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Having plodded through the article getting the citations right, I'm wondering if the narrative is too tactical and needs to be more operational and strategic in emphasis now that the "controversy" material has been added? The symbiotic nature of operations in the east end with those of the west end also need to be explicit. As Hart, S. A. points out, there are methodological problems implicit in many accounts because of the detail of Monty's strategic and operational thinking and his obfuscations for reasons which are sometimes understandable and sometimes not. The effect of Ultra intelligence needs a commentary since it was used extensively but not admitted for years afterwards, which also distorts accounts before 1974. Having parachuted most of this section in from other articles I'm beginning to think it was a waste of time. Keith-264 ( talk) 12:48, 19 May 2017 (UTC)

I think this is all very valuable material, and well worth the effort. You cannot have an article about a battle, and then not describe the battle - especially a battle as complex as this one. I do agree that we should maybe expand the Background and Prelude sections a bit more to better describe the strategic issues. However we don't want to over-duplicate with Operation Overlord though. Wdford ( talk) 14:04, 19 May 2017 (UTC)

At the very least the sections on battles need only to contain the detail that refers to Caen, which isn't tactical but operational. The risk of duplication with Operation Overlord you mention is already evident in the battle section with the main articles. Keith-264 ( talk) 14:19, 19 May 2017 (UTC)

Agreed re the individual battle sections - they have their own articles for the full details.

Some duplication with Overlord is inevitable, since the Battle for Caen was a major component of Overlord. However we should give only an overview of the strategy and of the context, not rehash the entire thing.

Wdford ( talk) 14:56, 19 May 2017 (UTC)

The Battle section is a rehash. Keith-264 ( talk) 14:58, 19 May 2017 (UTC)

No, its a summary of 8 articles about 8 separate battles, all of which together made up the Battle for Caen. You can't have an article about a battle, and then not describe the battle. It might be appropriate to prune out a few more words from each section, but the sections need to at least properly summarize the gist of each of those underlying articles about those component operations/battles.

The notability of the Battle for Caen rests on three main issues:

• The British and Canadians struggled for weeks to achieve an objective, which was defended largely by the schoolboys of the Hitler Youth, and they took heavy casualties in the process. For the British and Canadians, Caen was a very significant aspect of the Normandy campaign.
• Montgomery failed to achieve his original "master plan", and then he tried to lie his way out of this reality in order to save face. In the process he ruined his relationship with his boss Eisenhower, he undermined his credibility even further with his British colleagues, and he damaged his own legacy.
• In order to finally achieve the objective, the Allies bombed the town to rubble, in the process killing a great many French (ie Allied) civilians.

Everything else is detail, and most of it can probably be left to the various component articles. All that is required here are the appropriate summaries - which are already largely in place. A bit more polish is required, but I don't see a need to restructure the article.

If you remove the Battle section, with what do you propose to replace it?

Wdford ( talk) 22:16, 19 May 2017 (UTC)

Not remove, decide what it's for; at the moment it's a list with no concept of what the list is for, plus recent additions, most in the Analysis section which brings in matters of strategy, post-war squabbles about meaning, credit and blame not connected to the battle section. An example is the "failure" to capture Caen on day 1 and the need to keep attacking at the same time as not sacrificing the manpower of the Anglo-Canadians, until the Americans were ready to advance towards Avranches. As Hart points out, the thankless task at the east end went to plan and didn't, depending on which level of war the writer is examining and was determined by events in the west at the same time. The Second Army could have captured Caen sooner but this would have meant sacrificing a British war aim. As you point out, recriminations at the time and after obscure as much as they illuminate, particularly the over-emphasis on Monty when Dempsey and Crerar were no more ciphers than Bradley. Spiteful claims by Tedder et al. need to be put into context as much as Monty's preening. Caen was never an objective in itself, that was the Westheer. Keith-264 ( talk) 23:35, 19 May 2017 (UTC)

The OB West Situation report of 10–16 July referred to the capture of Caen on 10 July and the establishment of another defence line south of the Odon. If backseat drivers at Shaef can have their say, the Germans deserve a look-in, don't you think? The report also describes the loss of 3–5 km NE and NW of St Lo as an Allied failure. Keith-264 ( talk) 23:41, 19 May 2017 (UTC)

We know exactly what the list of operations is for – the battle for Caen was made up of a number of failed attempts to capture the town, as well as a couple of more successful attempts, which ultimately collectively resulted in the capture of the town. The context is given quite clearly in the lede and the background section and in the prelude section, although we can always make it even more explicit.

In addition, each separate operation section states somewhere in its content that "the objective was xxx". I think we should just polish it a bit so that each operation section states in the opening line what the objective thereof was, and that will pretty much solve the problem.

Nothing in war is "an objective in itself", but capturing Caen ASAP was very definitely an objective. Monty tried very hard to capture Caen as soon as possible, and incurred a lot of casualties in the process. He didn't deliberately incur all those losses while intending to fail to capture the town, merely as a decoy.

The Battle for Caen is notable because Monty intended to capture it early, failed to do so and then LIED ABOUT IT. It’s not unusual in war to fail to reach an objective – the opposition are after all trying hard to block you. The issue is that Monty’s ego and insecurity didn’t permit him to simply admit this and move on.

When you say "The Second Army could have captured Caen sooner but this would have meant sacrificing a British war aim", which war aim are you alluding to please?

As thankless tasks go, the Americans were always well aware that Monty allocated to the British units the easy beaches and the open terrain, while the US forces got Omaha and the bocage.

What context do you propose to add re Tedder’s "spiteful claims"? Tedder was well respected, competent, well informed and Monty's superior – how exactly were his insights "spiteful" please?

In what way were SHAEF "backseat drivers"? Monty had a boss, and could hardly demand that SHAEF should give him a million men and 6000 ships and then leave him alone to run a private war?

What is your point with this comment about the OB West Situation report please? The article already states clearly that Caen north of the River Orne was captured by 10 July.

Equally, the battles around St Lo were not part of the battle for Caen, and the detail of what the beaten Germans claimed about a completely different battle is hardly relevant here. Again, what is your point with this comment please?

Why have you added all the waffle in the separate "Colossal Cracks" subsection? There is very little here that is not already mentioned higher up already.

It is wrong to say that "Bedell Smith, Eisenhower and others claimed that the break-out from Normandy was supposed to come in the east" – Ike was Monty’s commanding officer, he was the commander of the entire invasion, and he knew better than anybody what the original plan was. He wasn’t CLAIMING anything, he KNEW.

Likewise, it is wrong to say that "Bradley refuted this in his 1983 autobiography". Bradley was very clearly referring to the revised plan, exactly as revealed by Eisenhower, which came about only after Monty realized that he couldn’t achieve the original plan. The issue of the British drawing the German response toward Caen so as to ease the US forces in their much harder job of reaching Cherbourg through the bocage is fair enough, except that the original plan was for Monty to CAPTURE Caen with its roads and bridges and thus draw a counter-attack, not to squander thousands of lives on the outskirts while leaving the Germans in possession of the town and its roads and bridges.

I think the "Colossal Cracks" subsection can be integrated into the Analysis section, and the duplication removed.

Wdford ( talk) 23:10, 20 May 2017 (UTC)

Notes taken at a meeting of Army Commanders and their Chiefs of Staff, at HQ 21st Army Group, 7 Jan 1944

Task of the British Army will be to operate to the south to prevent any interference with the American army from the east.

It is hoped eventually to get a firm lodgement from Caen to Nantes....p 20

Montgomery's notes for Brief Summary of Operation Overlord as affecting the Army. Given as an address to all General officers of the four field armies in London on 7 April 1944

Second British Army To assault to the west of the R. Orne and to develop operations to the south and south-east, in order to secure airfield sites and to protect the eastern flank of First US Army while the latter is capturing Cherbourg.

In its subsequent operations the Army will pivot on its left and offer a strong front against enemy movement towards the lodgement area from the east. Brooks, 2008, pp 68, 72.

Diary notes 7 June: Caen was not captured and it was clear that the enemy intended to hold it strongly and to try to drive in my eastern flank. p 118

Letter to Maj-gen F E W Simpson, 8 June: The Germans are doing everything they can to hold on to Caen. I have decided not to have a lot of casualties by butting up against the place.... p 122

Need I go on? Keith-264 ( talk) 00:03, 21 May 2017 (UTC)

• Brooks, S. (2008). Montgomery and the Battle of Normandy. Publications of the Army Records Society. Vol. 27. Stroud: The History Press. ISBN  978-0-7509-5123-4. Keith-264 ( talk) 00:09, 21 May 2017 (UTC)

No, you don't need to go on if you don't want to. This latest source makes it abundantly clear that Monty was trying to capture Caen initially, but that he changed his plan once the battle started because the opposition was stiffer than he had expected. That is exactly what Ike said, and what I have been saying all along.

The initial plan was to capture Caen and use it as a base for the shielding of the peninsular, as well as to get the airfields to facilitate forward air support. In reality he failed to take Caen and had to operate as a distraction from outside the town instead. No real problem there, except that he decided to cover up this failure by lying about his original intentions. The second problem is that he failed to capture the airfields, which further upset Tedder and US Tactical Air commander Pete Quesada, as well as all the American ground commanders who then had to cope with reduced air support.

Also interesting is that he seemingly told Simpson that he had decide to stop "butting up against the place" in order to conserve casualties, but he nonetheless thereafter ran 8 operations to capture Caen, and suffered serious casualties in the process. More Monty Doublespeak?

PS: What about all my other questions and suggestions please? Wdford ( talk) 12:28, 21 May 2017 (UTC)

This?

• Notes taken at a meeting of Army Commanders and their Chiefs of Staff, at HQ 21st Army Group, 7 Jan 1944

Task of the British Army will be to operate to the south to prevent any interference with the American army from the east.

It is hoped eventually to get a firm lodgement from Caen to Nantes....p 20

on 7 JAN 44? As below, I suggest that we list the views of the RS in chronological order and avoid WP:Synth by arguing about their significance or accuracy. I don't have anything to say about the rest of your comment because it looks like advocacy. If you look at Hart, he makes it abundantly clear that Caen wasn't an end in itself, the same as Monty's pre-invasion records etc; the strategy was attritional not territorial. See D'Este too. Keith-264 ( talk) 13:09, 21 May 2017 (UTC)

Let me help you. Since you like Hart so much, in his book “Montgomery and "Colossal Cracks": The 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944–45” (2000), Stephen Hart includes the following revealing statements:

• Pg 69: Montgomery initially remained prepared to push Second (British) Army hard to capture the vital strategic town of Caen, and consequently incur heavy losses. (emphasis mine)
• Pg 72: Montgomery was more prepared to incur heavy casualties both before the capture of the strategically vital town of Caen, and in mid-August when attempting to close the Falaise pocket. (emphasis mine)
• Pg 81: Another problem with interpreting the Field Marshal’s stated intentions was that he sometimes misled his colleagues – Eisenhower especially – about these aims. (Note that Hart is pussy-footing a bit here – Ike was not Monty’s “colleague”, Ike was Monty’s COMMANDER.)
• Pg 86: However, this is far removed from Montgomery’s totally specious claim that the Normandy campaign went "exactly as planned". (Go look up the word "specious" – it’s well worth it.)

Re the statement "It is hoped eventually to get a firm lodgement from Caen to Nantes" – yes, exactly so. The plan was to CAPTURE every town from Caen to Nantes, not to swan around in front of them taking massive casualties merely as a decoy. Interesting, the British were to take Caen and the US were to take all the other towns, all the way down the Brittany coast. Obviously capturing Caen wasn't an end in itself, but as Hart and many others have clearly stated, Caen was a vital objective, and Monty therefore shed a lot of Allied blood over the course of many weeks in trying to capture it.

Wdford ( talk) 17:56, 21 May 2017 (UTC)

See what I mean? You're paraphrasing the Colossal Cracks section I put in the Analysis and pushing a POV (and missing the subtlety of Hart's thesis); it's like reading a throwback to the 1970s. Again I suggest we put our disagreements to one side and describe what the RS say in chronological order. Once done, we can decide if they would be better reorganised thematically. Arguing about Monty's intentions is pointless from the Wiki point of view since we aren't the RS, merely reporters. Keith-264 ( talk) 19:25, 21 May 2017 (UTC)

I’m not arguing or paraphrasing, I am quoting Hart verbatim – because it seems from your comments above that you have somehow missed those various statements. Hart is very pro-Monty, hence his use of nice euphemisms like "specious", but he makes it clear that Caen was originally seen to be a vital objective, and that Monty subsequently lied a lot – the facts do not leave a lot of room for subtlety there, and in this Hart is supported by almost all the reliable sources.

Your Colossal Cracks sub-section reads like an apologetic for Monty, but in reality everyone accepts that Monty needed to adjust his strategy once on the ground – which was actually a welcome improvement from the traditional British cannon-fodder approach. Nonetheless, the British Army still launched assault after assault on Caen, and incurred many casualties. Some authors liken the battles around Caen to the trench warfare of Flanders 20-odd years earlier.

The main issue from Monty’s view was that all his British and American detractors (ie just about everyone) was complaining about the failure of his original plan, Washington was apparently calling for Ike to sack Monty and take charge himself, Churchill was apparently on the brink of sacking Monty as well, and thus Monty felt the need to "pretend" that everything was actually going according to plan. He got caught out, inevitably, and therefore despite the best intentions of the "British School", his credibility (and his legacy) suffered severely. It goes without saying that an officer should never lie to his commander, and Monty's willingness to repeatedly lie to all and sundry - including his superiors - would have seen him court-martialed had it occurred in less-politicized circumstances.

"The subtlety of Hart's thesis" is that he tries to smooth over the failures and the lies by stating that the Normandy invasion was ultimately a success, and therefore "all’s well that ends well". Nobody is disputing that it turned out well in the end – unless you were one of the tens of thousands who died in the effort – but Caen is largely notable for the serious negative impact it had on Monty’s reputation, so this needs to be addressed honestly.

I see no point in "listing" the various RS comments, or having a separate subsection for the Colossal Cracks. The fact that Monty "evolved" the overall plan in the face of unexpectedly solid German resistance is common sense and common cause, and it needs only to be mentioned once, not repeatedly as at present. We should then also group together all the many sources that report Monty’s subsequent mendacity, as that is the more notable issue.

The horrific casualties caused to Allied (French) civilians by Allied bombing deserves a section of its own, not to be buried deep below the apologetics.

We should probably mention in the Atrocities section that British and Canadian troops were also guilty of repeated instances of murdering prisoners.

Wdford ( talk) 08:20, 22 May 2017 (UTC)

This is advocacy and almost as specious as Monty! It is not for us to judge the RS, that is against NPOV and will amount to WP:Synth. If you think that Hart is suspect then look at D'Este on the significance of Caen. Notice also that you ignore the necessity to attack in the east because of the time it took the First Army to be capable of fighting Operation Cobra. According to you, the attacks in the east were all failures because Monty was crap and the delays in the west were all circumstantial. I put Colossal Cracks into a separate section because of its significance relative to the litany of complaints in your sources and the POV pushing inherent in trying to make a point, rather than illustrate the ones in the RS according to an objective system such as chronology or theme. When I get my copy of D'Este out of storage, I will add that to the analysis and think again. I suggest that you have another look at Hart chapters 4 and 5, particularly from p. 71to get a better idea of his thesis. You also could do worse than learn something about the tactical and operational excellence achieved by the BEF in 1917. Much of what you are critical of is the logic of firepower warfare. What did you make of the facts quoted from Brooks (2008)?

• Notice that Monty inherited the Overlord plan and rejected it as too small? Notice "It is hoped eventually to get a firm lodgement from Caen to Nantes." (7 January 1944)? What you seem to have overlooked are the differences between strategy, operations and tactics. I can't see the point of discussing it further and I fear that unilateral alterations to the Analysis are going to be challenged for the reasons outlined above. Notice also that the sections on the operations by the Anglo-Canadians are make-weights (mostly parachuted in by me) and need re-editing to make them relevant to the article. Without agreement on a concept of what the article is for, were heading for trouble in that section too. Regards Keith-264 ( talk) 09:01, 22 May 2017 (UTC)

No, this is directly taken from reliable sources – including your favourite Stephen Hart. Hart specifically says (several times) that Caen was a vital objective, and that the original intention was to take it ASAP.

I am not the one who is POV pushing here. Creating a separate section to highlight points that support your POV while ignoring an inconvenient fact from the RS, is in fact blatant POV.

I do not ignore the necessity to attack in the east – that is clearly mentioned in the article already.

The attacks in the east were failures because they failed in the objective to capture Caen – the effect of drawing in the German reserves is valid and useful, but was not the only objective, and you cannot pretend otherwise. Ike was in command, and when Ike complained that Monty was repeatedly failing to capture Caen, it illustrates that capturing Caen was an important issue.

The facts quoted from Brooks do not in any way deviate from the fact that the original plan was to capture Caen on day 1, and that the Second Army continued hammering away for weeks thereafter to achieve that vital objective.

I have been calling throughout for an objective system for the Analysis section, but I prefer theme to chronology, because it is more coherent. The themes need at a minimum to be as follows:

• Monty took forever to achieve his D-Day objective of capturing the vital strategic objective of Caen, and here are the reasons why he failed.
• Despite all this failing, they did at least draw in the German reserves. This was valuable according to the REVISED plan, which was to ask the US forces to achieve the breakout instead.
• Monty lied and lied and lied throughout, including to his commanding officer, in order to disguise the fact that he was not achieving the original objectives. This ruined his relationship with Ike, who replaced him as Land Forces Commander officially in September, but effectively on 1 August when Patton landed and Bradley assumed command of the expanded US forces.

The logic of firepower is impeccable, but you can only control a town once you have captured it. In the Pacific, the US Navy would blow atolls completely off the map where possible, to avoid the casualties of a land invasion, but you cannot do that if you want to use that atoll for an airbase going forward.

Getting “a firm lodgement from Caen to Nantes” required CAPTURING those towns, not just dying in large numbers on their outskirts.

Monty was not the only person who rejected the original Overlord plan – even the COSSAC team who created it knew it was too small. However Churchill didn’t allow COSSAC to assume greater resources originally, because Churchill was trying to avoid Overlord completely, and he wanted all the resources dedicated to the Italian theatre.

The sections on the operations by the Anglo-Canadians do indeed need slight re-editing to make them relevant to the article – mostly to clarify where they fitted in. It is very clear what the article is for, so there is no reason to delay. (Unless your intention is to whitewash Monty, in which case there will indeed be a challenge.)

Wdford ( talk) 11:20, 22 May 2017 (UTC)

WP:civil Clearly you are beyond reason so I will stop wasting effort. Keith-264 ( talk) 12:36, 22 May 2017 (UTC)

Why the excessive discussion of Montgomery in this article? The article should focus on the battle, which was about the capture/defence of Caen and the Allied and Axis response to that objective.

@WD pls repair the inadequate Hixon citations that you're restored. Keith-264 ( talk) 11:02, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Yes, will do. It was all fine last night when I signed off - dunno what changed overnight. Wdford ( talk) 11:20, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

I think you left a space | Hixon, rather than |Hixon which got them redded. Keith-264 ( talk) 11:24, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Thanks. It look sorted now on my browser - will see after the Grand Prix if the fix is permanent. Wdford ( talk) 11:38, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Temporarily blanked lesser Anglo-Canadian operations, I suggest they aren't necessary for the article and that Goodwood is questionable too, because Atlantic was specific to Caen and Goodwood wasn't. Keith-264 ( talk) 09:47, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

These were all attempts by Montgomery to incrementally capture Caen. You cannot blank them out just because they were British failures. Wdford ( talk) 10:21, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

I Suggest that the attacks intended to Capture Caen were Epsom, Charnwood and Atlantic. Goodwood went round the eastern side of the city while Atlantic was a direct attack. The other operations were NOT attempts to capture Caen. Keith-264 ( talk) 10:43, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

After failing to take Caen on D-Day as planned, Monty "evolved" the plan and tried to take Caen in a series of stepping stones. We can maybe thin out this material a bit, but it will need to be mentioned. Wdford ( talk) 10:49, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Show evidence from RS and see comments below. Keith-264 ( talk) 10:51, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

• • I've just remembered something which you need to know; as well as parachuting the lead sections of the operations in the Battle section, I wrote most of them so if you rely on their content you could get caught in a paradox where you want to keep them and I don't because I've had second thoughts about their relevance. ;o) Keith-264 ( talk) 11:51, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

@WD, I suggest that you are remiss in not mentioning sources in the text as well as in a citation, when describing explanations of events (the descriptions are usually not controversial). A bald statement that .... should be prefaced by "In [year] Hixon wrote that...." since the writings of Hixon et al. you describe in the Analysis are judgemental not descriptive. Keith-264 ( talk) 11:46, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Fair enough. Wdford ( talk) 14:01, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Thank you, it's a bit of a drag avoiding synonyms but I haven't thought of a way round it. Regards Keith-264 ( talk) 14:23, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Wikipedia:Citing_sources#In-text_attribution see here. Keith-264 ( talk) 16:23, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Altered heading because after 9 July, the city was bombarded by German artillery. Keith-264 ( talk) 10:32, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

The controversy was not that the Germans shelled the city, the controversy is that the Allies bombed Allied civilians. Wdford ( talk) 10:51, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

The facts are that both sides bombarded Caen just as they bombarded St Lo. Which RS do you refer to? Keith-264 ( talk) 10:56, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

All towns that get caught in a battle are damaged by artillery and tanks from both sides - its sadly unavoidable. However Caen was blasted to rubble by repeated strikes of strategic bombers - yielding dubious military value for the heavy civilian casualties and massive damage. It was far from the only town that suffered like this at the hands of its liberators - Manila was a particularly serious case - but this is an article about Caen, not Manila etc. The various artillery bombardments etc are mentioned (or can be added) to the battle sections, where they are part of the specific actions. Wdford ( talk) 11:12, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Which RS? Keith-264 ( talk) 11:47, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

The bombing of Caen killed 300-400 ( .5% to .7% ) of an estimated 60K inhabitants. It is hard to square this death toll with the claim that the city was blasted to rubble. Claims of near total destruction could only apply to areas of city that represent only a small fraction of the cities total area. Although tragic, this doesn't seem like a particularly high death toll in comparison to other Allied bombing attacks on French targets or in comparison to total French Civilian casualties (~60K) from Allied bombing. Damwiki1 ( talk) 22:52, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Do you have a source? Thanks Keith-264 ( talk) 00:37, 29 May 2017 (UTC)

It's on my to do list. I am a bit pressed for time for the next week. Damwiki1 ( talk) 13:52, 29 May 2017 (UTC)

http://pcn.loc.gov/isbncnvt.html will convert isbns to ISBN-13 and hyphenate the numbers, both being wikipreferences. http://www.isbn.org/ISBN_converter isn't as good but sometimes converts isbns that the first one can't. Keith-264 ( talk) 13:59, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

https://www.worldcat.org/account/?page=searchItems Keith-264 ( talk) 14:01, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

I'm revising for an IT exam on Thurs so I don't have much time to spare. I don't mind if the section is blanked temporarily (Not reverted, WD) if editors prefer until I can get it finished according to Wikipedia:Manual_of_Style/Military_history#Sources articles on military history should aim to be based primarily on published secondary works by reputable historians. Keith-264 ( talk) 16:41, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

"Montgomery’s solution to the dilemma was to attempt to remain Commander of Land Forces until the end of the war, so that any victory attained – although achieved primarily by American formations – would accrue in part to him and thus to Britain. He would also be able to ensure that British units were spared some of the high-attrition actions, but would be most prominent when the final blows were struck. ^[1]<!--this citation does not support the text-->{{citation needed|May 2017}} When that strategy failed, he persuaded Eisenhower to occasionally put some American formations under the control of the 21st Army Group, so as to bolster his resources while still maintaining the outward appearance of successful British effort. ^[2]<!--Hart DID NOT WRITE THIS, he wrote "With Montgomery commanding all forces in the theatre, any success, irrespective of the nationality of the forces achieving it, would reflect on him, and hence on Britain. No doubt, retention of this command appointment also assuaged his rampant personal glory-seeking.--> In the early days of Operation Overlord, many American commanders suspected that US forces were being used as a sacrificial lamb while the British proceeded more cautiously in the east. ^[3]"<!--this citation is to an index page!-->{{citation needed|May 2017}} [wrong book, I looked in Decision in Normandy]

WD, with all due respect, this is not good writing. Keith-264 ( talk) 15:26, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

I am paraphrasing Hart so as to avoid problems with copyright, but I am very happy to use the exact wording if that turns out to be legally acceptable. The extract from D’Este is spot-on – see here for some assistance. [1] Wdford ( talk) 18:24, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Thanks but that's not the point, your summary is not justified by the citations and sometimes is the opposite of what is in the source, this is not paraphrase, hence my request for a third opinion to try to sort it out. Keith-264 ( talk) 18:55, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

How does this

The outrage and frustration of the air commanders and many American officers still rankled long after the war. They were among many who failed to understand the reasons for the delay at Caen, and suspected that US forces were being used as a sacrificial lamb while the British dallied in the east.

justify

In the early days of Operation Overlord, many American commanders suspected that US forces were being used as a sacrificial lamb while the British proceeded more cautiously in the east. ^[3]

this? Keith-264 ( talk) 19:49, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

How does it not? Wdford ( talk) 19:59, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

"They were among many who failed to understand the reasons for the delay at Caen" you used it as an anecdote about what without the contextual why that they were ignorant. Cherry-picking, misleading, non-NPOV, SYNTH. Keith-264 ( talk) 20:03, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

The "why" has been dealt with in humungous detail in the article already, and you even added an entire sub-section dedicated to explaining Monty's alibi's on that particular point. What was still missing, however, was the way in which the US officers interpreted the situation on the ground. The only editor doing the cherry-picking is you. Wdford ( talk) 06:10, 29 May 2017 (UTC)

Wikipedia:BOLD, revert, discuss cycle I am looking at this as a possible way to get acceptable edits and suggest that we bear in mind that if either of us revert an edit, the item should be left until discussed here to find consensus. To be helpful, I may apply this model but won't do it to the existing text, despite the qualms I have that you are digging a huge NNPOV, SYNTH, Wikipedia:Cherrypicking and misleading hole.

Would you explain why "What was still missing, however, was the way in which the US officers interpreted the situation on the ground." this claim (true or not) has anything to do with the capture of Caen? Put another way, why is office gossip relevant to the article? You wrote that that aspects of the passage had already been dealt with but I disagree and I think you are misleading a reader by omitting "They were among many who failed to understand the reasons for the delay at Caen" (my italics). The why has not been dealt with because you aren't giving equal weight to contrary view, you've even denigrated

articles on military history should aim to be based primarily on published secondary works by reputable historians. The use of high-quality primary sources is also appropriate, but care should be taken to use them correctly, without straying into original research.

this and "...straying[ed] into original research." except that it isn't all that original; it reflects the state of writing on Caen in the 1970s and early 80s. Keith-264 ( talk) 07:34, 29 May 2017 (UTC)

WP:BRD would apply to your drawn-out and repetitive apologetic in the Colossal Cracks section as well.

The anger of the American officers about Monty's glacial progress against Caen was a significant part of the controversy, so those issues are certainly relevant. This is a fact, not "gossip". Even Churchill was getting impatient with the lack of progress in the east. Any misunderstanding of his reasons was probably due either to the fact that Monty kept changing his reasons retroactively, and that he lied about his plans to everyone, including his commander. That is also a significant part of the controversy, as I have repeated time and again, although you just Don't Hear That. Even your favorite source Hart acknowledges this.

The correspondence by Ike and all the other commanders which stands against Monty's lies, is all presented in reliable secondary sources, so your dissembling about primary sources is invalid on all levels.

I'm still waiting for you to present a source which shows that the British D-Day Battle Plan called for the British Army to not capture Caen on D-Day, seeing as how the Sword Beach plan clearly called for the capture of Caen on D-Day.

Wdford ( talk) 21:00, 29 May 2017 (UTC)

Are you really suggesting that it's up to me to disprove a negative? Don't you understand that "Sword Beach plan" is not the master plan? Keith-264 ( talk) 21:31, 29 May 2017 (UTC)

(Which I've referred to twice?) Keith-264 ( talk) 21:44, 29 May 2017 (UTC)

Apropos your comment about BRD, it isn't a stick to beat people with, it's a device to gain consensus. I suggest you look at WP:Civil and avoid slurs like dissembling and favourite. Keith-264 ( talk) 21:44, 29 May 2017 (UTC)

The Sword Beach Plan was the final British Army plan for the invasion of that stretch of the coast, and it specifically included capturing Caen as a D-Day objective. You continue to claim that capturing Caen was NOT a D-Day objective for the British Army, but the Sword Beach Plan proves you wrong. If you are prepared to concede that capturing the vital city of Caen on D-Day was indeed a British Army objective, then we can agree that Monty lied when he claimed that everything went exactly according to plan. How hard is that to understand? Wdford ( talk) 07:21, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

Every Allied Division had D-Day objectives, which were essentially lines of maximum advance, and were dependent on a number of factors, not the least of which was German dispositions and the strength of their opposition. No Allied division advanced sufficiently to capture it's stated D-Day objectives. This doesn't mean that D-Day was a failure or that Allied planning was faulty but we have to understand the difference between stated objectives, as lines of maximum advance, and the actual advance. Damwiki1 ( talk) 13:41, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

This map shows the plan of advance drawn up by Montgomery. Note that Paris was not expected to be captured until after D +90, but it actually fell on D +80. Damwiki1 ( talk) 14:10, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

I wonder if it might help to separate the Analysis into a section on the capture of Caen and a following section on the disputed views of what it meant? Keith-264 ( talk) 14:27, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

Adding citations to an inaccurate test does not address the issue of misleading paraphrase, the text needs editing accurately to reflect the source. Keith-264 ( talk) 14:35, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

Nobody is saying that D-Day was a failure, although some did criticise the planning as being overly optimistic. Nobody is confused about the difference between the stated objectives and the actual advance – everyone is clear that many of the stated objectives were not met on schedule. Tedder in particular was upset about the failure to achieve the promised capture of the advanced airfields on schedule. Some objectives were eventually achieved a few days late, and some were eventually achieved many weeks late - that's war. The controversial issue is that Montgomery subsequently lied when he told everyone that the whole thing went exactly according to plan.

There is no need to create yet another Analysis section “on the disputed views of what it meant”. There is no dispute “on what it meant” – the dispute is on the extent to which Montgomery lied when he claimed that everything went exactly according to plan. We have enough apologetics in the Analysis section as it is.

Wdford ( talk) 15:06, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

Even a brief review of your writing on the article compared to the source adduced, shows that some of your paraphrases are not supported by the citations you have applied. There is a dispute about your editing because of the evidence of these discrepancies. Repeating the same claims, calling contrary sources apologetics, resorting to terms like whitewashing can not be supported unless you are referring to such terms in a source. It is not for any of us to interpret what a source means, it is not for us to ignore WP:Sources WP:SYNTH WP:OR etc.

Who wrote this

While various historians and authors take differing positions on the controversy, it is possible to ascertain the understanding of some of the senior people who were the actual leaders at the time.

you or a RS? Keith-264 ( talk) 16:50, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

I will watch the page but try to refrain from editing while I'm revising. I urge WD to take a good look at some of the recent edits and comments by others who have taken an interest in the article. Keith-264 ( talk) 19:04, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

Odd how playing with cats, cleaning the bath and listening to deep house had become much more attractive today. ;o) Keith-264 ( talk) 19:15, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

Leaving the German casualties as unknown is not acceptable. There are a variety of sources available from which a rough estimate of numbers can be made. I will attempt to narrow down the estimate as time permits. Steiger states that, for example, the 8000 man 716th infantry division suffered ~80% casualties on 6 June alone. Steiger states Army grp B casualties as 100K plus by 7 July.

OB West weekly report [from Army Group B that is] 24-30 July gives Normandy casualties from D-Day to 27 July as 127,247 with 14,594 replacements against a claim of 2,395 tanks KO and 402 aircraft shot down. Wood, 2007, Army of the West p. 156.

31 July-7 August: 148,075, replacements 19,914, 16,457 awaited, claim of 2,799 Allied tanks and 450 aircraft. p. 166 ibid.

8-14 Aug: 158,930, 30,069 replacements and 9,933 on the way, claim of 3,370 Allied tanks and 475 aircraft. p. 191 ibid. Keith-264 ( talk) 19:13, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

Actually, inventing a figure yourselves is even more unacceptable. I reverted this wild personal estimate because it seems to be unsourced original research. The casualties of the German forces can be estimated for the entire invasion, but not individually for Caen alone.

The Britannica source refers to the entire Normandy Invasion, not just Caen. It says that “Obtaining an accurate count of German losses is especially difficult, as many relevant personnel records were destroyed in Allied bombing raids.” They nonetheless go on to estimate total German casualties of 173,000, plus lots of prisoners. This included losses for Caen, as well as for D-Day, and the bocage and Cherbourg and St Lo and Falaise etc etc.

This article by the D-Day museum states that “The losses of the German forces during the Battle of Normandy can only be estimated. Roughly 200,000 German troops were killed or wounded”. [2] This included losses for Caen, as well as for D-Day, and the bocage and Cherbourg and St Lo and Falaise etc etc.

The book Normandy: The Landings to the Liberation of Paris”, by Olivier Wieviorka, pg 224, at [3] states that the total German casualties by 23 July were 116,863. By this date the Battle for Caen was over, and so these casualty figures include all the Caen losses, as well as D-Day and the bocage and Cherbourg, but not St Lo and Falaise etc.

Allocating 100,000 out of 116,863 just to Caen seems like a serious stretch. Do you have a proper source for that “estimate”, or is it original research?

I think “unknown” is a better effort here.

Wdford ( talk) 19:35, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

Did you notice the Army Group B reports I added above? I have put a request in for published sources on AHB but it will be easy to give German losses up to the point when the battle for Caen ended and note that German losses there are in the total. The Germans considered Caen captured at the end of Charnwood (9 July), even if Atlantic is the terminus date that takes us to 20 July, not 6 August. Keith-264 ( talk) 19:49, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

The Army Group B reports are for the entire invasion, not just for Caen.

We know the German losses for Caen are included in the total. However for this article we want to know what were the German losses for the Battle for Caen alone.

Wdford ( talk) 20:01, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

I know, that's what I wrote; until something better comes along they will go in. Keith-264 ( talk) 20:22, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

I restored this because the citation edits did not address the fact that the text is not supported by the citations. The text is SYNTH and cherrypicking. I suggest that we discuss that section here before making more edits to gain consensus. As it stands the text is a false representation of the source. Keith-264 ( talk) 14:24, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

Go and read [4] at WP:PARAPHRASE, then point out a specific sentence that offends you, and suggest alternative wording that meets your requirements as well as the requirements of [5]. Wdford ( talk) 14:52, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

Did you miss this?

• "Montgomery’s solution to the dilemma was to attempt to remain Commander of Land Forces until the end of the war, so that any victory attained – although achieved primarily by American formations – would accrue in part to him and thus to Britain. He would also be able to ensure that British units were spared some of the high-attrition actions, but would be most prominent when the final blows were struck. ^[1]<!--this citation does not support the text Hart wrote nothing of the sort-->{{citation needed|May 2017}} When that strategy failed, he persuaded Eisenhower to occasionally put some American formations under the control of the 21st Army Group, so as to bolster his resources while still maintaining the outward appearance of successful British effort. ^[2]<!--Hart DID NOT WRITE THIS, he wrote "With Montgomery commanding all forces in the theatre, any success, irrespective of the nationality of the forces achieving it, would reflect on him, and hence on Britain. No doubt, retention of this command appointment also assuaged his rampant personal glory-seeking.--> In the early days of Operation Overlord, many American commanders suspected that US forces were being used as a sacrificial lamb while the British proceeded more cautiously in the east. ^[3]

• I suggest that you improve the quality of your editing; this paragraph is not a paraphrase of Hart and the last sentence omits D'Este's point that the commanders he was writing about were ignorant. This is not paraphrase, it comes close to fabrication. Keith-264 ( talk) 17:31, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

having skimmed preview of Hart, it comes across to me that Hart is being used to attack Montgomery rather than explain his reasoning and actions at Caen. More effort expended in saying that Monty avoided casualties rather than how he applied artillery and airpower. GraemeLeggett ( talk) 18:41, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

Applying artillery and airpower is included in the Battle sections, and can easily be expanded even more. There is a separate section dedicated to the use of airpower on Caen itself. This section is about the reality of Britain's manpower shortage, and the impact it had on British strategy and tactics. Wdford ( talk) 19:07, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

I thought it was about the Battle for Caen...? Keith-264 ( talk) 19:55, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

This section is about the reality of Britain's manpower shortage, and the impact it had on British strategy and tactics at the battle for Caen, as an explanation/excuse for Monty's "caution" and slow progress on that front. Your tendentious tendency is showing through. Wdford ( talk) 21:12, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

Who wrote this

While various historians and authors take differing positions on the controversy, it is possible to ascertain the understanding of some of the senior people who were the actual leaders at the time.

you or a RS? Keith-264 ( talk) 21:18, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

When you take your next break from revising for your test, google "Battle of the Books". You can get a flavor of it in Baxter, starting on pg 71.

I'm still waiting for you to present a source which shows that the British D-Day Battle Plan called for the British Army to not capture Caen on D-Day, seeing as how the Sword Beach plan clearly called for the capture of Caen on D-Day. Or perhaps you might consider acknowledging that capturing Caen was indeed a D-Day objective, and that Monty failed to achieve the D-Day objective. By about five weeks. And then lied about it.

Wdford ( talk) 21:30, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

Have you read anything I've written about your tendentious citation and lack of it? Humour me and tell me if you wrote that line or if it's the gist of what a RS wrote. Keith-264 ( talk) 21:58, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

I added some extra citations to the article. Now humour me and acknowledge that the capture of Caen was a D-Day objective, that the British Army failed to achieve it and that Monty thereafter LIED when he claimed everything went according to plan. Wdford ( talk) 10:23, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

After D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout is not about the invasion but the breakout. Caen was not "key to the invasion" but it's possession facilitated the Breakout and the encirclement of the Germany Army at Falaise. Damwiki1 ( talk) 09:02, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

I was just quoting the source, which was very clear and unambiguous on that point. If the British Army had captured Caen and the airfields on D-Day as per their original plan, the whole campaign would have worked out differently. Wdford ( talk) 10:23, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

You are misquoting Carafano as he clearly states that "...Caen was the key to the whole operation because the city offered the best routes beyond the D-Day beachheads." "beyond" is the operative word, and Carafano's book is all about "beyond" the invasion. Carafano is discussing Caen's importance to After D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout which is the "operation" he is talking about, not the invasion. I earlier posted a link to Montgomery's master plan which shows the planned frontlines as of D +90 and clearly the Allied Armies "over fullfilled" Monty's plan for advance, so there is also no basis for claiming that the failure to capture Caen earlier than was the case somehow delayed the Allied defeat of the German army in France. It seems obvious, in fact, that the tenacious German defence of Caen gravely weakened the overall German position and led to their near annihilation at Falaise. It can be argued that if Caen had miraculously fallen on 6 June 1944, that the German response would have been to fall back from Normandy and then attempt to fight a mobile battle beyond the range of Allied Naval GFS and tactical air support with all it's uncertainty of outcome: On 17 June, Hitler suddenly appeared in norther France (his first and only visit to the west after 1940). By that time, Rommel and Rundstedt were in agreement that their only hope was to withdraw from Caen to a strong defensive position that could be held by infantry while the panzer divisions were refitted for a powerful counteroffensive against the Americans in the Cotentin Peninsula. Characteristically, Hitler refused to consider such a proposal and insisted that the line beheld at all costs The War in Western Europe. The 2nd factor was that an early breakout might have convinced Hitler to release the 15th Army and send it south to overwhelm the invasion forces by sheer weight of numbers before the Allies could land sufficient forces. Damwiki1 ( talk) 15:57, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

I am not misquoting the source, so please stop making these mendacious accusations. The cited source actually says that "A great controversy still lingers over how well General Montgomery conducted the campaign, and this debate is important for understanding the origins of Bradley's offensive. The controversy centers on Montgomery's intentions for the city of Caen, which, everyone agreed, was the key to the whole operation because the city offered the best routes beyond the D-Day beachheads." "Operation" presumably means Overlord, because "the campaign" is the context of the discussion. The context does not in any way suggest that "the invasion" is a separate issue to "Operation Overlord". Are you seriously going to all this trouble to prove that I was wrong to use the word "invasion" to refer to Operation Overlord?

The Allies were way behind schedule for much of the campaign, then accelerated toward the end to beat the 90-day target because the US forces broke though in the west despite the failure of the original plan. The Falaise outcome was possible only because the US broke through, not because the British failed to break through. The controversy is not about whether Monty's failure was actually a good thing, the point is that he failed to accomplish that part of the plan, and then he lied about it.

The naval fire support certainly helped a lot, but the plan was for the tactical air-forces to provide close support as they headed inland. Had Monty achieved the original plan, the tactical squadrons would have had forward airbases in France and the close air support would have been better than it was, earlier than it was.

It is not for us to argue whether the Allies would have fared worse had they succeeded in achieving their original plan and that Monty's failure was therefore a good thing in the end, but that interesting suggestion does raise the question whether Monty's original plan was badly flawed. It presumably goes without saying that a plan which adds more value by failing than succeeding is a very poor plan, as is any plan which depends on the enemy acting irrationally. The 15th Army could have been redirected at any time to support the defenders at Caen, so the failure to break through as per the original plan cannot be assumed to be the reason why the 15th Army was held at Calais as long as it was. Hitler was insane, and Rommel would have moved 15th Army a lot sooner had Hitler stayed in bed. No competent general would wager the outcome of the war and a million lives on the assumption that the German commanders would stuff up such a simple decision.

Wdford ( talk) 17:32, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

You still can't tell the difference between your opinion, a description of events and the explanations offered by writers and historians. Keith-264 ( talk) 17:40, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

The "invasion" occurred on 6 June 1944. Operation Cobra, which is the "the whole operation" being referred to occurred on 25 July 1944. Clearly Caen was not key to the invasion, since the invasion succeeded without Caen in Allied hands. You are attempting to twist Carafano's statement. No Allied division achieved their first day objectives yet the overall plan was exceeded by ~D+70 and I stated that to capture Caen on 6 June 1944 would have been miraculous. The Montgomery master plan, referred to previously, shows the US Army clearly breaking out on the eastern flank of Allied Operations. Montgomery's personal attributes and statements have nothing to do with this article, except perhaps as a small footnote. Damwiki1 ( talk)

This is just more mendacious POV-pushing.

I am not "twisting" Carafano's statement as you dishonestly allege, I am quoting it verbatim. Carafano makes it very clear that the "operation" is the entire Normandy campaign, NOT just Cobra. Caen and its roads had very little to do with Cobra, which only happened because the US forces had to find a way inland without using the Caen roads at all. Caen and it's roads were certainly not "key" to Cobra, thus Operation Cobra could not be "the whole operation" being referred to by Carafano. Obvious, really.

The fact that the US forces managed to succeed in the breakout by going around Caen rather than by going through Caen is not relevant to the point that the capture of Caen was seen to be key at the original planning stage – and your personal conclusions are original research and thus equally irrelevant.

If the capturing of Caen on D-Day really would have been miraculous, why was it included in the plan to begin with? More evidence of poor planning perhaps?

Did the US forces break out on the eastern flank or the western flank? Maybe go check that map again?

Montgomery's dishonest statements around this very battle created a lasting controversy, which is very notable. However we note your valiant attempt to protect him.

Wdford ( talk) 20:10, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

The importance of the road hub centred on Caen was that it allowed rapid movement across the front by German units and it was one route for the Commonwealth armies to move north-east: Map. The US Army was never planned to move through Caen! Where you could have got such an idea? It was always seen as moving east after passing south of Caen. Many objectives were planned to be captured, as farthest points of advance, on day 1 of the invasion yet none were gained. Caen was just one of a number of farthest lines of advance, and as events proved it was not vital except to act as a magnet for the Panzer divisions, to prevent them from stopping the US breakout to the east (Paris is east of Caen and east of the start line for the Falaise envelopment: map. The Germans only feared a US move west because the US divisions could then wheel east around the southern flank of the German units pinned against the Commonwealth Armies. Paris and Berlin are east of Normandy and the US could only threaten them by moving east. Montgomery and controversy around his personal life are not germain to this article. Damwiki1 ( talk)

For a balanced view of Allied strategy and Montgomery's role as Allied Ground force commander please read: Unfolding of the Grand Design. I don't know why this vitally important work was left out, but I've added it to the reflist. Damwiki1 ( talk) 15:09, 1 June 2017 (UTC)

Yet more mendacity – it’s becoming increasingly difficult to AGF. I never suggested the US had planned to use the Caen roads to move inland – but then you know that, don’t you?

According to Carafano (pg22), Caen "was the key to the whole operation because the city offered the best routes beyond the D-Day beachheads." A few lines further down, he states that: "For heading into France in a hurry without bogging down in a slug-fest reminiscent of World War I, Caen was the way to go". The Germans had no need to "head into France", so he must have been referring to the Allies using those roads to go inland. Don't you think?

Copp (pg 20) states that: "The capture of Caen and the high ground south of the city was of particular importance to tactical air force officers, who wanted sites for their airfields, but everyone agreed that the city and the bridges across the Orne had to be taken as quickly as possible. South of Caen, the country was open, with good roads leading to the Seine and Paris. The planners assumed that the enemy would defend this area in strength, as a breakthrough here would cut off German forces in the west, and bring a quick conclusion to the Battle of Normandy. …. The plan called for the American army to capture Cherbourg and then fight its way south, turning west into Brittany to capture Brest and create a new port at Quiberon Bay." Brest, as you probably know, is nowhere near Caen. If Monty was really planning to sit on his butt in front of Caen until after Patton had captured Brest, then he was planning to settle in for months. Of course, we know that this was not the original plan, but rather the "evolved" plan.

The fact was that when Monty was unable to capture Caen as per the original plan, the plan was "evolved" (Ike’s euphemism, Carafano pg 22) to have the US forces achieve the breakout with Cobra. Cobra was never Plan A. Carafano (pg 84-86) makes it clear that Cobra was an American plan.

The Germans feared a US move west because in the west lay the critical port of Cherbourg. The Germans therefore fortified the city, made the US work hard to capture it, and then destroyed the port before finally surrendering. If they were mostly concerned with being outflanked to the south, then they would simply have fortified their southern flank with the 40,000-odd men who were expended defending Cherbourg, and abandoned the peninsular.

The German units were NEVER "pinned against the Commonwealth Armies" – they could have retired at any time toward the Seine, and only Hitler’s madness prevented his generals from actually doing so.

That the US forces were able to break the stalemate without the British capturing Caen was fortunate, but it does not mean that you can pretend that Caen was never an important objective of the original invasion plan.

Montgomery’s personal life is not germane to this article, but his decisions about capturing Caen are certainly central to an article about the Battle for Caen, and Montgomery’s subsequent lies about his plans and his failures re Caen are certainly notable.

I can see why you like Pogue (1954) – he trustingly accepts Montgomery’s retroactive assertion that he never intended to capture Caen early in the invasion. Later authors, who perhaps had access to documentation that Pogue never saw, were far more enlightened.

Wdford ( talk) 17:49, 1 June 2017 (UTC)

Have you read the third opinion by ProgrammingGeek? He/she suggested that the thing to do is use 2° sources to describe the controversy. This isn't difficult, surely? Keith-264 ( talk) 17:58, 1 June 2017 (UTC)

I note that an editor has deleted a lot of referenced material that directly discusses the two controversies that make this battle notable - Montgomery's dishonesty about his failures to capture Caen as planned, and the Allied bombing of the French civilians. This appears to be blatant POV-pushing. While I welcome the removal of the POV-pushing Colossal Cracks section, it is not appropriate to remove all referenced material that criticizes your hero. Please discuss (and justify) each deletion on Talk. Wdford ( talk) 10:25, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

I have blanked a considerable amount of your writing, this is not deletion but a temporary measure because I am concerned that in your enthusiasm to make a case you have cherry-picked sources and failed adequately to summarise some of them. I have gi ven reasons for the blanking in the text with the intention of discussing the sections with you and anyone else who's interested. You ascribed claims to Copp (2004) made by D'Este (1983), which Copp was criticising. You made a list of evidence against Monty which among other things contradict the facts about strategy which were agreed before the invasion so the accuracy of the sources you cited are questionable at the very least. After saving I realised that I'd buggered something up and lots of writing had disappeared, it turned out to be a missing - which took a while to find, apologies and egg on face. Keith-264 ( talk) 10:40, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

PLEASE DON'T REVERT YET, read the comment above and begin discussion here. Keith-264 ( talk) 10:47, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

I BLANKED with reasons not deleted some of the sections in the battle section for discussion here. Perhaps you could explain why you think that Operation Martlet was an attempt to capture Caen? [Correction: Which RS are you referring to?] Keith-264 ( talk) 10:59, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

I BLANKED with reasons not deleted some of the material in the analysis because it is not a description of the facts but a one-sided advocacy of SOME facts in the absence of others. Keith-264 ( talk) 10:50, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Please indicate the RS that contradict your bullet pointed commentary and please note that I edited some of your writing better to ascribe it to the source you claimed it was from. Surely that's not arguable? Keith-264 ( talk) 10:59, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Good, let's discuss it.

The lede section of the article on Operation Martlet specifically says it was "part of a series of British attacks to capture the town of Caen and its environs". If that is wrong then let's fix it, but don't just go blanking stuff.

• do you know the difference between deletion and blanking? Martlet was an attack on the Rauray Spur, as a flank guard for Epsom, which was an attack to capture caen (among other things under certain circumstances)

I don't think that listing all the British school authors who are trying to whitewash Monty is going to help - its not a voting system. People like Eisenhower and Bedell Smith and Churchill and Williams etc ACTUALLY KNEW the plans, and are thus reliable sources, whereas post-war authors are merely giving opinions. I am happy to remove some of the "author opinions" I added last night, because I added them to show that the British school is not unchallenged. I feel we need to distinguish between facts as per the SHAEF commanders and whitewashing as per Hamilton etc, and to leave out all "opinions" as far as possible.

• There is no British school but there are pro- and anti- Monty schools. Plenty of British historians and writers damn him and plenty of US ones don't. That you use terms like whitewashing is non-NPOV and undermines your right to WP:AGF

I think that the factual planning should be part of the background sections rather than the analysis sections, as it is more logical and more coherent for readers to see the plan upfront rather than at the end.

• The facts of the Normandy strategy should be in the Prelude and comments by RS during and after the war should be in the Analysis section of the Aftermath as a straightforward chronological listing, which once agreed might bear re-editing thematically if possible.

The plan was indeed to attract the Germans to the east while Cherbourg was captured, but it was intended to capture Caen not merely threaten it. Monty changed the plan, which is logical and appropriate, but then he lied about changing the plan, which is not. We need to report both aspects. Dissembling between strategic plans and operational plans doesn't add value, because Monty was himself a bit vague about those semantics, far less the average reader.

• This claim ignores the differences between the theatre strategy as laid down and accepted in the meetings of the commanders in April and May, the operational plan and sub-operational plans; it also ignores the Germans. There's no doubt that Monty was willing to lie and equally no doubt that some of his critics like Tedder were also dishonest little shits. The question is what the RS make of it and its relevance to the capture of Caen. As Hart points out, the master plan was adhered to, the operational plan and sub-operational ones weren't, partly because of the flexibility of Monty and his subordinates Dempsey and Bradley, partly because of the Germans and partly because the operations of the First US Army also took longer to complete. "The average reader"? Who is it? It is not for us to make assumptions about readers, we are here to describe what the RS contain. Keith-264 ( talk) 11:22, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Wdford ( talk) 11:05, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Edit summary "We need to weigh the opinions of those who were in command at the time, against post-war authors." actually no, we need to describe what RS have written, your claim is OR and non-NPOV, which perhaps explains why you keep ignoring the facts of the Normandy strategy that was established before the invasion in writing and on record. Keith-264 ( talk) 11:09, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Sigh. We have a lot of authors who base their opinions on "what Monty said", and we have a lot of other authors who base their opinions on what was stated by everyone else who knew what was actually going on. We already note the British School accepted and popularized Monty's own (deceitful) version of the truth. I don't think it will help to actually list all the British school authors and the American school authors - we already note that there were many of each. What is helpful to readers is to see that Monty's version of the truth was contradicted by THOSE PEOPLE WHO ACTUALLY KNEW WHAT WAS GOING ON. I am not disputing the Normandy Strategy at all, and I am trying to explain it coherently in the Battle section. However the Normandy Strategy called for Caen to be taken on D-Day, and when Monty failed to do so he lied about it. QED Wdford ( talk) 11:19, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

If you look, you will see that early writing tended to be memoir literature from people who either didn't know or who could not refer to some of the details, like Ultra and contradicted each other, again sometimes on hearsay or while the facts as recorded at the time were officially secret. Later on, some writing about Normandy was related to the rearmament of Germany for the Cold War and mined the Normandy campaign for evidence that small armies could beat big ones, to provide reasons for treating the size of the Red Army as of less significance than ability. After that, when some of the facts became public domain, they were used to revise the history of the campaign and sometimes to sling more mud and profit commercial publishers. After that some writers took up the uberGerman thesis, while dancing around nazi ideology, the savagery of Wehrmacht discipline and collective guilt practices. Others followed SLA Marshall's writing about western soldiers who didn't shoot at anyone (later exposed as fabrications) or Keegan's motivation theory. As Terry Copp pointed out in 2004, few of them checked their sources and even fewer looked at the ground in Normandy which meant that untenable claims about Monty, Normandy and the US forces at the west end were repeated. If you have a copy, I suggest that you look again at chapter 4, which makes mincemeat of some of the sources you are using. Regards Keith-264 ( talk) 11:38, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

I agree with much of your latest comment above. That's why I would prefer not to wallow in all the verbiage from authors who are "mining" history to make a buck, or for Cold War political reasons etc. However the recollections of Eisenhower and Bedell Smith and Williams etc do not rank equal with the subsequent "war of the books". Since the battle orders of the British 1st Infantry Division specifically called for the capture of Caen on D-Day, do you have any actual D-Day plans that say "The British Army DID NOT intend to capture Caen on D-Day"? Wdford ( talk) 11:47, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Recollections by participants are a minefield

Wikipedia:Manual_of_Style/Military_history#Sources

"Policy requires that articles reference only reliable sources; however, this is a minimal condition, rather than a final goal. With the exception of certain recent topics that have not yet become the subject of extensive secondary analysis, and for which a lower standard may be temporarily permitted, articles on military history should aim to be based primarily on published secondary works by reputable historians. The use of high-quality primary sources is also appropriate, but care should be taken to use them correctly, without straying into original research. Editors are encouraged to extensively survey the available literature—and, in particular, any available historiographic commentary—regarding an article's topic in order to identify every source considered to be authoritative or significant; these sources should, if possible, be directly consulted when writing the article."

(my highlighting) I suggest that your views on Eisenhower et al. are untenable. Keith-264 ( talk) 12:06, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Please don’t scatter your responses throughout a discussion, it makes coherence more difficult.

• Number them then. Keith-264 ( talk) 14:59, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Re the article structure – I would be happier if we condense the battle section into a single section without sub-sections. We can remove a bit of the detail, and give each element a few lines as appropriate and relevant. Dividing Martlet off from Epsom is artificial – it’s like a football match where we have a separate article for each half of the game.

• RS? Keith-264 ( talk) 14:59, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

I am happy to mention the two “schools”, whatever the labels. The important issue is that Monty lied – some choose to believe him, and others do not. Any treatment of the Battle for Caen that ignores this, is unacceptable.

• This is a monocausal explanation and other participants lied too. What RS do you have to support your claim? Keith-264 ( talk) 14:59, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

The issue of the post-war secondary discussions is then the question of “where did this RS get their info from?” There are only three possible answers here: A) From hard documentation; B) from interviewing the leaders or from their memoirs, and C) by wishful speculation. Rather than wallowing in opinions, it is surely better to state A) what the available documentation says, where available; and then B) what did the actual leaders say. If an RS states that “The battle plan clearly shows xxx”, then that is a useful source. If an RS states that “It seems to me that Monty should be believed regardless of all the evidence to the contrary”, then that is less useful. Is it your wish to clutter up the article with a list of all the pro-Monty school expressing their belief in his claims?

• Yet another tendentious claim. Did you read the Wiki on the importance of secondary sources? The care necessary with primary sources. Keith-264 ( talk) 14:59, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Yes, Ike’s recollections are prone to blur over time, as are Monty’s recollections. However Ike wrote those letters very close to the time when it was all happening, as did Bedell Smith, and those letters/memos don’t change over time. Second, the published documentation appears to support Ike’s recollections a lot better than it supports Monty’s recollections. There is of course the battle plan which states that the 1st Div must take Caen on D-Day.

• Yet another tendentious claim. Did you read the Wiki on the importance of secondary sources? The care necessary with primary sources. What RS? Who says? Keith-264 ( talk) 14:59, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

A battle plan published in April may well have changed by June, but nonetheless, is there any version of a plan which states that “The British will NOT ATTEMPT to take Caen on D-Day, rather they will just incur lots of casualties on the outskirts to cause a drawn-out diversion?”

• Straw man, look again at the master plan, operational plan and sub-operational plans as described by Hart. Where in the plans accepted in April and May is Caen mentioned?

It therefore seems to be that all the senior officers (including Monty’s Supreme Commander, the Supreme Commander’s chief of staff, Monty’s Secretary of War, Monty’s Prime Minister and Monty’s chief of intelligence) all thought then and later that Caen was a D-Day objective, supported by documentation from the time, and that Monty alone claims the contrary, and even he contradicts himself. I think you are making more of this than is really necessary. Monty was a known liar, and he lied in this matter as well – case closed.

• Yet again, this is synth. The 3rd Infantry Division had Caen as an objective, I Corps had an alternative if the Germans forestalled the attack and the "master plan" referred to the area to the south. Caen wasn't mentioned. This conforms to the difference between the master plan, operational plan and sub-operational plan. Keith-264 ( talk) 14:59, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

The theatre strategy was for the Brits to capture Caen and draw the counter-attacks, while the US penetrated the bocage, fought across hundreds of miles to capture the fortress of Cherbourg, then broke out of the lodgement to encircle the Germans. This was eventually achieved, so the theatre plan was eventually achieved – no problem. The article already says this, and it can be made more explicit if we expand the Background section or the Prelude section etc. The operational plan included capturing Caen on D-Day, and this was not achieved – no problem either. However then Montgomery lied about this, and pretended that the operational plan NEVER included capturing Caen on D-Day, which was ridiculous since Ike and Churchill and everyone knew that this was indeed the plan – including all the men who got sent to do the job. There is also documentation that makes it clear that the plan was to capture Caen on D-Day – unless you have a different plan available?

Wdford ( talk) 14:41, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

• Notes taken at a meeting of Army Commanders and their Chiefs of Staff, at HQ 21st Army Group, 7 Jan 1944

Task of the British Army will be to operate to the south to prevent any interference with the American army from the east.

It is hoped eventually to get a firm lodgement from Caen to Nantes....p 20

Montgomery's notes for Brief Summary of Operation Overlord as affecting the Army. Given as an address to all General officers of the four field armies in London on 7 April 1944

Second British Army To assault to the west of the R. Orne and to develop operations to the south and south-east, in order to secure airfield sites and to protect the eastern flank of First US Army while the latter is capturing Cherbourg.

In its subsequent operations the Army will pivot on its left and offer a strong front against enemy movement towards the lodgement area from the east. Brooks, 2008, pp 68, 72.

Diary notes 7 June: Caen was not captured and it was clear that the enemy intended to hold it strongly and to try to drive in my eastern flank. p 118

Letter to Maj-gen F E W Simpson, 8 June: The Germans are doing everything they can to hold on to Caen. I have decided not to have a lot of casualties by butting up against the place.... p 122

Need I go on? Keith-264 (talk) 1:03 am, 21 May 2017, Sunday (8 days ago) (UTC+1) for the second time. See how the master, operational and sub-operational plans fit the facts? Note again that you overlook the German side and ignore contrary RS. These exchanges are pointless if all you do is gainsay everything that I offer from RS, denigrate the RS and ignore Wiki. Keith-264 ( talk) 14:59, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

So it is perfectly clear now that you can produce no official plan that says Caen WAS NOT to be captured on D-Day, whereas there is an official plan that says Caen WAS to be captured on D-Day. In addition the correspondence from Ike and other senior commanders all indicates that Caen was indeed a D-Day objective. The fact that the British Army had an alternative plan in the event that the first plan failed, indicates that the first plan did exist, not that the first plan never existed. Even your favorite source Hart admits that Monty was lying when he said everything went according to plan. And yet still you persist?

• Favourite? Where are your RS? Keith-264 ( talk) 19:03, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

How can you claim that Goodwood was “a failure only to RS who ignore the revised orders about objectives”? Is every source who disagrees with your POV now irrelevant? Goodwood was seen by the commanders to be a failure, Monty nearly got fired because of it, and yet you claim it was a success because Monty claimed to have changed the objectives? When did he change the objectives- after it was clear that the operation had failed?

• I'm referring to the sources but will quote them if you want. Keith-264 ( talk) 19:03, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Since the documentary evidence all shows that Caen was a D-Day objective, the secondary sources who support Monty’s lies can only be basing their opinions on Monty’s personal recollections. What makes Monty’s personal recollections more reliable than all the other evidence?

• RS? Keith-264 ( talk) 19:03, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

The fact that other people lied about things is irrelevant – this is about Caen. I have no opinion on Tedder, but it is clear from these sources that the Plan called for the capture of tactical airfields around Caen, and that Monty failed to deliver, thereby upsetting Tedder and the other air commanders. The fact that Monty unilaterally changed the Plan retroactively when he failed to achieve it, does not remove the reality that the Plan existed and that Monty failed to deliver on it, then lied that everything had gone according to plan.

• RS? Keith-264 ( talk) 19:03, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

The actions of the Germans clearly caused the failure of Monty’s plans, but that does not grant Monty an excuse to lie about those plans retroactively. Ultra intel may well have caused Monty to change the plans, but that does not grant Monty an excuse to lie about those plans retroactively either.

Wdford ( talk) 18:21, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

• RS? Keith-264 ( talk) 19:03, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Discussing this with you seems a waste of time so I'll wait for a 3rd opinion as requested and add Copp's 2004 discussion of the writing on Caen to clarify some of the dead ends in the existing text. Keith-264 ( talk) 19:03, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

I have given sources in the text for all my edits. Whining RS? RS? after every point is not going to help you. I am still waiting for you to provide a British Army Plan that proves Caen was not a D-Day objective, when their Sword Beach battle plan clearly states that it was a D-Day objective as Ike etc all knew and said. Wdford ( talk) 19:30, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Response to third opinion request :

Both of you raise valid points, and neither one of you is "right". Here's my suggested compromise: Reliable, secondary sources must always take precedence, even if you believe that they are wrong. If other RS contradict those, then I suggest a section on the controversy. Blanking, even temporarily, should be avoided on content disputes. It unnecessarily disrupts the article, and seeking consensus before making changes is key. Just include both viewpoints equally, and source it properly. ProgrammingGeek talktome 14:25, 1 June 2017 (UTC)

Thanks for your input. As you can see from the article, it already has a section dedicated to the controversy. It is based entirely on reliable secondary sources, and it already includes both sides of the controversy. The two sides is essence are A) Montgomery's own claims and writings, supported by his supporters who base their support on Montgomery's own writings; and B) Anybody who points out that all the other evidence contradicts Montgomery's own claims. Both sides are already included, and are fully sourced. Wdford ( talk) 09:16, 2 June 2017 (UTC)

@Graham I thought that a word wrap around a number had to be anchored to the following word? Keith-264 ( talk) 15:33, 1 June 2017 (UTC)

Word wrap only needs to be prevented when it breaks up a number and a unit at the space between or at a hypen. So you might not want "125 m beyond the beach" to break with "...125" at the end of the line and start the next line with "m beyond..." but there's no problem with "over 100 elephants in the reservation" breaking after the number and starting the next line with "elephants...." (In those cases where you do want the 100 elephants to stay together the non-breaking space also works). GraemeLeggett ( talk) 09:53, 2 June 2017 (UTC)

Thanks. Keith-264 ( talk) 09:57, 2 June 2017 (UTC)

I took out a passage quoted from Peter Gray but cited to John Buckley after an earlier rv was counter rv. Buckley did not write the passage and you have lifted it verbatim from Gray Caen -The Martyred City. Keith-264 ( talk) 17:27, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

I think I've got the subsections of the Analysis in the right order but clearly it needs a drastic pruning and the removal of duplication and overlaps. Under the circumstances I suggest that proposals be made here first. Regards Keith-264 ( talk) 16:39, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

Agreed. Take the few paragraphs from the Colossal Cracks section that are relevant to the article, move them to the appropriate places, and delete all the stuff in the Colossal Cracks section that is NOT relevant to the article - such as the waffle about avoiding over-reliance on theory. Wdford ( talk) 17:32, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

Do you agree for me to do the same to your edits for the same reasons? Keith-264 ( talk) 17:35, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

My edits are all relevant to the topic of this article. If you have doubts about a particular paragraph, raise it here. Meanwhile, dump the paragraph about avoiding over-reliance on theory. Keep the paragraph about Monty being "flexible", but make it more clear that he was being flexible by changing to Plan B only after Plan A had failed. Wdford ( talk) 17:43, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

You don't agree to a level playing-field then? Your edits are not about the battle for Caen, they are about your opinion of Monty. Keith-264 ( talk) 17:50, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

This is not a playing-field, its an encyclopedia. My edits are about Monty's deceit re events at the Battle of Caen, the impact thereof at the time of the invasion, and the controversy it caused thereafter. It's all specific to Caen, and it's notable. This is not my personal opinion, it's all backed by secondary sources as well. The existence and position of the pro-Monty authors has also been recorded. I have not included Monty's issues in Sicily or Italy or Germany, just Caen. Wdford ( talk) 17:56, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

You are writing an essay against Monty, not an article about the battle for Caen. Keith-264 ( talk) 18:08, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

I completely agree and the undue emphasis on Montgomery must be removed from this summary article. Damwiki1 ( talk) 18:17, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

I asked Anotherclown earlier for an informal opinion but perhaps you can answer the same question [6] "...what options have I got left that don't formally involve administrators?" Keith-264 ( talk) 18:32, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

There is no undue emphasis. The controversy is notable, and it only takes up a few paragraphs at the end of the article. It could be even shorter were it not for having to clarify it for the POV-pushers. The Colossal Cracks section, on the other hand, is largely unnecessary. We note your latest attempt to remove this criticism of Montgomery from the article. Wdford ( talk) 19:06, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

There is a consensus of 2:1. Keith-264 ( talk) 19:15, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

Yes.

Lots of secondary sources worked with primary documentation, and they state clearly that Caen was a D-Day objective. If you read the actual order reproduced in Winter, pg 179, it clearly states under the heading "D-Day Divisional Objectives", the following: (v) "The capture of the city of Caen by means of a rapid advance and the establishment of a bridgehead south of the city." There is no mention of masking here. Masking only appears much deeper, where alternatives are discussed.

Eisenhower and Bedell Smith WROTE some of those primary documents – why are their views to be discarded?

2:1 is not a consensus. Perhaps look up “consensus” in a dictionary. Failing that, we can follow a dispute process.

Wdford ( talk) 20:01, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

Wikipedia:No_original_research#Primary.2C_secondary_and_tertiary_sources

Policy: Unless restricted by another policy, primary sources that have been reputably published may be used in Wikipedia, but only with care, because it is easy to misuse them.[4] Any interpretation of primary source material requires a reliable secondary source for that interpretation. A primary source may only be used on Wikipedia to make straightforward, descriptive statements of facts that can be verified by any educated person with access to the primary source but without further, specialized knowledge. For example, an article about a novel may cite passages to describe the plot, but any interpretation needs a secondary source. Do not analyze, evaluate, interpret, or synthesize material found in a primary source yourself; instead, refer to reliable secondary sources that do so. Do not base an entire article on primary sources, and be cautious about basing large passages on them. Do not add unsourced material from your personal experience, because that would make Wikipedia a primary source of that material. Use extra caution when handling primary sources about living people; see WP:Biographies of living persons § Avoid misuse of primary sources, which is policy.

Keith-264 ( talk) 20:35, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

Damwiki and K-264 have consensus. Keith-264 ( talk) 20:39, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

There is consensus here, according to wiki policy. This article, as it stands, focuses primarily on Montgomery and the controversy surrounding him rather than on the actual campaign. An analogy would be if the Battle of Midway article focused on Admiral Fletcher and controversy surrounding him, or if the Allied invasion of Sicily article focused on Patton's personal failings or the rivalry between him and Monty. I rather suspect that an attempt to alter those article to focus on a personality would be rejected. Damwiki1 ( talk) 21:15, 3 June 2017 (UTC)