![]() | This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Archive 5 | â | Archive 8 | Archive 9 | Archive 10 | Archive 11 | Archive 12 | â | Archive 15 |
http://www.motl.org/resource/curriculum/curriculum_15.htm Zeq 16:52, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
This is purly wrong translation (and does not make any sense) Komemeiut is "rebuilding, resconstruction, restoration" and also "to become independent " etc... Zeq 03:41, 4 April 2006 (UTC)
The neutrality of this article has been disputed for many months. The background is not neutral because it emphasizes events far less relevant than many others for a background. Typically, the following paragraphs : great uprising, yishouv/British intelligence and Haj Amin al husseini should not be developed that much. I suggest they are deleted and the background is changed. Alithien 18:19, 4 April 2006 (UTC)
No. He doesn't "cover" this in the introduction. In the introduction he covers the armement and politicial status of first yishouv and palestinian society in 1947 but doesn't consider important to explain in details why the 1936-39 revolt was that much critical for the palestinian. He gives some words about that later but don't forget his book is not about the war but about the "war, the escape and the refugee problem". I will summarize exactly what he says in chapter 6 but if this is in chapter 6, that also means that it is not in the introduction or background.
Much historians I read (eg Gelber, Pappé, Laurens, Morris, Karsh) or commentators (Lapierre et Collins) emphasizes on the "goals" (if any) of the protagonists during the war (ie Yishouv - HAC - Abdallah - Arab League - British - US - (Soviets). All (same + Vidal) emphasizes of their real military situation. All this is important. I would add that commentators such as Lapierre et Collins have the same approach.
This is quite normal for a war to emphasizes on that. This is indeed more interesting, to fit to propaganda, to emphasize on "Mufti's antisemitism and collaboration with Nazis" or the "Zionist and Jewish (underground) intelligence with British" or to try to make believe there was a "overtrained" army in Palestine in 1947.
Do we delete all this stuff ?
Best Regards, Alithien 08:19, 5 April 2006 (UTC)
Ian, you agree to delete Haj Amin. It is rather well-sourced (here). There are more reference in Gelber (and I think in all history books on the topic) about Haj Amin than about the 1936-39 Great uprising consequences on 1948's war. I don't understand how you are convinced that it is justified to delete one and not the other. Could you explain your point ? Alithien 15:17, 5 April 2006 (UTC)
Hello. I don't say he was not relevant. I say many people were far more. I think historians emphasize first on the role of other politicians and on some fighters or soldiers. Politicians : Ben Gourion, Abdallah, The "British" (Bevin, Cunningham, Kirkbride) were far more relevant than him. It is therefore POV to talk about al-Husseini withtout talking about them (Let's not forget Truman and Farouk who could have changed the issue of that war). Haj Amin al-Husseini was a "spectator". On the military point of view, there are many "personnalites" to introduce : Yadin, as real chief of staff on Yishuv side, Glubb, Qawuqji, Abd-al Kader and Salame... Above all, a description of their intents before the war and during this is exteremly important to have a fair image of what happened. Alithien 08:57, 10 April 2006 (UTC)
I've been asked to look at a conflict here, but I'm not sure what it is. Could someone explain it? Jayjg (talk) 22:36, 5 April 2006 (UTC)
Ian. I agree but there are many things to comment...
As a consequence, it is extremely relevant to explain why a paramilitary underground organisation became an army and why several armies only sent expeditionary forces with restrained military options. And we must explain (with quotes) how real these restrictions were. And just after, we must explain how far the other side was aware of these restrictions... That is a very difficult exercise to explain everything fairly. 81.246.202.230 14:17, 10 April 2006 (UTC)
Were really these youth organisation ? Nor Gelber (p.5) or Karsh (p.26) precises this. For the spelling they both write this with one "j". And so does Morris (I have just checked) =correction, he uses 2 jj p.36= with one j he refers to something else. What means "youth" here ? Christophe Greffe 20:45, 5 April 2006 (UTC)
Christophe, I think the verb you're looking for is either "define" or "specify" (instead of "precise"). Joffan 21:42, 25 May 2006 (UTC)
Can "O Jerusalem" be considered as a valuable source because they give much information about the acquisition of weapons by Haganah and Arabs that I personally didn't find with so much details in the other references books ? Alithien 20:45, 5 April 2006 (UTC)
Not to give the feeling that the "universe" was against the Yishuv, wouldn't it be important to gather the arab coalised forces as far as reasonnable ? I introduce this but feel free to revert. Alithien 08:42, 11 April 2006 (UTC)
To give a fair and understandable vision of the situation, background should only introduce the real military power in 1947 and the article should explain how each side prepared itself and why. The last subsection of phase 2 should show what the Israeli army had become and what were Arab forces ready for combat. Alithien 08:42, 11 April 2006 (UTC)
Somebody deleted this : Of the Arab aircraft, only less than a dozen fighters and three to four bombers saw action, the rest were unserviceable..
Personnally I only heard about Egyptian bombing of Tel Aviv and don't know for the remaining. Karsh underlines that Iraqi air forces had only half of their planes operationnel (Karsh, p.27). I don't know their range of action. I read on the "apparently neutral" website that it was roughly the same for the Egyptian air forces [4]. They talk also about 5 squadrons like Karsh. Are there reliable scholar sources about this (I write reliable because sometimes historians, even or maybe particularly academicians, do not know a lot about military matters)Â ? Alithien 08:53, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
"Finkelstein and [another writer] share a method: they selectively quote from [my books] what suits their purposes while ignoring, and in Finkelstein's case, ridiculing what doesn't. Neither seems to know anything about 1948 beyond what is to be found in my books and neither marshals sources or material from elsewhere that could serve to contradict my findings." Benny Morris. (see Finkelstein) Alithien 10:33, 21 April 2006 (UTC)
I would bet money that the person above isn't Benny Morris, although I do still agree with what he said.- Moshe Constantine Hassan Al-Silverburg | Talk 10:37, 21 April 2006 (UTC)
Hello. I thank you for your attempt to "neutralize" the article. Let's see what can be done that way. Alithien 12:08, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3248081,00.html
and German study:
http://www.ejpress.org/article/7448
and a jewish study:
http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-kuntzel-s05.htm
Ian, this last addition may be misleading. Haganah was of course superior to the Arab population in Palestine. Everybody knew about it, and it is not possible to doubt it after reading the article. But the article is about the war which was mainly fought between IDF and the Arab armies. Haganah was then generally considered to be inferior to those armies. If memory serves it deemed its own chances as only about equal. Writing that it considered itself superior to the Arab polulation have a great chance to be misinterpreted, without adding anyting to the article that wasn't already there. -- Heptor talk 16:28, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
In the conclusion of chapter 8 - the Arab Regular Armies'Invasion of Palestine of Palestine 1948, Y. Gelber writes this :
Alithien 12:00, 20 May 2006 (UTC)
Pappé writes in "La guerre de 1948 en Palestine" that (free translation) in february the Jewish Agency meeting was very pessimistic due to the situation of Jerusalem and the recent victories of Palestinians and the entry of ALA troops. I would add that they had not received weapons from Czecoslovaquia and that they planned the D-Day of the attacks of ALA for April (the Arab League meeting). Without weapons, they also knew they could not fight versus the potential intervention of Arab armies. And they didn't know that Bevin had forbidden Abdallah to attack them in Tel Aviv or that Arab armies didn't plan to interact. What you do is personnal research. Gelber and others historians have a wider vision as we have. If you want we analyse all together the reality of what historians claim, I am intersted to debate this with you but not here. I suggest we subscribe on a forum where we can discuss freely and emit personnal opinions and make hypothesis. Here on WK, we just report facts and professional analysis. Alithien 10:31, 24 May 2006 (UTC)
No Ian. Unfortunately, I still think that what you present is the gathering of facts from different sources to argue for one point of view, which I think is different from giving all points of views of different historians. In the current case, I still say that both Gelber and Morris unambiguously claim that yishouv "feared the face a genocide's threat" and that they both consider this is revelant for the war. My personnal understanding of the conflict is that they don't lie nor exagerate when they give these analysis. Schlaim's analysis is interesting but I never read his book. I choose Pappé to have a pro-palestinian pov. If your point is that in practice they never faced such a threath, that is also true and to know if they would have been genocided if Arabs had won the war is part of what Pappé calls "alternative History". Alithien 18:03, 26 May 2006 (UTC)
![]() | This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page. |
Archive 5 | â | Archive 8 | Archive 9 | Archive 10 | Archive 11 | Archive 12 | â | Archive 15 |
http://www.motl.org/resource/curriculum/curriculum_15.htm Zeq 16:52, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
This is purly wrong translation (and does not make any sense) Komemeiut is "rebuilding, resconstruction, restoration" and also "to become independent " etc... Zeq 03:41, 4 April 2006 (UTC)
The neutrality of this article has been disputed for many months. The background is not neutral because it emphasizes events far less relevant than many others for a background. Typically, the following paragraphs : great uprising, yishouv/British intelligence and Haj Amin al husseini should not be developed that much. I suggest they are deleted and the background is changed. Alithien 18:19, 4 April 2006 (UTC)
No. He doesn't "cover" this in the introduction. In the introduction he covers the armement and politicial status of first yishouv and palestinian society in 1947 but doesn't consider important to explain in details why the 1936-39 revolt was that much critical for the palestinian. He gives some words about that later but don't forget his book is not about the war but about the "war, the escape and the refugee problem". I will summarize exactly what he says in chapter 6 but if this is in chapter 6, that also means that it is not in the introduction or background.
Much historians I read (eg Gelber, Pappé, Laurens, Morris, Karsh) or commentators (Lapierre et Collins) emphasizes on the "goals" (if any) of the protagonists during the war (ie Yishouv - HAC - Abdallah - Arab League - British - US - (Soviets). All (same + Vidal) emphasizes of their real military situation. All this is important. I would add that commentators such as Lapierre et Collins have the same approach.
This is quite normal for a war to emphasizes on that. This is indeed more interesting, to fit to propaganda, to emphasize on "Mufti's antisemitism and collaboration with Nazis" or the "Zionist and Jewish (underground) intelligence with British" or to try to make believe there was a "overtrained" army in Palestine in 1947.
Do we delete all this stuff ?
Best Regards, Alithien 08:19, 5 April 2006 (UTC)
Ian, you agree to delete Haj Amin. It is rather well-sourced (here). There are more reference in Gelber (and I think in all history books on the topic) about Haj Amin than about the 1936-39 Great uprising consequences on 1948's war. I don't understand how you are convinced that it is justified to delete one and not the other. Could you explain your point ? Alithien 15:17, 5 April 2006 (UTC)
Hello. I don't say he was not relevant. I say many people were far more. I think historians emphasize first on the role of other politicians and on some fighters or soldiers. Politicians : Ben Gourion, Abdallah, The "British" (Bevin, Cunningham, Kirkbride) were far more relevant than him. It is therefore POV to talk about al-Husseini withtout talking about them (Let's not forget Truman and Farouk who could have changed the issue of that war). Haj Amin al-Husseini was a "spectator". On the military point of view, there are many "personnalites" to introduce : Yadin, as real chief of staff on Yishuv side, Glubb, Qawuqji, Abd-al Kader and Salame... Above all, a description of their intents before the war and during this is exteremly important to have a fair image of what happened. Alithien 08:57, 10 April 2006 (UTC)
I've been asked to look at a conflict here, but I'm not sure what it is. Could someone explain it? Jayjg (talk) 22:36, 5 April 2006 (UTC)
Ian. I agree but there are many things to comment...
As a consequence, it is extremely relevant to explain why a paramilitary underground organisation became an army and why several armies only sent expeditionary forces with restrained military options. And we must explain (with quotes) how real these restrictions were. And just after, we must explain how far the other side was aware of these restrictions... That is a very difficult exercise to explain everything fairly. 81.246.202.230 14:17, 10 April 2006 (UTC)
Were really these youth organisation ? Nor Gelber (p.5) or Karsh (p.26) precises this. For the spelling they both write this with one "j". And so does Morris (I have just checked) =correction, he uses 2 jj p.36= with one j he refers to something else. What means "youth" here ? Christophe Greffe 20:45, 5 April 2006 (UTC)
Christophe, I think the verb you're looking for is either "define" or "specify" (instead of "precise"). Joffan 21:42, 25 May 2006 (UTC)
Can "O Jerusalem" be considered as a valuable source because they give much information about the acquisition of weapons by Haganah and Arabs that I personally didn't find with so much details in the other references books ? Alithien 20:45, 5 April 2006 (UTC)
Not to give the feeling that the "universe" was against the Yishuv, wouldn't it be important to gather the arab coalised forces as far as reasonnable ? I introduce this but feel free to revert. Alithien 08:42, 11 April 2006 (UTC)
To give a fair and understandable vision of the situation, background should only introduce the real military power in 1947 and the article should explain how each side prepared itself and why. The last subsection of phase 2 should show what the Israeli army had become and what were Arab forces ready for combat. Alithien 08:42, 11 April 2006 (UTC)
Somebody deleted this : Of the Arab aircraft, only less than a dozen fighters and three to four bombers saw action, the rest were unserviceable..
Personnally I only heard about Egyptian bombing of Tel Aviv and don't know for the remaining. Karsh underlines that Iraqi air forces had only half of their planes operationnel (Karsh, p.27). I don't know their range of action. I read on the "apparently neutral" website that it was roughly the same for the Egyptian air forces [4]. They talk also about 5 squadrons like Karsh. Are there reliable scholar sources about this (I write reliable because sometimes historians, even or maybe particularly academicians, do not know a lot about military matters)Â ? Alithien 08:53, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
"Finkelstein and [another writer] share a method: they selectively quote from [my books] what suits their purposes while ignoring, and in Finkelstein's case, ridiculing what doesn't. Neither seems to know anything about 1948 beyond what is to be found in my books and neither marshals sources or material from elsewhere that could serve to contradict my findings." Benny Morris. (see Finkelstein) Alithien 10:33, 21 April 2006 (UTC)
I would bet money that the person above isn't Benny Morris, although I do still agree with what he said.- Moshe Constantine Hassan Al-Silverburg | Talk 10:37, 21 April 2006 (UTC)
Hello. I thank you for your attempt to "neutralize" the article. Let's see what can be done that way. Alithien 12:08, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3248081,00.html
and German study:
http://www.ejpress.org/article/7448
and a jewish study:
http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-kuntzel-s05.htm
Ian, this last addition may be misleading. Haganah was of course superior to the Arab population in Palestine. Everybody knew about it, and it is not possible to doubt it after reading the article. But the article is about the war which was mainly fought between IDF and the Arab armies. Haganah was then generally considered to be inferior to those armies. If memory serves it deemed its own chances as only about equal. Writing that it considered itself superior to the Arab polulation have a great chance to be misinterpreted, without adding anyting to the article that wasn't already there. -- Heptor talk 16:28, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
In the conclusion of chapter 8 - the Arab Regular Armies'Invasion of Palestine of Palestine 1948, Y. Gelber writes this :
Alithien 12:00, 20 May 2006 (UTC)
Pappé writes in "La guerre de 1948 en Palestine" that (free translation) in february the Jewish Agency meeting was very pessimistic due to the situation of Jerusalem and the recent victories of Palestinians and the entry of ALA troops. I would add that they had not received weapons from Czecoslovaquia and that they planned the D-Day of the attacks of ALA for April (the Arab League meeting). Without weapons, they also knew they could not fight versus the potential intervention of Arab armies. And they didn't know that Bevin had forbidden Abdallah to attack them in Tel Aviv or that Arab armies didn't plan to interact. What you do is personnal research. Gelber and others historians have a wider vision as we have. If you want we analyse all together the reality of what historians claim, I am intersted to debate this with you but not here. I suggest we subscribe on a forum where we can discuss freely and emit personnal opinions and make hypothesis. Here on WK, we just report facts and professional analysis. Alithien 10:31, 24 May 2006 (UTC)
No Ian. Unfortunately, I still think that what you present is the gathering of facts from different sources to argue for one point of view, which I think is different from giving all points of views of different historians. In the current case, I still say that both Gelber and Morris unambiguously claim that yishouv "feared the face a genocide's threat" and that they both consider this is revelant for the war. My personnal understanding of the conflict is that they don't lie nor exagerate when they give these analysis. Schlaim's analysis is interesting but I never read his book. I choose Pappé to have a pro-palestinian pov. If your point is that in practice they never faced such a threath, that is also true and to know if they would have been genocided if Arabs had won the war is part of what Pappé calls "alternative History". Alithien 18:03, 26 May 2006 (UTC)