Büro Ha also known as Buero Ha was a Swiss intelligence agency that was founded by Major Hans Hausamann in September 1939 [1] and established by the Swiss Militia. It was closed in 1949. [2]
Büro Ha was founded in September 1939. [1] with an office that was set up in Teufen by the Swiss Militia. [1] The agency was a covert arm of Swiss Intelligence, disguised as a press-cuttings agency. The agency was designed to develop the Swiss defence force and at the same time enable the Swiss to maintain the dubious claim of neutrality. [1] Buero Ha was established as an independent agency by Hausamann because he feared the during the period that led up to the war and in the event of a war, that the official intelligence agency, the Swiss Army Intelligence would be too small to defend Switzerland. [3]
In 1939–1940, Hausamann's office was moved to the Villa Stutz in Horw-St. Niklausen south of Lucerne. Against the resistance of the intelligence section of the army staff, Hausamann later succeeded in finding accommodation in the Hotel Schweizerhof in Lucerne, where Intelligence Collection Point 1, headed by Max Waibel, was already located. The radio equipment remained in Teufen, and a telex connection was added. Hausamann's office consisted of Hausamann himself, two women from the Women's Auxiliary Service, a radio operator and an office orderly who was also a driver. [4]
Haussaman was assisted in the agency by military intelligence officer, Czech colonel Karel Sedlacek, who was with the Czech government-in-exile in Switzerland. [5] [6] Hausamann reported to the 5th Section of the Army Staff. Brigadier Roger Masson. [7] of the Swiss General Staff, [5] was chief of Swiss wartime intelligence. [8]
In a travel report from Austria on 1 June 1938, it is stated:
After the collapse of France, states that had remained democratic or the constitutional Principality of Liechtenstein were endangered. According to Germany, Germany should organize the European continent. In a large-scale system, the leading people grant the people being led graduated autonomy. But for the peoples being led there would be no sovereignty, no independence and no territorial integrity. [10] [11]
From the Swiss point of view, the question therefore arose as to how the war would develop in the future and how Switzerland could retain its sovereignty. In the memorandum of 1 June 1940, the Hausamann office describes and assesses the political and military situation in detail:
The prognosis for the war's outcome was accurate, but inevitable success was not associated with the war effort. The convoys across the Atlantic, vital to Britain, could hardly defend themselves against German submarine attacks until 1942. It was only with the invention of radar and the orchestrated use of air surveillance, radio reconnaissance and radar that convoys could be effectively protected from 1942 onwards. [13] The defence of the Soviet Union was on the brink of failure in 1941 and 1942. In June 1941, parts of the Wehrmacht leadership already assumed that the blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union would be successful. It was not until 5 December 1941 that the attack became bogged down thirty kilometres from Moscow during the Battle of Moscow. [14] Hitler's second campaign was also difficult for the Soviet Union to stop. [15] Only by narrow margins and with endless sacrifices was the Soviet Union able to stop the more northerly German advance at Stalingrad [16] and the more southerly one at Novorossiysk. [17]
The draft of Directive No. 32 of 11 June 1941, "Victory Order" ( Full text), assumes that the Soviet Russian Forces has been crushed and that Germany and Italy dominate the European mainland, for the time being with the exception of Spain and Portugal, and that the newly won eastern region must be organised and secured. [18] Hausamann's office reported on this on 1 July 1941:
The hint was useful and accurate, for on 5 December 1941, contrary to expectations of victory, the first Russian campaign was to bog down outside Moscow and the Soviet counter-attack was to take place. [14]
On 18 March 1940 the agency reported:
At the same time, however, the Army High Command had an operational plan drawn up for the raid-like occupation of Switzerland. The third version was completed on 12 August 1940. [21]
On 25 July 1940, "Tannenbaum" reported on the attack plan:
On 31 July 1940, a line of division was agreed between Germany and Italy in the event of the occupation of Switzerland. [23] On 26 August 1940, the Chief of the Army General Staff, Franz Halder, ordered Army Group C to draw up an operational plan once again, again taking into account an Italian area of interest. [24] At the end of October 1940, Hausammann's office reported from the NSDAP Office of Foreign Affairs, based in Stuttgart:
For three months there was hardly any talk of Switzerland in Germany. Since the beginning of February 1941, according to the Hausamann office, there was more talk of Switzerland again, in connection with talks about the reorganisation of the European continent:
On 20 May 1941, Hausamann's office reported that Germany intended to partition Switzerland along the following lines:
For a year, Switzerland had peace from German plans of attack, because all forces were taken up for the invasion of the Soviet Union. In 1942, Switzerland again came more strongly into the German field of vision because an invasion of Western Europe, France or Spain, was expected. At the end of September 1942, the Hausamann office reported on this:
On 16 August 1942, Hausamann's office took a position on Hitler's second Russian campaign in 1942. On 9 August, the fast units of Army Group A reached the oil fields of Maikop northwest of the Caucasus. The Soviet troops retreated quickly, but not precipitously and not in thick columns, [29] and did not move to counterattacks in the mountains until 12 September 1942. [30] This raised the question in the Army Intelligence and Security Service as to whether the Red Army was still at all capable of fighting in the southern part of the theatre of war, or whether it was an elastic defence. [31] In Germany, this led to a largely orderly retreat.
In Germany, the largely orderly withdrawal led to political considerations: Ernst von Weizsäcker, State Secretary in the Foreign Office, speculated on 9 August 1942 that the Soviet Union would leave it to Great Britain to defend its access to Iraq, Iran and India. Similarly, the Defence Department of the Foreign Armies East of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht stated on 9 September 1942 that it had learned from Comintern circles that the Red Army would only participate to a small extent in the defence of the Caucasus, leaving the main share to Great Britain, which was interested in this. [32] The Soviet Union was not interested in the defence of the Caucasus.
Hausamann's office took up these views and in its memorandum of 16 August 1942 for Brigadier Colonel Roger Masson, the head of the Swiss Army's intelligence and security service, insinuated that the Red Army had a war policy intention:
Recent research, on the other hand, denies that there was any strategic or war policy intention behind the Red Army's retreat. They conclude this from the fact that Stalin forbade retreats only two months after the elastic defence began. On 28 July 1942, Stalin issued Order No. 227, a directive that all retreats must cease and every position and every metre of Soviet soil must be defended. From December 1942, the Red Army began its winter offensive against Army Group A from the Caucasus. [34]
In 1949, Büro Ha was closed. [2] Hausamann's reports have been preserved in their entirety and are stored and available for consultation in chronological order in the Swiss Federal Archives. Copies are available at the Institute of Contemporary History in Munich. [35]
Supplement to Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift No. 2, February 2003 and Schweizer Soldat No. 2, February 2003, page 13
Supplement to Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift No. 2, February 2003 and Schweizer Soldat No. 2, February 2003, page 12
Supplement to Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift No. 2, February 2003 and Schweizer Soldat No. 2, February 2003, page 13
Büro Ha also known as Buero Ha was a Swiss intelligence agency that was founded by Major Hans Hausamann in September 1939 [1] and established by the Swiss Militia. It was closed in 1949. [2]
Büro Ha was founded in September 1939. [1] with an office that was set up in Teufen by the Swiss Militia. [1] The agency was a covert arm of Swiss Intelligence, disguised as a press-cuttings agency. The agency was designed to develop the Swiss defence force and at the same time enable the Swiss to maintain the dubious claim of neutrality. [1] Buero Ha was established as an independent agency by Hausamann because he feared the during the period that led up to the war and in the event of a war, that the official intelligence agency, the Swiss Army Intelligence would be too small to defend Switzerland. [3]
In 1939–1940, Hausamann's office was moved to the Villa Stutz in Horw-St. Niklausen south of Lucerne. Against the resistance of the intelligence section of the army staff, Hausamann later succeeded in finding accommodation in the Hotel Schweizerhof in Lucerne, where Intelligence Collection Point 1, headed by Max Waibel, was already located. The radio equipment remained in Teufen, and a telex connection was added. Hausamann's office consisted of Hausamann himself, two women from the Women's Auxiliary Service, a radio operator and an office orderly who was also a driver. [4]
Haussaman was assisted in the agency by military intelligence officer, Czech colonel Karel Sedlacek, who was with the Czech government-in-exile in Switzerland. [5] [6] Hausamann reported to the 5th Section of the Army Staff. Brigadier Roger Masson. [7] of the Swiss General Staff, [5] was chief of Swiss wartime intelligence. [8]
In a travel report from Austria on 1 June 1938, it is stated:
After the collapse of France, states that had remained democratic or the constitutional Principality of Liechtenstein were endangered. According to Germany, Germany should organize the European continent. In a large-scale system, the leading people grant the people being led graduated autonomy. But for the peoples being led there would be no sovereignty, no independence and no territorial integrity. [10] [11]
From the Swiss point of view, the question therefore arose as to how the war would develop in the future and how Switzerland could retain its sovereignty. In the memorandum of 1 June 1940, the Hausamann office describes and assesses the political and military situation in detail:
The prognosis for the war's outcome was accurate, but inevitable success was not associated with the war effort. The convoys across the Atlantic, vital to Britain, could hardly defend themselves against German submarine attacks until 1942. It was only with the invention of radar and the orchestrated use of air surveillance, radio reconnaissance and radar that convoys could be effectively protected from 1942 onwards. [13] The defence of the Soviet Union was on the brink of failure in 1941 and 1942. In June 1941, parts of the Wehrmacht leadership already assumed that the blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union would be successful. It was not until 5 December 1941 that the attack became bogged down thirty kilometres from Moscow during the Battle of Moscow. [14] Hitler's second campaign was also difficult for the Soviet Union to stop. [15] Only by narrow margins and with endless sacrifices was the Soviet Union able to stop the more northerly German advance at Stalingrad [16] and the more southerly one at Novorossiysk. [17]
The draft of Directive No. 32 of 11 June 1941, "Victory Order" ( Full text), assumes that the Soviet Russian Forces has been crushed and that Germany and Italy dominate the European mainland, for the time being with the exception of Spain and Portugal, and that the newly won eastern region must be organised and secured. [18] Hausamann's office reported on this on 1 July 1941:
The hint was useful and accurate, for on 5 December 1941, contrary to expectations of victory, the first Russian campaign was to bog down outside Moscow and the Soviet counter-attack was to take place. [14]
On 18 March 1940 the agency reported:
At the same time, however, the Army High Command had an operational plan drawn up for the raid-like occupation of Switzerland. The third version was completed on 12 August 1940. [21]
On 25 July 1940, "Tannenbaum" reported on the attack plan:
On 31 July 1940, a line of division was agreed between Germany and Italy in the event of the occupation of Switzerland. [23] On 26 August 1940, the Chief of the Army General Staff, Franz Halder, ordered Army Group C to draw up an operational plan once again, again taking into account an Italian area of interest. [24] At the end of October 1940, Hausammann's office reported from the NSDAP Office of Foreign Affairs, based in Stuttgart:
For three months there was hardly any talk of Switzerland in Germany. Since the beginning of February 1941, according to the Hausamann office, there was more talk of Switzerland again, in connection with talks about the reorganisation of the European continent:
On 20 May 1941, Hausamann's office reported that Germany intended to partition Switzerland along the following lines:
For a year, Switzerland had peace from German plans of attack, because all forces were taken up for the invasion of the Soviet Union. In 1942, Switzerland again came more strongly into the German field of vision because an invasion of Western Europe, France or Spain, was expected. At the end of September 1942, the Hausamann office reported on this:
On 16 August 1942, Hausamann's office took a position on Hitler's second Russian campaign in 1942. On 9 August, the fast units of Army Group A reached the oil fields of Maikop northwest of the Caucasus. The Soviet troops retreated quickly, but not precipitously and not in thick columns, [29] and did not move to counterattacks in the mountains until 12 September 1942. [30] This raised the question in the Army Intelligence and Security Service as to whether the Red Army was still at all capable of fighting in the southern part of the theatre of war, or whether it was an elastic defence. [31] In Germany, this led to a largely orderly retreat.
In Germany, the largely orderly withdrawal led to political considerations: Ernst von Weizsäcker, State Secretary in the Foreign Office, speculated on 9 August 1942 that the Soviet Union would leave it to Great Britain to defend its access to Iraq, Iran and India. Similarly, the Defence Department of the Foreign Armies East of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht stated on 9 September 1942 that it had learned from Comintern circles that the Red Army would only participate to a small extent in the defence of the Caucasus, leaving the main share to Great Britain, which was interested in this. [32] The Soviet Union was not interested in the defence of the Caucasus.
Hausamann's office took up these views and in its memorandum of 16 August 1942 for Brigadier Colonel Roger Masson, the head of the Swiss Army's intelligence and security service, insinuated that the Red Army had a war policy intention:
Recent research, on the other hand, denies that there was any strategic or war policy intention behind the Red Army's retreat. They conclude this from the fact that Stalin forbade retreats only two months after the elastic defence began. On 28 July 1942, Stalin issued Order No. 227, a directive that all retreats must cease and every position and every metre of Soviet soil must be defended. From December 1942, the Red Army began its winter offensive against Army Group A from the Caucasus. [34]
In 1949, Büro Ha was closed. [2] Hausamann's reports have been preserved in their entirety and are stored and available for consultation in chronological order in the Swiss Federal Archives. Copies are available at the Institute of Contemporary History in Munich. [35]
Supplement to Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift No. 2, February 2003 and Schweizer Soldat No. 2, February 2003, page 13
Supplement to Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift No. 2, February 2003 and Schweizer Soldat No. 2, February 2003, page 12
Supplement to Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift No. 2, February 2003 and Schweizer Soldat No. 2, February 2003, page 13