Hwasong-11 [1] | |
---|---|
Type | SRBM |
Place of origin | North Korea and Soviet Union |
Service history | |
In service | 2008–present |
Used by | Korean People's Army Strategic Force |
Production history | |
Manufacturer | North Korea |
Specifications | |
Mass | 2,010 kg (4,430 lb) |
Length | 6.4 m (21 ft) |
Diameter | 0.65 m (2.1 ft) |
Warhead | single HE, submunition, thermonuclear, chemical |
Warhead weight | 250 or 485 kg (551 or 1,069 lb) |
Engine | Solid-fuel rocket |
Propellant | solid |
Operational range | ~120–220 km (75–137 mi) [2] [3] |
Guidance system | Inertial, optical correlation system |
Accuracy | 100 m [4] |
Launch platform | TEL |
KN-02 Toksa | |
Chosŏn'gŭl | |
---|---|
Hancha | |
Revised Romanization | Doksa |
McCune–Reischauer | Toksa |
lit. Viper |
The KN-02 Toksa ( Korean: 독사; lit. Viper 毒蛇), Hwasong-11 [5] is a North Korean reverse-engineered locally produced modification of the OTR-21 Tochka short-range ballistic missile.
In 1983, Syria acquired a number of 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab-A) missiles from the Soviet Union, a single-stage, solid-propellant guided missile with a range of 70 km and a CEP of 160 m. In 1996, Syrian missile technicians provided North Korea with technical data on the missiles, then shipped some of the missiles themselves. The first test of a North Korean-produced version occurred in April 2004 and was a failure, but it was then successfully fired on 1 May 2005 into the Sea of Japan; the KN-02 has been tested at least 17 times. Initial production is believed to have begun in 2006, with the missile displayed aboard a launcher during a military parade in April 2007, and entering service in 2008. At least 50 missiles are speculated to be in service. [6] [7] [8]
The KN-02 is a short-range, road-mobile ballistic missile, broadly equivalent to the improved Scarab-B. Although it has a shorter range than other North Korean missiles like the Scud-C, it has superior accuracy of near 100 meters CEP through inertial guidance with an optical correlation system in the terminal phase, making it the most accurate ballistic missile in the inventory; this enables it to be used for precision strikes against priority targets such as airfields, command posts, bridges, storage facilities, and even enemy troops concentrations in a tactical support role on the battlefield. Its warhead weighs 485 kg (1,069 lb) and likely consists of a high-explosive, submunition, thermonuclear, chemical payload; Russian engineers could equip the OTR-21 with a 100 kiloton nuclear warhead. The missile has a range of 120–140 km (75–87 mi), and it may be capable of traveling 160 km (99 mi) through reducing payload to 250 kg (550 lb). [6] [7] [9] [10]
A significant difference between the Russian OTR-21 and North Korean KN-02 is the transporter erector launcher (TEL). While the Russian missile is transported and fired from the 6×6 9P129 that has amphibious capabilities, the KN-02's TEL is a locally fabricated version of the Belarusian MAZ-630308-224 or -243 6×4 or 6×6 commercial heavy utility truck, which has a maximum road speed of 60 km/h (37 mph) and is not amphibious. The vehicle has a short firing cycle, able to be ready for launch in 16 minutes, launch the missile in 2 minutes, and be reloaded in 20 minutes by a supporting reloader vehicle of the same design fitted with a crane and holding 2-4 more missiles. [6] [7] [10] [11] [12] [13]
In 2013, South Korean intelligence reports suggested that North Korea was developing an anti-ship ballistic missile version of the KN-02. Its range is estimated to be 200–300 km (120–190 mi; 110–160 nmi), longer than current KN-01 variants, and it would be much more difficult to intercept due to its faster speed. [14]
In March 2014, a South Korean military source claimed that the KN-02's range had been extended to 170 km (110 mi) through improved engine performance. The source also claimed that North Korea possessed 100 missiles with 30 TELs deployed to fire them. [15] In August 2014, three KN-02s were fired out to a range of 220 km (140 mi) [16] and estimated to have 100 meter circular error probable accuracy. [17]
Extended range Hwasong-11/KN-02 is referred to as KN-10. [18] [19] [20] [21] It is expected that range of the missile is greater than 230 kilometers. [22]
The U.S. identified the KN-10 system back in 2010. [23]
In January 2024, National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby reported that Russia launched North Korean ballistic missiles against Ukraine. According to Joost Oliemans, photographic evidence indicates that Hwasong-11 missiles such as the KN-23 and KN-24 were used in the attacks. [24]
Hwasong-11 [1] | |
---|---|
Type | SRBM |
Place of origin | North Korea and Soviet Union |
Service history | |
In service | 2008–present |
Used by | Korean People's Army Strategic Force |
Production history | |
Manufacturer | North Korea |
Specifications | |
Mass | 2,010 kg (4,430 lb) |
Length | 6.4 m (21 ft) |
Diameter | 0.65 m (2.1 ft) |
Warhead | single HE, submunition, thermonuclear, chemical |
Warhead weight | 250 or 485 kg (551 or 1,069 lb) |
Engine | Solid-fuel rocket |
Propellant | solid |
Operational range | ~120–220 km (75–137 mi) [2] [3] |
Guidance system | Inertial, optical correlation system |
Accuracy | 100 m [4] |
Launch platform | TEL |
KN-02 Toksa | |
Chosŏn'gŭl | |
---|---|
Hancha | |
Revised Romanization | Doksa |
McCune–Reischauer | Toksa |
lit. Viper |
The KN-02 Toksa ( Korean: 독사; lit. Viper 毒蛇), Hwasong-11 [5] is a North Korean reverse-engineered locally produced modification of the OTR-21 Tochka short-range ballistic missile.
In 1983, Syria acquired a number of 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab-A) missiles from the Soviet Union, a single-stage, solid-propellant guided missile with a range of 70 km and a CEP of 160 m. In 1996, Syrian missile technicians provided North Korea with technical data on the missiles, then shipped some of the missiles themselves. The first test of a North Korean-produced version occurred in April 2004 and was a failure, but it was then successfully fired on 1 May 2005 into the Sea of Japan; the KN-02 has been tested at least 17 times. Initial production is believed to have begun in 2006, with the missile displayed aboard a launcher during a military parade in April 2007, and entering service in 2008. At least 50 missiles are speculated to be in service. [6] [7] [8]
The KN-02 is a short-range, road-mobile ballistic missile, broadly equivalent to the improved Scarab-B. Although it has a shorter range than other North Korean missiles like the Scud-C, it has superior accuracy of near 100 meters CEP through inertial guidance with an optical correlation system in the terminal phase, making it the most accurate ballistic missile in the inventory; this enables it to be used for precision strikes against priority targets such as airfields, command posts, bridges, storage facilities, and even enemy troops concentrations in a tactical support role on the battlefield. Its warhead weighs 485 kg (1,069 lb) and likely consists of a high-explosive, submunition, thermonuclear, chemical payload; Russian engineers could equip the OTR-21 with a 100 kiloton nuclear warhead. The missile has a range of 120–140 km (75–87 mi), and it may be capable of traveling 160 km (99 mi) through reducing payload to 250 kg (550 lb). [6] [7] [9] [10]
A significant difference between the Russian OTR-21 and North Korean KN-02 is the transporter erector launcher (TEL). While the Russian missile is transported and fired from the 6×6 9P129 that has amphibious capabilities, the KN-02's TEL is a locally fabricated version of the Belarusian MAZ-630308-224 or -243 6×4 or 6×6 commercial heavy utility truck, which has a maximum road speed of 60 km/h (37 mph) and is not amphibious. The vehicle has a short firing cycle, able to be ready for launch in 16 minutes, launch the missile in 2 minutes, and be reloaded in 20 minutes by a supporting reloader vehicle of the same design fitted with a crane and holding 2-4 more missiles. [6] [7] [10] [11] [12] [13]
In 2013, South Korean intelligence reports suggested that North Korea was developing an anti-ship ballistic missile version of the KN-02. Its range is estimated to be 200–300 km (120–190 mi; 110–160 nmi), longer than current KN-01 variants, and it would be much more difficult to intercept due to its faster speed. [14]
In March 2014, a South Korean military source claimed that the KN-02's range had been extended to 170 km (110 mi) through improved engine performance. The source also claimed that North Korea possessed 100 missiles with 30 TELs deployed to fire them. [15] In August 2014, three KN-02s were fired out to a range of 220 km (140 mi) [16] and estimated to have 100 meter circular error probable accuracy. [17]
Extended range Hwasong-11/KN-02 is referred to as KN-10. [18] [19] [20] [21] It is expected that range of the missile is greater than 230 kilometers. [22]
The U.S. identified the KN-10 system back in 2010. [23]
In January 2024, National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby reported that Russia launched North Korean ballistic missiles against Ukraine. According to Joost Oliemans, photographic evidence indicates that Hwasong-11 missiles such as the KN-23 and KN-24 were used in the attacks. [24]