On 7 August 1942, US and Australian naval forces undertook the invasion of the Japanese-held islands of Guadalcanal and Tulagi in the lower Solomon Islands chain, the first Allied offensive in the Pacific Theatre. The landing of the US 1st Marine Division on the beaches of Savo Sound began the unexpectedly long and extremely arduous Guadalcanal Campaign, lasting officially until 9 February 1943.
The naval forces dedicated to Operation Watchtower were minuscule compared to those deployed for later Allied offensives such as the invasion of the Gilberts and the capture of Okinawa. This is owing to the commitment the United States had made to Great Britain to undertake the invasion of North Africa in the fall of 1942, a commitment which essentially left the Guadalcanal operation with the naval leftovers. For this reason, American sailors and Marines referred to the invasion as "Operation Shoestring". [1]
US Navy combat ships:
3 fleet carriers, 1 fast battleship, 9 heavy cruisers, 2 anti-aircraft light cruisers, 31 destroyers
Amphibious assault vessels:
13 transports, 6 attack cargo ships, 4 destroyer transports
Auxiliaries:
5 fast minesweepers, 5 oilers
Australian Navy combat ships:
2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser
The roles of Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA) and Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), were both exercised by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz from his headquarters at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
Since the Solomons lie in the Southern Pacific, the landings of 7 August 1942 on Guadalcanal were the responsibility of the South Pacific Fleet, led by Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley from his headquarters at Noumea, New Caledonia. [2] Adm. Ghormley's pessimism, inadequate staff work and unwillingness to visit the front led Adm. Nimitz to replace him with the much more aggressive and hands-on Vice Admiral William F. Halsey on 18 October 1942. [3]
Operational command of the invasion was assigned to Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, who also had direct command of the covering force, designated Task Force 61, where he flew his flag aboard fleet carrier Saratoga. This embodiment of two levels of command in a single officer enabled a decision-making process that left the Marine forces on Guadalcanal essentially stranded and short-supplied. The amphibious forces, Task Force 62, were led by Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner aboard transport McCawley.
Bitter disputes between the two men arose during both the planning and execution of the invasion over how long Fletcher's aircraft carriers would stay in the vicinity of Guadalcanal to provide air cover for the Marines ashore. Fletcher decided the matter after multiple assaults on the Allied amphibious task force by bombers from the Japanese base at Rabaul on D-Day and D+1. These attacks convinced Fletcher that his crucial aircraft carriers could not be risked in the waters of the Solomons any longer and he ordered his carriers along with Turner's still-half-full cargo ships out of the area on the night of 8 August. This decision resulted in much hard feeling among the Marines ashore, who felt that the Navy had abandoned them.
Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher
Air Support Force (Task Group 61.1)
Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes
Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner in transport McCawley
On 7 August 1942, US and Australian naval forces undertook the invasion of the Japanese-held islands of Guadalcanal and Tulagi in the lower Solomon Islands chain, the first Allied offensive in the Pacific Theatre. The landing of the US 1st Marine Division on the beaches of Savo Sound began the unexpectedly long and extremely arduous Guadalcanal Campaign, lasting officially until 9 February 1943.
The naval forces dedicated to Operation Watchtower were minuscule compared to those deployed for later Allied offensives such as the invasion of the Gilberts and the capture of Okinawa. This is owing to the commitment the United States had made to Great Britain to undertake the invasion of North Africa in the fall of 1942, a commitment which essentially left the Guadalcanal operation with the naval leftovers. For this reason, American sailors and Marines referred to the invasion as "Operation Shoestring". [1]
US Navy combat ships:
3 fleet carriers, 1 fast battleship, 9 heavy cruisers, 2 anti-aircraft light cruisers, 31 destroyers
Amphibious assault vessels:
13 transports, 6 attack cargo ships, 4 destroyer transports
Auxiliaries:
5 fast minesweepers, 5 oilers
Australian Navy combat ships:
2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser
The roles of Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA) and Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), were both exercised by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz from his headquarters at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
Since the Solomons lie in the Southern Pacific, the landings of 7 August 1942 on Guadalcanal were the responsibility of the South Pacific Fleet, led by Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley from his headquarters at Noumea, New Caledonia. [2] Adm. Ghormley's pessimism, inadequate staff work and unwillingness to visit the front led Adm. Nimitz to replace him with the much more aggressive and hands-on Vice Admiral William F. Halsey on 18 October 1942. [3]
Operational command of the invasion was assigned to Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, who also had direct command of the covering force, designated Task Force 61, where he flew his flag aboard fleet carrier Saratoga. This embodiment of two levels of command in a single officer enabled a decision-making process that left the Marine forces on Guadalcanal essentially stranded and short-supplied. The amphibious forces, Task Force 62, were led by Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner aboard transport McCawley.
Bitter disputes between the two men arose during both the planning and execution of the invasion over how long Fletcher's aircraft carriers would stay in the vicinity of Guadalcanal to provide air cover for the Marines ashore. Fletcher decided the matter after multiple assaults on the Allied amphibious task force by bombers from the Japanese base at Rabaul on D-Day and D+1. These attacks convinced Fletcher that his crucial aircraft carriers could not be risked in the waters of the Solomons any longer and he ordered his carriers along with Turner's still-half-full cargo ships out of the area on the night of 8 August. This decision resulted in much hard feeling among the Marines ashore, who felt that the Navy had abandoned them.
Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher
Air Support Force (Task Group 61.1)
Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes
Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner in transport McCawley