This page is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
In the current revision, section Analysts:
“ | Sergey Yushenkov, the head of the unofficial inquiry into the bombings, was assassinated 13 days before the announcement of the completion of the official investigation of the bombings and Yury Schekochikhin's medical records are still classified. Yushenkov had occasionally suggested to reporters off the record his personal belief that the security services were behind the murder of his colleague Vladimir Golovlyov, as well as the Moscow bombings. | ” |
This statement is followed by the reference " Foiled Attack or Failed Exercise? A Look at Ryazan 1999". That reference says lots of things. For example,
“ | Commenting on the film, Russian Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov decried the lack of civilian control over the armed forces and especially over the secret services in Russia. Following the events of September 11, Yushenkov stated, many Russians waited with concern to see how the United States would react whether or not the Americans would forget Benjamin Franklin'sadmonition that those would sacrifice freedom for security would gain neither. Those fears were not borne out; even after the terrorist attack, democratic institutions functioned normally, including civilian control over the military and secret services. Russia's experience was different, and the movie showed three things clearly, according to Yushenkov. First, there is no civilian control over the secret services in Russia, which is clear from the refusal of the Russian Duma and government to investigate the suspicious events in Ryazan. Second, the Russian authorities, especially the FSB, are prone to lying. And third, even if FSB claims that the Ryazan incident was a civilian defense exercise were true, such an exercise involving unsuspecting civilians would be a gross violation of Russian law. Without civilian control, Yushenkov concluded, the FSB will continue to get away with violations of law and telling lies to society. | ” |
The only thing it doesn't say is anything to support the claims made in the current revision of the article.
The first author of the cited fragment has inserted an unreferenced statement, and the second author might have inadvertently used the wrong link as the reference. It's actually no big deal at all. But until the correct link is found (which does prove the statement, so that we can correctly attribute it) I suggest that the cited fragment should be removed from the article.
Document hippo ( talk) 17:53, 21 August 2017 (UTC)
Death of a Dissident by Goldfarb for the first sentence and https://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol8/ed0810.html for the second sentence. Please restore.
RAB3L ( talk) 19:38, 24 August 2017 (UTC)
“ | For a long time I was of two minds as to who killed Yushenkov, and why. His murder fit the mounting pattern of conspiracy theories, from the apartment bombings to the Terkibayev revelations. But then again, none of them had been proven, and, as a scientist, I had to consider that they could have been coincidences, however improbable. Intuitively it was logical that the FSB killed Yushenkov, who was the most vocal promoter of anti-FSB allegations. Then, a competing theory about Yushenkov emerged. Two months after the murder, the police caught his assassins. The two perpetrators turned out to be career criminals and drug addicts, who were paid for the hit by a certain Alexander Vinnik, a Liberal Russia functionary from the provincial center of Syktyvkar. Vinnik confessed and said that he had acted on behalf of Mikhail Kodanev, Yushenkov’s rival in the Liberal Russia leadership. When the four of them went on trial, Kodanev was the only one who pleaded not guilty. Vinnik was lying, he said.
Yet Kodanev had a motive. In july 2002, a couple of months after Liberal Russia had been formed, Yushenkov had a conversation with a highly placed official at the justice Ministry. He told him in no uncertain terms that the party would never be registered for the 2003 elections if Berezovsky remained on its candidate list. That was the president’s explicit order. Yushenkov had no choice; he agreed to dump Boris. The party split in half, with a Yushenkov wing and a Berezovsky wing. But then Yushenkov came to London, sat down with Boris, and they reconciled: after the party was registered, Boris’s wing would return to Yushenkov’s fold. Kodanev had been Number Two in Boris’s wing, but would have faced a much lesser standing in the reunited party. According to the prosecution, he put out the contract on Yushenkov when he learned about his reconciliation with Boris. On the testimony of Vinnik, Kodanev was convicted and given a sentence of twenty years. I had met Kodanev a couple of times in London, and I did not like him. But Sasha was adamant that it was all a setup. The two killers were probably recruited by the FSB while in jail, he said. They were promised a few months of freedom and a reduction in their remaining sentences in exchange for the hit and for naming Vinnik as their patron. Vinnik, in turn, was told to name Kodanev or face a life sentence. Sasha had no doubt; he had seen dozens of such cases. With his pledge to make the bombings an election issue Yushenkov was a threat; Kontora would stop at nothing to get rid of him. How could I not see it? Yushenkov was not the first and would not be the last, he predicted. "And there will always be a plausible ‘legend.’ That’s part of the tradecraft." Indeed, seven months before Yushenkov was killed, his associate, Vladimir Golovlyov, a Duma member who was in charge of Liberal Russia finances, was shot while walking his dog. His killers were never found. The predominant theory was that it was a business dispute; Golovlyov had been involved in many privatization deals. Three months after Yushenkov, Yuri Schekochihin, the crusading journalist from Novaya Gazeta and a member of the Public Commission, died suddenly from an unexplained "allergic reaction." His medical chart ended up "classified." His colleagues and his family suspected poisoning related to his numerous investigations of the FSB. ‘See," said Sasha when we learned of Schekochihin’s mysterious death, "I told you, didn’t I?” Sasha was an oper, not a scientist. He did not believe in coincidences. In retrospect, he had a point. |
” |
If you refer back to the opening sentence of this section, all I said was that Yushenkov was assassinated, he was shot, but I didn't say who by. You are being way too defensive. Also why would you classify someone's medical records unless the cause of death was suspicious and the government was involved in his death? Pages 278-9. RAB3L ( talk) 12:22, 28 August 2017 (UTC)
While all good-faith contributions to Wikipedia are appreciated, this edit has added some WP:OR.
With due respect to its author, the OR contents should be moved to the talk page (here), until it can be adequately sourced. Here's the removed content:
“ | However, the invasion of Dagestan began on 4th August and the first bombing in Moscow was on the 4th September; according to the official Russian investigation of the bombings, as mentioned above, the explosives used were stored for 2 months in a wharehouse in Kislovodsk. How can preparations for a retributive act commence long before the act for which the retribution is intended even started? | ” |
Meanwhile, perhaps we could have a little bit of a discussion here in the talk?
It seems to me, that a trivial explanation would be that the explosives were prepared by Wahhabis beforehand, in the anticipation that they might become useful as the leverage against the Russian authorities (similar to Basayev's Budyonnovsk moment).
So, Wahhabis invested in the capability which might or might not have been used. And once the Russian army started to deal with their invasion into Dagestan, they blew up the buildings as an act of revenge.
Perhaps I used too many words, but hopefully made it clear that IMHO there's no necessary contradiction contained in Ware's statement. Stated like that, it's OR of course, but it's only the talk page so it should be excusable. ;-)
Document hippo ( talk) 00:04, 16 August 2017 (UTC)
Even with explosives to hand, four weeks or less is wholly insufficient time for preparation of an apartment bombing. From this article: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Whos-Blowing-Up-Russia.pdf
"This story, which openly contradicted official statements (that the terrorist acts in Moscow were
committed by Chechen terrorists as revenge for their defeat in Dagestan), was first aired on the
morning of 16th September, a few hours before the explosion in Volgodonsk. Moskovskiy
Komsomolets published an article with a sensational headline: “Was the Kremlin making
bombs?”. With reference to an anonymous intelligence analyst, the article claimed that “together
with the commonly accepted story [that Chechens wanting to avenge state operations in Dagestan
were behind the Moscow bombings], a series of bizarre scenarios have been considered”.
Specifically, “just three hours after the first bombing on Kashirskoye Highway, it was suggested
that Chechen mujahidin had nothing to do with the terrorist acts in the capital. Over time, there is
more and more evidence to support this”.
According to the anonymous analyst, “simulating an attack similar to the two explosions in Moscow proves that terrorists would have needed between four and four and a half months to plan them”. But “during that time, even if the Chechens were indeed planning to invade Dagestan, they would have only been in the very early stages”. This leads to the conclusion that the terrorist acts in the capital could not have resulted from the situation in Dagestan or in Chechnya, meaning the Moscow explosions could have been the work of the FSB. The Main Directorate for Special Programs of the President of the Russian Federation (GUSP), which the article mentions, could have played a role. A part of the GUSP is “the former 15th division of the KGB which operates the underground bunkers for top public officials in case of war. The experts from this division... know how to work with explosives. Furthermore, the administration is a “pocket” presidential intelligence agency subordinate only to the head of state”.
The material unambiguously claimed that “the terrorist acts in Moscow were almost certainly carried out by professionals”. In addition, the anonymous analysts put forward the idea that “it could have been done by men hired by the Russian security services”. Naturally, the President’s spokesman Dmitry Yakushkin was quick to announce that “any suggestion of the Kremlin’s involvement in the explosion is absolutely monstrous”. "
RAB3L ( talk) 17:18, 16 August 2017 (UTC)
“ | Once, when I was at Shamil’s home and we were sitting in the living room, he asked me, “Tell me, Ilyas, do you have a dream, a vision of our future?”
I answered, “Yes, I do have a dream. I don’t have to be part of it, but I would like to look through a key hole and see on the other side that Chechnya resembles a state with normal political processes.” “You are an idealist, as are many among us,” Shamil countered. “I used to believe this too, but now I can see, based on everything that I’ve experienced, we’ll never be able to build a state.” “What do you mean? What have we been trying to accomplish all these years? And why have we made all the sacrifices if not for a Chechen state?” “The Russians will never permit us to establish a normal state,” he insisted. “We need to create a caliphate. The Russians will never let us be.” “Shamil, do you understand that a caliphate is an empire, a religious empire, but still an empire? Historically empires arise in one of two ways: if a state is so well run, prosperous, and beneficial to its citizens that its neighbors rush to unite with it, or if it is so strong militarily that it can conquer its neighbors. Right now we resemble a gang, and you cannot build a caliphate around a gang. Chechnya is a piece of land divided by rival gangs. We don’t control our territory, we don’t control our borders, there’s chaos all around, and based on this you’re going to build a caliphate? “Your problem is that you are a hostage of your Soviet education,” Shamil shot back. “Okay. Let that be my problem, but I don’t want my problem to become anyone else’s problem. I don’t pretend to understand these congresses and caliphates, and I don’t think that they offer a way out, and I have no desire to participate in them. In any case, Shamil, in any endeavor that you undertake, if what you are doing is just and right in my understanding, I will always be your loyal companion and I will stand next to you, but I have to believe that you are on the right path.” He responded, “Each is free to make his own decisions and each will answer to the Almighty for his decisions and his actions.” This was probably the last time that I casually dropped by Shamil’s house. After this we had very few meetings, partly because he moved to Serzhen Yurt and partly because our relationship changed. I think Udugov and Shamil were already hatching plans for Dagestan, and this is why they would quieten down when I entered the room, or isolate themselves from me. |
” |
But that's my opinion, of course. The point you tried to insert as OR is currently reviewed in the article in the section Theory of ibn-Khattab involvement/Criticism:
“ | The culprits would also have needed to organise nine explosions (the four that occurred and the five attempted bombings reported by the authorities) in different cities in a two-week period. Satter’s estimate for the time required for target plan development, site visits, explosives preparation, renting space at the sites and transporting explosives to the sites was four to four and a half months. If Satter is correct, the preparations for these acts of revenge would have needed to be initiated long before the act for which they were revenge for, had occurred! | ” |
I don't see how it would help if it's repeated twice. Document hippo ( talk) 20:28, 16 August 2017 (UTC)
OK, so you are suggesting that the Wahhabis went ahead and manufactured and/or acquired explosives for future use. That's a very reasonable suggestion. But then, before the invasion of Dagestan, they somehow transfer some of those explosives to Moscow "just in case" they are required for future use. Questionable I'd say, given the risk of being found out. Even more questionable, to say the least, when the storage used, as fairly conclusively proved by Trepashkin, was rented by Romanovich, an FSB agent - unless of course the Wahhabis were collaborating with the FSB! It was easy to frame Gochiyaev; he had known Wahhabi sympathies. Fortunately the swapping of the identifit of Romanovich for that of Gochiyaev was found by Trepashkin. So no, as far as Moscow is concerned, this theory is a non-starter.
You should also be sceptical about the Wahhabis. Zakayev, as pointed out in the article, was under the impression that the Wahhabis were sponsored by the Russians. During a crackdown in 1998, the Maskhadov government rounded up some Wahhabis and expelled them to Jordan. They were all Arabs who spoke Russian and were in the pay of the Russians. They couldn't enter Chechnya directly because the borders were tightly sealed to outsiders. They all had Jordanian passports with Russian visas and had entered Chechnya by flying first to Moscow. They could not have done so without the FSB knowing.
It would also seem that the invasion of Dagestan was facilitated by the Russians. This is covered in Dunlop's book pages 71-73:
"That the rebels would be coming into Dagestan," the deputy minister of internal affairs of Dagestan, Major General Magomed Omarov, recalled in mid-2003, "was known to everyone several months before the events. That there would be a war in August was spokenof as early as the spring (of 1999) beginning with the operational workers from the power structures and ending with the women of the bazaars.""The information, naturally was passed on to the centre," he remembered, " but why the necessary reaction did not take place is a question not to be addressed by me."
Omarov also noticed that "three mnths [before the incursions] the troops were withdrawn from the Dagestan-Chechen border, troops which had stood there for a long time.""There are many more other questions," Omarov added, "the main one of which is: why were the rebels let in without hindrance and why were they allowed to leave freely."
Retired army colonel Viktor Baranets reported in September 1999 that, "The administration of the FSB of Dagestan had over the course of the last three years mre than 2,000 times informed Moscow about the growing activity of Chechen emissaries in the republic." Baranets, citing the text of a "confidential document", reports that on 5-6 June 1999, control over a section of the border 14 kilometers long in Tsumadinskii District was transferred from the Russian Border Guards, an elite unit, to the Tsumadinskii branch of the MVD of Dagestan. "And to the excursion there remianed precisely sixty days".
Florian Hassel, Moscow correspndent of the Frankfurter Rundschau, has reported meeting, in October 1999, five Dagestani policemen who had briefly fought Basayev's troops in the Mountains:
"Basayev's attack on Dagestan was apparently organised in Moscow," said one policeman, Elgar, who watched the Chechens retreatfrom the village of Botlikh on September 11. "Basayev and his people went back comfortably in broad daylight with about 100 cars and trucks and many on foot. They used the main road to Chechnya and were not fired at by our combat helicopters. We received express orders not to attack."
The commander of a Russian special operations team in Dagestan told a correspondent for Time magazine that one one scorching August day in 1999, "he had Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev in his sights....With a simple squeeze of a finger [he] could take out Basayev.... But [he] says that he received the following order over his walki-talkie: "Hold your fire". We just watched Basyev's long column of trucks and jeeps withdraw from Dagestan back to Chechnya under cover provided by our own helicopters."
Some invasion!
RAB3L ( talk) 19:51, 17 August 2017 (UTC)
So, in other words you agree that at least one act of revenge was initiated before the act for which the revenge was intended had even started? Of course, the longer the explosives were stored in the final position of use, the more the suspicion should be that the FSB were responsible. If the FSB explosives were found (as in Ryazan) there would be no consequences! Explosions were prevented because Gochiyaev warned the authorities! The culprits could have been caught (by setting a trap) but the FSB decided to make their "find" public, possibly to avoid the embarressment of catching their own people! Trepashkin tried to investigate Gochiyaev's phone records but the FSB were uncooperative. According to Trepashkin they have no interest in finding him!
RAB3L ( talk) 19:31, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
“ | While there is not yet sufficient information for the conclusive evaluation of such claims, the following considerations may prove useful:
1. Russian troops inexplicably were withdrawn from the Dagestani border in the area of the insurgency just prior to the onset of the conflict. 2. Basayev exited the republic with an ease reminiscent of Raduyev's departure from Pervomaiskoye. The Dagestani Avar leader, Gadji Mahachev, claims that his requests that Russian troops should mine Basayev's exit routes were unheeded. Of course it is easier to request mines than it is to plant them in rugged western Dagestan, and it is far from certain that mines would have proven effective, but it seems that Basayev got into, and out of, Dagestan far too easily. <...> Without sacrificing simplicity, it is possible to account for the first two points by postulating low-level, as opposed to high level, conspiracies: Scenario 1: Basayev bribes Russian officers near the Dagestani border to permit him access by retracting their troops just prior to his advance and later permitting his escape. Scenario 2: Russian officers on the ground in Dagestan, who are familiar with the Dagestani people and realize that most of them will resist Basayev, pull back to allow him to enter Dagestan, because they anticipate that the trap will weaken or destroy Basayev. Basayev's escape is due to his well-known skills combined with well-documented Russian incompetence. |
” |
So in effect, Ware is supporting the conspiracy theory, at least as far as Dagestan is concerned. Your scenarios are meaningless conjecture. This was not a local arrangement. It was negotiated in Beaulieu with Voloshin. Dunlop: "It is necessary for me to report here that a representative of one of the French intelligence organisations, whose identity is known to me, subsequently confirmed to an experienced Western academic, that French intelligence does indeed possess evidence that coincides roughly with what Boris Kagarlitsky wrote." RAB3L ( talk) 19:42, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
Have you ever made an edit in this article that was anti Russian government? Some time ago there was someone who we worked out was a Dutch nationalist. Most likely a member of Geert Wilders party, which is sponsored by Russia. So I asked him if he was working quid pro quo for the chekists. He never replied and seems to have disappeared from Wikipedia.
RAB3L ( talk) 19:50, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
"I don't see an issue with making anti-Russian government edits." You are avoiding the question. RAB3L ( talk) 21:52, 23 August 2017 (UTC)
That's criticism? More like the exception that proves the rule! Why did they need a war instead of using television? Because Yeltsin's popularity was in single figures!
RAB3L ( talk) 12:00, 28 August 2017 (UTC)
"Lastly, Yelstin's popularity was in single figures in 1996, too. So..." - good point, or maybe not: http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2107565,00.html. It worked once but perhaps not a second time. So something else was required, perhaps postponement or cancellation of the 2000 presidential elections? RAB3L ( talk) 19:13, 31 August 2017 (UTC)
In the article the discussion of Trepashkin's claims about Romanovich appears twice, with a significant overlap ( current revision).
First, in the section Related events -> Arrest of independent investigator Trepashkin:
“ | The commission of Sergei Kovalyov asked lawyer Mikhail Trepashkin to investigate the case. Trepashkin found that the basement of one of the bombed buildings was rented by FSB officer Vladimir Romanovich and that the latter was witnessed by several people. Trepashkin was unable to bring the evidence to court because he was arrested by FSB in October 2003 and imprisoned in Nizhny Tagil, allegedly for "disclosing state secrets", just a few days before he was to make his findings public.[106] He was sentenced by a military closed court to a four-year imprisonment.[107] Amnesty International issued a statement that, "[T]here are serious grounds to believe that Mikhail Trepashkin was arrested and convicted under falsified criminal charges".[108] Romanovich subsequently died in a hit and run accident in Cyprus. According to Trepashkin, his supervisors and FSB members promised not to arrest him if he left the Kovalyov commission and started working with the FSB "against Alexander Litvinenko".[109] | ” |
Second, in the section Investigations and theories -> Attempts at independent investigation:
“ | Trepashkin claimed to have found that the basement of one of the bombed buildings was rented by FSB officer Vladimir Romanovich and that the latter was witnessed by several people. Trepashkin was unable to bring the alleged evidence to the court because he was arrested in October 2003 for illegal arms possession, just a few days shortly before he was to make his findings public.[106] He was sentenced by a Moscow military court to four years imprisonment for disclosing state secrets.[107] Amnesty International issued a statement that "there are serious grounds to believe that Mikhail Trepashkin was arrested and convicted under falsified criminal charges which may be politically motivated, in order to prevent him continuing his investigative and legal work related to the 1999 apartment bombings in Moscow and other cities".[108]
However, in 2009, Russian Novaya Gazeta newspaper published a note which stated that Romanovich died more than a year before the apartment bombings took place:[166] "According to legally reliable texts of certificates of his [Romanovich's] death (the source is the bodies of power of the Republic of Cyprus), that we obtained after publishing that article, death of Romanovich occurred in April 1998." |
” |
I propose the merger of these sections. Trepashkin's claims are viewed more extensively in the second place, so I suggest the related material should be moved there. Document hippo ( talk) 22:19, 17 August 2017 (UTC)
Especially since it was later revealed that Romanovich died a year before the bombings, I don't think it's an overly important point, and not the one that deserves multiple discussions. Document hippo ( talk) 22:56, 17 August 2017 (UTC)
How do you know that the so-called death certificate was genuine? Why did it take 10 years to "discover" it? Suspicious or what? RAB3L ( talk) 21:50, 23 August 2017 (UTC)
Worst of all, the material has been presented like that for years. Apparently it's not obvious to notice, no wonder it evaded everyone's attention. Document hippo ( talk) 23:09, 17 August 2017 (UTC)
Meanwhile, I wondered, how did Dunlop address the report in Novaya Gazeta that Romanovich died in 1998? Well, he found it "rather strange" (p. 155) and asked a bunch of questions (p. 156) which he apparently didn't attempt to answer:
“ | Is, one is prompted to ask, the information contained in this "Refutation" accurate? If so, why did Romanovich's widow, or "widow," and her well-wishers wait nearly six years to refute what Mikhail Trepashkin had first publicly asserted in November of 2003 and had then repeated in public many times subsequently? Were the documents from the Republic of Cyprus that were allegedly produced authentic or could they have been forged? And how did a death certificate from Cyprus prove that Romanovich had had no connections to the FSB? Could immense pressure have been put on Gefter and the editorial board of the newspaper to issue this refutation? These are questions that need to be addressed. | ” |
We can't even say he doubted that article because there are just questions that are left hanging in the air. Why didn't Dunlop ask Romanovich's wife? Why didn't he address Gefter or the editorial board of Novaya Gazeta? Etc, etc.
The problem is, you cannot arbitrarily trust and distrust the same newspaper depending on whether you like or dislike what you read — and Novaya Gazeta has been the major venue researching the conspiracy.
What's ever strange in that journalists of Novaya Gazeta just honestly did their job, reporting the evidence they have got? Document hippo ( talk) 12:01, 18 August 2017 (UTC)
"you cannot arbitrarily trust and distrust the same newspaper depending on whether you like or dislike what you read" - is that not exactly what you are doing? RAB3L ( talk) 21:47, 23 August 2017 (UTC)
It's apparently not too difficult to acquire false death certificates in Cyprus:
http://news.pseka.net/index.php?module=article&id=3609
Would Trepashkin not have been aware of when Romanovich died?
RAB3L ( talk) 21:06, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
"He seems to have relied on the word of mouth" - How on earth can you claim that? How do you know how he obtained the information? Complete B/S!
RAB3L ( talk) 21:47, 23 August 2017 (UTC)
“ | Once he had had a chance to see, in the direct wake of the Moscow bombings, the composite photo of the Moscow bomber which had been compiled from Blumenfeld’s words, Trepashkin informed his former leaders in the FSB that the composite photo was very similar to Romanovich. “Soon,” he has recalled, “I paid attention to the fact that the composite photo had been transformed: the face had become more elongated. And later I learned that Romanovich, who had left for Cyprus, had been struck and killed by a car.” | ” |
“ | Сделав неожиданное открытие, я сообщил об этом своим бывшим руководителям из ФСБ, передав им и фотографию Романовича, которая у меня была. Вскоре я обратил внимание на то, что фоторобот, очень похожий на Романовича, трансформировался: лицо становилось все более вытянутым. А спустя полгода узнал, что Романовича, который к тому времени выехал на Кипр, будто бы задавила машина. | ” |
The Russian word for "allegedly" is "предполагаемо"; strangely it's absent from your quotation! Romanovich or not, it doesn't alter the fact that the FSB attempted to fit up Gochiyaev, as Trepashkin conclusively proved. RAB3L ( talk) 21:18, 24 August 2017 (UTC)
“ | Acting on a hunch, Trepashkin began going through old newspaper archives in the hope that the original sketch had been published somewhere before the FSB had pulled it from circulation. After an exhaustive search, he finally found it. To his surprise, it was a sketch of someone he knew: Vladimir Romanovich, an FSB agent who in the mid 1990s had been responsible for investigating Chechen criminal organizations. | ” |
If you use Systranet ( http://www.systranet.com/translate/?session=ba187eb98110d60b--5d50190f-12e3a08ec4f--2290) you get a different answer. Supposedly might be a better term than allegedly, but as used it (or allegedly) only refers to the means of death rather than the death itself. Presumably Trepashkin was not present when Romanovich died! The other "surprising" aspect is that it took ten years for the death certificate to be "discovered".
You haven't got your "facts" right about Romanovich either: "The sting resulted in a raid on a Bank Soldi branch in Moscow in Dec 1995. Trepashkin claims that the raid uncovered bugging devices used by the extortionists, whose serial numbers linked their origin to the FSB or Ministry of Defense. Furthermore, a van outside the bank was monitoring the bugging devices. In the van was Vladimir Romanovich, an FSB agent who Trepashkin claims was working for the criminals. However, most of those arrested in the sting were released. Nikolai Patrushev took Trepashkin off the case, and began an investigation of Trepashkin instead.[2]" Of course if it was the normal practice of the FSB investigating itself, you would be correct! RAB3L ( talk) 11:37, 28 August 2017 (UTC)
"as if machine[car] would crush [Romanovich]" - is a comment on the means of death, not when the death occurred. Clear? "He says that he saw a facial composite of fake-Laipanov, which he recognized as his ex-colleague Romanovich... After that, full stop." - What Trepashkin doesn't say is no evidence of anything. What is more important to the case is that an attempt was made to switch the identity of the person responsible for renting the basements. Trepashkin thought it might be Romanovich but his only evidence was a photofit, so he could have been wrong. In the same article, Trepashkin describes Romanovich as an FSB informer. "Dunlop thinks it means Romanovich wasn't FSB agent." - where does that come? Not from me! It's interesting perhaps that Trepashkin considers that it would have been impossible to transfer explosives by road into Moscow, either before or during September. 89.241.95.151 ( talk) 18:54, 31 August 2017 (UTC)
Found another place with duplicate information, which I removed. The same info can be found in the section " Allegations that Russians planned the Second Chechen war". I point out that no information is removed from the article. But there's no reason to repeat the same info twice. If the discussion about Yeltsin and Putin's role in the Second Chechen war seems to be more appropriate in any other place than the section "Allegations that Russians planned the Second Chechen war", it could be moved there. But I repeat it, there's no reason to repeat the same info twice. It doesn't serve any end but irritates the reader. Document hippo ( talk) 14:09, 18 August 2017 (UTC)
Another strange bit in the current revision (section "Investigations and theories -> Theory of Russian government conspiracy -> Criticism -> Scholars"):
“ | According to Henry E. Hale of Harvard University, one thing that remains unclear about the "FSB did it" theory: If the motive was to get an FSB-friendly man installed as president, why would the FSB have preferred Putin, a little-known "upstart" who had leapt to the post of FSB director through outside political channels, to Primakov, who was certainly senior in stature and pedigree and who was also widely reputed to have a KGB past?[191] Why? Because Putin was supported by the "Family" whereas Primakov most certainly wasn't. According to Felshtinsky, Berezovsky was unaware of the FSB's support for Putin until about a year after the apartment bombings.[186] | ” |
Regarding the bold part of the text, Felshtinsky only claims that FSB supported Putin. He doesn't say that the FSB supported Putin because the Family supported Putin. I can see some issues with that. That would imply the FSB was somehow dependent on the Family, which makes the Family the entity which ruled the FSB. Anyway, stated like that it's OR, because the claim is not supported by the reference.
Please think of how it could be fixed to reintegrate that or a similar thought into the article. Document hippo ( talk) 00:00, 19 August 2017 (UTC)
Where does it say "that the FSB supported Putin because the family supported Putin"? That's just wilful mis-interpretation! Nothing more. Perhaps you have problems understanding English?
RAB3L ( talk) 17:47, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
OK, both Putin and Primakov were FSB but Primakov was a lot older and not a long-term prospect perhaps. If Putin was backed by the "Family" and FSB and Primakov was only backed by the FSB, which of the two was the likely winner? Simple really!
RAB3L ( talk) 19:20, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
Further bit. Section "Investigations and theories -> Theory of Russian government conspiracy -> Criticism -> Analysts".
“ | Berezovsky wasn’t actually the originator of the theory of the FSB's responsibility for the bombings. According to Yury Felshtinsky, Berezovsky wasn’t even aware of the FSB’s support for Putin as presidential candidate until a conversation with the former about a year after the apartment bombings. With this knowledge, he then realised who was most likely responsible for the bombings. | ” |
Very well. Here's what we are being told in the preceding section "Section Investigations and theories -> Theory of Russian government conspiracy -> Criticism -> Scholars":
“ | According to Felshtinsky, Berezovsky didn’t come to the conclusion that Putin and the FSB were responsible for the bombings until about a year after they had occurred, at about the same time that he also realised that Putin had had the support of the FSB as presidential candidate. Until then Berezovsky had believed that only the “Family” had backed Putin. Berezovsky even offered to show Felshtinsky’s manuscript of Blowing Up Russia to Putin on what was possibly the former’s last visit to Moscow. | ” |
There's a significant overlap. I propose a merger of these two fragments. Document hippo ( talk) 00:16, 19 August 2017 (UTC)
Under the above title:
Andrew Jack, former Moscow bureau chief for the Financial Times, quoted a "very senior official from the period" who dismissed as bravado Stepashin's claims that the military operations were long planned:
“ | Two weeks before the invasion, Stepashin went to Dagestan and said everything was calm. He was ineffective. Nothing was prepared for the attack. We were not ready. Putin could lose, people didn't want to fight, and the polls were against war. | ” |
Stepahin's statements were made in early 2000 and were solely about Chechnya. There was, as far as I have found, no mention of any invasion of Dagestan. How could there be? It would have been secret but it appears that he was aware of it at the time. So how could statements made in early 2000 about Chechnya (only), have any effect on Dagestan in 1999? It's just a stupid statement and should be removed!
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Under the above title:
Andrew Jack, former Moscow bureau chief for the Financial Times, quoted a "very senior official from the period" who dismissed as bravado Stepashin's claims that the military operations were long planned:
“ | Two weeks before the invasion, Stepashin went to Dagestan and said everything was calm. He was ineffective. Nothing was prepared for the attack. We were not ready. Putin could lose, people didn't want to fight, and the polls were against war. | ” |
Stepahin's statements were made in early 2000 and were solely about Chechnya. There was, as far as I have found, no mention of any invasion of Dagestan. How could there be? It would have been secret but it appears that he was aware of it at the time. So how could statements made in early 2000 about Chechnya (only), have any effect on Dagestan in 1999? What it does suggest though is that there was a conspiracy!
RAB3L ( talk) 18:16, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
Yes, that applies to Chechnya and Chechnya only, not Dagestan. Stephashin knew what would happen in Dagestan at the time but the military could not be forewarned! How could they when they had seemingly made every attempt to hollow out the defences?? How could he have made it known that the Russians knew what was going to happen but did nothing? Jack's statement does in fact reinforce the suspicion that it was a conspiracy.
RAB3L ( talk) 19:09, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
No, I didn't suggest that Stephasin was part of the conspiracy, only that he knew about it: https://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n20/jonathan-steele/doing-well-out-of-war It seems he didn't have the stomach for war and was trying to avoid it; that's maybe why he was replaced as prime minister. RAB3L ( talk) 17:52, 24 August 2017 (UTC)
"In the summer of 1999, Berezovsky, by then no longer a member of the government, says he was visited by a Chechen ally of Basaev, who asked him how Russia would react to a Chechen incursion into Dagestan. Berezovsky says he told his visitor it would be a crazy thing to do and would lose Chechens their international support. But when Berezovsky contacted Sergei Stepashin, Putin’s predecessor as prime minister, Stepashin is supposed to have told him to keep quiet because everything was under control. Berezovsky may be biased, but after he lost his job Stepashin himself told a Russian newspaper that the Kremlin had started planning a second invasion of Chechnya in March 1999, long before the Basaev offensive in Dagestan." RAB3L ( talk) 12:25, 28 August 2017 (UTC)
"But when Berezovsky contacted Sergei Stepashin, Putin’s predecessor as prime minister, Stepashin is supposed to have told him to keep quiet because everything was under control." Doesn't that imply that Stepashin already knew? Either your understanding of English is limited or you are guilty of willful mis-interpretation (again). 89.241.95.151 ( talk) 17:25, 31 August 2017 (UTC)
“ | 39
Berezovsky’s role in the onset of the Chechen hostilities has been the subject of much speculation. Berezovsky had good connections among some Chechen groups, but I think he was more of an intermediary than an instigator. The origins of the second war lie primarily in disorder inside Chechnya and weariness with the conflict in Moscow. The first factor, internal disorder, was caused by a split between Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen president, and Basayev. Maskhadov, who had been Moscow’s interlocutor, lost control of the disparate Chechen fighting groups. The second factor was Kremlin indecision. Anton Surikov, a former Russian military intelligence officer who later became a staff director of a Russian parliamentary committee, told me Russian officials had indications that Basayev was planning something on the Dagestani border that summer. “It was not being hidden,” he said. “There was a certain panic here. There was a feeling of complete helplessness.” Likewise, Voloshin said in August, “The dates [of the Basayev assault] were definitely known several days before.” But, he added, the “area is hilly and difficult to guard. There are hundreds of different paths, plenty of canyons, mountain paths. There is no border, actually.... That is why it is not possible just to line up soldiers to guard the border.” Berezovsky told me that he began warning the Kremlin in May and June 1999 that Chechen commanders were telling him that things were getting out of control and “there may be trouble in Dagestan.” Berezovsky added, “I passed it all on to Stepashin, who was the prime minister then. I had a meeting with him and told him. He said, ‘Boris, don’t worry. We know everything, all is under control.’” Separately, Stepashin told me the planning for a crackdown on Chechnya was under way earlier in the year after a Russian Interior Ministry general was kidnapped. He said the Russian authorities had intelligence in June of a possible attack, and “we were planning to implement” a cordon around Chechnya “irrespective of Basayev’s assault.” Stepashin said he chaired a meeting of the Kremlin Security Council in July, and “we all came to the conclusion that there was a huge hole on our border that won’t be closed if we don’t [advance] to the Terek [River inside Chechnya]. It was a purely military decision.” Stepashin said that after his dismissal, Putin picked up the plans he had put in place and continued with them. Basayev’s reasons for staging the dramatic cross-border incursion, and his reading of how Russia would respond, are not clear. He declared at the time that he hoped to trigger an uprising in Dagestan, rallying support for the creation of an Islamic state. But it was a futile effort. The raid triggered alarms in Dagestan, which is a mosaic of ethnic groups, and many villages began arming themselves to fight the Chechens. Eventually Russian troops beat them back to the border, and Putin launched the larger offensive. Another unanswered question is who was responsible for the apartment house bombings that triggered the war. Putin and his government blamed Chechens. Inside Russia, some have speculated that the blasts were carried out by shadowy groups possibly linked to security services as a way to propel Putin to power. When Berezovsky was asked about this on September 19, 2000, during a meeting with Washington Post editors and reporters, he said that at first he could not believe the security services would have done it; he was sure it was the Chechens. But, he added, “I have more and more doubts that it was done by Chechens.” |
” |
"In reality, Stepashin knew about a Chechen incursion, but it had no relation to any sort of a conspiracy." - How is the above proof of this statement? In any case, whether Stepahin was part of any conspiracy or not, doesn't prove either way whether there was a conspiracy. RAB3L ( talk) 19:24, 31 August 2017 (UTC)
I removed this section [3] because it was about connections between Berezovsky and Chechens, but not about subject of this page. Yes, it is widely known that he paid Chechens ransoms for hostages, but this is an entirely different story. My very best wishes ( talk) 14:30, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
My very best wishes, as an editor I don't have a strong opinion on this issue. I feel conflicted. I would rather abstain from a discussion. Thanks, Document hippo ( talk) 16:01, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
Recently the theory of FSB complicity in apartment bombings resurfaced in the Russian media, in an August 2017 interview of sports journalist and video blogger Yury Dud ( ru:Юрий Дудь) with Vladimir Zhirinovsky.
Here's the video (~ 4 million views by now). I have written down the relevant part of the interview.
From 33:52 to 37:50. For convenience, Dud's speech is marked as bold text, and Zhirinovsky's as plain text.
“ | -Боитесь ли Вы Путина?
-Я никого не боялся. Ни Горбачева, ни Ельцина, ни Путина, ни Медведева. -Если Вы никого не боитесь, Владимир Вольфович, расскажите нам, пожалуйста. 1999 год. Ваше выступление в Думе. Вы говорите, ловите Селезнева на дикой, чудовищной оговорке. Селезнев за три дня до взрыва в Волгодонске произнес об этом -на совете Думы. <A cut with the historic video of Zhirinovsky's 1999 speech> -Как это понимать? -Видимо ему позвонили кто-то и сказал, что совершен теракт. И назвали Волгодонск. Ну здесь, планировались, видимо, теракты. Обстановка была ненормальная. Теракты, естественно, могли быть ближе к Кавказу. Ростовская область. Волгодонск, потому, что там, по-моему, атомная станция или завод по производству. Это вот, конечно, вызвало подозрения, что значит, ему сообщили, что теракт уже произошел. Он не произошел еще. В этом плане, он же четвертый человек в стране. Он член Совета Безопасности. Его обязаны информировать. И он _нам_ сообщил это. А это была ошибка, никакого теракта не было. -Но Вы понимаете, что это выглядит очень просто? Все... Есть версия, она очень популярная, что дома взрывало ФСБ. -Нет. -Рязанский сахарок. -Да, да. -Тот самый. -Ну. -И эта оговорка, о чем она может говорить? О том, что он знал, что взрыв будет там. И Вы, единственный, его на этом подловили. Как мне, гражданину России, вашему потенциальному избирателю, -Да. -после этого верить в то, что в Кремле, о будущем взрыве не знали? -Объясняю. -И не они это сделали. Как? -Объясняю. Еще раз оценить мое мужество и смелость, ибо все молчали, и никто ничего не говорил, и никто якобы ничего не заметил. -Окей. -Второе. Обстановка была самая напряженная. И теракты могли произойти в любой момент, в любых точках. И ФСБ отслеживало. Слушайте внимательно. ФСБ отслеживало, где может произойти. И они уже знали, что определенная группа пришла в Волгодонск. Или там в Рязань. Или еще где-то. Но. Возможно, технически сработало так, что информация была что _готовится_ теракт в Волгодонске. А по инерции кто-то мог передающий написал, что произошел теракт. Это же был сбой технический. Ибо по всей стране, обстановка была сверх-напряженная, с августа по, там, сентябрь 1999 года. -Вы допускаете, что ФСБ это сделало, и что спецслужбы это сделали, и этим была оговорка допущена? -Нет. Я просто, вот, смотрите. -Почему "нет"? Какой аргумент "нет" кроме того, что человек из спецслужб теперь Президент России, в том числе, Ваш начальник. Глобально. -Потому, что и так обстановка была напряженная. Зачем же что-то еще делать? Тогда можно сказать, что мы войну устроили там? Войну, на Кавказе. Две войны, устроили. Знать они могли. Вот в этом плане оговорка была. Они знали, где возможны теракты. Как сейчас. Они ведут жесткую борьбу с будущими террористами. Москва, Петербург, Новосибирск, Ростов. Крупные города. Там, где выгодно совершить теракт. Никто не поедет в Урюпинск делать теракт. Это впечатления не произведет. Поэтому они знают и сегодня, ФСБ. И они ведут работу. Они в Петербурге почему прохлопали? Они хотели еще узнать связи этой группы. Может быть, еще будут связи, и накрыть всех вместе. И опоздали, они взяли, рванули метро раньше срока. Ну, это ошибка их, просчет. |
” |
Document hippo ( talk) 18:35, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
I wonder why this edit had to be made.
Johnson's Russia List is a valid information source, which is cited in books on the topic.
Besides, Kirill Pankratov is an established journalist, having published 38 articles for The eXile magazine.
I would be glad to receive more comprehensive explanations. -- Document hippo ( talk) 17:22, 12 September 2017 (UTC)
In that edit, Latynina's claim was removed, with the cited reason being "Irrelevan here/citation out of context. Author actually tells that "terrorists attacks were not carried out by Chechens but by other nationalities"". Yes, she indeed says that. But the section is called Theory of Ibn Al Khattab's involvement. Ibn Al-Khattab wasn't a Chechen, he was a Saudi citizen. So I do not see any contradiction. Please, show me where I'm wrong.
However, actually I believe the quotation is wrongly placed and could be better used as the statement of that theory, rather than an argument to prove it. Document hippo ( talk) 17:28, 12 September 2017 (UTC)
This page is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
In the current revision, section Analysts:
“ | Sergey Yushenkov, the head of the unofficial inquiry into the bombings, was assassinated 13 days before the announcement of the completion of the official investigation of the bombings and Yury Schekochikhin's medical records are still classified. Yushenkov had occasionally suggested to reporters off the record his personal belief that the security services were behind the murder of his colleague Vladimir Golovlyov, as well as the Moscow bombings. | ” |
This statement is followed by the reference " Foiled Attack or Failed Exercise? A Look at Ryazan 1999". That reference says lots of things. For example,
“ | Commenting on the film, Russian Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov decried the lack of civilian control over the armed forces and especially over the secret services in Russia. Following the events of September 11, Yushenkov stated, many Russians waited with concern to see how the United States would react whether or not the Americans would forget Benjamin Franklin'sadmonition that those would sacrifice freedom for security would gain neither. Those fears were not borne out; even after the terrorist attack, democratic institutions functioned normally, including civilian control over the military and secret services. Russia's experience was different, and the movie showed three things clearly, according to Yushenkov. First, there is no civilian control over the secret services in Russia, which is clear from the refusal of the Russian Duma and government to investigate the suspicious events in Ryazan. Second, the Russian authorities, especially the FSB, are prone to lying. And third, even if FSB claims that the Ryazan incident was a civilian defense exercise were true, such an exercise involving unsuspecting civilians would be a gross violation of Russian law. Without civilian control, Yushenkov concluded, the FSB will continue to get away with violations of law and telling lies to society. | ” |
The only thing it doesn't say is anything to support the claims made in the current revision of the article.
The first author of the cited fragment has inserted an unreferenced statement, and the second author might have inadvertently used the wrong link as the reference. It's actually no big deal at all. But until the correct link is found (which does prove the statement, so that we can correctly attribute it) I suggest that the cited fragment should be removed from the article.
Document hippo ( talk) 17:53, 21 August 2017 (UTC)
Death of a Dissident by Goldfarb for the first sentence and https://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol8/ed0810.html for the second sentence. Please restore.
RAB3L ( talk) 19:38, 24 August 2017 (UTC)
“ | For a long time I was of two minds as to who killed Yushenkov, and why. His murder fit the mounting pattern of conspiracy theories, from the apartment bombings to the Terkibayev revelations. But then again, none of them had been proven, and, as a scientist, I had to consider that they could have been coincidences, however improbable. Intuitively it was logical that the FSB killed Yushenkov, who was the most vocal promoter of anti-FSB allegations. Then, a competing theory about Yushenkov emerged. Two months after the murder, the police caught his assassins. The two perpetrators turned out to be career criminals and drug addicts, who were paid for the hit by a certain Alexander Vinnik, a Liberal Russia functionary from the provincial center of Syktyvkar. Vinnik confessed and said that he had acted on behalf of Mikhail Kodanev, Yushenkov’s rival in the Liberal Russia leadership. When the four of them went on trial, Kodanev was the only one who pleaded not guilty. Vinnik was lying, he said.
Yet Kodanev had a motive. In july 2002, a couple of months after Liberal Russia had been formed, Yushenkov had a conversation with a highly placed official at the justice Ministry. He told him in no uncertain terms that the party would never be registered for the 2003 elections if Berezovsky remained on its candidate list. That was the president’s explicit order. Yushenkov had no choice; he agreed to dump Boris. The party split in half, with a Yushenkov wing and a Berezovsky wing. But then Yushenkov came to London, sat down with Boris, and they reconciled: after the party was registered, Boris’s wing would return to Yushenkov’s fold. Kodanev had been Number Two in Boris’s wing, but would have faced a much lesser standing in the reunited party. According to the prosecution, he put out the contract on Yushenkov when he learned about his reconciliation with Boris. On the testimony of Vinnik, Kodanev was convicted and given a sentence of twenty years. I had met Kodanev a couple of times in London, and I did not like him. But Sasha was adamant that it was all a setup. The two killers were probably recruited by the FSB while in jail, he said. They were promised a few months of freedom and a reduction in their remaining sentences in exchange for the hit and for naming Vinnik as their patron. Vinnik, in turn, was told to name Kodanev or face a life sentence. Sasha had no doubt; he had seen dozens of such cases. With his pledge to make the bombings an election issue Yushenkov was a threat; Kontora would stop at nothing to get rid of him. How could I not see it? Yushenkov was not the first and would not be the last, he predicted. "And there will always be a plausible ‘legend.’ That’s part of the tradecraft." Indeed, seven months before Yushenkov was killed, his associate, Vladimir Golovlyov, a Duma member who was in charge of Liberal Russia finances, was shot while walking his dog. His killers were never found. The predominant theory was that it was a business dispute; Golovlyov had been involved in many privatization deals. Three months after Yushenkov, Yuri Schekochihin, the crusading journalist from Novaya Gazeta and a member of the Public Commission, died suddenly from an unexplained "allergic reaction." His medical chart ended up "classified." His colleagues and his family suspected poisoning related to his numerous investigations of the FSB. ‘See," said Sasha when we learned of Schekochihin’s mysterious death, "I told you, didn’t I?” Sasha was an oper, not a scientist. He did not believe in coincidences. In retrospect, he had a point. |
” |
If you refer back to the opening sentence of this section, all I said was that Yushenkov was assassinated, he was shot, but I didn't say who by. You are being way too defensive. Also why would you classify someone's medical records unless the cause of death was suspicious and the government was involved in his death? Pages 278-9. RAB3L ( talk) 12:22, 28 August 2017 (UTC)
While all good-faith contributions to Wikipedia are appreciated, this edit has added some WP:OR.
With due respect to its author, the OR contents should be moved to the talk page (here), until it can be adequately sourced. Here's the removed content:
“ | However, the invasion of Dagestan began on 4th August and the first bombing in Moscow was on the 4th September; according to the official Russian investigation of the bombings, as mentioned above, the explosives used were stored for 2 months in a wharehouse in Kislovodsk. How can preparations for a retributive act commence long before the act for which the retribution is intended even started? | ” |
Meanwhile, perhaps we could have a little bit of a discussion here in the talk?
It seems to me, that a trivial explanation would be that the explosives were prepared by Wahhabis beforehand, in the anticipation that they might become useful as the leverage against the Russian authorities (similar to Basayev's Budyonnovsk moment).
So, Wahhabis invested in the capability which might or might not have been used. And once the Russian army started to deal with their invasion into Dagestan, they blew up the buildings as an act of revenge.
Perhaps I used too many words, but hopefully made it clear that IMHO there's no necessary contradiction contained in Ware's statement. Stated like that, it's OR of course, but it's only the talk page so it should be excusable. ;-)
Document hippo ( talk) 00:04, 16 August 2017 (UTC)
Even with explosives to hand, four weeks or less is wholly insufficient time for preparation of an apartment bombing. From this article: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Whos-Blowing-Up-Russia.pdf
"This story, which openly contradicted official statements (that the terrorist acts in Moscow were
committed by Chechen terrorists as revenge for their defeat in Dagestan), was first aired on the
morning of 16th September, a few hours before the explosion in Volgodonsk. Moskovskiy
Komsomolets published an article with a sensational headline: “Was the Kremlin making
bombs?”. With reference to an anonymous intelligence analyst, the article claimed that “together
with the commonly accepted story [that Chechens wanting to avenge state operations in Dagestan
were behind the Moscow bombings], a series of bizarre scenarios have been considered”.
Specifically, “just three hours after the first bombing on Kashirskoye Highway, it was suggested
that Chechen mujahidin had nothing to do with the terrorist acts in the capital. Over time, there is
more and more evidence to support this”.
According to the anonymous analyst, “simulating an attack similar to the two explosions in Moscow proves that terrorists would have needed between four and four and a half months to plan them”. But “during that time, even if the Chechens were indeed planning to invade Dagestan, they would have only been in the very early stages”. This leads to the conclusion that the terrorist acts in the capital could not have resulted from the situation in Dagestan or in Chechnya, meaning the Moscow explosions could have been the work of the FSB. The Main Directorate for Special Programs of the President of the Russian Federation (GUSP), which the article mentions, could have played a role. A part of the GUSP is “the former 15th division of the KGB which operates the underground bunkers for top public officials in case of war. The experts from this division... know how to work with explosives. Furthermore, the administration is a “pocket” presidential intelligence agency subordinate only to the head of state”.
The material unambiguously claimed that “the terrorist acts in Moscow were almost certainly carried out by professionals”. In addition, the anonymous analysts put forward the idea that “it could have been done by men hired by the Russian security services”. Naturally, the President’s spokesman Dmitry Yakushkin was quick to announce that “any suggestion of the Kremlin’s involvement in the explosion is absolutely monstrous”. "
RAB3L ( talk) 17:18, 16 August 2017 (UTC)
“ | Once, when I was at Shamil’s home and we were sitting in the living room, he asked me, “Tell me, Ilyas, do you have a dream, a vision of our future?”
I answered, “Yes, I do have a dream. I don’t have to be part of it, but I would like to look through a key hole and see on the other side that Chechnya resembles a state with normal political processes.” “You are an idealist, as are many among us,” Shamil countered. “I used to believe this too, but now I can see, based on everything that I’ve experienced, we’ll never be able to build a state.” “What do you mean? What have we been trying to accomplish all these years? And why have we made all the sacrifices if not for a Chechen state?” “The Russians will never permit us to establish a normal state,” he insisted. “We need to create a caliphate. The Russians will never let us be.” “Shamil, do you understand that a caliphate is an empire, a religious empire, but still an empire? Historically empires arise in one of two ways: if a state is so well run, prosperous, and beneficial to its citizens that its neighbors rush to unite with it, or if it is so strong militarily that it can conquer its neighbors. Right now we resemble a gang, and you cannot build a caliphate around a gang. Chechnya is a piece of land divided by rival gangs. We don’t control our territory, we don’t control our borders, there’s chaos all around, and based on this you’re going to build a caliphate? “Your problem is that you are a hostage of your Soviet education,” Shamil shot back. “Okay. Let that be my problem, but I don’t want my problem to become anyone else’s problem. I don’t pretend to understand these congresses and caliphates, and I don’t think that they offer a way out, and I have no desire to participate in them. In any case, Shamil, in any endeavor that you undertake, if what you are doing is just and right in my understanding, I will always be your loyal companion and I will stand next to you, but I have to believe that you are on the right path.” He responded, “Each is free to make his own decisions and each will answer to the Almighty for his decisions and his actions.” This was probably the last time that I casually dropped by Shamil’s house. After this we had very few meetings, partly because he moved to Serzhen Yurt and partly because our relationship changed. I think Udugov and Shamil were already hatching plans for Dagestan, and this is why they would quieten down when I entered the room, or isolate themselves from me. |
” |
But that's my opinion, of course. The point you tried to insert as OR is currently reviewed in the article in the section Theory of ibn-Khattab involvement/Criticism:
“ | The culprits would also have needed to organise nine explosions (the four that occurred and the five attempted bombings reported by the authorities) in different cities in a two-week period. Satter’s estimate for the time required for target plan development, site visits, explosives preparation, renting space at the sites and transporting explosives to the sites was four to four and a half months. If Satter is correct, the preparations for these acts of revenge would have needed to be initiated long before the act for which they were revenge for, had occurred! | ” |
I don't see how it would help if it's repeated twice. Document hippo ( talk) 20:28, 16 August 2017 (UTC)
OK, so you are suggesting that the Wahhabis went ahead and manufactured and/or acquired explosives for future use. That's a very reasonable suggestion. But then, before the invasion of Dagestan, they somehow transfer some of those explosives to Moscow "just in case" they are required for future use. Questionable I'd say, given the risk of being found out. Even more questionable, to say the least, when the storage used, as fairly conclusively proved by Trepashkin, was rented by Romanovich, an FSB agent - unless of course the Wahhabis were collaborating with the FSB! It was easy to frame Gochiyaev; he had known Wahhabi sympathies. Fortunately the swapping of the identifit of Romanovich for that of Gochiyaev was found by Trepashkin. So no, as far as Moscow is concerned, this theory is a non-starter.
You should also be sceptical about the Wahhabis. Zakayev, as pointed out in the article, was under the impression that the Wahhabis were sponsored by the Russians. During a crackdown in 1998, the Maskhadov government rounded up some Wahhabis and expelled them to Jordan. They were all Arabs who spoke Russian and were in the pay of the Russians. They couldn't enter Chechnya directly because the borders were tightly sealed to outsiders. They all had Jordanian passports with Russian visas and had entered Chechnya by flying first to Moscow. They could not have done so without the FSB knowing.
It would also seem that the invasion of Dagestan was facilitated by the Russians. This is covered in Dunlop's book pages 71-73:
"That the rebels would be coming into Dagestan," the deputy minister of internal affairs of Dagestan, Major General Magomed Omarov, recalled in mid-2003, "was known to everyone several months before the events. That there would be a war in August was spokenof as early as the spring (of 1999) beginning with the operational workers from the power structures and ending with the women of the bazaars.""The information, naturally was passed on to the centre," he remembered, " but why the necessary reaction did not take place is a question not to be addressed by me."
Omarov also noticed that "three mnths [before the incursions] the troops were withdrawn from the Dagestan-Chechen border, troops which had stood there for a long time.""There are many more other questions," Omarov added, "the main one of which is: why were the rebels let in without hindrance and why were they allowed to leave freely."
Retired army colonel Viktor Baranets reported in September 1999 that, "The administration of the FSB of Dagestan had over the course of the last three years mre than 2,000 times informed Moscow about the growing activity of Chechen emissaries in the republic." Baranets, citing the text of a "confidential document", reports that on 5-6 June 1999, control over a section of the border 14 kilometers long in Tsumadinskii District was transferred from the Russian Border Guards, an elite unit, to the Tsumadinskii branch of the MVD of Dagestan. "And to the excursion there remianed precisely sixty days".
Florian Hassel, Moscow correspndent of the Frankfurter Rundschau, has reported meeting, in October 1999, five Dagestani policemen who had briefly fought Basayev's troops in the Mountains:
"Basayev's attack on Dagestan was apparently organised in Moscow," said one policeman, Elgar, who watched the Chechens retreatfrom the village of Botlikh on September 11. "Basayev and his people went back comfortably in broad daylight with about 100 cars and trucks and many on foot. They used the main road to Chechnya and were not fired at by our combat helicopters. We received express orders not to attack."
The commander of a Russian special operations team in Dagestan told a correspondent for Time magazine that one one scorching August day in 1999, "he had Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev in his sights....With a simple squeeze of a finger [he] could take out Basayev.... But [he] says that he received the following order over his walki-talkie: "Hold your fire". We just watched Basyev's long column of trucks and jeeps withdraw from Dagestan back to Chechnya under cover provided by our own helicopters."
Some invasion!
RAB3L ( talk) 19:51, 17 August 2017 (UTC)
So, in other words you agree that at least one act of revenge was initiated before the act for which the revenge was intended had even started? Of course, the longer the explosives were stored in the final position of use, the more the suspicion should be that the FSB were responsible. If the FSB explosives were found (as in Ryazan) there would be no consequences! Explosions were prevented because Gochiyaev warned the authorities! The culprits could have been caught (by setting a trap) but the FSB decided to make their "find" public, possibly to avoid the embarressment of catching their own people! Trepashkin tried to investigate Gochiyaev's phone records but the FSB were uncooperative. According to Trepashkin they have no interest in finding him!
RAB3L ( talk) 19:31, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
“ | While there is not yet sufficient information for the conclusive evaluation of such claims, the following considerations may prove useful:
1. Russian troops inexplicably were withdrawn from the Dagestani border in the area of the insurgency just prior to the onset of the conflict. 2. Basayev exited the republic with an ease reminiscent of Raduyev's departure from Pervomaiskoye. The Dagestani Avar leader, Gadji Mahachev, claims that his requests that Russian troops should mine Basayev's exit routes were unheeded. Of course it is easier to request mines than it is to plant them in rugged western Dagestan, and it is far from certain that mines would have proven effective, but it seems that Basayev got into, and out of, Dagestan far too easily. <...> Without sacrificing simplicity, it is possible to account for the first two points by postulating low-level, as opposed to high level, conspiracies: Scenario 1: Basayev bribes Russian officers near the Dagestani border to permit him access by retracting their troops just prior to his advance and later permitting his escape. Scenario 2: Russian officers on the ground in Dagestan, who are familiar with the Dagestani people and realize that most of them will resist Basayev, pull back to allow him to enter Dagestan, because they anticipate that the trap will weaken or destroy Basayev. Basayev's escape is due to his well-known skills combined with well-documented Russian incompetence. |
” |
So in effect, Ware is supporting the conspiracy theory, at least as far as Dagestan is concerned. Your scenarios are meaningless conjecture. This was not a local arrangement. It was negotiated in Beaulieu with Voloshin. Dunlop: "It is necessary for me to report here that a representative of one of the French intelligence organisations, whose identity is known to me, subsequently confirmed to an experienced Western academic, that French intelligence does indeed possess evidence that coincides roughly with what Boris Kagarlitsky wrote." RAB3L ( talk) 19:42, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
Have you ever made an edit in this article that was anti Russian government? Some time ago there was someone who we worked out was a Dutch nationalist. Most likely a member of Geert Wilders party, which is sponsored by Russia. So I asked him if he was working quid pro quo for the chekists. He never replied and seems to have disappeared from Wikipedia.
RAB3L ( talk) 19:50, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
"I don't see an issue with making anti-Russian government edits." You are avoiding the question. RAB3L ( talk) 21:52, 23 August 2017 (UTC)
That's criticism? More like the exception that proves the rule! Why did they need a war instead of using television? Because Yeltsin's popularity was in single figures!
RAB3L ( talk) 12:00, 28 August 2017 (UTC)
"Lastly, Yelstin's popularity was in single figures in 1996, too. So..." - good point, or maybe not: http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2107565,00.html. It worked once but perhaps not a second time. So something else was required, perhaps postponement or cancellation of the 2000 presidential elections? RAB3L ( talk) 19:13, 31 August 2017 (UTC)
In the article the discussion of Trepashkin's claims about Romanovich appears twice, with a significant overlap ( current revision).
First, in the section Related events -> Arrest of independent investigator Trepashkin:
“ | The commission of Sergei Kovalyov asked lawyer Mikhail Trepashkin to investigate the case. Trepashkin found that the basement of one of the bombed buildings was rented by FSB officer Vladimir Romanovich and that the latter was witnessed by several people. Trepashkin was unable to bring the evidence to court because he was arrested by FSB in October 2003 and imprisoned in Nizhny Tagil, allegedly for "disclosing state secrets", just a few days before he was to make his findings public.[106] He was sentenced by a military closed court to a four-year imprisonment.[107] Amnesty International issued a statement that, "[T]here are serious grounds to believe that Mikhail Trepashkin was arrested and convicted under falsified criminal charges".[108] Romanovich subsequently died in a hit and run accident in Cyprus. According to Trepashkin, his supervisors and FSB members promised not to arrest him if he left the Kovalyov commission and started working with the FSB "against Alexander Litvinenko".[109] | ” |
Second, in the section Investigations and theories -> Attempts at independent investigation:
“ | Trepashkin claimed to have found that the basement of one of the bombed buildings was rented by FSB officer Vladimir Romanovich and that the latter was witnessed by several people. Trepashkin was unable to bring the alleged evidence to the court because he was arrested in October 2003 for illegal arms possession, just a few days shortly before he was to make his findings public.[106] He was sentenced by a Moscow military court to four years imprisonment for disclosing state secrets.[107] Amnesty International issued a statement that "there are serious grounds to believe that Mikhail Trepashkin was arrested and convicted under falsified criminal charges which may be politically motivated, in order to prevent him continuing his investigative and legal work related to the 1999 apartment bombings in Moscow and other cities".[108]
However, in 2009, Russian Novaya Gazeta newspaper published a note which stated that Romanovich died more than a year before the apartment bombings took place:[166] "According to legally reliable texts of certificates of his [Romanovich's] death (the source is the bodies of power of the Republic of Cyprus), that we obtained after publishing that article, death of Romanovich occurred in April 1998." |
” |
I propose the merger of these sections. Trepashkin's claims are viewed more extensively in the second place, so I suggest the related material should be moved there. Document hippo ( talk) 22:19, 17 August 2017 (UTC)
Especially since it was later revealed that Romanovich died a year before the bombings, I don't think it's an overly important point, and not the one that deserves multiple discussions. Document hippo ( talk) 22:56, 17 August 2017 (UTC)
How do you know that the so-called death certificate was genuine? Why did it take 10 years to "discover" it? Suspicious or what? RAB3L ( talk) 21:50, 23 August 2017 (UTC)
Worst of all, the material has been presented like that for years. Apparently it's not obvious to notice, no wonder it evaded everyone's attention. Document hippo ( talk) 23:09, 17 August 2017 (UTC)
Meanwhile, I wondered, how did Dunlop address the report in Novaya Gazeta that Romanovich died in 1998? Well, he found it "rather strange" (p. 155) and asked a bunch of questions (p. 156) which he apparently didn't attempt to answer:
“ | Is, one is prompted to ask, the information contained in this "Refutation" accurate? If so, why did Romanovich's widow, or "widow," and her well-wishers wait nearly six years to refute what Mikhail Trepashkin had first publicly asserted in November of 2003 and had then repeated in public many times subsequently? Were the documents from the Republic of Cyprus that were allegedly produced authentic or could they have been forged? And how did a death certificate from Cyprus prove that Romanovich had had no connections to the FSB? Could immense pressure have been put on Gefter and the editorial board of the newspaper to issue this refutation? These are questions that need to be addressed. | ” |
We can't even say he doubted that article because there are just questions that are left hanging in the air. Why didn't Dunlop ask Romanovich's wife? Why didn't he address Gefter or the editorial board of Novaya Gazeta? Etc, etc.
The problem is, you cannot arbitrarily trust and distrust the same newspaper depending on whether you like or dislike what you read — and Novaya Gazeta has been the major venue researching the conspiracy.
What's ever strange in that journalists of Novaya Gazeta just honestly did their job, reporting the evidence they have got? Document hippo ( talk) 12:01, 18 August 2017 (UTC)
"you cannot arbitrarily trust and distrust the same newspaper depending on whether you like or dislike what you read" - is that not exactly what you are doing? RAB3L ( talk) 21:47, 23 August 2017 (UTC)
It's apparently not too difficult to acquire false death certificates in Cyprus:
http://news.pseka.net/index.php?module=article&id=3609
Would Trepashkin not have been aware of when Romanovich died?
RAB3L ( talk) 21:06, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
"He seems to have relied on the word of mouth" - How on earth can you claim that? How do you know how he obtained the information? Complete B/S!
RAB3L ( talk) 21:47, 23 August 2017 (UTC)
“ | Once he had had a chance to see, in the direct wake of the Moscow bombings, the composite photo of the Moscow bomber which had been compiled from Blumenfeld’s words, Trepashkin informed his former leaders in the FSB that the composite photo was very similar to Romanovich. “Soon,” he has recalled, “I paid attention to the fact that the composite photo had been transformed: the face had become more elongated. And later I learned that Romanovich, who had left for Cyprus, had been struck and killed by a car.” | ” |
“ | Сделав неожиданное открытие, я сообщил об этом своим бывшим руководителям из ФСБ, передав им и фотографию Романовича, которая у меня была. Вскоре я обратил внимание на то, что фоторобот, очень похожий на Романовича, трансформировался: лицо становилось все более вытянутым. А спустя полгода узнал, что Романовича, который к тому времени выехал на Кипр, будто бы задавила машина. | ” |
The Russian word for "allegedly" is "предполагаемо"; strangely it's absent from your quotation! Romanovich or not, it doesn't alter the fact that the FSB attempted to fit up Gochiyaev, as Trepashkin conclusively proved. RAB3L ( talk) 21:18, 24 August 2017 (UTC)
“ | Acting on a hunch, Trepashkin began going through old newspaper archives in the hope that the original sketch had been published somewhere before the FSB had pulled it from circulation. After an exhaustive search, he finally found it. To his surprise, it was a sketch of someone he knew: Vladimir Romanovich, an FSB agent who in the mid 1990s had been responsible for investigating Chechen criminal organizations. | ” |
If you use Systranet ( http://www.systranet.com/translate/?session=ba187eb98110d60b--5d50190f-12e3a08ec4f--2290) you get a different answer. Supposedly might be a better term than allegedly, but as used it (or allegedly) only refers to the means of death rather than the death itself. Presumably Trepashkin was not present when Romanovich died! The other "surprising" aspect is that it took ten years for the death certificate to be "discovered".
You haven't got your "facts" right about Romanovich either: "The sting resulted in a raid on a Bank Soldi branch in Moscow in Dec 1995. Trepashkin claims that the raid uncovered bugging devices used by the extortionists, whose serial numbers linked their origin to the FSB or Ministry of Defense. Furthermore, a van outside the bank was monitoring the bugging devices. In the van was Vladimir Romanovich, an FSB agent who Trepashkin claims was working for the criminals. However, most of those arrested in the sting were released. Nikolai Patrushev took Trepashkin off the case, and began an investigation of Trepashkin instead.[2]" Of course if it was the normal practice of the FSB investigating itself, you would be correct! RAB3L ( talk) 11:37, 28 August 2017 (UTC)
"as if machine[car] would crush [Romanovich]" - is a comment on the means of death, not when the death occurred. Clear? "He says that he saw a facial composite of fake-Laipanov, which he recognized as his ex-colleague Romanovich... After that, full stop." - What Trepashkin doesn't say is no evidence of anything. What is more important to the case is that an attempt was made to switch the identity of the person responsible for renting the basements. Trepashkin thought it might be Romanovich but his only evidence was a photofit, so he could have been wrong. In the same article, Trepashkin describes Romanovich as an FSB informer. "Dunlop thinks it means Romanovich wasn't FSB agent." - where does that come? Not from me! It's interesting perhaps that Trepashkin considers that it would have been impossible to transfer explosives by road into Moscow, either before or during September. 89.241.95.151 ( talk) 18:54, 31 August 2017 (UTC)
Found another place with duplicate information, which I removed. The same info can be found in the section " Allegations that Russians planned the Second Chechen war". I point out that no information is removed from the article. But there's no reason to repeat the same info twice. If the discussion about Yeltsin and Putin's role in the Second Chechen war seems to be more appropriate in any other place than the section "Allegations that Russians planned the Second Chechen war", it could be moved there. But I repeat it, there's no reason to repeat the same info twice. It doesn't serve any end but irritates the reader. Document hippo ( talk) 14:09, 18 August 2017 (UTC)
Another strange bit in the current revision (section "Investigations and theories -> Theory of Russian government conspiracy -> Criticism -> Scholars"):
“ | According to Henry E. Hale of Harvard University, one thing that remains unclear about the "FSB did it" theory: If the motive was to get an FSB-friendly man installed as president, why would the FSB have preferred Putin, a little-known "upstart" who had leapt to the post of FSB director through outside political channels, to Primakov, who was certainly senior in stature and pedigree and who was also widely reputed to have a KGB past?[191] Why? Because Putin was supported by the "Family" whereas Primakov most certainly wasn't. According to Felshtinsky, Berezovsky was unaware of the FSB's support for Putin until about a year after the apartment bombings.[186] | ” |
Regarding the bold part of the text, Felshtinsky only claims that FSB supported Putin. He doesn't say that the FSB supported Putin because the Family supported Putin. I can see some issues with that. That would imply the FSB was somehow dependent on the Family, which makes the Family the entity which ruled the FSB. Anyway, stated like that it's OR, because the claim is not supported by the reference.
Please think of how it could be fixed to reintegrate that or a similar thought into the article. Document hippo ( talk) 00:00, 19 August 2017 (UTC)
Where does it say "that the FSB supported Putin because the family supported Putin"? That's just wilful mis-interpretation! Nothing more. Perhaps you have problems understanding English?
RAB3L ( talk) 17:47, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
OK, both Putin and Primakov were FSB but Primakov was a lot older and not a long-term prospect perhaps. If Putin was backed by the "Family" and FSB and Primakov was only backed by the FSB, which of the two was the likely winner? Simple really!
RAB3L ( talk) 19:20, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
Further bit. Section "Investigations and theories -> Theory of Russian government conspiracy -> Criticism -> Analysts".
“ | Berezovsky wasn’t actually the originator of the theory of the FSB's responsibility for the bombings. According to Yury Felshtinsky, Berezovsky wasn’t even aware of the FSB’s support for Putin as presidential candidate until a conversation with the former about a year after the apartment bombings. With this knowledge, he then realised who was most likely responsible for the bombings. | ” |
Very well. Here's what we are being told in the preceding section "Section Investigations and theories -> Theory of Russian government conspiracy -> Criticism -> Scholars":
“ | According to Felshtinsky, Berezovsky didn’t come to the conclusion that Putin and the FSB were responsible for the bombings until about a year after they had occurred, at about the same time that he also realised that Putin had had the support of the FSB as presidential candidate. Until then Berezovsky had believed that only the “Family” had backed Putin. Berezovsky even offered to show Felshtinsky’s manuscript of Blowing Up Russia to Putin on what was possibly the former’s last visit to Moscow. | ” |
There's a significant overlap. I propose a merger of these two fragments. Document hippo ( talk) 00:16, 19 August 2017 (UTC)
Under the above title:
Andrew Jack, former Moscow bureau chief for the Financial Times, quoted a "very senior official from the period" who dismissed as bravado Stepashin's claims that the military operations were long planned:
“ | Two weeks before the invasion, Stepashin went to Dagestan and said everything was calm. He was ineffective. Nothing was prepared for the attack. We were not ready. Putin could lose, people didn't want to fight, and the polls were against war. | ” |
Stepahin's statements were made in early 2000 and were solely about Chechnya. There was, as far as I have found, no mention of any invasion of Dagestan. How could there be? It would have been secret but it appears that he was aware of it at the time. So how could statements made in early 2000 about Chechnya (only), have any effect on Dagestan in 1999? It's just a stupid statement and should be removed!
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Under the above title:
Andrew Jack, former Moscow bureau chief for the Financial Times, quoted a "very senior official from the period" who dismissed as bravado Stepashin's claims that the military operations were long planned:
“ | Two weeks before the invasion, Stepashin went to Dagestan and said everything was calm. He was ineffective. Nothing was prepared for the attack. We were not ready. Putin could lose, people didn't want to fight, and the polls were against war. | ” |
Stepahin's statements were made in early 2000 and were solely about Chechnya. There was, as far as I have found, no mention of any invasion of Dagestan. How could there be? It would have been secret but it appears that he was aware of it at the time. So how could statements made in early 2000 about Chechnya (only), have any effect on Dagestan in 1999? What it does suggest though is that there was a conspiracy!
RAB3L ( talk) 18:16, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
Yes, that applies to Chechnya and Chechnya only, not Dagestan. Stephashin knew what would happen in Dagestan at the time but the military could not be forewarned! How could they when they had seemingly made every attempt to hollow out the defences?? How could he have made it known that the Russians knew what was going to happen but did nothing? Jack's statement does in fact reinforce the suspicion that it was a conspiracy.
RAB3L ( talk) 19:09, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
No, I didn't suggest that Stephasin was part of the conspiracy, only that he knew about it: https://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n20/jonathan-steele/doing-well-out-of-war It seems he didn't have the stomach for war and was trying to avoid it; that's maybe why he was replaced as prime minister. RAB3L ( talk) 17:52, 24 August 2017 (UTC)
"In the summer of 1999, Berezovsky, by then no longer a member of the government, says he was visited by a Chechen ally of Basaev, who asked him how Russia would react to a Chechen incursion into Dagestan. Berezovsky says he told his visitor it would be a crazy thing to do and would lose Chechens their international support. But when Berezovsky contacted Sergei Stepashin, Putin’s predecessor as prime minister, Stepashin is supposed to have told him to keep quiet because everything was under control. Berezovsky may be biased, but after he lost his job Stepashin himself told a Russian newspaper that the Kremlin had started planning a second invasion of Chechnya in March 1999, long before the Basaev offensive in Dagestan." RAB3L ( talk) 12:25, 28 August 2017 (UTC)
"But when Berezovsky contacted Sergei Stepashin, Putin’s predecessor as prime minister, Stepashin is supposed to have told him to keep quiet because everything was under control." Doesn't that imply that Stepashin already knew? Either your understanding of English is limited or you are guilty of willful mis-interpretation (again). 89.241.95.151 ( talk) 17:25, 31 August 2017 (UTC)
“ | 39
Berezovsky’s role in the onset of the Chechen hostilities has been the subject of much speculation. Berezovsky had good connections among some Chechen groups, but I think he was more of an intermediary than an instigator. The origins of the second war lie primarily in disorder inside Chechnya and weariness with the conflict in Moscow. The first factor, internal disorder, was caused by a split between Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen president, and Basayev. Maskhadov, who had been Moscow’s interlocutor, lost control of the disparate Chechen fighting groups. The second factor was Kremlin indecision. Anton Surikov, a former Russian military intelligence officer who later became a staff director of a Russian parliamentary committee, told me Russian officials had indications that Basayev was planning something on the Dagestani border that summer. “It was not being hidden,” he said. “There was a certain panic here. There was a feeling of complete helplessness.” Likewise, Voloshin said in August, “The dates [of the Basayev assault] were definitely known several days before.” But, he added, the “area is hilly and difficult to guard. There are hundreds of different paths, plenty of canyons, mountain paths. There is no border, actually.... That is why it is not possible just to line up soldiers to guard the border.” Berezovsky told me that he began warning the Kremlin in May and June 1999 that Chechen commanders were telling him that things were getting out of control and “there may be trouble in Dagestan.” Berezovsky added, “I passed it all on to Stepashin, who was the prime minister then. I had a meeting with him and told him. He said, ‘Boris, don’t worry. We know everything, all is under control.’” Separately, Stepashin told me the planning for a crackdown on Chechnya was under way earlier in the year after a Russian Interior Ministry general was kidnapped. He said the Russian authorities had intelligence in June of a possible attack, and “we were planning to implement” a cordon around Chechnya “irrespective of Basayev’s assault.” Stepashin said he chaired a meeting of the Kremlin Security Council in July, and “we all came to the conclusion that there was a huge hole on our border that won’t be closed if we don’t [advance] to the Terek [River inside Chechnya]. It was a purely military decision.” Stepashin said that after his dismissal, Putin picked up the plans he had put in place and continued with them. Basayev’s reasons for staging the dramatic cross-border incursion, and his reading of how Russia would respond, are not clear. He declared at the time that he hoped to trigger an uprising in Dagestan, rallying support for the creation of an Islamic state. But it was a futile effort. The raid triggered alarms in Dagestan, which is a mosaic of ethnic groups, and many villages began arming themselves to fight the Chechens. Eventually Russian troops beat them back to the border, and Putin launched the larger offensive. Another unanswered question is who was responsible for the apartment house bombings that triggered the war. Putin and his government blamed Chechens. Inside Russia, some have speculated that the blasts were carried out by shadowy groups possibly linked to security services as a way to propel Putin to power. When Berezovsky was asked about this on September 19, 2000, during a meeting with Washington Post editors and reporters, he said that at first he could not believe the security services would have done it; he was sure it was the Chechens. But, he added, “I have more and more doubts that it was done by Chechens.” |
” |
"In reality, Stepashin knew about a Chechen incursion, but it had no relation to any sort of a conspiracy." - How is the above proof of this statement? In any case, whether Stepahin was part of any conspiracy or not, doesn't prove either way whether there was a conspiracy. RAB3L ( talk) 19:24, 31 August 2017 (UTC)
I removed this section [3] because it was about connections between Berezovsky and Chechens, but not about subject of this page. Yes, it is widely known that he paid Chechens ransoms for hostages, but this is an entirely different story. My very best wishes ( talk) 14:30, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
My very best wishes, as an editor I don't have a strong opinion on this issue. I feel conflicted. I would rather abstain from a discussion. Thanks, Document hippo ( talk) 16:01, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
Recently the theory of FSB complicity in apartment bombings resurfaced in the Russian media, in an August 2017 interview of sports journalist and video blogger Yury Dud ( ru:Юрий Дудь) with Vladimir Zhirinovsky.
Here's the video (~ 4 million views by now). I have written down the relevant part of the interview.
From 33:52 to 37:50. For convenience, Dud's speech is marked as bold text, and Zhirinovsky's as plain text.
“ | -Боитесь ли Вы Путина?
-Я никого не боялся. Ни Горбачева, ни Ельцина, ни Путина, ни Медведева. -Если Вы никого не боитесь, Владимир Вольфович, расскажите нам, пожалуйста. 1999 год. Ваше выступление в Думе. Вы говорите, ловите Селезнева на дикой, чудовищной оговорке. Селезнев за три дня до взрыва в Волгодонске произнес об этом -на совете Думы. <A cut with the historic video of Zhirinovsky's 1999 speech> -Как это понимать? -Видимо ему позвонили кто-то и сказал, что совершен теракт. И назвали Волгодонск. Ну здесь, планировались, видимо, теракты. Обстановка была ненормальная. Теракты, естественно, могли быть ближе к Кавказу. Ростовская область. Волгодонск, потому, что там, по-моему, атомная станция или завод по производству. Это вот, конечно, вызвало подозрения, что значит, ему сообщили, что теракт уже произошел. Он не произошел еще. В этом плане, он же четвертый человек в стране. Он член Совета Безопасности. Его обязаны информировать. И он _нам_ сообщил это. А это была ошибка, никакого теракта не было. -Но Вы понимаете, что это выглядит очень просто? Все... Есть версия, она очень популярная, что дома взрывало ФСБ. -Нет. -Рязанский сахарок. -Да, да. -Тот самый. -Ну. -И эта оговорка, о чем она может говорить? О том, что он знал, что взрыв будет там. И Вы, единственный, его на этом подловили. Как мне, гражданину России, вашему потенциальному избирателю, -Да. -после этого верить в то, что в Кремле, о будущем взрыве не знали? -Объясняю. -И не они это сделали. Как? -Объясняю. Еще раз оценить мое мужество и смелость, ибо все молчали, и никто ничего не говорил, и никто якобы ничего не заметил. -Окей. -Второе. Обстановка была самая напряженная. И теракты могли произойти в любой момент, в любых точках. И ФСБ отслеживало. Слушайте внимательно. ФСБ отслеживало, где может произойти. И они уже знали, что определенная группа пришла в Волгодонск. Или там в Рязань. Или еще где-то. Но. Возможно, технически сработало так, что информация была что _готовится_ теракт в Волгодонске. А по инерции кто-то мог передающий написал, что произошел теракт. Это же был сбой технический. Ибо по всей стране, обстановка была сверх-напряженная, с августа по, там, сентябрь 1999 года. -Вы допускаете, что ФСБ это сделало, и что спецслужбы это сделали, и этим была оговорка допущена? -Нет. Я просто, вот, смотрите. -Почему "нет"? Какой аргумент "нет" кроме того, что человек из спецслужб теперь Президент России, в том числе, Ваш начальник. Глобально. -Потому, что и так обстановка была напряженная. Зачем же что-то еще делать? Тогда можно сказать, что мы войну устроили там? Войну, на Кавказе. Две войны, устроили. Знать они могли. Вот в этом плане оговорка была. Они знали, где возможны теракты. Как сейчас. Они ведут жесткую борьбу с будущими террористами. Москва, Петербург, Новосибирск, Ростов. Крупные города. Там, где выгодно совершить теракт. Никто не поедет в Урюпинск делать теракт. Это впечатления не произведет. Поэтому они знают и сегодня, ФСБ. И они ведут работу. Они в Петербурге почему прохлопали? Они хотели еще узнать связи этой группы. Может быть, еще будут связи, и накрыть всех вместе. И опоздали, они взяли, рванули метро раньше срока. Ну, это ошибка их, просчет. |
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Document hippo ( talk) 18:35, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
I wonder why this edit had to be made.
Johnson's Russia List is a valid information source, which is cited in books on the topic.
Besides, Kirill Pankratov is an established journalist, having published 38 articles for The eXile magazine.
I would be glad to receive more comprehensive explanations. -- Document hippo ( talk) 17:22, 12 September 2017 (UTC)
In that edit, Latynina's claim was removed, with the cited reason being "Irrelevan here/citation out of context. Author actually tells that "terrorists attacks were not carried out by Chechens but by other nationalities"". Yes, she indeed says that. But the section is called Theory of Ibn Al Khattab's involvement. Ibn Al-Khattab wasn't a Chechen, he was a Saudi citizen. So I do not see any contradiction. Please, show me where I'm wrong.
However, actually I believe the quotation is wrongly placed and could be better used as the statement of that theory, rather than an argument to prove it. Document hippo ( talk) 17:28, 12 September 2017 (UTC)