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This is a great article! -- Mr. Blake 11:34, 15 July 2006 (UTC)
Artfully sanitised.-- Achim 19:45, 16 July 2006 (UTC)
You included nothing about the applicability of STUVA findings or the Eureka findings, which have been incorporated into applicable codes on the continent. I repeated several of the references more than once on the previous talk page. It's an undersea tunnel with no fireproofing (incomprehensible in itself) and the fire chewed up the concrete down to a thickness of two inches, which was widely reported in fire protection cirlces outside the tunnel business. The project management cancelled the purpose-designed fire doors on the cars. All of this was described and you said nothing about any of it. But frankly, I'm tired or arguing about it because we've both been there and done that. It is inconceivable for any fire protection insider to think that Eureka findings and STUVA findings would be inapplicable to any underground traffic thoroughfare such as this. If it were inapplicable, why would so many European governments have actively participated? What more can I say? After all the time spent going over this material, on the record, I could easily be offended that you took absolutely no notice of it. After all that? You won't look at the role of passive fire protection despite an abundance of peer reviewed, empirical and interpreted evidence, which was provided to you in writing. There is no logical basis for ignoring such facts that I can think of, particularly, since the discussion of them are exclusively what led you to this re-write. -- Achim 02:15, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
It is known in fire protection circles, that fire modelling had an influence on the design of the fire safety plan and systems in this facility. Contrary to common practice in many modern subterranean tunnel facilities, this tunnel omitted fireproofing, which resulted in the reduction of the concrete liner to a thickness of 2". Is there any official statement on the difference between the models used and what really happened and the cost cutting measures that were instituted on the basis of the models? What was the modelling program used and the experience of the party responsible for the modelling? Furthermore, what is the technological basis for continuing to omit fireproofing in this undersea tunnel? I offer the following as an intellectual framework on the topic of fire modelling and performance based codes:
http://www.geocities.com/achim_hering/Articles/performance_based_building_codes.html
As well, before judging passive fire protection measures for traffic tunnels, I suggest a look at the following: Eureka "Firetun" project:
http://www.sp.se/fire/Eng/Protection/Tunnel.htm
Also: http://www.stuva.de/index-e.html
Furthermore, pictures and data concerning this topic can be seen on this page: http://www.promat-tunnel.com/idprt001.htm
A balanced approach to fire protection includes all three aspects:
-- Achim 22:17, 29 July 2006 (UTC)
The article states that 7539 stopped at a red signal before entering the tunnel. In fact there are no line side signals in the TVM 430 in-cab signalling scheme. The stop indication is a flashing '000' on the in cab TVM430 display (the target speed), which instructs the driver to stop at the next section marker.
The article gives a bit more than an impression that the amenity car was at the front of the train. The amenity car is in fact located at the French end of all HGV shuttle trains. It is not moved from one end of the train to the other as the journey direction changes. In the subject train where the train was heading towards the UK, the amenity car would have been at the rear of the train. The report that I read suggested that some smoke had entered the car while the train was still moving. This is consistent with the car being behind the source of that smoke.
86.132.205.207 10:54, 11 February 2007 (UTC)
This article says "rake" alot but i think it is supposed to be "rack". Is "rake" a British spelling of "rack"? Or is it a bunch of typeos? Because rake usally refers to Rake (tool) -- Nick Scratch 22:06, 29 March 2007 (UTC)
The lack of inline citations is a problem. However I have some factual issues that need resolving- the article claims that Eurotunnel "modified its HGV transporter wagons to incorporate water fog fire suppression" - I need a reference for that - specifically I doubt this - as it doesn't appear to have worked or been present in the later fire ??
Also the list of safety issues is problematic eg 1996_Channel_Tunnel_fire#Safety_features_at_the_time_of_the_fire - what exactly is the point of this section - the fire happened - therefor it is an absence of safety feature or control that is relavent surely.
The consequences section ignores some recommendations that were not carried out. [1] and [2]
It is also relavent that the original design specifications were ignored ( see around page 60+ and page 3 onwards ) specifically the original design called for the same safety features in the HGV wagons as in the car transporters, and subsequently downgraded. Imgaril ( talk) 16:36, 7 July 2011 (UTC)
- this is regarding the design of the wagons I mentioned above"Is he also aware that the safety authority originally recommended that semi-open wagons should not be used for the carriage of heavy goods vehicles ... Given that the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority changed its original advice, because it was told that it should take account of the costs and commercial interests of the channel tunnel operators.."
This article is rated B-class on Wikipedia's
content assessment scale. It is of interest to the following WikiProjects: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
This is a great article! -- Mr. Blake 11:34, 15 July 2006 (UTC)
Artfully sanitised.-- Achim 19:45, 16 July 2006 (UTC)
You included nothing about the applicability of STUVA findings or the Eureka findings, which have been incorporated into applicable codes on the continent. I repeated several of the references more than once on the previous talk page. It's an undersea tunnel with no fireproofing (incomprehensible in itself) and the fire chewed up the concrete down to a thickness of two inches, which was widely reported in fire protection cirlces outside the tunnel business. The project management cancelled the purpose-designed fire doors on the cars. All of this was described and you said nothing about any of it. But frankly, I'm tired or arguing about it because we've both been there and done that. It is inconceivable for any fire protection insider to think that Eureka findings and STUVA findings would be inapplicable to any underground traffic thoroughfare such as this. If it were inapplicable, why would so many European governments have actively participated? What more can I say? After all the time spent going over this material, on the record, I could easily be offended that you took absolutely no notice of it. After all that? You won't look at the role of passive fire protection despite an abundance of peer reviewed, empirical and interpreted evidence, which was provided to you in writing. There is no logical basis for ignoring such facts that I can think of, particularly, since the discussion of them are exclusively what led you to this re-write. -- Achim 02:15, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
It is known in fire protection circles, that fire modelling had an influence on the design of the fire safety plan and systems in this facility. Contrary to common practice in many modern subterranean tunnel facilities, this tunnel omitted fireproofing, which resulted in the reduction of the concrete liner to a thickness of 2". Is there any official statement on the difference between the models used and what really happened and the cost cutting measures that were instituted on the basis of the models? What was the modelling program used and the experience of the party responsible for the modelling? Furthermore, what is the technological basis for continuing to omit fireproofing in this undersea tunnel? I offer the following as an intellectual framework on the topic of fire modelling and performance based codes:
http://www.geocities.com/achim_hering/Articles/performance_based_building_codes.html
As well, before judging passive fire protection measures for traffic tunnels, I suggest a look at the following: Eureka "Firetun" project:
http://www.sp.se/fire/Eng/Protection/Tunnel.htm
Also: http://www.stuva.de/index-e.html
Furthermore, pictures and data concerning this topic can be seen on this page: http://www.promat-tunnel.com/idprt001.htm
A balanced approach to fire protection includes all three aspects:
-- Achim 22:17, 29 July 2006 (UTC)
The article states that 7539 stopped at a red signal before entering the tunnel. In fact there are no line side signals in the TVM 430 in-cab signalling scheme. The stop indication is a flashing '000' on the in cab TVM430 display (the target speed), which instructs the driver to stop at the next section marker.
The article gives a bit more than an impression that the amenity car was at the front of the train. The amenity car is in fact located at the French end of all HGV shuttle trains. It is not moved from one end of the train to the other as the journey direction changes. In the subject train where the train was heading towards the UK, the amenity car would have been at the rear of the train. The report that I read suggested that some smoke had entered the car while the train was still moving. This is consistent with the car being behind the source of that smoke.
86.132.205.207 10:54, 11 February 2007 (UTC)
This article says "rake" alot but i think it is supposed to be "rack". Is "rake" a British spelling of "rack"? Or is it a bunch of typeos? Because rake usally refers to Rake (tool) -- Nick Scratch 22:06, 29 March 2007 (UTC)
The lack of inline citations is a problem. However I have some factual issues that need resolving- the article claims that Eurotunnel "modified its HGV transporter wagons to incorporate water fog fire suppression" - I need a reference for that - specifically I doubt this - as it doesn't appear to have worked or been present in the later fire ??
Also the list of safety issues is problematic eg 1996_Channel_Tunnel_fire#Safety_features_at_the_time_of_the_fire - what exactly is the point of this section - the fire happened - therefor it is an absence of safety feature or control that is relavent surely.
The consequences section ignores some recommendations that were not carried out. [1] and [2]
It is also relavent that the original design specifications were ignored ( see around page 60+ and page 3 onwards ) specifically the original design called for the same safety features in the HGV wagons as in the car transporters, and subsequently downgraded. Imgaril ( talk) 16:36, 7 July 2011 (UTC)
- this is regarding the design of the wagons I mentioned above"Is he also aware that the safety authority originally recommended that semi-open wagons should not be used for the carriage of heavy goods vehicles ... Given that the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority changed its original advice, because it was told that it should take account of the costs and commercial interests of the channel tunnel operators.."