, at last, much of the strategic armoured reserve - General Baron Geyr von Schweppenburg's Panzer Group West - could be pulled out of the line, to rest, re-fit, and prepare for its proper task; not limited local counter-attacks, but a massive counter-offensive to split the narrow bridgehead in two and destroy the British and Americans separately. The Americans being reckoned much the easier proposition, the German armour began to move away from the cemetery city of Caen and the bloodsoaked Odon stream, towards the American front, where Bradley's drive to take St Lo had collapsed, and where for at least ten days, and in fact fifteen, no major American offensive action was likely to succeed. If those panzer divisions were allowed to re-group in front of the delayed American breakout, there would be at very least no break-out; there might instead be a break-in. It was imperative to hold them, or at least the bulk of them, on the British-Canadian anvil of Caen; and to crack them there. A critical situation required emergency measures, improvised and unorthodox, and therefore open to criticism if it failed in any way. And this is the reason that Montgomery's last battle for Caen, Operation 'Goodwood', has provoked more criticism, much of it biased, and most of it ill-tempered, than all the rest of the Normandy battles put together." [McKee, pp.266-268]... The fiasco was naturally not publicized at the time, nor the terrible drain on the infantry which had reduced battalions to about half-strength. The British and Canadians had been prepared to take punishment for two or three weeks, while the Americans massed for the major break-out around July 1st; they had held the Germans for twice that time, and still the Americans could not get going. For his part, Bradley needed to be sure that his new break-out attempt, Operation 'Cobra', would really go; there was little time left for another failure. It was supposed to have been launched on the heels of 'Goodwood', to take full advantage of the flow of further German reinforcements to the Caen sector which would be the obvious result, win or lose; but the bad weather which set in after July 20 put back the date to July 24th, and then, finally July 25th. Weather was vital to 'Cobra', because the plan was similar to 'Goodwood' - attack on a very narrow front preceded by an enormous air bombardment. The Americans now had nineteen divisions in Normandy, facing a hotch-potch of German forces amounting to nine divisions (with 110 tanks, none of them Tigers). The British and Canadians had fourteen divisions facing fourteen German divisions (with 600 tanks, many of them Tigers). The only way to prevent some transfers to the American front was to make yet another threat to Falaise and the Paris road; this time, a hopeless one, head-on at the strongly-held heights. It was to be launched regardless of weather on July 25th and was called Operation 'Spring'. The infantry and armour of II Canadian Corps attacked at 0330, with the surviving British armoured divisions, 7th and Guards, ready to exploit a breakthrough...[McKee, p.314-315]
References
Keep your invective to yourself. Keith-264 ( talk) 17:10, 7 July 2017 (UTC)
"...Weigley managed to squeeze enormous detail about the 1944-45 campaign in the space of 730 pages. (Twenty-five percent of that space is devoted to the cross-Channel Attack and the Battle of Normandy.) He asserts that Montgomery, a commander he characterized as "altogether Britain's ablest general of the war," had originally intended for the breakout to occur on his 21 Army Group front, where the ground was decidedly more favorable to the deployment of armor. Although Mont- gomery carefully removed any obligation for a 21st Army Group breakout from the COSSAC plans, Weigley believes that he never ceased to contemplate the possibility. In support of this interpretation Weigley cites two sources-a memorandum written by Bedell Smith several months after the landings and the 21 Army Group plans for Operation Lucky Strike. Bedell Smith's memo indicates that Monty's claim merely to be drawing the Germans to his left flank was unknown to him until the end of June. At the same time, 21 Army Group planners were working on Operation Lucky Strike, which clearly involved a breakout to the east led by the Second British Army...
So we have no documentary evidence of a pre-invasion plan for a Commonwealth breakout via the Caen route, but instead we only have Weigley's "...interpretation...". As I and others have stated every Allied plan of operations had to prepare for all eventualities including a German collapse. So, of course, each thrust toward or around Caen had to plan for breaking through, yet the balance of forces, which were well known to Monty, via Ultra, made a breakthrough exceedingly unlikely. However, at the same time, those same balance of forces overwhelmingly favoured the US Army because the Germans had concentrated their armour and elite SS divisions to defend Caen, (and there is strong evidence that Monty had expected this). Monty for various reasons, would not interfere with the day to day planning and operations of the US Army in Normandy but it seems pretty clear that any Allied breakout would occur where the enemy was weakest, not where he was strongest; this simple idea seems to have gotten lost somehow but it is probably the oldest and surest maxim of military planning. Damwiki1 ( talk) 19:42, 7 July 2017 (UTC)
"...But to return to the campaign. My master plan for the land battle in Normandy I have described already. Briefly, it was so to stage and conduct operations that we drew the main enemy strength on to the front of the Second British Army on our eastern flank, in order that we might the more easily gain territory in the west and make the ultimate break-out on that flank—using the First American Army for the purpose. If events on the western flank were to proceed rapidly it meant that we must make quick territorial gains there. On the eastern flank, in the Caen sector, the acquisition of ground was not so pressing; the need there was by hard fighting to make the enemy commit his reserves, so that the American forces would meet less opposition in their advances to gain the territory which was vital on the west. In this master plan we were greatly assisted by the immense strategic importance of Caen. It was a vital road and rail centre through which passed the main routes leading to our lodgement area from the east and south-east. As the bulk of the German mobile reserves were located north of the Seine, they would have to approach our bridgehead from the east and would thus converge on Caen. To the south-east, between Caen and Falaise, was good ground for airfields. I was convinced that strong and persistent offensive action in the Caen sector would achieve our object of drawing the enemy reserves on to our eastern flank: this was my basic conception. From the beginning it formed the basis of all our planning. Once on shore and firmly established, I began to get this strategy working and after the heavy battles in the Caen area, and the overrunning of the Cherbourg peninsula, it began to take shape. I never once had cause or reason to alter my master plan. Of course we did not keep to the times and phase lines we had envisaged for the benefit of administrative planning, and of course, too, we didn't hesitate to adjust our plans and dispositions to the tactical situation as it developed—as in all battles. Of course we didn't. I never imagined we would. But the fundamental design remained unchanged; it was to that that I pinned my hopes and clung so resolutely, despite increasing opposition from the fainter-hearted. We did not capture Caen, for instance, till the l0th July and we did not finally clear the eastern suburbs till the 20th July. It had been my original intention to secure the high ground between Caen and Falaise as early as possible, as being a suitable area for the construction of airfields; but this was not vital, and when I found it could not be done in accordance with the original plan without suffering unjustified casualties, I did not proceed with that venture. This was not popular with the Air Command. It was indeed a fundamental object of my strategy on the eastern flank to establish a force strong in armour to the south-east of Caen in the area about Bourguebus; this was the key to ensuring that we kept the bulk of the German armour on the eastern flank, and thus helped the American expansion on the west. We did not get on to this high ground until Second Army launched Operation GOODWOOD on the 18th July, with armoured forces. As soon as the armoured advance came to a standstill because of determined enemy resistance, and also because heavy rain turned the whole area into a sea of mud, I decided to abandon that thrust. Many people thought that when Operation GOODWOOD was staged, it was the beginning of the plan to break out from the eastern flank towards Paris, and that, because I did not do so, the battle had been a failure. But let me make the point again at the risk of being wearisome. There was never at any time any intention of making the break-out from the bridgehead on the eastern flank. Misunderstandings about this simple and basic conception were responsible for much trouble between British and American personalities. Here, for example, is an extract from page 32 of Eisenhower's report on the campaign, dated the 13 th July 1945, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff: " Nevertheless, in the east we had been unable to break out towards the Seine, and the enemy's concentration of his main power in the Caen sector had prevented us from securing the ground in that area we so badly needed. Our plans were sufficiently flexible that we could take advantage of this enemy reaction by directing that the American forces smash out of the lodgement area in the west while the British and Canadians kept the Germans occupied in the east. Incessant pressure by the Second Army to contain the enemy was therefore continued by Field-Marshal Montgomery during July." The impression is left that the British and Canadians had failed in the east (in the Caen sector) and that, therefore, the Americans had to take on the job of breaking out in the west. This reflection on Dempsey and the Second Army is a clear indication that Eisenhower failed to comprehend the basic plan to which he had himself cheerfully agreed. All through the fierce fighting which took place in Normandy, there was never any intention of breaking out on the eastern flank towards the Seine; reference to all the orders and instructions which I issued makes that abundantly clear. This false conception existed only at Supreme Headquarters, and none of the senior officers responsible for the conduct of the actual fighting in Normandy, Bradley included, had any doubt about the true plan. The misconception led to much controversy and those at Supreme Headquarters who were not very fond of me took advantage of it to create trouble as the campaign developed. One of the reasons for this in my belief was that the original COSSAC plan had been, in fact, to break out from the Caen-Falaise area, on our eastern flank. I had refused to accept this plan and had changed it. General Morgan who had made the COSSAC plan was now at Supreme Headquarters as Deputy Chief of Staff He considered Eisenhower was a god; since I had discarded many of his plans, he placed me at the other end of the celestial ladder. So here were the seeds of discord. Morgan and those around him (the displaced strategists) lost no opportunity of trying to persuade Eisenhower that I was defensively minded and that we were unlikely to break out anywhere! In all the " curfufle " which developed on this issue Morgan was assisted by the airmen, because most understandably, they wanted the airfields on the eastern flank beyond Caen. And some airmen were only too glad to be able to suggest that something had gone wrong..." [my bolding for emphasis, and italics to show the quotes by Wdford]. On page 257 Monty explains how his GOODWOOD press conference in July gave the impression that GOODWOOD was an intended breakout, but that he and Bradley both agreed that the actual intentions of the operations had to be kept from the Germans.
"...In later years, some confusion would arise in the minds of military historians over the exact role Monty assigned his own forces in Overlord. There was never any confusion about his role at the time. Monty's self assigned mission was to seize Caen and the area south and east toward Falaise for the construction of Allied airfields and to give his ground forces a lodgement of sufficient size for resupply and maneuver. He did not ever envision a major "breakout" from his lodgement; the major breakout was to be conducted by my forces, wheeling as described; Monty would absorb the main shock of the enemy counterattack, pin down and kill as many of the enemy as possible (keeping them off my forces), providing the solid hub on which we would turn our wheel..." [ A General's life, p.234. My italics]. The exact timing of all of this was not entirely up to Bradley or Monty, since it depended on the German response: "...A key assumption in the Overlord plan was that after we had achieved overwhelming strength in Normandy the German armies facing us would make a gradual withdrawal to the Seine River, a natural defensive barrier. We also assumed that by that time the Germans would have awakened to the fact that Fortitude had been a deception, and the German Fifteenth Army would be shifted from Pas de Calais to the Seine for an all-out defense, the showdown battle for Germany. These were the prescribed textbook solutions to the German military battle in Normandy. But the Germans were not following the textbook. Hitler, still in pain and agony from the wounds he received in the assassination attempt, and distrustful of von Kluge's loyalty, had taken control of strategy on the Western Front. Against all military advice, he forbade withdrawal to the Seine. Not a foot of ground was to be yielded to the Allies. Not only that, he was hatching plans for a new and visionary counterattack that would shatter the Allies and drive us back into the sea. In preparation for this offensive, he released divisions from the Fifteenth Army at Pas de Calais to move to Normandy. Other units in southern France received similar orders. In all, Hitler committed some seven new divisions. Hitler had made the decision to fight the showdown battle for Germany not at the Seine, as we had anticipated, but in Normandy. It was the worst possible military strategy, one of the great mistakes of World War II..."[ A General's life, p.289 ]. This is not to suggest that Bradley and Monty didn't have some serious disagreements about the way the battle was fought and, for example, Bradley places the blame on Monty for not foreseeing the US Army's difficulties with the Bocage (as though Bradley was not an active participant in the planning, and as though there was any alternatives to placing the US Army where it was). And we can see that Bradley was also feeling the heat for the US Army's poor showing in July (First bolded segment below). Regarding GOODWOOD Bradley stated: "...Some historians have seized on these pronouncements, and others, to suggest that at this point there was a radical change in Allied strategy. That owing to lack of faith in the GI and the difficulty of the terrain facing my forces—the hedgerows and marshes—Monty had decided that he, not I, would mount the real breakout in good tank country and that Ike approved this change in strategy. This is not true. Monty's order to Dempsey's Second Army, dated July 15, clearly defines a limited offensive in which "a victory on the eastern flank will help us gain what we want on the Western Front." The aide he sent to the War Office also said, "All the activities on the eastern flank are designed to help the [American forces] in the west while ensuring that a firm bastion is kept in the east." What happened, I think, is that Monty promoted Goodwood to such a degree that Ike allowed himself to believe that it could develop into something larger than designed. At this point, Ike desperately wanted Monty to get moving. Goodwood was the first solid indication that Monty might really get moving. In his eagerness to buttress Monty's apparent resolve, Ike got a little carried away himself. Nor had Monty misled Ike into believing that he, Monty, had made a fundamental change in strategy—as some historians also suggest. Ike knew full well that the original Overlord strategy was still the guiding policy, that Goodwood was designed to support Cobra, the main breakout effort, and not the other way around. This is clearly shown, I believe, in an undated letter Ike wrote me on the eve of Cobra..."[ A General's life, p.274-275. My italics] and "...We viewed Goodwood as a limited thrust in support of Cobra and expected no more..."[A General's life, p.278. My italics]