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The idea that logic is best understood in terms of potential dialogs between opposing positions in an argument predates this idea and can be formalised: Lorenzen was the first to do so. See Game semantics for a currently not very polished introduction to the idea. The idea is anti-Tarskian (hence anti- " semantic theory of truth"), but is itself an idea about the semantics of logic ---- Charles Stewart 13:04, 30 Aug 2004 (UTC)
Trying to consolidate and make the articles more fluid -- DennisDaniels 19:24, 31 Aug 2004 (UTC)
Wilfred Hodges has an article Logic and games that will be interesting in the context of this article (and elsewhere). Let me quote two paragraphs:
Though some parts of argumentative dialogue theory can be formulated in terms of games, this would be unfortunate for several reasons:
practical cases of argument, it isn't easy to test whether this terminal state is achieved.
The game theoretic view is too explicitly stateful and largely ignores argument history (I know, histories can always be represented in state by taking state large enough) "Histories" of dialectical positions taken by individual participants are an essential ingredient of argumentative dialogue. In other words, I am thinking of a argumentative dialogue as being represented by the run of a communication protocol (for some idea of the events principals might engage in in this protocol, see van Eemeren Grootendorst). This approach has other advantages viz-- some of the "timing" issues involved in argument (for instance, delay in response in many instances may be regarded as failing to adequately respond) CSTAR 00:33, 1 Sep 2004 (UTC)
To echo myself, I'm not saying that game semantics are the right way to frame this article, but rather there is a common idea behind them; also there are interesting points of contact between the two. Some points:
In the medium term (ie. after a couple of weeks or so), I'm planning on overhauling what I wrote in semantics of logic, and treating proof theoretic and game semantical approaches more thoroughly. I'll draw on Wilfred Hodges article, and I'd like there to be some commonality of ground between this article and what I write elsewhere. This is the reason I posted the above excerpt in the first place ---- Charles Stewart 01:48, 1 Sep 2004 (UTC)
If nobody puts anything in them I will delete them. I'm not sure any of these distinctions are useful anyway. I also strongly object to state of an argument. CSTAR 13:19, 2 Sep 2004 (UTC)
There is another strand of 'Argumentation' that is more concerned with it's use as a machine-executable technique for qualitative decision making, and draws on work done by people sung as Dung, Fox, Parsons and McBurney (to name but a few) This is actually fairly different from this page, so I thought it might warrant something different, and should probably go under something more computer-y.
Any thoughts?
User:20040302 put as a new first paragraph:
In my view, this is an unacceptable lead paragrph, as it assumes that logical argument must be conducted in a determinate formal language, so I've RV'ed it. ---- Charles Stewart 09:06, 28 October 2004 (UTC)
There is another confusing element in this discussion which I'm afraid I'm responsible for: I'm using validity as a property of assertions and preservation of validity as a property of arguments. Now I've deliberatley (and possibly indiosyncratically) avoided applying truth to assertions and preservation of truth (ordinarily called deductive validity) to arguments. In part, I have been motivated by thinking of moral arguments or political arguments. For example, moral arguments relate sets of moral hypotheses to moral conclusions. Moral assertions may be true or false under particular interpretations of their constituent terms; rather than say an assertion is true under interpretation σ, I prefer to say assertion is valid under σ. CSTAR 06:09, 30 October 2004 (UTC)
Two attempted fixes to the disputed status have appeared, due to User:Nortexoid and User:Ancheta Wis. I rv'ed Nortexoids edits, and ancheta's usages I tidied up and put back a disputed notice on soundness. This is a just a temporary fix, I'll merge the two articles later today, as I promised Nortexoid last week and provided there are no well-founded objections. ---- Charles Stewart 12:14, 28 Feb 2005 (UTC)
Bien primero usted necesita tomar un wumpy regordete.
En el idioma ordinario, las personas se refieren a la lógica de una terminología del argumento o el uso que sugiere que un argumento se basa en reglas de inferencia de la lógica formal. Aunque los argumentos utilizan las inferencias que son indisputablemente puramente lógicas (tal como silogismos)
El contenido [showhide] 1 validez del Argumento
2 El paradigma matemático
3 Teorías de argumentos
4 Diálogo Discutidor
5 Otra La creencia predominante entre autores matemáticos es que los argumentos válidos en matemáticas son ésos que se pueden reconocer están como en el formalizable del principio en el abarcar la teoría formal. Sigue que la teoría de argumentos válidos en matemáticas es reducible a la teoría de inferencias válidas en teorías matemáticas formales. Una teoría de la validez de teorías matemáticas formales postula dos elementos claros: la sintaxis que da las reglas para cuando una fórmula se construye correctamente y semántico que es esencialmente una función de fórmulas a valores de verdad. Una expresión se dice ser válido si la función semántica asigna el valor verdadero a. Una regla de la inferencia es válida si y sólo si es validez-preservar. Un argumento es válido si y sólo si utiliza las reglas válidas de la inferencia. Note que en el caso de matemático semántico, la sintaxis y semántico son objetos matemáticos.
En el uso general, sin embargo, los argumentos son raramente formales o tienen aún el rigor de pruebaes matemáticas.
[redacte] las Teorías de Teorías de argumentos de argumentos son estrechamente relacionadas a teorías de la lógica informal. Idealmente, una teoría del argumento debe proporcionar algún mecanismo para explicar la validez de argumentos.
Un enfoque natural seguiría el paradigma y la tentativa matemáticos para definir la validez en términos de semántico de las afirmaciones en el argumento. Aunque tal enfoque apela en su sencillez, los obstáculos a avanzar esta manera es muy difícil para algo de otra manera que los argumentos puramente lógicos. Entre otros problemas, nosotros necesitamos interpretar las oraciones no sólo enteras, pero también componentes de oraciones, las frases por ejemplo sustantivas tales como El valor actualizado de renta de gobierno para los próximos doce años.
Una dificultad mayor de seguir este enfoque es eso determinando un dominio semántico apropiado no es una tarea fácil, levantando numerosos asuntos ontológicos espinosos. Levanta también la perspectiva desalentadoa de tener que trabajar fuera teorías semánticas aceptables es antes capaz de decir algo útil acerca de la comprensión y evaluar los argumentos. Para esta razón que el enfoque puramente semántico se reemplaza generalmente con otros enfoques que son más fácilmente aplicables al discurso práctico.
Para argumentos con respecto a temas tales como la probabilidad, la economía o la física, parte de los problemas semánticos se puede empujar convenientemente bajo la alfombra si podemos servirnos de un modelo del fenómeno bajo la discusión. En este caso, nosotros podemos establecer una interpretación semántica limitada que utiliza los términos del modelo y la validez del argumento es reducida a que del modelo abstracto. Esta clase de la reducción se utiliza en las ciencias naturales generalmente, y sería especialmente útil en discutir acerca de asuntos sociales si los partidos pueden convenir en un modelo. Desgraciadamente, esto reducción previa rara vez ocurre, con el resultado que argumentos acerca de la política social tienen raramente una resolución satisfactoria.
Otro enfoque deberá desarrollar una teoría del argumento pragmático, por lo menos en ciertos casos donde argumento e interacción social son estrechamente relacionados. Esto es muy útil cuando la meta del argumento lógico deberá establecer una resolución mutuamente satisfactoria de una diferencia de la opinión entre individuos llamas Discutidoras de poopy de diálogo están delicioso
The Overview is lead by: "In ordinary, philosophical and scientific argumentation abductive arguments and arguments by analogy are also commonly used." These need to be explored further in the body of this article rather than relying on the reader clicking on links. For example, outside brain-scanning machines abduction is the only way we can ascribe people's actual emotions or intent. Also, in practice analogical arguments are frequently the most compelling. Disallowing these methods because they lack rigor makes most practical argument impossible. - Wfaxon 06:26, 9 July 2006 (UTC)
Multimedia University,Cyberjaya Campus,Malaysia
The article begins:-
"In logic, an argument is an attempt to demonstrate the truth of an assertion called a conclusion, based on the truth of a set of assertions called premises."
This is surely better describes an (attempted) proof than an argument. I would write:
"This article is about arguments in logic.
In logic, an argument is a set of statements known as the premises, and another statement known as the conclusion in which it is asserted that the truth of the conclusion follows from (is entailed by) the premisses. A valid argument is one in which the premises cannot be true and the conclusion false. A sound argument is a valid argument with true premises (see also Validity, Soundness, true)"'
This introduces the key concepts of statement, truth, falsity,validity and entailment in one go. We might then add:
"A proof is a demonstration that an argument is valid (see Proof procedure). Note statements are either true or false (not valid or invalid); arguments are valid, invalid sound or unsound (not true or false). "
Views?
--
Philogo
01:53, 31 January 2007 (UTC)
Agree that a logical argument is a linguistic thing, not merely an attempt at persuasion, hence need emphasis on statements. Also think we need to distinguish deductive logic (where the premises are meant to entail the conclusion, or ensure that the conclusion must be true) from inductive logic and abductive logic etc., where the aim is the more modest one of conferring probability on the conclusion. See edits.
- Bosphor 23:59, 8 March 2007 (UTC)
—Preceding unsigned comment added by Philogo ( talk • contribs) 23:43, August 29, 2007 (UTC)
The distinction between argument and explanation seems superficial to me. The page seems to imply that any defense of the idea that "the moon causes the tides" is an explanation, precisely because the fact that there are tides is universally accepted. But could I not conjure up appropriate premises, and then make an argument whose conclusion would be "the moon causes the tides"?
Is this really a distinction make by philosophers and/or logicians these days? If so, could we put some references to their names?
If not, perhaps we could eliminate this section, or make it a lot more clear?
--Ryguasu
I agree. This is nonsensical. -- The Cunctator
"For example, arguments commonly deal with causality, probability and statistics or even specialized areas such as economics." -matt :? is not a sentance
I have now altered the introductory paragraph and the two following paragraphs, 'Validity' and 'Proof', as discussed above. Is there a good reason why this article is called 'Logical Argument' instead of Argument (Logic) -- Philogo 23:50, 29 August 2007 (UTC)
The dispute discussed below seems to have ended in late 2004, but just in case someone wishes to revive it:
I agree with Philogo that assigning a fixed, formal meaning to the notion of the 'soundness' of an argument is a recent (i.e. late 20th Century) development. Historically, and colloquially, soundness is probably not distinguished from validity. Charles Stewart is also correct to say that in model theory (or more accurately, in the study of formal logical systems), the notion of 'soundness' is a related but different notion to that being discussed here. Nevertheless, the modern technical use of the word 'sound' in the field of logical arguments is what we should reflect here, and as above references to articles have shown (and any textbook e.g. Hodges, Logic would confirm), the modern usage of 'sound' is to describe a valid argument with true premises. The other uses should be noted in the main article on Soundness as soon as possible.
- Bosphor 00:44, 9 March 2007 (UTC)
It is very clear on the distinction between validity and soundness. ( 20040302 14:54, 28 Oct 2004 (UTC))
The definition of 'sound argument' as (i) 'valid argument with true premises' as opposed to (ii) 'valid argument' is not universaly accepted, or if it is only recently. Definition (i) I note appear in the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Definition (ii) however appears in e.g. Mates, Elementary Logic, OUP:1972 p4: "An argument is said to be sound (correct, valid) if its conclusion follows from or is a consequnce of its premises; otherwise it is unsound". -- Philogo 22:45, 11 February 2007 (UTC)
I have contacted Kevin Klement, who is the Logic Editor of the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, and who is therefore responsible for one of the pages User:20040302 cited above. I plan on contacting several of the authors of other entries to try and get a picture of the usage of this definition, and perhaps to find a locus solum for it.
This issue is important, since soundness is a fundamental technical term of logic, and the definition we reach here has repercussions for many pages on logic in Wikipedia. It is possible, since the two definitions are not in outright contradiction, to let both definitions be used freely in the logic pages. It would, however, in view of the pronounced tension between the two definitions, be a recipe for confusion for many users of Wikipedia, so I think we should establish a policy. Perhaps it is time to dust of my proposal for a Wikiproject Logic?
Comments sought. ---- Charles Stewart 09:17, 29 Oct 2004 (UTC)
I wasn't aware there was a formal dispute, although I agree that an outside opinion would be useful. And why the reference by 20040302to someone's socio-political agenda? Am I missing something? I thought we agreed that the broader concept of logical argument should be flexible enough to accomodate argumentative dialogue and arguments in the natural and social sciences which use specialized models. Those arguments include social-political ones.
As I've tried to argue previously in this Talk page (and I thought Charles Stewart generally agrees with me on that one), argumentative dialogue is more like a communication protocol between principals than a sequence of WFF's in a formal deductive system. How is such an argument -- (i.e. run of a protocol) true? Look at the Chaim Perelman --- Lucie Tyteca-Olbrechts references, cited in the article, where they do consider "truth" as a criterion for judging numerous kinds of arguments and find it inadequate to evaluate most arguments in practice. Concepts such as fairness are completely ignored by strictly semantic theories of truth. This is not to say that some communicating process semantics for such arguments wouldn't be desirable, but as far as I know this idea has only been explored very tentatively.
For example, legal arguments, though not strictly formal logical arguments are arguments nonetheless, with a structure that needs to be accounted for in some way. But how is a legal argument true? Legal arguments are evaluated by other elements in them. Should we suddenly declare, "well these aren't arguments in any recognizable sense" ? CSTAR 14:29, 29 Oct 2004 (UTC) (revised my own earlier comments which were written with numerous mistakes) CSTAR 17:19, 29 Oct 2004 (UTC)
As mentioned above: The definition of 'sound argument' as (i) 'valid argument with true premises' as opposed to (ii) 'valid argument' is not universaly accepted, or if it is only recently. Definition (i) I note appear in the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Definition (ii) however appears in e.g. Mates, Elementary Logic, OUP:1972 p4: "An argument is said to be sound (correct, valid) if its conclusion follows from or is a consequnce of its premises; otherwise it is unsound".
I do not think that soundness (as opposed to validity) is a fundamental technical term of logic, -- Philogo 22:45, 11 February 2007 (UTC)
If This article is about arguments in logic. For other uses, see argument then this paragraph is surely digressive and should be moved to somewhere more appropriate -- Philogo ( talk) 13:44, 12 February 2008 (UTC) Therefore I have deleted it.-- Philogo ( talk) 02:32, 14 February 2008 (UTC)
eh no that makes no sesnce it acnt be logic i dont think that it is following a specific structure.==eh?== A valid
argument is one in which a
specific structure is followed. An invalid argument is one in which a specfic structure is NOT folloInsert non-formatted text herewed
This is surely a really unhelpful sentence. What specific structure? Any specific stucture? Invalid arguments have
specific structures as well, e.g. If p then q; not p therefore not q. -- Philogo ( talk) 14:09, 31 January 2008 (UTC) Insert non-formatted text here<<nowiki>Insert non-formatted text here/nowiki>
That may be so, but it is IMHO a totally unhelful and confusing statement, in fact just plain wrong. I cannot see how it could be th
----
Insert non-formatted text here----
ought appropriate for an encyclpedia. In act I'm just going to delete it..--
Philogo (
talk)
00:30, 9 February 2008 (UTC)
I would be happy if tthe entire article were rewritten. Nevertheless, there are several important issues which should be addressed by any version of this article.
15:48, 28 Oct 2004 (UTC)
New article Argument (Logic) dealing with arguments in deductve logic only-- Philogo ( talk) 13:19, 14 February 2008 (UTC)
Given the name of these two articles, one would be inclined to think they were about the same thing, no? Richard001 ( talk) 08:01, 8 February 2008 (UTC)
Help someone is trying to edit this article at the same time as me and its going to hell in a hand basket! Hang on whoever it is, pne at a time!-- Philogo ( talk) 05:37, 24 February 2008 (UTC)
Should not the books you have added under references not be under further reading, unless they are texts cited in support of the article? (what is the Wiki convention?
Do you think that the article as it now stands is (a) better or (b) worse than the article logical argument? -- Philogo ( talk) 03:03, 26 February 2008 (UTC)
or "false".
Should these words not be left in italics as they were and other such follwoing are as per the wiki use/mention distinction and not in double quotes as they have been recently put? —Preceding
unsigned comment added by
Philogo (
talk •
contribs)
22:40, 27 February 2008 (UTC)
I thought Philogo's latest deletions unfortunate. I think we both agree that a deductive argument is more accurately described with the "necessarily follows" language. However it is true, and helpful to make sure to include what most texts and classrooms use, even if it is not the greatest understanding. Instead, Philogo, perhaps we can find a way to put this in context:
"It is more commonly understood as the type of reasoning that proceeds from general principles or premises to derive particular information."
The reason you give for the other edit was "Careful: the conclusion of a valid argument need not be a necessary truth, (even though it follwos necessarily from the premises))"
The conclusion of a sound deductive argument is not necessarily a "necessary truth" as in "analytic truth", however it is in fact necessarily the truth. I thing the "necessary" language really is needed. Be well, Pontiff Greg Bard ( talk) 21:42, 1 April 2008 (UTC)
Necessarily follows and necessarily true.
These two terms should be distinguised rather than than confused in an article on Logic. It is the corresponding conditional of a valid argument which is a necessary truth - the conclusion need not be. The conclusion of a valid argument may be but need not be a necessary truth (although it necessarily follows from the premises.) Any argument is valid whose conclusion is a necessary truth, no matter its form or premises. Eg I am a walrus therefore it is true that it is raining or it is false that it is raining. I think it most unhelpful and plainly wrong to define a valid argument as one whose concusion is a necessary truth (although it might be). You might just as well say that the president of the united states is a drunkard (becuase he might be)
Since we are writing an enclopedia article and not a dictionary I see no good reason to perpetrate missussage. I do not know how many "textbooks and freshman logic classes" "use this language" and I do not think we should be bothered. I believe we should give the best possible explanation: concise and to the point.
If Lambiam is not offended by "silly", "gripe" and "tiresome" then thats good, but I find such langauge offensive and unhelpful your ideas would be more persuasive if they were not couched in such language.
Lampian and I seem to be in agreement that the sentence It is often – but less precisely – described as the type of argument that proceeds from general principles to derive particular claims. for the reasons given above. Therefore I propose it is deleted until somebody proposes a formulation here which all agree adds value to the article. It is NOT valuable material if it is unhelpful. Such a formultion would have to explain and define (a) general principles (b)particular claims and it would have to explain whether (A) Some Greeks are men therefore some men are Greeks and (B) Some men are mortal therefore not all men are immortal are (on the principle being discussed), valid deductive arguments a fortiori dedcutove arguments, and if so how they are proceeding from general principles to derive particular claims and if they are not valid deductive arguments what they are.
I suspect that the description type of argument that proceeds from general principles to derive particular claims is a lexical description of the vernacular use of the word deduction and not the definition of the term as it appears in reputable text books of Logic (rather than ordinary dictionaries). I would be interested and stand to be corrected to see some citations from reputable text books on Logic or authoritve authors which or who promote this definition. Gregbard says there are thousands; three would suffice. <br />
--
Philogo (
talk)
22:35, 14 April 2008 (UTC)
We seem to have more or less the same issue in
Deductive reasoningwhere it says:
It is more commonly understood as the type of reasoning that proceeds from general principles or premises to derive particulars[1], although this is a less precise understanding.--
Philogo (
talk)
22:35, 14 April 2008 (UTC)
I am not happy with this because I think the reader may confuse (a) a conclusion following necessarily from its premsies (b) a conclusion which is a necessarilty truth. There is no point in my editing it, howver, if Gregbard is just going to revert. Therefore I will propose the text below in substitution, and await the consensus.
A valid deductive argument is variously defined as an argument (a) such that the truth of the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises (b) in which the conclusion is entailed by the premises,(c) such that if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true (d) such that it would be self contradictory to assert the premises and deny the conclusion. (e) such that the premises and the negation of the conclusion are contradictory. These definitions could justly be said to be synonymous. The nature of the relationship between the premises and the conclusion of valid arguments which makes them such is one, if not the, main concern of Logic and the matter cannot be resolved or properly explained by a mere definition; see validity below
The
corresponding conditional, of a valid argument is a necessary truth (true in all possible worlds) and so we might say that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, or follows of logical necessity. The conclusion of a valid argument is not necessarily true, it depends on whether the premises are true. The conclusion of a valid argument need not be a necessary truth: if it were so, it would be so independently of the premisses.
By way of examples:
Some Greeks are logicians, therefore some logicans are Greeks: Valid argument; it would be self-contradictory to admit that Some Greeks are logicians but deny that some (any) logicans are Greeks.
All Greeks are human and All humans are mortal therefore All Greeks are mortal. : Valid argument; if the premises are true the concusion must be true.
Some Greeks are logicians and some logician are tiresome therefore some Greeks are tiresome. Invalid argument: the tiresome logicians might all be ones!
Either we are all doomed or we are all saved; we are not all saved therefore we are all doomed. Valid argument; the premises entail the conclusion. (Remember that does not mean the conclusion has to be true, only if the premisses are true, and perhaps they are not, perhaps some people are saved and some people are doomed, and perhaps some neither saved nor doomed!)
END PROPOSED NEW TEXT
--
Philogo (
talk)
22:17, 14 April 2008 (UTC)
The
corresponding conditional, of a valid argument is a necessary truth (true in all possible worlds) and so we might say that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, or follows of logical necessity. The conclusion of a valid argument is not necessarily true, it depends on whether the premises are true. The conclusion of a valid argument need not be a necessary truth: if it were so, it would be so independently of the premisses
NB Gregbard: It was to avoid going into this matter that I proposed using "must follow" rather than "necessarily follows" but you reverted it. IF we are going to use "necessrily follows" then we must explain the distinction between (a) being necessarily, e.g a tautology and (b) following necessarily from premises. I have drafted the above paragraoh in an atemt to provide that explanation. Are you content? Does it need polishing? Need a link to article on "necessary truth" I feel. I do not want to copy it into the article if you are going to revert it.--
Philogo (
talk)
12:34, 16 April 2008 (UTC)
I am afraid I think this material is off topic, and we could well do without it. --Philogo 23:53, 31 October 2008 (UTC)
The text "Whereas formal arguments are static, such as one might find in a textbook or research article, argumentative dialogue is dynamic. It serves as a published record of justification for an assertion." is ambiguous to me. I see that formal arguments are static so a static medium such as paper is appropriate but argumentative dialogue (AD) is not. In the next sentence "It serves as...",what does "It" refer to because it seems to me it refers to AD and then implies that it should be published - perhaps on paper. I'm certainly no subject expert so I won't try and correct it. -- Keith Whittingham ( talk) 08:28, 20 March 2009 (UTC)
My roommate and I noticed that the first sentence is really problematic. He's good at copy editing and I think I know what the sentence is trying to say but, between me not really know the best way to say it and him not knowing what was being said, We couldn't make heads or tails of it. I hope someone else can.
Peace
206.192.69.147 (
talk)
04:24, 19 April 2010 (UTC)
![]() | This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Archive 1 | Archive 2 | Archive 3 |
The idea that logic is best understood in terms of potential dialogs between opposing positions in an argument predates this idea and can be formalised: Lorenzen was the first to do so. See Game semantics for a currently not very polished introduction to the idea. The idea is anti-Tarskian (hence anti- " semantic theory of truth"), but is itself an idea about the semantics of logic ---- Charles Stewart 13:04, 30 Aug 2004 (UTC)
Trying to consolidate and make the articles more fluid -- DennisDaniels 19:24, 31 Aug 2004 (UTC)
Wilfred Hodges has an article Logic and games that will be interesting in the context of this article (and elsewhere). Let me quote two paragraphs:
Though some parts of argumentative dialogue theory can be formulated in terms of games, this would be unfortunate for several reasons:
practical cases of argument, it isn't easy to test whether this terminal state is achieved.
The game theoretic view is too explicitly stateful and largely ignores argument history (I know, histories can always be represented in state by taking state large enough) "Histories" of dialectical positions taken by individual participants are an essential ingredient of argumentative dialogue. In other words, I am thinking of a argumentative dialogue as being represented by the run of a communication protocol (for some idea of the events principals might engage in in this protocol, see van Eemeren Grootendorst). This approach has other advantages viz-- some of the "timing" issues involved in argument (for instance, delay in response in many instances may be regarded as failing to adequately respond) CSTAR 00:33, 1 Sep 2004 (UTC)
To echo myself, I'm not saying that game semantics are the right way to frame this article, but rather there is a common idea behind them; also there are interesting points of contact between the two. Some points:
In the medium term (ie. after a couple of weeks or so), I'm planning on overhauling what I wrote in semantics of logic, and treating proof theoretic and game semantical approaches more thoroughly. I'll draw on Wilfred Hodges article, and I'd like there to be some commonality of ground between this article and what I write elsewhere. This is the reason I posted the above excerpt in the first place ---- Charles Stewart 01:48, 1 Sep 2004 (UTC)
If nobody puts anything in them I will delete them. I'm not sure any of these distinctions are useful anyway. I also strongly object to state of an argument. CSTAR 13:19, 2 Sep 2004 (UTC)
There is another strand of 'Argumentation' that is more concerned with it's use as a machine-executable technique for qualitative decision making, and draws on work done by people sung as Dung, Fox, Parsons and McBurney (to name but a few) This is actually fairly different from this page, so I thought it might warrant something different, and should probably go under something more computer-y.
Any thoughts?
User:20040302 put as a new first paragraph:
In my view, this is an unacceptable lead paragrph, as it assumes that logical argument must be conducted in a determinate formal language, so I've RV'ed it. ---- Charles Stewart 09:06, 28 October 2004 (UTC)
There is another confusing element in this discussion which I'm afraid I'm responsible for: I'm using validity as a property of assertions and preservation of validity as a property of arguments. Now I've deliberatley (and possibly indiosyncratically) avoided applying truth to assertions and preservation of truth (ordinarily called deductive validity) to arguments. In part, I have been motivated by thinking of moral arguments or political arguments. For example, moral arguments relate sets of moral hypotheses to moral conclusions. Moral assertions may be true or false under particular interpretations of their constituent terms; rather than say an assertion is true under interpretation σ, I prefer to say assertion is valid under σ. CSTAR 06:09, 30 October 2004 (UTC)
Two attempted fixes to the disputed status have appeared, due to User:Nortexoid and User:Ancheta Wis. I rv'ed Nortexoids edits, and ancheta's usages I tidied up and put back a disputed notice on soundness. This is a just a temporary fix, I'll merge the two articles later today, as I promised Nortexoid last week and provided there are no well-founded objections. ---- Charles Stewart 12:14, 28 Feb 2005 (UTC)
Bien primero usted necesita tomar un wumpy regordete.
En el idioma ordinario, las personas se refieren a la lógica de una terminología del argumento o el uso que sugiere que un argumento se basa en reglas de inferencia de la lógica formal. Aunque los argumentos utilizan las inferencias que son indisputablemente puramente lógicas (tal como silogismos)
El contenido [showhide] 1 validez del Argumento
2 El paradigma matemático
3 Teorías de argumentos
4 Diálogo Discutidor
5 Otra La creencia predominante entre autores matemáticos es que los argumentos válidos en matemáticas son ésos que se pueden reconocer están como en el formalizable del principio en el abarcar la teoría formal. Sigue que la teoría de argumentos válidos en matemáticas es reducible a la teoría de inferencias válidas en teorías matemáticas formales. Una teoría de la validez de teorías matemáticas formales postula dos elementos claros: la sintaxis que da las reglas para cuando una fórmula se construye correctamente y semántico que es esencialmente una función de fórmulas a valores de verdad. Una expresión se dice ser válido si la función semántica asigna el valor verdadero a. Una regla de la inferencia es válida si y sólo si es validez-preservar. Un argumento es válido si y sólo si utiliza las reglas válidas de la inferencia. Note que en el caso de matemático semántico, la sintaxis y semántico son objetos matemáticos.
En el uso general, sin embargo, los argumentos son raramente formales o tienen aún el rigor de pruebaes matemáticas.
[redacte] las Teorías de Teorías de argumentos de argumentos son estrechamente relacionadas a teorías de la lógica informal. Idealmente, una teoría del argumento debe proporcionar algún mecanismo para explicar la validez de argumentos.
Un enfoque natural seguiría el paradigma y la tentativa matemáticos para definir la validez en términos de semántico de las afirmaciones en el argumento. Aunque tal enfoque apela en su sencillez, los obstáculos a avanzar esta manera es muy difícil para algo de otra manera que los argumentos puramente lógicos. Entre otros problemas, nosotros necesitamos interpretar las oraciones no sólo enteras, pero también componentes de oraciones, las frases por ejemplo sustantivas tales como El valor actualizado de renta de gobierno para los próximos doce años.
Una dificultad mayor de seguir este enfoque es eso determinando un dominio semántico apropiado no es una tarea fácil, levantando numerosos asuntos ontológicos espinosos. Levanta también la perspectiva desalentadoa de tener que trabajar fuera teorías semánticas aceptables es antes capaz de decir algo útil acerca de la comprensión y evaluar los argumentos. Para esta razón que el enfoque puramente semántico se reemplaza generalmente con otros enfoques que son más fácilmente aplicables al discurso práctico.
Para argumentos con respecto a temas tales como la probabilidad, la economía o la física, parte de los problemas semánticos se puede empujar convenientemente bajo la alfombra si podemos servirnos de un modelo del fenómeno bajo la discusión. En este caso, nosotros podemos establecer una interpretación semántica limitada que utiliza los términos del modelo y la validez del argumento es reducida a que del modelo abstracto. Esta clase de la reducción se utiliza en las ciencias naturales generalmente, y sería especialmente útil en discutir acerca de asuntos sociales si los partidos pueden convenir en un modelo. Desgraciadamente, esto reducción previa rara vez ocurre, con el resultado que argumentos acerca de la política social tienen raramente una resolución satisfactoria.
Otro enfoque deberá desarrollar una teoría del argumento pragmático, por lo menos en ciertos casos donde argumento e interacción social son estrechamente relacionados. Esto es muy útil cuando la meta del argumento lógico deberá establecer una resolución mutuamente satisfactoria de una diferencia de la opinión entre individuos llamas Discutidoras de poopy de diálogo están delicioso
The Overview is lead by: "In ordinary, philosophical and scientific argumentation abductive arguments and arguments by analogy are also commonly used." These need to be explored further in the body of this article rather than relying on the reader clicking on links. For example, outside brain-scanning machines abduction is the only way we can ascribe people's actual emotions or intent. Also, in practice analogical arguments are frequently the most compelling. Disallowing these methods because they lack rigor makes most practical argument impossible. - Wfaxon 06:26, 9 July 2006 (UTC)
Multimedia University,Cyberjaya Campus,Malaysia
The article begins:-
"In logic, an argument is an attempt to demonstrate the truth of an assertion called a conclusion, based on the truth of a set of assertions called premises."
This is surely better describes an (attempted) proof than an argument. I would write:
"This article is about arguments in logic.
In logic, an argument is a set of statements known as the premises, and another statement known as the conclusion in which it is asserted that the truth of the conclusion follows from (is entailed by) the premisses. A valid argument is one in which the premises cannot be true and the conclusion false. A sound argument is a valid argument with true premises (see also Validity, Soundness, true)"'
This introduces the key concepts of statement, truth, falsity,validity and entailment in one go. We might then add:
"A proof is a demonstration that an argument is valid (see Proof procedure). Note statements are either true or false (not valid or invalid); arguments are valid, invalid sound or unsound (not true or false). "
Views?
--
Philogo
01:53, 31 January 2007 (UTC)
Agree that a logical argument is a linguistic thing, not merely an attempt at persuasion, hence need emphasis on statements. Also think we need to distinguish deductive logic (where the premises are meant to entail the conclusion, or ensure that the conclusion must be true) from inductive logic and abductive logic etc., where the aim is the more modest one of conferring probability on the conclusion. See edits.
- Bosphor 23:59, 8 March 2007 (UTC)
—Preceding unsigned comment added by Philogo ( talk • contribs) 23:43, August 29, 2007 (UTC)
The distinction between argument and explanation seems superficial to me. The page seems to imply that any defense of the idea that "the moon causes the tides" is an explanation, precisely because the fact that there are tides is universally accepted. But could I not conjure up appropriate premises, and then make an argument whose conclusion would be "the moon causes the tides"?
Is this really a distinction make by philosophers and/or logicians these days? If so, could we put some references to their names?
If not, perhaps we could eliminate this section, or make it a lot more clear?
--Ryguasu
I agree. This is nonsensical. -- The Cunctator
"For example, arguments commonly deal with causality, probability and statistics or even specialized areas such as economics." -matt :? is not a sentance
I have now altered the introductory paragraph and the two following paragraphs, 'Validity' and 'Proof', as discussed above. Is there a good reason why this article is called 'Logical Argument' instead of Argument (Logic) -- Philogo 23:50, 29 August 2007 (UTC)
The dispute discussed below seems to have ended in late 2004, but just in case someone wishes to revive it:
I agree with Philogo that assigning a fixed, formal meaning to the notion of the 'soundness' of an argument is a recent (i.e. late 20th Century) development. Historically, and colloquially, soundness is probably not distinguished from validity. Charles Stewart is also correct to say that in model theory (or more accurately, in the study of formal logical systems), the notion of 'soundness' is a related but different notion to that being discussed here. Nevertheless, the modern technical use of the word 'sound' in the field of logical arguments is what we should reflect here, and as above references to articles have shown (and any textbook e.g. Hodges, Logic would confirm), the modern usage of 'sound' is to describe a valid argument with true premises. The other uses should be noted in the main article on Soundness as soon as possible.
- Bosphor 00:44, 9 March 2007 (UTC)
It is very clear on the distinction between validity and soundness. ( 20040302 14:54, 28 Oct 2004 (UTC))
The definition of 'sound argument' as (i) 'valid argument with true premises' as opposed to (ii) 'valid argument' is not universaly accepted, or if it is only recently. Definition (i) I note appear in the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Definition (ii) however appears in e.g. Mates, Elementary Logic, OUP:1972 p4: "An argument is said to be sound (correct, valid) if its conclusion follows from or is a consequnce of its premises; otherwise it is unsound". -- Philogo 22:45, 11 February 2007 (UTC)
I have contacted Kevin Klement, who is the Logic Editor of the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, and who is therefore responsible for one of the pages User:20040302 cited above. I plan on contacting several of the authors of other entries to try and get a picture of the usage of this definition, and perhaps to find a locus solum for it.
This issue is important, since soundness is a fundamental technical term of logic, and the definition we reach here has repercussions for many pages on logic in Wikipedia. It is possible, since the two definitions are not in outright contradiction, to let both definitions be used freely in the logic pages. It would, however, in view of the pronounced tension between the two definitions, be a recipe for confusion for many users of Wikipedia, so I think we should establish a policy. Perhaps it is time to dust of my proposal for a Wikiproject Logic?
Comments sought. ---- Charles Stewart 09:17, 29 Oct 2004 (UTC)
I wasn't aware there was a formal dispute, although I agree that an outside opinion would be useful. And why the reference by 20040302to someone's socio-political agenda? Am I missing something? I thought we agreed that the broader concept of logical argument should be flexible enough to accomodate argumentative dialogue and arguments in the natural and social sciences which use specialized models. Those arguments include social-political ones.
As I've tried to argue previously in this Talk page (and I thought Charles Stewart generally agrees with me on that one), argumentative dialogue is more like a communication protocol between principals than a sequence of WFF's in a formal deductive system. How is such an argument -- (i.e. run of a protocol) true? Look at the Chaim Perelman --- Lucie Tyteca-Olbrechts references, cited in the article, where they do consider "truth" as a criterion for judging numerous kinds of arguments and find it inadequate to evaluate most arguments in practice. Concepts such as fairness are completely ignored by strictly semantic theories of truth. This is not to say that some communicating process semantics for such arguments wouldn't be desirable, but as far as I know this idea has only been explored very tentatively.
For example, legal arguments, though not strictly formal logical arguments are arguments nonetheless, with a structure that needs to be accounted for in some way. But how is a legal argument true? Legal arguments are evaluated by other elements in them. Should we suddenly declare, "well these aren't arguments in any recognizable sense" ? CSTAR 14:29, 29 Oct 2004 (UTC) (revised my own earlier comments which were written with numerous mistakes) CSTAR 17:19, 29 Oct 2004 (UTC)
As mentioned above: The definition of 'sound argument' as (i) 'valid argument with true premises' as opposed to (ii) 'valid argument' is not universaly accepted, or if it is only recently. Definition (i) I note appear in the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Definition (ii) however appears in e.g. Mates, Elementary Logic, OUP:1972 p4: "An argument is said to be sound (correct, valid) if its conclusion follows from or is a consequnce of its premises; otherwise it is unsound".
I do not think that soundness (as opposed to validity) is a fundamental technical term of logic, -- Philogo 22:45, 11 February 2007 (UTC)
If This article is about arguments in logic. For other uses, see argument then this paragraph is surely digressive and should be moved to somewhere more appropriate -- Philogo ( talk) 13:44, 12 February 2008 (UTC) Therefore I have deleted it.-- Philogo ( talk) 02:32, 14 February 2008 (UTC)
eh no that makes no sesnce it acnt be logic i dont think that it is following a specific structure.==eh?== A valid
argument is one in which a
specific structure is followed. An invalid argument is one in which a specfic structure is NOT folloInsert non-formatted text herewed
This is surely a really unhelpful sentence. What specific structure? Any specific stucture? Invalid arguments have
specific structures as well, e.g. If p then q; not p therefore not q. -- Philogo ( talk) 14:09, 31 January 2008 (UTC) Insert non-formatted text here<<nowiki>Insert non-formatted text here/nowiki>
That may be so, but it is IMHO a totally unhelful and confusing statement, in fact just plain wrong. I cannot see how it could be th
----
Insert non-formatted text here----
ought appropriate for an encyclpedia. In act I'm just going to delete it..--
Philogo (
talk)
00:30, 9 February 2008 (UTC)
I would be happy if tthe entire article were rewritten. Nevertheless, there are several important issues which should be addressed by any version of this article.
15:48, 28 Oct 2004 (UTC)
New article Argument (Logic) dealing with arguments in deductve logic only-- Philogo ( talk) 13:19, 14 February 2008 (UTC)
Given the name of these two articles, one would be inclined to think they were about the same thing, no? Richard001 ( talk) 08:01, 8 February 2008 (UTC)
Help someone is trying to edit this article at the same time as me and its going to hell in a hand basket! Hang on whoever it is, pne at a time!-- Philogo ( talk) 05:37, 24 February 2008 (UTC)
Should not the books you have added under references not be under further reading, unless they are texts cited in support of the article? (what is the Wiki convention?
Do you think that the article as it now stands is (a) better or (b) worse than the article logical argument? -- Philogo ( talk) 03:03, 26 February 2008 (UTC)
or "false".
Should these words not be left in italics as they were and other such follwoing are as per the wiki use/mention distinction and not in double quotes as they have been recently put? —Preceding
unsigned comment added by
Philogo (
talk •
contribs)
22:40, 27 February 2008 (UTC)
I thought Philogo's latest deletions unfortunate. I think we both agree that a deductive argument is more accurately described with the "necessarily follows" language. However it is true, and helpful to make sure to include what most texts and classrooms use, even if it is not the greatest understanding. Instead, Philogo, perhaps we can find a way to put this in context:
"It is more commonly understood as the type of reasoning that proceeds from general principles or premises to derive particular information."
The reason you give for the other edit was "Careful: the conclusion of a valid argument need not be a necessary truth, (even though it follwos necessarily from the premises))"
The conclusion of a sound deductive argument is not necessarily a "necessary truth" as in "analytic truth", however it is in fact necessarily the truth. I thing the "necessary" language really is needed. Be well, Pontiff Greg Bard ( talk) 21:42, 1 April 2008 (UTC)
Necessarily follows and necessarily true.
These two terms should be distinguised rather than than confused in an article on Logic. It is the corresponding conditional of a valid argument which is a necessary truth - the conclusion need not be. The conclusion of a valid argument may be but need not be a necessary truth (although it necessarily follows from the premises.) Any argument is valid whose conclusion is a necessary truth, no matter its form or premises. Eg I am a walrus therefore it is true that it is raining or it is false that it is raining. I think it most unhelpful and plainly wrong to define a valid argument as one whose concusion is a necessary truth (although it might be). You might just as well say that the president of the united states is a drunkard (becuase he might be)
Since we are writing an enclopedia article and not a dictionary I see no good reason to perpetrate missussage. I do not know how many "textbooks and freshman logic classes" "use this language" and I do not think we should be bothered. I believe we should give the best possible explanation: concise and to the point.
If Lambiam is not offended by "silly", "gripe" and "tiresome" then thats good, but I find such langauge offensive and unhelpful your ideas would be more persuasive if they were not couched in such language.
Lampian and I seem to be in agreement that the sentence It is often – but less precisely – described as the type of argument that proceeds from general principles to derive particular claims. for the reasons given above. Therefore I propose it is deleted until somebody proposes a formulation here which all agree adds value to the article. It is NOT valuable material if it is unhelpful. Such a formultion would have to explain and define (a) general principles (b)particular claims and it would have to explain whether (A) Some Greeks are men therefore some men are Greeks and (B) Some men are mortal therefore not all men are immortal are (on the principle being discussed), valid deductive arguments a fortiori dedcutove arguments, and if so how they are proceeding from general principles to derive particular claims and if they are not valid deductive arguments what they are.
I suspect that the description type of argument that proceeds from general principles to derive particular claims is a lexical description of the vernacular use of the word deduction and not the definition of the term as it appears in reputable text books of Logic (rather than ordinary dictionaries). I would be interested and stand to be corrected to see some citations from reputable text books on Logic or authoritve authors which or who promote this definition. Gregbard says there are thousands; three would suffice. <br />
--
Philogo (
talk)
22:35, 14 April 2008 (UTC)
We seem to have more or less the same issue in
Deductive reasoningwhere it says:
It is more commonly understood as the type of reasoning that proceeds from general principles or premises to derive particulars[1], although this is a less precise understanding.--
Philogo (
talk)
22:35, 14 April 2008 (UTC)
I am not happy with this because I think the reader may confuse (a) a conclusion following necessarily from its premsies (b) a conclusion which is a necessarilty truth. There is no point in my editing it, howver, if Gregbard is just going to revert. Therefore I will propose the text below in substitution, and await the consensus.
A valid deductive argument is variously defined as an argument (a) such that the truth of the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises (b) in which the conclusion is entailed by the premises,(c) such that if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true (d) such that it would be self contradictory to assert the premises and deny the conclusion. (e) such that the premises and the negation of the conclusion are contradictory. These definitions could justly be said to be synonymous. The nature of the relationship between the premises and the conclusion of valid arguments which makes them such is one, if not the, main concern of Logic and the matter cannot be resolved or properly explained by a mere definition; see validity below
The
corresponding conditional, of a valid argument is a necessary truth (true in all possible worlds) and so we might say that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, or follows of logical necessity. The conclusion of a valid argument is not necessarily true, it depends on whether the premises are true. The conclusion of a valid argument need not be a necessary truth: if it were so, it would be so independently of the premisses.
By way of examples:
Some Greeks are logicians, therefore some logicans are Greeks: Valid argument; it would be self-contradictory to admit that Some Greeks are logicians but deny that some (any) logicans are Greeks.
All Greeks are human and All humans are mortal therefore All Greeks are mortal. : Valid argument; if the premises are true the concusion must be true.
Some Greeks are logicians and some logician are tiresome therefore some Greeks are tiresome. Invalid argument: the tiresome logicians might all be ones!
Either we are all doomed or we are all saved; we are not all saved therefore we are all doomed. Valid argument; the premises entail the conclusion. (Remember that does not mean the conclusion has to be true, only if the premisses are true, and perhaps they are not, perhaps some people are saved and some people are doomed, and perhaps some neither saved nor doomed!)
END PROPOSED NEW TEXT
--
Philogo (
talk)
22:17, 14 April 2008 (UTC)
The
corresponding conditional, of a valid argument is a necessary truth (true in all possible worlds) and so we might say that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, or follows of logical necessity. The conclusion of a valid argument is not necessarily true, it depends on whether the premises are true. The conclusion of a valid argument need not be a necessary truth: if it were so, it would be so independently of the premisses
NB Gregbard: It was to avoid going into this matter that I proposed using "must follow" rather than "necessarily follows" but you reverted it. IF we are going to use "necessrily follows" then we must explain the distinction between (a) being necessarily, e.g a tautology and (b) following necessarily from premises. I have drafted the above paragraoh in an atemt to provide that explanation. Are you content? Does it need polishing? Need a link to article on "necessary truth" I feel. I do not want to copy it into the article if you are going to revert it.--
Philogo (
talk)
12:34, 16 April 2008 (UTC)
I am afraid I think this material is off topic, and we could well do without it. --Philogo 23:53, 31 October 2008 (UTC)
The text "Whereas formal arguments are static, such as one might find in a textbook or research article, argumentative dialogue is dynamic. It serves as a published record of justification for an assertion." is ambiguous to me. I see that formal arguments are static so a static medium such as paper is appropriate but argumentative dialogue (AD) is not. In the next sentence "It serves as...",what does "It" refer to because it seems to me it refers to AD and then implies that it should be published - perhaps on paper. I'm certainly no subject expert so I won't try and correct it. -- Keith Whittingham ( talk) 08:28, 20 March 2009 (UTC)
My roommate and I noticed that the first sentence is really problematic. He's good at copy editing and I think I know what the sentence is trying to say but, between me not really know the best way to say it and him not knowing what was being said, We couldn't make heads or tails of it. I hope someone else can.
Peace
206.192.69.147 (
talk)
04:24, 19 April 2010 (UTC)