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Comment: Few reviewers will have access to these sources, so if you can add accessible sources that will improve the likelihood of a review being able to establish notability.
Greenman (
talk) 12:36, 24 June 2024 (UTC)
The trust game is one of the foundational games in experimental economics and behavioral economics. [1]
In the basic two-player game, there are two players, each of whom is endowed with an equal initial endowment. [2]
One of the two players is a first mover-- sometimes referred to as the Trustor-- who chooses between Invest and Not Invest. Not investing guarantees the first mover his initial endowment as a sure outcome. Investing transfer the entire invested amount by the first mover to the second mover, multiplied by 3. That invested amount is subtracted from the first mover's endowment. [3]
If the first mover invests, the second mover-- referred to as a Trustee-- receives the entire investment of the fist mover, multiplied by 3. He can choose how much to transfer back to the first mover. [4]
If the second mover transfer any amount over 1/3 of the investment to the first mover, then the first mover is as well off as he would have been had he not invested. However, the second mover has a strategic dominance in the sub-game of transferring back nothing at all. [5] [6]
By backward induction, the first mover can expect to receive nothing, and therefore he is better off not investing. [7]
The trust game is sometimes erroneously referred to as a variant of the dictator game. [8]
References
- ^ Burks, Stephen V.; Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Verhoogen, Eric (June 2003). "Playing both roles in the trust game". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 51 (2): 195–216. doi: 10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00093-8.
- ^ Johnson, Noel D.; Mislin, Alexandra A. (October 2011). "Trust games: A meta-analysis". Journal of Economic Psychology. 32 (5): 865–889. doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2011.05.007.
- ^ Wilson, Rick K.; Eckel, Catherine C. (June 2006). "Judging a Book by its Cover: Beauty and Expectations in the Trust Game". Political Research Quarterly. 59 (2): 189–202. doi: 10.1177/106591290605900202. ISSN 1065-9129.
- ^ Berg, Joyce; Dickhaut, John; McCabe, Kevin (July 1995). "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History". Games and Economic Behavior. 10 (1): 122–142. doi: 10.1006/game.1995.1027.
- ^ Krueger, Frank; McCabe, Kevin; Moll, Jorge; Kriegeskorte, Nikolaus; Zahn, Roland; Strenziok, Maren; Heinecke, Armin; Grafman, Jordan (2007-12-11). "Neural correlates of trust". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 104 (50): 20084–20089. Bibcode: 2007PNAS..10420084K. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0710103104. ISSN 0027-8424. PMC 2148426. PMID 18056800.
- ^ Rigdon, Mary L.; McCabe, Kevin A.; Smith, Vernon L. (2007). "Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games". The Economic Journal. 117 (522): 991–1007. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02075.x. ISSN 0013-0133. JSTOR 4625540.
- ^ Burnham, Terence; McCabe, Kevin; Smith, Vernon L (September 2000). "Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 43 (1): 57–73. doi: 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00108-6.
- ^ Alarcon, Gene M.; Lyons, Joseph B.; Christensen, James C.; Klosterman, Samantha L.; Bowers, Margaret A.; Ryan, Tyler J.; Jessup, Sarah A.; Wynne, Kevin T. (October 2018). "The effect of propensity to trust and perceptions of trustworthiness on trust behaviors in dyads". Behavior Research Methods. 50 (5): 1906–1920. doi: 10.3758/s13428-017-0959-6. ISSN 1554-3528. PMID 28917031.
| Review waiting, please be patient.
This may take 4 months or more, since drafts are reviewed in no specific order. There are 2,953 pending submissions waiting for review.
Where to get help
How to improve a draft
You can also browse Wikipedia:Featured articles and Wikipedia:Good articles to find examples of Wikipedia's best writing on topics similar to your proposed article. Improving your odds of a speedy review To improve your odds of a faster review, tag your draft with relevant WikiProject tags using the button below. This will let reviewers know a new draft has been submitted in their area of interest. For instance, if you wrote about a female astronomer, you would want to add the Biography, Astronomy, and Women scientists tags. Editor resources
Reviewer tools
|
- Comment: Few reviewers will have access to these sources, so if you can add accessible sources that will improve the likelihood of a review being able to establish notability.
Greenman (
talk) 12:36, 24 June 2024 (UTC)
The trust game is one of the foundational games in experimental economics and behavioral economics. [1]
In the basic two-player game, there are two players, each of whom is endowed with an equal initial endowment. [2]
One of the two players is a first mover-- sometimes referred to as the Trustor-- who chooses between Invest and Not Invest. Not investing guarantees the first mover his initial endowment as a sure outcome. Investing transfer the entire invested amount by the first mover to the second mover, multiplied by 3. That invested amount is subtracted from the first mover's endowment. [3]
If the first mover invests, the second mover-- referred to as a Trustee-- receives the entire investment of the fist mover, multiplied by 3. He can choose how much to transfer back to the first mover. [4]
If the second mover transfer any amount over 1/3 of the investment to the first mover, then the first mover is as well off as he would have been had he not invested. However, the second mover has a strategic dominance in the sub-game of transferring back nothing at all. [5] [6]
By backward induction, the first mover can expect to receive nothing, and therefore he is better off not investing. [7]
The trust game is sometimes erroneously referred to as a variant of the dictator game. [8]
References
- ^ Burks, Stephen V.; Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Verhoogen, Eric (June 2003). "Playing both roles in the trust game". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 51 (2): 195–216. doi: 10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00093-8.
- ^ Johnson, Noel D.; Mislin, Alexandra A. (October 2011). "Trust games: A meta-analysis". Journal of Economic Psychology. 32 (5): 865–889. doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2011.05.007.
- ^ Wilson, Rick K.; Eckel, Catherine C. (June 2006). "Judging a Book by its Cover: Beauty and Expectations in the Trust Game". Political Research Quarterly. 59 (2): 189–202. doi: 10.1177/106591290605900202. ISSN 1065-9129.
- ^ Berg, Joyce; Dickhaut, John; McCabe, Kevin (July 1995). "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History". Games and Economic Behavior. 10 (1): 122–142. doi: 10.1006/game.1995.1027.
- ^ Krueger, Frank; McCabe, Kevin; Moll, Jorge; Kriegeskorte, Nikolaus; Zahn, Roland; Strenziok, Maren; Heinecke, Armin; Grafman, Jordan (2007-12-11). "Neural correlates of trust". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 104 (50): 20084–20089. Bibcode: 2007PNAS..10420084K. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0710103104. ISSN 0027-8424. PMC 2148426. PMID 18056800.
- ^ Rigdon, Mary L.; McCabe, Kevin A.; Smith, Vernon L. (2007). "Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games". The Economic Journal. 117 (522): 991–1007. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02075.x. ISSN 0013-0133. JSTOR 4625540.
- ^ Burnham, Terence; McCabe, Kevin; Smith, Vernon L (September 2000). "Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 43 (1): 57–73. doi: 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00108-6.
- ^ Alarcon, Gene M.; Lyons, Joseph B.; Christensen, James C.; Klosterman, Samantha L.; Bowers, Margaret A.; Ryan, Tyler J.; Jessup, Sarah A.; Wynne, Kevin T. (October 2018). "The effect of propensity to trust and perceptions of trustworthiness on trust behaviors in dyads". Behavior Research Methods. 50 (5): 1906–1920. doi: 10.3758/s13428-017-0959-6. ISSN 1554-3528. PMID 28917031.