ROMAN ARMY OF THE LATE REPUBLIC

TThe Late Republican Roman Army was a standing, professional army used by the Late Roman Republic from the beginning of the 1st century BC until the establishment of the Imperial Roman Army by Augustus in 30 BC. The Late Republic saw the transition from the Temporary Roman Army of the Mid-Republic, which was based solely on conscription of Roman citizens, to the Imperial Roman Army of the Princes, which was a standing, professional army based on the recruitment of volunteers.

Constant expansion, wars, conflicts and the acquisition of a growing overseas territory led to an increasing degree of professionalism within the army. In the late Republic, much of the action took place within Roman borders and between Roman commanders vying for control of the Republic.

After the Social War (91-87 BC) and the formation of the First Triumvirate by Julius Caesar, Marcus Licinius Crassus and Pompeus Magnus, the focus shifted to the expansion of a united Republic into regions such as Britain and Palestine. Efforts to suppress non-Roman invasions and revolts continued throughout the period.

The structure of the Roman army changed dramatically during the Late Republic, with the maniple being replaced by the cohort as the new standard tactical unit of the legions. Some scholars argue that these changes may have been more gradual than traditionally attributed to the reforms of Gaius Marius..^[1]

Main sources

The main sources for the army's organization and practices in this period are the publications De Bello Gallico and De Bello Civilli, begun by the Roman general Julius Caesar and finished by his subordinates.

Conflicts and expansion

During the late Republic, Rome experienced continuous warfare and civil war, with ambitious commanders leading massive campaigns to expand the empire's borders beyond Italy. The most intensive period of conquest in Rome's history saw Rome expand its territory by adding large territories in Gaul, North Africa, Asia Minor, Cyprus, Crete, and the Levant. The frequency of war, prolonged campaigns, and growing demand for garrisons led to legions developing a more permanent and professional character. As the length of military service increased, legionaries began to view the army as a career in itself, not just an interruption of normal life.^[2]

Campaign history: military in politics

Jugurthine War

After receiving permission from the Plebeian Council to command the army in 107 BC, Gaius Marius marched through Numidia to take the town of Capsa whose entire population was either killed or sold into slavery. This action was later criticized as “against the law of war” by Roman historian Sallust. Marius then swiftly assured victory after marching 600 miles to capture the Jugurthine Royal Treasury. The campaign displayed the effectiveness of the proletarian army in battle.

Conflict with wandering Germanic tribes

In 105 BC, two Roman armies were defeated by the Cimbri and Teutones in the Battle of Arausio. These forces were led by Servilius Caepio of a firmly ingrained Roman heritage and Mallius Maximus from a newer, aspiring family. The defeat is credited to a lack of coordination due to strife between them as Caepio refused to work alongside someone not of noble blood.

The constant fear of Germanic invasion allowed the Populist faction a foothold to have Gaius Marius reelected in 104, 103, and 102 BC. Marius showcased his army's capability once again, first massacring 90,000 of the 100,000 Teutones soldiers, which included women and children, implementing a well-coordinated rear ambush tactic. He subsequently overpowered the Cimbri at Vercellae in what is now Vercelli, Italy. Following these battles, Marius eradicated the equites and thus the light cavalry which doubled as a political attack against the aristocratic class.

Since proletarians had no land to return to, Marius, now beginning his 6th consulship, joined his men in the Forum to battle the Senate who refused to provide them with land. This exemplifies the growing trend of applying military force to obtain a political resolution.

Social War

The Social War opened in 91 BC when Italians began to revolt because the Senate would not grant them Roman citizenship even though they showed loyalty in fighting for Rome in the past. The revolt was headed by the Marsi and Samnites who established a capital, senate, and two commanders at Corfinium which was renamed Italia. Some Italians remained on Rome's side including the Etruscans, Umbrians, Campanians, Greeks, and Latins. The Roman force consisted of 150,000 men against 100,000, but the rebellion was extinguished when, in 89 BC, Rome presented a citizenship offer to all Italians that surrendered.

Civil Wars

At the completion of the Social War in 89 BC, Lucius Cornelius Sulla Felix marched on Rome with six legions, who devoted their loyalty solely to him, as a means of coercing the Plebeian Council to grant him authority to fight King Mithridates of Pontus who invaded the Roman province of Asia. This sparked factional fighting and the murders of important Romans such as Quintus Pompeius Rufus. Lucius Cornelius Cinna and Gaius Marius teamed up to use their armies to sack and loot Rome and declare themselves co-consuls after starving it out. It would be Marius’ seventh and final term. In 83 BC, following his capture of Athens from Mithridates, Sulla returned to Rome, joined his army of 35,000 veterans with three legions raised by the young Pompey to defeat a lone consul's 100,000 newly recruited.

The First Triumvirate in 60 BC consisted of Pompey, Marcus Licinius Crassus, and Julius Caesar; the latter was granted command in Cisalpine Gaul, Illyricum, and Transalpine Gaul as a result of some recent successes: commanding at a victorious siege of Mytilene in 80 BC to receive a civic crown, defeating pirates in naval warfare, commanding in the Pontic War of 74, and subduing Spanish tribes in 61. Caesar called upon his forces to threaten the Senate into providing land for Pompey's veterans.

Annexations achieved by Caesar (although he cunningly called them alliances) include lands of many Gallic tribes such as the Aedui, Belgic tribes like the Nervii, and Germanic tribes including the Usipetes and Tencteri. Even though he characteristically drove his men to their limits in these battles, those legions would grow intensely loyal to him which would become very important in the near future.

As Caesar's legal command over his 13 legions was running out, he famously crossed the Rubicon River with just one legion, purportedly stating alea iacta est ("the die is cast"). He defeated the larger Pompeian armies through the experience of his men and clever use of strategy, even employing the pilum as a bayonet to combat Pompey's 7–1 cavalry advantage.

Caesar's assassination led to the creation of the Second Triumvirate of Octavian (to become known as Augustus), Mark Antony, and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus in 43 BC. Exemplifying the mobility of loyalty in the army of this period, Octavian was able to raise legions without legal command as a result of his Caesarian connection, two of which had defected from Antony. The Triumvirate was short lived and inner strife led to further civil war. Thanks to the military prowess of his general Agrippa, Octavian was able to gain control of the West's entire army of 45 legions and navy of 500–600 ships. Even though the Roman military power concentrated on heavy infantry, the importance of naval warfare was displayed in the final Battle of Actium, where Octavian achieved total victory. He then acted to consolidate the military in preparation to transition the Roman government to the Principate.

Background: The Polybian army

The organization of the army of the mid-republic (also known as the "Polybian" or Manipular army) was described by the Greek historian Polybius in the mid-second century BC The basic military unit of the Polybian army was the maniple, which numbered about 120 men, and was subdivided into two centuries of 60 men.^[3] The standard legion contained thirty maniples organized into three distinct lines, and consisted of about 4,200 infantrymen and 300 Roman citizen cavalrymen ( equites). The actual size of the legions, however, often depended on the particular situation, and sources mention that in times of need legions could number between 5,000 and 6,000 men.^[4]

Based on their property and age, the infantrymen were divided into four specific groups, and were organized and equipped according to that particular group. The first group, which formed the first line of the Polybian legion, was that of the hastati. These men were recruited from the younger men eligible for service and were probably in their late teens or early 20s. The second line was formed by the principes, who were drawn from men in their later 20s or early 30s, and the last line was made up by the triarii, who were the oldest and (supposedly) most experienced men in the army. While there were normally 1,200 hastati and 1,200 principes in every legion, the triarii numbered just 600. The poorest and youngest of the citizens fought in the legions as light infantry ( velites), of which there were usually 1,200 in each legion.^[3]

Beside the troops levied from the eligible Roman population served the troops provided by Rome's allies. These troops, primarily recruited from Rome's allies on the Italian peninsula (or the socii), were organized in so-called alae (ala singular) or 'wing' (referring to their location on the flanks of the Roman legions).^[5]

Marian reforms

The Marian reforms were putative changes to the composition and operation of the Roman army during the late Roman republic usually attributed to Gaius Marius (a general who was consul in 107, 104–100, and 86 BC^[6]). The most important of those putative changes concerned the altering of the socio-economic background of the soldiery. Other changes were supposed to have included the introduction of the cohort; the institution of a single form of heavy infantry with uniform equipment; the universal adoption of the eagle standard; and the abolition of the citizen cavalry.^[7] It was commonly believed that Marius changed the soldiers' socio-economic background by allowing citizens without property to join the Roman army, a process called "proletarianisation".^[8] This was then supposed to have created a semi-professional class of soldiers motivated by land grants which in turn became clients of their generals, who then used them to overthrow the republic.^[9]

Belief in a comprehensive scheme of reforms under Marius emerged in 1840s German scholarship, which posited that any changes in the Roman army between the times of Polybius and Marius were attributable to a single reform event. This belief was spread relatively uncritically and was accepted as largely proven by the 1850s and through much of the 20th century. There is, however, little ancient evidence for any permanent or significant change to recruitment practice in Marius's time.^[10]^[11]^[12] The occurrence of such a comprehensive reform led by Marius is no longer widely accepted by specialists;^[13]^[14] 21st-century scholars have called the reforms a "construct of modern scholarship".^[15]^[16]

Other reforms to the army's operations and equipment, said to have been done by Marius, are also largely rejected by scholars.^[17] Few of them have any basis in the ancient and archaeological evidence.^[18] Others are wrongly dated or misattributed. Changes in the Roman army of the late republic occurred both later (during the Social War and following civil wars rather than at the end of the 2nd century BC) and emerged from circumstance rather than a reformist Marian vision.

Army structure and organization

Legionary infantry

By the first decades of the 1st century, the cohort had replaced the maniple as the standard tactical unit of the legions.^[19] The three lines of the manipular legion were combined to form the cohort, which generally numbered about 480 to 500 men.^[20]^[21] Maniples and centuriae continued to be used to as military and administrative subdivisions for the cohort.^[22] There were six centuriae in a cohort, which were now all 80-men strong.^[23] The legion was now composed of ten cohorts rather than thirty maniples, and numbered an average of about 5,000 men.^[24] The legionaries no longer needed to provide their own equipment and were now all equipped and organized as heavy infantry with pilum and gladius.^[25]

It is unclear when or for what reasons the cohort became the basic unit. Sources such as Polybius and Livy suggest that cohorts existed as a military unit well before the late Republic and that cohorts had been used alongside maniples in the mid-Republic.^[26] Traditionally, historians have attributed the standardization of the cohort to Gaius Marius who, among his other reforms (see Marian reforms), may have increased the size of the basic unit as a response to the Germanic and Celtic concentrated and dispersed way of fighting.^[27] Other historians believe that the cohort may have gradually developed as the standard unit and that Marius merely continued a trend that was already in progress.^[28]

Nevertheless, it is clear that the cohort provided several advantages over the manipular organization. The cohort structure simplified the use of commands, since orders only had to be conveyed to ten units instead of thirty. It also enabled much more flexibility through independent and rapid detached operations.^[29] The cohort could vary in size depending on the time and place. For example, at the Battle of Pharsalus in 48 BC Pompey's cohorts numbered 409 men while Caesar's cohorts contained just 275 legionaries.^[22]

Following the conclusion of the Social War, soldiers in the Roman army began to acquire a specialized expertise alongside their regular legionary duty. These roles included engineers, doctors, and artillerymen who operated the ballistae and catapults. During the Republic, the required length of service included six consecutive years followed by a total of ten more years. Once Augustus came to power, this was increased to twenty total years.^{[
citation needed]}

Even though they identified as soldiers of Rome, legionaries of the late Republic increasingly shifted their true loyalty to a specific general because of the length of each campaign and the respect they gained for the general's military prowess. As the civil wars came to a close, there were a total of 28 Roman legions. Some assigned numbers were repeated since legionary allegiances became scattered among generals when military overcame politics. Thus, repetitions were allocated a name as well, such as Legio III Augusta and Legio III Gallica.

The consuls were commanders in chief of the army as a whole. In provinces, the governor would be given command of the army units within his territory. Beneath him were the legionary legates, a laticlavian tribune who was a senatorial officer working for 1–2 years toward becoming a senator at the age of 25, five angusticlavian tribunes, and lastly, equestrians who supported the legate and were a class below the senators in society.

Under Julius Caesar, officers all came from aristocratic families that contained senators of the highest standings. Common soldiers, however, whether Roman or not, could rise through the ranks if they displayed outstanding ability and loyalty. Caesar also raised each legionary's salary to 900 sesterces a year and granted Roman citizenship to soldiers raised in Gaul for their effort in his war against Pompey.

Velites

The light-armed troops, known as the velites, disappeared from records after Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus's campaign in 109-108 BC. Their elimination has been traditionally linked to Marius, who made several changes in organization and equipment. However, no concrete proof of such a reform has ever been found. Some historians suggest that the lowering of property qualifications may have been the cause behind their disappearance. 21st-century scholars question if there is enough evidence to show that property qualifications were even reduced. The figures of 11,000, 4,000, and 1,500'velites' are reported in sources, but no evidence warrants a descending sequence. It is possible that the'velites' disappeared gradually as their recruitment declined.^[30]

Cavalry

As with the velites, the Roman and Italian allied cavalry (the equites) disappeared as a fighting force in the beginning of the late Republic. From this period until the Principate, the Romans relied on non-Roman mercenaries and auxiliary units to provide its cavalry during wars and campaigns.^[31] Previous generations of scholars have ascribed the elimination of the citizen cavalry to Marius’ reforms. The inferiority of Roman cavalry and their ineffectiveness against enemy cavalry may have motivated Marius to disband the Roman citizen cavalry altogether. There is, however, no concrete evidence of any such reform, and it is arguable whether Roman cavalry truly was ineffective.^[32]

It has also been suggested that the desperate need for manpower during the Social War and the social-political changes that followed may have been responsible for their disappearance. The Social War strained the Roman manpower resources as its allies and clients, who had supplied soldiers to Rome in the past, revolted against them. To compensate for the soldiers it had lost, Rome may have been forced to recruit its legionaries from the equites while the auxiliaries provided for Rome's cavalry (only Roman citizens could become legionaries).^[33] With the granting of citizenship to all Italian communities and the growing significance of wealth and income to status, cavalry service, which had been used to climb the ranks of society in the past, may have decreased in importance all together as it became associated with foreigners.^[34]

Auxiliaries

The disappearance of the Roman cavalry and light infantry was paralleled by the increasing use of Auxilia. The use of non-Roman and non-Italian troops had been a common practice in the mid-Republic, but significantly increased in scale during the late Republic.^[30] While the legionaries were now recruited from the Italian communities south of the Po River, Rome had to rely on its non-Roman allies and clients to provide cavalry and light infantry. Despite problems with loyalty and desertion, this practice may have offered many benefits as some possessed over specialized skills or native traditions that the Romans lacked.^[30] Auxiliary units such as the Numidians, Spanish, and Gauls were famed by the Romans for the strength of their cavalry.^[35] Numidian javelineers, Cretan archers, and Balearic slingers were notorious for their effectiveness as light infantry.^[24] In most circumstances, these units were only raised for specific campaigns and disbanded as soon as their services were no longer required.^[36]

Military strategy

After the development of the cohort, once in formation, the general would give a speech of encouragement and then give the signal to attack. Intimidation was a tactic commonly used by the Romans; soldiers would even litter the battlefield with severed body parts beforehand to frighten the enemy. The Roman strategy was to make battles as short as possible. To do so, they would begin by hurling their pila, and then uniformly charge to rout the enemy and slaughter them. This action is where the cavalry was most effective; otherwise, it was protecting the flanks and rear. Outside battle, the cavalry was mostly employed to obstruct enemy supply lines and scout areas.

The army of Julius Caesar focused on swift movements (celeritas) over spending time on full preparations. His approach to strategy is known to be one of great daring and risk. He subjected his men to dangerous winter marches and relied heavily on the crafting skill of Romans in quickly building siege weapons and fortifications. He even split his army in two while fighting Gallic tribes. His success in carrying out these unusual tactics is why he is credited with exceptional cunning. During the war with Pompey, Caesar depended heavily on the experience of his soldiers in the face of larger numbers.

Equipment

While in the mid-Republic legionaries had to provide their own equipment and were equipped according to military unit and status, in the late Republic equipment was issued by the state and all legionaries were equipped in a similar fashion.^[37]

The late Republican army was armed with the pilum and gladius. The pilum was a short-range javelin with a range of about 15 meters, used as a spear to demoralize the enemy and break the enemy's charge. It consisted of a pyramidal iron head atop a soft iron shank attached to a wooden shaft. The pilum's narrow point, long shank, and heavy weight made it difficult to withdraw from an enemy shield. The gladius, or the "Iberian sword," was the primary weapon of the late Republican legionary, used for slashing and stabbing. .^[38]

Chain-mail armour, also known as lorica hamata, was the standard body protection for legionaries during the late Republican period. It was made of iron rings and was heavy but flexible and comfortable. The segmented armor, often associated with the Romans, was not used until the Imperial period.^[39]

The Montefortino and Coolus helmets were the most commonly used helmets in the late Republic, derived from Gallic designs. Both helmets featured cheek and neck guards for protection without obstructing hearing and vision. The oldest helmet, the Montefortino, was in use since the third century BC and was gradually replaced by the Coolus helmet in the first century BC. Centurions distinguished themselves from legionaries by a wide transverse crest, while legionaries often mounted their helmets with plumes and crests attached to a knob.^[40]

The legionaries carried a long, oval-shaped shield called the scutum, made of wood layers, canvas and hide cover, and an iron or copper alloy boss. Its purpose was to deflect attacks and create openings in the formation by basing against the opponent's shield or body.^[41]

Military training and punishment

Soldiers in the Roman military were trained to display agility, technique, stamina, courage and confidence in fighting aggressively while maintaining formation. Training continued throughout their careers and emphasised maintaining ranks, not fleeing, not breaking off to attack on impulse, and keeping enough space between men to prevent freedom of movement. Sword-fighting was paramount in Roman military culture, and soldiers were expected to fight for honour and glory for themselves and for Rome.

Maintaining discipline was an important means of ensuring military success. Sources from the period paint a harsh picture of the punishments meted out in the Roman army, including clubbing, flogging, stoning, crucifixion and public humiliation. Any soldier caught stealing from the camp, bearing false witness, abandoning his post, or discarding his armour or other equipment was beaten to death with a wooden club (fustuarium). Legionaries who fled during battle risked being crucified or thrown into an arena with wild animals.

In the Late Republic, the commanding general exercised ultimate disciplinary and judicial authority within the army. There were no specific laws to limit his decisions, so the general was free to maintain discipline and administer punishment as he saw fit. In ordinary, everyday circumstances, the punishment of soldiers was left to a tribunal of military tribunes, who tried the suspect(s) and were responsible for deciding on the appropriate punishment.^[42]

Social impact of military service

Soldiers came to view themselves as a class superior to average citizens, and exhibited corresponding behavior. This led to an overarching sense of fear and antipathy whenever Roman citizens encountered Roman legionaries.

Victories were celebrated in what was known as a triumph, a large, extravagant, parade-like procession through the streets of Rome. During these events, spoils of war would be handed out to soldiers and citizens.

Citations

^ Goldsworthy, Adrian (2003). The Complete Roman Army. New York: Thames & Hudson. pp. 44–47.
^ Goldsworthy, Adrian (2003). The Complete Roman Army. New York: Thames & Hudson. pp. 44–49.
^ ^a ^b Goldsworthy, Adrian (2003). The Complete Roman Army. New York: Thames & Hudson. p. 27.
^ Goldsworthy, Adrian (2003). The Complete Roman Army. New York: Thames & Hudson. pp. 26–28.
^ Goldsworthy, Adrian (2003). The Complete Roman Army. New York: Thames & Hudson. p. 28.
^ Broughton, Thomas Robert Shannon (1952). The magistrates of the Roman republic. Vol. 2. New York: American Philological Association. p. 589.
^ Faszcza 2021, p. 21. See eg Taylor 2019, p. 76 and Cadiou 2018, p. 395.
^ Cadiou 2018, p. 18.
^ Eg Scullard 2011, pp. 47–48.
^ Gauthier 2020, p. 283. "The idea of a wide-ranging 'Marian reform' that permanently abolished property qualifications for military service has recently been thoroughly rebutted".
^ Keaveney 2007, pp. 93–94. "Marius did few, if any, of the things he is sometimes supposed to have done. He did not make the Roman army an army of mercenaries... he did not create a revolutionary army".
^ Rafferty 2021. "[Cadiou]'s conclusion is that 'l'armée romaine dite « post-marienne » est un mirage historiographique' [the Roman army called 'post-Marian' is a historiographical mirage]".
^ Probst 2008. "Modern research for the most part agrees, it can no longer be said that the Marian reforms and the military service of unpropertied men revolutionised the Roman army".
^ Faszcza 2021, pp. 14–15.
^ Taylor 2019, p. 79. "Relatively modest facts have been spun into the overarching 'Marian reforms', which are ultimately the construct of modern scholarship".
^ Cadiou 2018, p. 395. « L'armée romaine dite ‹ post-marienne › est un mirage historiographique. Elle n'a jamais existé que dans l'esprit des spécialistes modernes ... En ce sens, l'armée de citoyens pauvres à laquelle l'historiographie moderne a coutume d'attribuer une responsabilité décisive dans la crise et la chute de la République romaine s'apparente, en fait, à une armée imaginaire. »
^ Rosenstein 2020, p. 301. "[Gauthier] starts from a position that has become increasingly accepted among scholars (although unfortunately not popular among popular writers), namely that Marius was not responsible for the key changes that distinguished first-century legions from their mid-republican predecessors".
^ Other than army recruitment, the only two changes attributed to Marius directly are a redesign of the pilum and the elimination of non-eagle standards. Both ancient claims are disproved by archeological evidence. Taylor 2019, p. 78.
^ Sage, Michael M. (2008). The Republican Roman Army: A Sourcebook. New York: Routledge. p. 199.
^ Fields, Nic (2008). Warlords of Republican Roma: Caesar versus Pompey. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military. p. 12.
^ Sage, Michael M. (2008). The Republican Roman Army: A Sourcebook. New York: Routledge.
^ ^a ^b Sage, Michael M. (2008). The Republican Roman Army: A Sourcebook. New York: Routledge. p. 202.
^ Goldsworthy, Adrian (2003). The Complete Roman Army. New York: Thames & Hudson. pp. 46–47.
^ ^a ^b Fields, Nic (2008). Warlords of Republican Rome: Caesar versus Pompey. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military. p. 13.
^ Goldsworthy, Adrian (2003). The Complete Roman Army. New York: Thames & Hudson. p. 47.
^ Sage, Michael M. (2008). The Republican Roman Army: A Sourcebook. New York: Routledge. pp. 200–202.
^ Fields, Nic (2008). Warlords of Republican Rome: Caesar versus Pompey. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military. p. 12.
^ Sage, Michael M. (2008). The Republican Roman Army: A Sourcebook. New York: Routledge. pp. 200–201.
^ Goldsworthy, Adrian (2003). The Complete Roman Army. New York: Thames & Hudson. pp. 47–48.
^ ^a ^b ^c Sage, Michael M. (2008). The Republican Roman Army: A Sourcebook. New York: Routledge. p. 205.
^ McCall, Jeremiah B. (2002). The Cavalry of the Roman Republic: Cavalry Combat and Elite Reputations in the Middle and Late Republic. New York: Routledge. p. 101. ISBN 9780415257138.
^ McCall, Jeremiah B. (2002). The Cavalry of the Roman Republic: Cavalry Combat and Elite Reputations in the Middle and Late Republic. New York: Routledge. p. 104. ISBN 9780415257138.
^ McCall, Jeremiah B. (2002). The Cavalry of the Roman Republic: Cavalry Combat and Elite Reputations in the Middle and Late Republic. New York: Routledge. p. 105. ISBN 9780415257138.
^ McCall, Jeremiah B. (2002). The Cavalry of the Roman Republic: Cavalry Combat and Elite Reputations in the Middle and Late Republic. New York: Routledge. pp. 123–124. ISBN 9780415257138.
^ McCall, Jeremiah B. (2002). The Cavalry of the Roman Republic: Cavalry Combat and Elite Reputations in the Middle and Late Republic. New York: Routledge. p. 1. ISBN 9780415257138.
^ Sage, Michael M. (2008). The Republican Roman Army: A Sourcebook. New York: Routledge. p. 206.
^ Goldsworthy, Adrian (2003). The Complete Roman Army. New York: Thames & Hudson. pp. 27–30.
^ Sage, Michael M. (2008). The Republican Roman Army: A Sourcebook. New York: Routledge. p. 84.
^ Goldsworthy, Adrian (2003). The Complete Roman Army. New York: Thames & Hudson. pp. 126–128.
^ Goldsworthy, Adrian (2003). The Complete Roman Army. New York: Thames & Hudson. p. 124.
^ Fields, Nic (2008). Warlords of Republican Rome: Caesar versus Pompey. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military. p. 16.
^ Sage, Michael M. (2008). The Republican Roman Army: A Sourcebook. New York: Routledge. p. 226.

References

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Fields, Nic. (2008): Warlords of Republican Rome: Caesar versus Pompey.
Goldsworthy, A. (2003): The Complete Roman Army.
McCall, J. B. (2002): The Cavalry of the Roman Republic: Cavalry Combat and Elite Reputations in the Middle and Late Republic.
Phang, Sara Elise (2008): Roman Military Service
Roth, Jonathan (2009): Roman Warfare
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Armstrong, Jeremy; Fronda, Michael P, eds. (2020). Romans at war: soldiers, citizens, and society in the Roman republic. Routledge. pp. 283–96. ISBN 978-1-138-48019-3.
- Gauthier, François. "The transformation of the Roman army in the last decades of the Republic". In Armstrong & Fronda (2020), pp. 283–96.
- Rosenstein, Nathan. "Epilogue". In Armstrong & Fronda (2020), pp. 297–307.
Cadiou, François (2018). L'armée imaginaire: les soldats prolétaires dans les légions romaines au dernier siècle de la République. Mondes anciens (in French). Paris: Les Belles Lettres. ISBN 978-2-251-44765-0.
Faszcza, Michał Norbert (2021). "Reformy Mariusza, czyli długie trwanie historiograficznego mitu". Res Historica (in Polish). 51: 13–42. doi: 10.17951/rh.2021.51.13-42. hdl: 20.500.12128/21768. ISSN 2082-6060. S2CID 237739140.
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Main sources